SENATE.] Powers of the Vice President. [FEB. 11, 182 manner, he felt himself bound to propose the same amend-pointed to revise the rules of the Senate; one of th ment for the consideration of the Senate; and should as- meetings of which he did not attend. In relation, how sign the reasons which induced him to offer that amend- ever, to the amendment proposed by the Senator fro ment in the committee, and which he now felt it his duty Connecticut, it had, he believed, been rejected by th to urge before the Senate, in favor of its adoption. Sir, committee on the ground that there was no necessity the the Senator from Alabama has stated very correctly the a member should sit down when called to order, until th proceedings of the committee on the subject. The rules President decided whether he were in or out of order of the Senate are few in number, embracing only the because, by such call, the President had already decid cases in which the Senate have thought proper to departed that he was out of order. Perhaps the committe from the rules of proceeding in Jefferson's Manual, which were expected to express he opinion that they did no appears to have been adopted by consent, as their guide in deem it expedient for us to prescribe a rule to gover all their deliberations. The 6th and 7th rules of the Se- the President of this body, who is not an agent of, nate, by the construction given by the present presiding amenable to this body, but elected by the People, and t officer, have put it entirely out of the power of any per- them only accountable. But he was of opinion that th son to call a Senator to order for words spoken, until the Constitution clearly vested the Vice President with th Senator shall have finished his speech. For, if the pre- power of preserving order in the proceedings of the So siding officer has not the power, it exists in no one; for nate, to be exercised in common with the individual mem in Jefferson's Manual it is laid down explicitly, that "Of- bers of the Senate. The very words of the Constitutio fensive words are not to be noticed until the member has which provide that the Vice President shall preside ove finished his speech, then they are to be written down." the Senate, must mean something, or they must mean no It appears from this, that these rules, instead of facilitat- thing. He was clearly of opinion that the Constitutio ing the business, are only calculated to produce embar- gave to the presiding officer the power of calling a Se rassment; and it is very evident that such has been nator to order when using improper or indecent language their operation in relation to the case to which the Se- Such language, said Mr. R., may be used of the Pres nator from Virginia, [Mr. TAZEWELL] has alluded. And, dent himself, and if there is no person to call the offende sir, in my opinion, the rules should either be amended so to order, he may go on to the greatest lengths. The dif as to recognize in the President the power to call to or ference between the Senate and House of Representa der, or that they should be expunged, and leave the Ma- tives was this-there the Speaker was elected by the nual for our guide; for, under that rule, it is made the House, is the agent of that body, and, consequently, duty of the presiding officer to call to order: for, in amenable to their authority. Here the case is different speaking of offensive words in debate, he says, "such the presiding officer is elected by the People; he, there proceedings Mr. Speaker ought to suppress." It would fore, did not believe that any appeal from his decision seem from the 6th rule, as if it was not contemplated, that could be had. In conclusion, Mr. R. said that the power the President should call to order for words spoken, be- of preserving order in the Senate, he believed to be vested cause the member is required to take his seat until the in the Vice President, and if the rules and practice o President decides whether he is in or out of order. And, the Senate had not already conferred this power, that i if called to order by the President, it would seem unne- ought to be done. cessary that he should take his seat to allow time for the President to decide; for the call to order would of course be a decision in the first instance. Mr. MACON said that he thought the President ough not to call to order. He should sit in his seat to decide between the members, and he ought to be pure and un biassed, like a Judge upon the Bench. Or, said Mr. M, suppose that he improperly calls te order, to whom are you to appeal? He is to decide; therefore he ought to keep aloof from the cause of complaint, and not be the originator of the call, so as to judge impartially betwee the opposite parties. He had rather leave it so, than al ter it. Sir, I am in favor of amending this rule in another re. spect. The President of the Senate is not elected by the Senate, and is not, of course, amenable to the Senate. But, sir, by the Constitution, we have the power of making our own rules of proceeding.