army, without serious contention, to disperse. But that cautious commander was restrained from the enterprise, from a regard to the health and safety of his own troops. Perhaps he did not fully know the condition of the American soldiery.

While General WASHINGTON was actively employed in supplying his troops, his mind was deeply engaged on a plan to recruit the army for the approaching campaign.

From jealousy of a standing army, or in the prospect of redress of grievances by the British government, Congress depending on annual enlistments, and on the aid of the militia, had neglected to enlist men for the war, until the depreciation of the paper currency, the hardships and privations of the soldiers, and the high bounty paid for short periods of service, rendered the measure in practicable. General WASHINGTON importuned Cong ess and the governments of the respective States, not to rely on foreign aid, but depending on the strength and resources of the country, to make the necessary exertions seasonably to meet the operations of the British General.

He gave an exact account to each State of its troops on the continental establishment, and urged them respectively to supply their deficiency.

The serious difficulties respecting the army induced Congress to depute a Committee of their own body to the camp, to consult with the General, and report to them such plans as the publick interest required. This committee repaired to Head Quarters in January. The General, having taken the advice of his officers, presented to them a memorial stating the difficulties that existed in the army, and pointing out the remedies. In these remedies was included that honourable pro vision for officers, which would make their commis. sions valuable, and secure the prompt execution of duty, through fear of censure, and from an apprehen sion of the loss of employment.

The representations of General WASHINGTON pro duced, in a good degree; their effect. The division of power in the subordinate departments of the army which had destroyed all responsibility, and created endless confusion, was removed. General Green was appointed Quarter Master General, and Colonel Wadsworth Cominissary General. These officers had a controlling power over their deputies, and under their management these departments were greatly improved. The movements of the army were from this period made with facility, and the soldiers never after wards suffered privations like those of this winter.

The alliance of France with America, and the sub sequent co-operation of that power with the United States, rendered Philadelphia a dangerous post for the British. Before the campaign opened, Sir William Howe resigned the command of the British MAY 20. army, and Sir Henry Clinton with his commission as Commander in Chief, received orders to evacuate that city. General WASHINGTON early penetrated this intention, and made his arrangements to meet it. He was uncertain whether the evacuation would be made by water, or whether Sir Henry would march his army through Jersey to New-York. As circumstances strengthened the probability that the British commander would attempt a passage through New-Jersey, General WASHINGTON detached General Maxwell with the Jersey brigade over the Delaware to take post on Mount Holly, and with the assistance of the Jersey militia, to obstruct the progress of he enemy. He was directed to fell trees, to break up bridges, and to hang upon the flanks of the Britis. army.

When it was fully ascertained that Sir JUNE 17. Henry Clinton was crossing the Delaware, General WASHINGTON required the opinion of his officers respecting measures proper to be pur sued. General Lee, who, having been exchanged

had now joined the army, was decidedly against a gr neral action, and he discountenanced even a partial attack, on the supposition that it would probably bring on a general engagement. In this opinion, the officers almost unanimously concurred. Of seventeen Generals, who composed the military Council, on this occasion, General Wayne and General Cadwallader only were decidedly in favour of an engagement. General Green gave it as his opinion that the country should be defended, and that if this led to an engagement, he would not shun it.

Although many of their stores were taken down the river in the shipping, yet the British army was encumbered with an immense quantity of baggage; and their line of march extended twelve miles. The weather being intensely hot, their movements were very slow ; in seven days, they marched only forty miles. On the 24th, General Clinton reached Allenton, and it was yet uncertain whether he would take the road to Amboy, or to Sandy Hook. General WASHINGTON therefore kept upon the High Lands of New-Jersey, above the enemy. In this situation, he had it in his power to fight or not, as circumstances should dictate. By the slow movement of the enemy, he was inclined to think that Sir Henry wished for an engagement Colonel Morgan, with his regiment consisting of six nundred men, was detached to gain the right flank of the enemy, and ordered to annoy him in every possible way. General Cadwallader, with Jackson's regi ment, and a small corps of militia, was ordered to harass his rear.

The British army at this time was calculated at en thousand men, and the American army consisted of between ten and eleven thousand. Although the late Council decided by a large majority against a general engagement, yet General WASHINGTON inclined to the n.casure. He again summoned his officers, and took their opinion, "whether it was adviseable to seek

a general action? If adviseable, is it best to attack with the whole ariny, to bring on a general engage ment by a partial attack, or to take a position that shall oblige the enemy to make an assault upon us?" The Council again determined against a general en gagement; but advised to strengthen the detachments on the wings of the enemy. General Scott was, in consequence, detached with fifteen hundred men to this service.

Having a force rather superiour to the British, General WASHINGTON conceived that the favourable opportunity to attack the enemy, ought not to be lost, and on his own responsibility, resolved to hazard a general engagement.

Having learned that Sir Henry Clinton JUNE 25. was moving towards Monmouth Court House, he detached Brigadier Wayne with a thousand men to reinforce the troops in advance. He offered the command of the whole force in front to General Lee; but ho, being opposed even to partial actions with the enemy, declined the service. The Marquis La Fayette joyfully accepted the command, which his senior Major General had declined. The orders given to the Marquis were similar to those which had before been given to the officers on the lines, to gain the rea and right flank of the enemy, and give him all possible annoyance. The Commander in Chief put the main army in motion, that he might be in a situation to support his parties in advance. By these morements General Lee perceived that more importance than he had imagined was given to the division in front, and he now importunately requested the com mand, which before he had declined. To gratify him without mortifying the Marquis, he was detached with two additional brigades to act in front, and the o^mmand of the whole, consisting of five thousand men, of course devolved on him. He was ordered to keep

nis detachments constantly on their arms and ever in a situation to attack.

Sir Henry Clinton perceiving the approach of a powerful force, changed the position of his army, and placed his best troops in the rear. On the 27th, he encamped in a secure manner on the heignts about Monmouth Court House. He could not be attacked in this position with the probability of success, and he was within twelve miles of strong ground, where he could not be assailed. General WASHINGTON therefore resolved to attack him as soon as he should move from his present encampment.

About five in the morning, the Command JUNE 28. er in Chief was informed that the front of the British army was in motion he immediately despatched an Aid de Camp to General Lee with orders to move on and attack the rear of the enemy, "unless there should be powerful reasons to the contrary," assuring him that the main body should seasonably move to support him.

From the movements of the American army, Sir Henry expected an attack. Early on the morning of the 28th, General Knyphausen marched with all the baggage of the British army. The grenadiers, light infantry, and chasseurs, unencumbered, remained on the ground under the command of Lord Cornwallis, and with this division was Sir Henry.

Having allowed time for General Knyphausen to move out of his way, Lord Cornwallis about eight o'clock took up his line of march, and descended from the heights of Freehold into a plain of about three miles extent. General Lee made his disposition to execute the orders of the Commander in Chief. Passing the heights of Freehold, he entered the plain, and ordered General Wayne to attack the rear of the covering party of the enemy in such a manner as to halt them; while he himself by a shorter road should gain their