as in fome cafes that we have feen the length of a grave orator's beard might hide the rifible emotions of his muscles, and the amplitude of his robe conceal the fhaking of his fides."

The fubjet is farther continued in the Author's remarks on the well-known portrait of Mr. Wilkes, and that of Churchill in the character of a bear. The first of thefe Mr. Ireland thinks a ftrong resemblance, and quotes Mr. Wilkes's own remark to prove the truth of his obfervation. In the fecond he truly admits there is more ill-nature than wit. It is rather caricature than character, and more like the coarse mangling of Tom Brown, than the delicate yet wounding fatire of Alexander Pope. For this rough retort he might, however, plead the poet's precedent. His opponent had brandifhed a tomohawk, and Hogarth, old as he was, wielded a battle-axe in his own defence.

For the remarks on Churchill's Epiffle, which we think in general are both acute and juft, we must refer our readers to the volumes.

To fuch of the plates as had not any metrical infcription, Mr. Ireland has fubjoined either a quotation or fome fianzas by himself. The following, which contains fome well-parodied lines, will be a fufficient fpecimen of his verfification. It is the motto to the print of

EVENING.

"One faltry Sunday-when go cooling

breeze

Was borne on Zephyr's wing to fan the trees;

One fultry Sunday-when the tepid ray
O'er nature beam'd intolerable day;
When raging Sirius warn'd us not to roam,
And Galen's fons prescrib'd cool draughts at
hom;

One fultry Sunday-near those fields of fame

"We'll take a mouthful of the country air;

"In the yew bower an hour or two we'll kill,

"There you may fmoke, and drink what "punch you will,

"Sophy and Billy each fhall walk with me, "And you must carry little Emily. "Veny is fick, and pants, and loaths her "food,

"The grafs will do the pretty creature "good.

"Hot rolls are ready as the clock strikes * five,

"And now 'tis after four, as I'm alive!"

The mandate iffued, fee the tour begun, And all the flock fet out for Iflington.

Now the broad Sun, refulgent lamp of day,

To reft with Thetis lopes his western way; And tipp'd with gold is Hampstead's lofty O'er every tree embrowning duft is spread,

head.

The paffive husband, in his nature mild, To wife configus his hat, and takes the child;

But the a day like this hath never felt,
Ob, that this too, too folid fi fh would melt,
Thaw and refolve itself into a dew!
Such monstrous heat-dear me!-she never
knew.

Adown her innocent and beauteous face
The big round pearly drops each other chase;
Thence trickling to thofe hills erft white as
fnow,

That now like tna's mighty mountains glow,

They hang like dew-drops on the full-blown rofe,

And to the ambient air their fweets difciofe. Fever'd with pleafure, thus the drags along, Nor dares her antler'd hufband fay 'tis

wrong.

The blooming offspring of this blissful pair

Sinking in Sublime Paintings, infcribed to the Dealers in Dark Pictures," which was the laft print the artift engraved. After defcribing the heterogeneous compound of ludicrous and ferious objects which compofe this print, the Author, referring to an object in the print, thus concludes.

"The book of nature, in which he was fo deeply read, and from whence he drew all his images, is open at the laft page. The characters that compofe his

pictured tragi-comedies have past in review before us; and with the words engraven on the laft leaf of that volume which he fo well ftudied, I will conclude this,

EXEUNT OMNES."

There is an inequality in the fize of the volumes, which we take it for granted will be corrected in the fecond edition; they might as well be of an equal fize.

THERE are few circumftances in the modern History of Philofophy more remarkable, than the neglect which the science of the human mind has experienced, at a time when every branch of phyfical fcience has been cultivated with fo much affiduity and zeal. From whatever caufes this neglect has arifen, whether from the abstract nature of the fubject itself, from the barbarous and fcholaftic method in which it is ufually taught, from the abfurd theories with which it fo often has been fullied, or from the fceptical and paradoxical conclufion to which it fometimes has led, we cannot but congratulate the world on the appearance of a work, which feems to us better fitted than any other performance which has preceded it, to reftore this neglected fcience to its native dignity, and to exemplify the important ends to which it is fubfervient.

The natural introduction to every branch of Science confifts in pointing out, first, Its nature and object, and fecondly, Its utility. If the fecond of thefe confiderations is necessary to intereft mankind in its purfuit, the first is perhaps ftill more neceffary to direct the Philofopher in the method of this purfuit. Without a juft and precife apprehenfion of the object of his refearches, of the truths which are attainable by the faculties of men, the labour of the Philofopher is often only a watte of fpeculation and invention, and inftead of adding to the flock of human knowledge, is only encumbering it with useless the ory and hypothetical reafoning. Mr.