[Mr. F. here read from the Constitution, which authorizes each House to determine the rules of its own proceedings.] This is the only security we have against an arbitrary exercise of Mr. FOOT perfectly agreed with the Senator from power over our deliberations. Our rules should pre- Ohio, with the exception as to the operation of the rules scribe to the President his duties, and define his powers, and he must say, that, if the rules had any effect, the Pre as the presiding officer of the Senate; and I am diposed siding officer had not the power to call a Senator to or so to amend them as to allow an appeal from every deci- der for words spoken in debate. Under the Parliament sion of the Chair. In this way, and in this only, can weary rule he had, but under that rule the member was not ever be secure from an improper exercise of power, This security is given expressly by the Constitution. By this amendment the Senate will be placed in precisely the same situation, in relation to the powers of the presiding officer, as every other deliberative body; and I cannot see any reasonable objection to it. These, sir, are my views in relation to this subject, and which induced me to offer the amendment; and I shall leave it to the sound discretion of the Senate to adopt or reject the amendment, feel- Mr. KING here read the 6th and 7th Rules, and com ing no solicitude about the result, but firmly believing mented on the effect of the amendment, as proposed by either that the amendment ought to be adopted, or the Mr. FOOT. If you give, said Mr. K., this power to the 6th and 7th rules expunged, so as to relieve the presid- Vice President, you clothe him with the most tremening officer from embarrassment, and make it his duty (as dous and dangerous power; a power no less than that of it clearly would be without the rules) to call a Senator to putting an end to debate; to gag a member when the order for "per onalities" or any improper language in de- course of debate is not consonant to his wishes or his feelbate. But, sir, it appears to me proper to have an ap-ings. He would suppose that the Vice President was peal from his decision to the Senate; otherwise, I cannot see how the Senate can determine or control their own deliberations as contemplated by the Constitution. Mr. RUGGLES was a member of the committee ap to be called to order until he had finished his speech. If then, the presiding officer had not the power, and the Senators had not the power of calling to order for offen sive words spoken, the offending member might go on to any extent. His view of the subject was, that the rules should be so altered, that a member using improper language may be called to order, and by the presiding offcer while speaking. connected, either by interest, or by inclination, with those in the administration of the Government, he would then have the power to put a member down the moment he discussed a subject that he did not wish to go abroad FEB. 11, 1828.] Powers of the Vice President. [SENATE. to the People-a power, which, if he chose to exercise of the manner in which he chose to present his views or it, would make him the veriest tyrant in existence. It is defend his principles. Yet this might happen, under the not necessary, said Mr. K., to enable us to carry on the discretion which would be given by this amendment. As business of the Senate with regularity and decorum, to to the individuals of the Senate, he could not believe that give any such power. He had no idea of subjecting the the time would ever come, when they would be so for freedom of debate to the control of any one individual.getful of their own dignity, and that of the body, as not Whatever confidence he might have in the present pre-to call to order any member who should overstep the siding officer, still the time might arrive when this power, bounds of decorum. He was satisfied with the rule as it if now given, would be found in dangerous hands. He was; and was, therefore, opposed to the amendment. hoped the amendment would not prevail. He repeated, he had every confidence in the impartiality and correctness of the decisions of the present presiding officer, but he wished to guard against any possible contingency. Mr. DICKERSON said, it was certain that any member of the Senate had a right to call another to order for words spoken in debate, however inoffensive those words might be; and he considered it equally certain that the President might call to order for words spoken in debate, when those words might be an outrage upon the decorum of the Senate. It is the duty of the presiding officer to preserve order. The power to do this must be an inherent one, without which, the duty could not be performed, and the officer could not preside. He has, and must have, so much power as to preserve decorum in the Senate, that the business may proceed without interruption. Two years ago, when two Senators, by the violence of their remarks upon each other, totally interrupted the business of the Senate, they were called to order by a third Senator, who was directed to reduce the words to writing; this he refused to do, as it was no concern of his. It was not absolutely necessary to vest the President with power to call to order for words or acts not immediately interfering with the decorum of the Senate. But, to give him the power to call to order for words in all cases where a Senator can call to order, would not make him more formidable than he now is. He can now, upon the call of any one Senator to order, decide the question without appeal. There will always be at least one Senator willing to aid the views of the President, if he wishes to erercise this power. Mr. BENTON was opposed to the accumulation of unnecessary power in irresponsible hands, and of that character he conceived the present motion to be. Every Senator had now the right to call to order, and certainly forty-seven Senators were enough to watch one. It could not be necessary to increase the number to forty-eight, by adding the Vice President, who is in no way responsible to us. We do not elect him, and we cannot displace him, except by an impeachment, which must be instituted in the other House. Nor is it safe to vest the power of restraining debates in an officer like him, not concerned in the debate, and not responsible to us for