Stewart has therefore, with great propriety, begun his work with an introductory enquiry" into the Nature and Object of the Philofophy of the Human Mind, and of the Utility of this branch of Philofophy." In the firft of these VOL. XXII.

Inquiries he ftates what are the juft and legitimate objects of metaphyfical inveftigation, the evidence of which fuch investigations are fufceptible; and the limits which the conftitution of our nature, by this means, imposes to our curiofity with refpect to the Human Mind. The rapid fuccefs of phyfical science fince the proper method of inveftigation has been purfued, affords Mr. S. an opportunity of illuftrating the laws of metaphyfical reafoning, by this fortunate example: And he purfues this analogy in a manner fo perfpicuous and fatisfactory, that it must leave upon the mind of every reader that conviction, both of the extent to which this branch of philofophy may be carried, and of the certainty of which it is fufceptible, which is of all impreffions the most fortunate for thofe who are entering upon any new fcientific purfuit.-In the Second Part of his Introduction he proceeds to enquire, at very confiderable length, into the advantages which may be expected to arise from a proper cultivation of the Philofophy of Mind. The fubjects which Mr. S. particularly confiders in this important part of his Introduction, are, first, "The light which a philofophical Analyfis of the Mind would neceflarily throw upon the fubjects of intellectual and moral Education;" and fecondly, "The importance which it is of to every fpecies of Philofophical Investigation, both by exhibiting a precife and steady idea of the objects which they prefent to our enquiry, and by afcertaining the rules of investigation which it is proper to follow in the different Sciences."Our philofophical readers will readily perceive the importance of these inquiries; but they will not easily be able to anticipate that precifion and accuracy of thought, that force and beauty of illuf A a a

tration,

tration, and those fublime and original views with respect to the moral and intellectual improvement of man, which render this Differtation one of the most eloquent, as well as one of the most valuable pieces of philofophical compo. fition which our language affords, and which alone would have been fufficient to entitle the Author to a very diftinguifhed rank of literary reputation.

After this long and valuable Introduction, Mr. S. proceeds to the fubject of his work. As the investigation of the phenomena of the material world, and of the laws by which they are governed, form the legitimate object of phyfical fcience; fo the analysis of the powers of the Human Mind, and of the laws to which they are fubject, form the object of the philofophy of Mind. The first power which unfolds itself in the History of Man is, "the power of External Perception," and it is this of courfe which forms the first object of Mr. S.'s Inquiries. There are few Men of Science who are unacquainted with the hypothefts which have been framed to account for the manner in which the mind perceives external objects, and which, fince the earliest days of Grecian Philofophy, have exercifed the attention and ingenuity of Metaphyficians. There are few alfo, we truft, who are ignorant of the conclufion which has, in our days, been given to this abftrufe and ufelefs Investigation, by the fagacity and penetration of Dr. Reid . What remained for Mr. S. was fimply to ftate the theories of former Philofophers, and the fimple and philofophical account which Dr. Reid has given of this law of our nature. But as the detection of error is never complete unless we can fhew the principles from which it arises, Mr. S. has added a very original inquiry "into the prejudices which have given rife to the common theories of perception," and by thus feizing the point of view which gave occafion to the errors of fo many former Philofophers, has put it in the power of the most careless reader to fee both the origin and the fallacy of thofe hypothefes which for fo many ages have mifled the philofophical world. The Chapter is concluded by fome very valuable obfervations upon the "origin of our knowledge," in which the reader will find a fatisfactory refutation of fonre opinions which have of late been fashionable upon the Continent,

66 Inquiry into the Human Mind ;"' and

and which Mr. S. feems to have confidered as deserving of his notice, as they form the foundation of the fatal and melancholy doctrine of Materialism.

The Second Chapter is employed in the confideration of the power of "Attention." That there is fuch a power in the Human Mind, and that, according to the different degrees in which it is enjoyed or attained, it has very impor tant effects upon human character, are truths with which every person is acquainted; yet it is fingular that Mr. S. is the first writer who has made this power the object of philofophical enquiry. Our limits do not allow us to enter into any analysis of the many new and im portant obfervations which this Chapter contains; but we cannot avoid faying, that we think the Science of Mind is greatly indebted to the Author for the labour he has employed upon this neglected part of the human conftitution and that he has very fuccefsfully applied his conclufions to account for fome important phenomena of our nature.