the exercise of his power. He may abuse this power, and we are without remedy. The power of stopping a mem ber in debate-of making him sit down and proceed in another manner, or not proceed at all, is a power of high import. The feelings of the Senator may be deeply wounded by it, but that is a trifle compared with the injury which may be done to his constituents. A debate, vital to their liberties, might be stopped and terminated, under the pretence of confining the Speaker to a particular question; and the injury would be without remedy. The Vice President holds his office independent of the will of the body over which he presides, and in that respect, differs from the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and all other presiding officers to which he has been likened. The Speaker of the House of Representatives is responsible to the body over which he presides. They make, and they can unmake him, and he is vested with powers by the rules of the House, which the Senate have never conferred upon the PresiMr. D. had no objection to increase the power of the dent of this body. But the principle involved in this President, but not so far as to permit him to restrain the question has already been decided upon, and acted on latude of debate. No member of this body should wil- for two years; I allude to the appointment of Commitingly submit to such restraint. Every one should adhere tees taken away from the President of this body because to his right of commenting most freely upon the Admi- he was not responsible to us, and retained in our own stration, Heads of Departments, or Officers of the Go-hands, although it was universally acknowledged that the renment. It is better that this privilege should be abused, than arbitrarily restrained. If, in the course of debate, a Senator deems it important to animadvert freely upon the characters or conduct of the living or the dead, be ought not to be restrained by the presiding officer. Mr. FOOT here called the attention of the gentleman to the words of the Manual. It is said there, decidedly, that a member cannot be called to order for words spoken, he has finished his speech. But it would be observbat such provision gave no possibility of remedy. He thought the power ought to be vested either in the Members or the President to call to order during debate. Mr. VAN BUREN said that he did not conceive that the office conferred the right to call to order. If the powers of the Vice President were derived from the Allusion has been nade, Sir, to past scenes in this Constitution, as nobody doubted, he knew of no sanction Chamber, when a Senator, not now a member of this to that power, either in cases of irrelevancy or impropri- body-one whom. I am proud to say, honors me with the ety of speech. The only express power granted by the name of friend, [Mr. RANDOLPH, --has been supposed to Constitution was that of giving the casting vote. This transcend the freedom of debate, and you, Sir, were cenamendment went to give him another power not contem-sured for permitting it. According to the opinion which plated by the Constitution. On the contrary, the Consti- you then expressed, and which I concur in, you had no on has given the right to the two Houses to make power to call to order for that cause, and the present for the government of their own members, and for motion goes upon that idea, otherwise it would not be the direction of their presiding officers. He thought the necessary now to confer this power. That you were Per a dangerous one to place in the hands of the Vice right in your decision, is strongly to be inferred, from the President. It was never tolerated, and it was never in- fact, that of forty-seven Senators having the undoubted tended to be, that a member should be put down because right to call to order on these occasions, no one did it ; power had been well exercised. The admission is gene- I SENATE.] Powers of the Vice President. [FEB. 11, 1828. tend to express an opinion. His purpose was to speak to the principles which he thought governed the subject, and not to pass upon the proper application of those principles to any particular person or subject. This was not the time or the occasion to discuss that question. and if those, whose rights were unquestionable, did not in the Chair, he was not now called upon, nor did he inact, it certainly was excusable in you, whose authority was at least doubtful, to follow their example. One thing is certain; if you erred, you erred on the side of liberty, not of authority; and the rarity of this kind of errors, by those in power, should give them a claim to our respect, when they do occur. But I do not admit there was an error, nor do I rest the vindication of my friend upon presumptions and inferences derivable from our own conduct. I take higher ground, and say that nothing which we ever heard from that gentleman on this floor, in reference to our President and his Secretaries, exceeded in severity and violence what is said with impunity in the British Parliament, by Commoners as well as Peers, of their King and his Ministers. I have some acquaintance with the debates of the British Parliament-not so much as I ought to have-but enough to bear me out in the assertion, that the King and his Ministers have been often animadverted upon, in both Houses of Parliament, with a degree of severity which the gentleman alluded to, never transcended on this floor, in any thing which he said of our President and his Ministers. I speak of what has occurred in the British Parliament in times of order and subordination, when the Speakers were men of the first weight and dignity of character, and when no one called them to order; and I must be permitted to say, that it argues badly for the spirit of the times in our country, that it is an evil omen for our republican institutions, if American Senators cannot be as free with their President and Secretaries, as British subjects may be with their monarch and his prime ministers. But this reproach, Sir, does not lie at your door. By your decision, you prevented the stain from sticking to your skirts. That you were right, I then believed, and still believe. Even upon a critical construction of our own rules, leaving out the enlarged considerations which governed you, your decision will stand the test of the severest scrutiny. Those rules only give you a power to decide after the question of order is raised and placed before you. When a member is called to order, his words shall be taken down in writing, and the President shall decide. This is the rule. Now why reduce to writing, except to inform the President of the words excepted And why inform him if he already knows them? And why make another decision, if he had already decided in the fact of calling to order? The words and the spirit of the rule go upon the idea, that one member is to accuse another of disorder, and that you, as a disinterested and impartial arbiter, are to decide between them. This is unfavorable to the spirit of our institution, which forever separates the functions of the judge and accuser, and so may they remain on this foor as every where else. Mr. CHAMBERS said, as he did not concur in the views which had been expressed, he deemed it proper to state the reasons for his vote. With regard to the correctness of any former decision He denied that the Constitution restrained the power of the Senate to adopt the rule proposed by the honorable gentleman from Connecticut, [Mr. FooT.] The Consti tution says, in the 3d Section of the 1st Article, "The Vice President of the United States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no vote, unless they be equally divided." The section does not proceed to enumerate the functions which, as President of the Senate, he shall perform. A presiding officer of a deliberative legisla tive body, has a known duty, and when he is designated as such officer, the duty of performing the appropriate functions is plainly signified. The vote which is refused to him, except on equal division, has reference to his participation on subjects of ordinary legislation, not to the observance of order. There was no such thing as a vote implied in the matter of calling a member to order, and he presumed the honorable gentleman who had referred to his expression with emphasis, did not rely on the effect of this prohibition to vote. In the 5th Section of the same article, the Constitution says, "Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its members for disorderly behaviour, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel a member." Here again there is no enumeration of the particular acts which will constitute the guilt of disorderly behaviour, subjecting its author to punishment and expulsion. There is no enumeration of the particular rules or orders_relat ing to the proceedings of the body which it has authority to determine. The language used is to be taken in re ference to the context, and where it had received an intelligible import before its adoption into the Constitution, the meaning is to be found by ascertaining what that was. Such rules as usually obtain in legislation may be adopted, and such conduct as the usages of legislative bodies consider disorderly may be punished. The notions which had been received by the framers of our Constitution in relation to Congressional rule, had been borrowed very much from the British House of Com mons. The rules of Parliament, he believed, had been the general standard to which had been referred all ques tions of this character in the Old Congress, and in all the State Legislatures. In all these bodies, he believed the presiding officer executed the duty of preserving proper order. He did not mean to include the House of Lords, because the honorable gentleman fron North Carolina, [Mr. MACON,] had said, the presiding officer there did not use the power. At a very early period the Senate exer cised the power thus given to it. They did pass certain rules, and they imposed certain duties on the President, being such as are usually imposed by other legislative bo The following instances, out of thousands, may be quoted: Mr. Burke, of the King's speech, in 1785. "It was so full of equivocation and double meaning, that every man of every opinion, might find some part or other of it that would meet his sentiments, or bear a construction similar to his sentiments, be they what they might." Of the King's speech in 1782. "The speech spoke a language so strange and contradictory, so full of ridiculous and absurd professions, along with such an incredible number of promises and boasts, that he declared, if he might be permitted to speak of it as it deserved, he should call it a farrago of nonsense and hypocricies." Of the same speech. "He had heard of a form of prayer in churches, but this was the first fort of prayer he had ever met with in a King's speech: it was, he declared, nothing more than a piece of hypocritical cant played off at the ex pense of Parliament." Of the same speech. "He thought it a compound of hypocrisy, self commendation and folly." Mr. Fox, in the year 1784, when the King and Ministers were in a minority in the House of Commons. "What, then, was the principle on which we beheld at this moment a Minister without the confidence of the House of Commons-an Executive Government in which the