In the next Chapter he goes on to the inveftigation of the power of " Conception," or, as he defines it, of that power of mind by which we are able to form a notion of a paft fenfation, or an abfent object of perception. After fome very juft remarks upon the nature of this faculty, its diftinction from Imagination, and its importance to the talent of Defcription, he proceeds to a very curious inquiry, How far our Conceptions are attended with belief?-It is in this part of his work, we confefs, that we feel ourfelves molt difpofed to hesitate, at least, with refpect to our Author's conclufions. We acknowledge, indeed, that his opinions are illuftrated with fingular felicity, that they feem to be fupported by many undoubted facts, and that they are stated with that modesty and distrust which ever accompanies philofophical genius but we do not feel from them that full conviction which we have felt in the greater part of Mr. S.'s reasonings. Upon this fubject, however, we ftate our doubts, rather than our diffent; and more with the intention of calling the attention of literary men to a question which they will find both curious and interesting, than with any purpose of oppofing Mr. S.'s opinions."

The Fourth Chapter is employed upon the power of "Abitraction," of all the intellectual powers of man perhaps the

" Effys on the Intellectual Powers of Man."

moft

most important, and the most strongly characteristic of the fuperiority of his nature. Our Author has accordingly treated it with very peculiar attention. The claffification of different objects, and the formation of general terms by which fuch claffes or affortments are expreffed, fuppofes a power of attending to fome of their qualities or attributes, without attending to the reft. In the first fection, from the confideration of the origin of general terms, Mr. S. deduces his account of the nature of Abftraction, or of that power, as he defines it, by which the understanding is able to feparate the combinations that are prefented to it. In the fecond, he enters into a long, and (what fome of our readers will icarcely imagine) a very amufing history of the controverfies which have arifen among Metaphyficians upon this fubject. The ideal fyftem early and naturally led to the queftion, What is the nature of the idea that correfponds to a general term? This question (as is well known) divided fome of the ancient Schools of Philofophy; but it was referved for the Middle Ages to agitate it with a zeal and rancour which has no example in the History of Science, and which forms one of the most remarkable eras in the annals of human folly. The account which he has given of this celebrated Controverty is fo entertaining, and forms fo eafy and fo natural an introduction to the investigation of this faculty, that we cannot but regret that Philofophers have not more frequently availed themselves of this mode of communication, to lead the minds of the young to the pursuits of Science. The opinions which Mr. S. has adopted upon the fubject, he has confirmed by so many new and important illuftrations, that it appears to us there cannot any longer remain a doubt upon the fubject. Thefe illustrations, however, are still more valuable, as they lead to fome profound and original obfervations" upon the ufe of Language as an inftrument of Thought," and with regard to the purpofes to which the powers of Abtraction and Generalization are fubfervient."In the remaining fections he enters into fome fpeculations of a more familiar kind, which must be interefting to every clafs of readers. The firft fubject which he treats, is "of the errors to which we are liable in fpeculation, and in the conduct of affairs, by a rafh application of general principles;" and the fecond," of the difference in the

intellectual characters of individuals, from their different habits of Abstraction and Generalization."

The Chapter is concluded by a dif quifition to which we wish to call the attention of all men who are anxious to arrive at truth in the most important fubject of human thought; we mean in the Science of Legislation. At a time when the world is divided into two great parties upon political principle, when prejudice upon one fide, and paflion upon the other, feem to aggravate the fources of divifion, and when the violence of controverfy has a tendency to lead to confequences much more fatal than mere fpeculative error, the Philofopher can in no way render fo effential a fervice to Humanity, as interpofing the voice of Reafon amid thefe oppofite clamours, and in recalling the minds of men from the falfe and narrow views of prejudice and party, to thofe great and fundamental principles of Political Science, which reft upon the bafis of Truth and Nature. This fection Mr. S. entitles, "Of the Ufe and Abuse of general Principles in Politics," and it is naturally and even neceffarily introduced by his preceding fpeculations. In the commencement of it he states fome important diftinctions between the Art of Legiflation and all the other practical arts of life, and fhews the fallacy of those reafoners who fuppofe, that the principles of Political Science can be deduced from no other fource than the actual experience of mankind. From thefe confiderations he proceeds to explain what is the juft foundation of the Science of Politics, and to illuftrate the important acceffions which it has lately received from the labours of the Economical Writers upon the Continent; a fect, whofe opinions are only beginning to be known in this country, and of whofe fyftem, even they who are acquainted with it will form ftill higher conceptions from the luminous and mafterly account which Mr. S. has given of it. He then goes on to fhew the effects which fuch views of Political Science naturally have upon the minds of those who have been fortunate enough to acquire them; on the one hand, in undermining that blind veneration and timid retention of established abufes, which has fo much more frequently than any other caufe been the fource of political convulfion; and on the other, by extending their views to the whole plan of civil fociety, in checking that indifcriminate zeal for innovations and reform, Aaa 2

which