House placed no degree of confidence whatever? It was their evident intention to render the House of Commons the mere tool and organ of despotism. He hoped the spirit of a brave and free people would defeat the base design. He had long observed the machinations, hatche and harbored by a combination of persons, against the liberty of the country, whose political principles were too well understood to need any further illustration. These people had long endeavored to have the voice of the people on their side, had long struggled to make the people parties in their own ruin, to make them enemies to their best friends." Debate in 1730. "Mr. Thomas Pitt entered into a mest severe animadversion upon the whole conduct of the administration for a series of years past, declaring that the Minister's name was the subject of contempt and ridicule in every Court in Europe." Debate 1770, Lord Chatham, declared that “Ministers held a corrupt influence in Parliament." Same year, he said, "I will beg leave to parodize the expression, and will say, those who gave the means of corruption, gave corruption. I will trust no sovereign in the world with means of purchasing the liberties of the people. Does he (the King) mean, by drawing the purse strings of his subjects, to spread corruption through the people, to procure a Parliament, like a packed jury, ready to réquite hrs Ministers at all adventure?"-[Note by Mr. B.] Mr. [SENATE. dies on a presiding officer, but certainly such are not par-ject to the control usually exercised by legislative bodies ticularly enumerated in the Constitution. Mr. C. said, in the shape of rules of proceeding. he thought it is quite manifest from the work of Mr. Jef ferson, which he held in his hand, that he did not feel any doubt about the Constitutional power of the Senate. Jefferson had an intimate connexion with the Governmest, almost from the first essay towards our independence, to the termination of his Presidency; and he was of all men the least likely to extend the powers granted by the Constitution to any branch of the General Govern-dent. But on a late occasion the President has said he did ment. It was, therefore, a question of expediency alone, whether the President of the Senate should have the power to preserve order and decorum in this body. If it were not for the occurrences which have taken place, he should not have thought the Senate now called upon to act on this subject. It had been the opinion of most persons, he believed, that such power existed with the Presinot think he had the power-the rules of the Senate had been committed to a special committee for revision, and the Chairman, who reports the rules without alteration, as to this subject, in answer to a question touching this precise point, has said, the committee are unanimous in the opinion that there is no such power in the President, and several members rise and sanction the same doctrine. If then, the rules of the Senate should remain unchang, ed, it must be received as the judgment of the Senate, that such powers do not belong to the President, and ought not to be exercised by him. In the preface to his Manual, prepared during the time he was Vice President, for the express purpose of aiding and informing the Senate in their proceedings, after noticing the grant of his power, he remarks: "The Senate have accordingly formed some rules for its own government, but those going only to few cases, they have referred to the decision of their President, without debate | and without appeal, all questions of order arising under their own rules, or where they have provided none." In the section treating of the "order of debate," a variety of instances are furnished, which are violations of this order, and we are told, Qui digreditur a materia ad personam, Mr. Speaker ought to suppress. Mr. Jefferson, pursuing his system of collocation, then adverts to the rules of the Senate. These rules do not designate the individual by whom a disorderly member is to be called to order, but Mr. Jefferson does not suggest that there is any diversity between the practice of the Senate and the House of Commons. The gentleman from Missouri, Mr. [BENTON] has called to his aid the proceeding of this body in relation to the change in the mode of selecting the standing committees. He says the power of appointing the committees was taken from the President, because the Constitution being the only source of his power, the Senate cannot confer other powers upon him. The honorable gentleman, no doubt, expresses the motives which influenced his vote on that occasion, but he certainly had entely misconceived those of some others who advocated that change. Mr. C. begged leave to say for himself (and he believ-gainst an honorable member of this House be made by ed he might say so for some others) that no apprehension of constitutional difficulty had influenced his vote. From the peculiar organization of this body, it might occur that the President of the Senate should differ from the majoriof its members, on great and important questions of natonal concern. The object of confiding subjects to our committees, is to facilitate the means of digesting principles, collecting information, and presenting views in relation to matters on which we are to act. A committee acts in the character of an agent to the body at large. Mr. C. expressed his surprise that any gentleman on this floor should doubt of the propriety, or indeed the necessity, of there being such a power in the Chair. He should not allude to the unpleasant occurrence on this floor, two years ago, which had been referred to, except for the purpose of using the remark made by the honorable gentleman from New Jersey, [Mr. DICKERSON.] That gentleman had informed us that an honorable member of the Senate who had moved the question of order, had refused to reduce the objectionable words to writing. That was not the only occasion on which the Senate had witnessed a refusal to take down words objected to as out of order. It might be so ; but he did not know that there had been an instance in which disorderly words were ta ken down in compliance with the rule. And who would consent to make a record of words which were offensive? The practice he understood was supposed to require that when taken down, the words were to be put upon the Journal. If, therefore, the most defamatory charge a He not only held it proper that the majority of the Senate should be represented on the important Committees, but it was perfectly suicidal to adopt a different case. It was the right of the majority to have the Comtees of their own political complexion, and in the pecular formation of this body the only mode by which this right can be secured is to give the appointment immediately to the Senate. In any other event the reports of your committees will be carried abroad to produce impressions on the public mind directly at variance with your own opinions; the great labor of your agents will be to counteract your own deliberate purposes. He did not wish to be undersood as alluding to the period when the change was made as the season when this state of things had been witnessed. The possibility fits occurrence required provision to meet it, and formed sufficient inducement for the vote he then gave. The constitution, therefore, had nothing to do with the question farther than it had constituted the Vice Presifer the presiding officer of this body, and thereby gave him the power properly belonging to such an officer, sub another member, the preliminary step towards redress is to cause a record of that charge to be made, which will for ever perpetuate the recollection of the charge. No individual could submit to this course, nor would he, when he was the victim of aspersion, be instrumental him. self, or allow his friend to be instrumental in handing down the evidence of the charge. And what are the reasons, asked Mr. C. urged against the adoption of the rule, as a measure of expediency? We are told that it places a power in the Chair, which may be used oppressively, and may arrest the latitude of debate. It is called a tremendous, a dangerous power. The whole argument on this point seemed to him full of error and mistake. On questions involving the political character of public men, there never had been, he believed, and God forbid there ever should be, a disposition to restrain debate. The people of this country had a right to know every thing touching the political conduct and character of our rulers, and no man or set of men on this floor, would ever dare to invade that right. The rule pro. posed did not touch that question. Freedom of debate was secured by a power superior to any rule of the Senate. To indulge it was no violation of order; and therefore not within the rule which restrained disorderly conduct. How then, stands the matter of oppressive power in the Chair? The amendment proposed will make it the duty of the Chair to cause order to be observed; it will submit to his discretion primarily, the question of what is or is not order; but if he should ever exert that discretion unwise. ly or oppressively, an appeal can be had to the Senate, and his decision may be reversed, and the character and responsibility of a majority of the Senate are the pledges by which every member claims his rights. How is it, under the construction now given to the existing rule? One individual may suggest a violation of order, invoke the authority of the Chair, and the occupant of that Chair, by this single fiat, may arrest the debate. His sole judgment, absolute and irreversible, is the standard by which every member here must measure his steps. In the one case, the tenure by which we hold our rights, is the intelligence, the discretion, and the responsibility of a majority of ourselves; and, in the other, the intelligence, the discretion, and the responsibility of one individual, not deriving his authority from us, and requiring it to be called into action only by the suggestion of an individual member. It appeared to him the argument was most strangely misapplied by the honorable gentleman who had used it, and the very apprehension to which they had yielded had driven him to the most decided conviction of the necessity of the proposed amendment. [FEB. 11, 182 he had so recently taken his seat, on a subject relating their rules and orders. The amendment appeared him directly to involve the power of the Vice Preside to call a Senator to order, and prevent him from speal ing, for words spoken in debate. He had considere that subject, and was of opinion that the Vice Preside did not possess such power, independent of or accordin to the existing rules of the Senate, and was unwilling confer such power by any alteration of the rules. Th amendment, by its turns, concedes, and the mover, wit a commendable spirit of candor, admits, that, by the e isting rules, the power in question cannot be exercise by the Vice President; and so far as this admission ma be entitled to weight, it would place the proposed chang on grounds of expediency merely; but the argument gentlemen had taken a wider scope, had asserted bolde claims to power, and had invested the Vice Presiden with authority to stop a Senator in debate, and arrest dis cussion for the use of words which he might deem irrele vant or disorderly. have no force on the proceedings of the Senate, much less that they could control the privilege of debate. That the Vice President was not a member of the Senate; that he was placed here, not by the body itself, but by the People of the United States, under the Con stitution, which, by specifying certain of his powers and limiting their extent, by a fair implication excluded all others, had already been sufficiently adverted to. He would press them no farther than to remark, that it thence appeared to him perfectly clear that the Constitu tion could not have designed to subject the Senate to the administration of an officer, without other rule than his arbitrary will, and irresponsible to those who might be come the objects of his oppression. It might be fairly presumed, he said, if it had not been expressly provided, that an authority thus conferred would be liable to the regulation of those on whom it was to be exerted. Mr. SMITH, of Maryland, said, it was the duty of the A power of such magnitude, so vital to the dearest pri Vice President, as presiding officer of the Senate, to de-vileges of the members of this body, has been supposed. cide agreeably to such rules and regulations as shall have by at least one Senator, inherent in the Vice President, been made for his guidance. In the House of Represen- as incident to his office as presiding officer of the Senate tatives the presiding officer had the power of calling- a under the Constitution, or derived from the rules containmember to order for words spoken," because he was ed in Mr. Jefferson's "Manual of Parliamentary Prac one of their own body, elected by themselves to preside tice." He denied these assertions altogether, which he over them, and amenable to their authority. If his deci considered dangerous in principle, and thought it per sions are unsatisfactory, they can refuse to re-elect him-fectly plain, that the law of the English Parliament could but we, Sir, have no such power. Our presiding officer is not elected by us-he is sent here by the People of the United States, and totally independent of us. Mr. S. was not willing to vest either the Vice President or President pro tem. with the power to stop debate. It is a tremendous power-I have felt it, Sir, and never shall forget it. On a certain occasion, in the other House, a report was presented from one of the Secretaries, which animadverted very severely on Mr. Gerry. I undertook to animadvert on the report, and was called to order. Unconscious that I had travelled out of the record, I proceeded, and was three times called to order. I then inquired why I was considered to be out of order?--and was told, by the Speaker, that the report upon which I had animadverted must not be considered the report of the Secretary, but of the President of the United States. That I could not proceed for, before the discussion commenced, I had been called out of my seat, and told, by a person high in office, that the President requested that the report might not be considered as his, but as the report of the Secretary of State. Mr. President, I am unwilling to be placed in this body, differently constituted as it is from the other, in such a situation as I then was, to be stopped in the course of my argument. There were high party times then, and high party times may come again, and, whenever they do, similar outrage may (with such a power) be committed. And where will be the remedy? Gentlemen say, in the appeal from the decision of the President. An appeal! My experience has taught me to know that an appeal is not worth a button. The majority will always support the Chair, right or wrong. An appeal was taken in the case I have mentioned, and the majority voted with the Speaker, and always will. An appeal from the Chair is vox et preteria nihil. I would rather be without the appeal. A gentleman has said that he will vote for the amend ment, to justify you for the decision you had made on the rule. Sir, you require no justification-you decided agreeably to the rules prescribed for your government, and would not have been authorized to have given any other decision. I hope, Mr. President, that the rule will not be changed. Mr. McLANE commenced his remarks with an apology for obtruding his sentiments upon the Senate, in which The doctrine of inherent or incidental power, [Mr. McL. said,] was every where the offspring of urgent new cessity, and belonged to no functions in this Government, unless indispensable to its existence. In regard to the right in question, there certainly could be no pretence for such necessity. If the Vice President possessed the power as incident to his office, it would be the gift of the Constitution, and as such transcend the authority of the Senate. There could be no limit to such power, but the arbitrary will of the presiding officer. The Senate could subject it to no control; they could neither prescribe rules of order, no the circumstances under which their debates might be i terrupted; and would thus be subjected to a dominion which he believed no gentleman had seriously contem plated. Of the privileges of the Senate, that of freely discus sing the various subjects of their deliberations, was the dearest, intimately interwoven with the structure of that body. He considered the freedom of speech here, as sa cred as that of the press elsewhere; and if the combined power of Congress and the Executive be incompetent, as he believed it was, to abridge the freedom of either, be yond these walls, he could not admit a power incident to the Vice President to regulate the former on this floor He could conceive of no right more clearly incident to the Senate, than that of free discussion, without which its de |