FEB. 11, 1828.] Powers of the Vice President. [SENATE. liberations could not be properly conducted. He thought | virtue of a special order of the Commons made for the it constituted an important part of the proceedings of the express purpose. It might with great propriety be conSenate, which they possessed the exclusive power of re-tended that, anterior to the order of 1604, personality was gulating by their own rules. The Constitution of the United States, establishing the Legislature for the Union, authorized "each House to "determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its mem"bers for disorderly behaviour, and, with the concur "rence of two-thirds, to expel a member." In this provision [Mr. McL. said] was contained the whole parliamentary power over the subject of orderthat of prescribing rules, and of enforcing obedience. It was absolute and unlimited, and could not consist with the existence of a similar power elsewhere. It relieved the Senate from any rule other than that emanating from its own will. It could not, he apprehended, be denied, that the Senate might, in virtue of this provision, prescribe by positive rule, that even personal remarks should not be deemed disorderly, and that the Vice President should in no instance call to order for words spoken, and therefore it would follow, that the power of that officer was wholly derived from the authority of the Senate. He would hereafter consider what would be deemed disorder in parliamentary discussion, in cases where the rules were silent. The error of the argument attributing to the Vice President this power as incident to his office, lay in clothing an officer whose dutics were ministerial merely, with legislative functions; and in confounding the powers of the Senate and those of the presiding officer. Gentlemen had insisted that the Vice President must possess the power in question to enable him to perform his duties. But what, he asked, were the duties of a presiding officer? Certainly not to make, but to execute the law-to preside over the body according to the rules prescribed by the competent authority for its government. When the Constitution designated the Vice President to preside wer this body, it conferred on the Senate the power of determining the rules of its own proceedings, and his duty consists in executing these rules. Where they are silent, the omission can only be supplied by the further action or tacit assent of the Senate, as the occasion may arise He said the history of every parliamentary body of which he had any knowledge, and more especially that of the English parliament, would fully sustain this position. In all parliamentary assemblies, rules of order emanated from the body itself, and the particular code of each consisted of their own special regulations, and decisions founded on the sanction of the house, dependant upon their will, and adapted to their own convenience. In all, freedom of discussion is the last matter subjected to specal regulation, and uniformly allowed the widest latitude. An analogy in this respect has been supposed to exist between the authority of the Vice President and the Speaker of the House of Commons, but such analogy would be fatal to the pretensions of gentlemen on this ccasion; since even the Speaker of the House of ComTons possesses no power to interfere with debate for disderly words, independent of the order of the Comons, as is apparent from the Manual referred to by the Serator from Maryland, [Mr. CHAMBERS.] That Scnator quoted from the Manual of the Englich Parliamentary Practice, the rule which provides that though the conseCences of a measure may be reprobated in strong terms, to arraign the motives of those who propose or advocate , is personality, and against order. Qui degreditur a teria ad personam, Mr. Speaker ought to suppress." At this duty is enjoined by the express order of the Commons, of the 19th April, 1604. It is therefore plain, that Mr. Speaker can interfere in the single instance of a departure from the subject before the House, to indulge in personality; and that even this power is exercised in VOL. IV.-19 not against order; and it is unquestionable, that the order was made to confer on the Speaker the power of doing that which previously could only have been done by the Commons themselves. The truth is, that, prior to the date of that order, the latitude of debate had been subjected to little or no regulation; disorderly words even had not been defined, much less had it been supposed competent for the Speaker to arrest discussion. But in the session of 1604, the Commons became engaged in serious inquiries into their own privileges; and the assumption of the Crown to issue writs of election to supply vacancies, and return of fensive members, led to discussions which afforded the majority of the Commons, who had throughout manifested a subserviency to the King, even when asserting their own privileges, a pretext for the order of 1604. But he apprehended it would scarcely be insisted that the Vice President did or ought to possess greater power over the debates of the Senate, than could have been exercised by the Speaker of the House of Commons, in the reign of James the First. It would be further obvious, [Mr. McL.. said,] by a recurrence to the Manual, that the right in the English Parliament of preserving order in debate, was not the power of arresting discussion, or of preventing the use of words on account of their intrinsic impropriety. On the contrary, it was the power of the House over refractory members, of inflicting punishment after the debate was terminated, for the use of words in violation of express rule. In cases of this kind, the offending member is allowed to proceed to the end of his speech, when the words are taken down, that the House may then take such order as to them may seem proper-by suppressi.g the objectionable words, or punishing the member. Mr. Speaker can suppress in the single case to which e order of 1604 applies. The argument on this occasion, however, claims for the Vice President the power of calling to order during the discussion, and of preventing the use of words, which, in his judgment alone, without any rule of the Senate, may be improper! But [Mr. McLANE said] he denied that the Lex Parlia mentaria of England had any binding force in the Senate of the United States, either to confer power on their presiding officer, or to determine the rules of their proceedings. Composed as that code was, of rules and orders expressly enacted by either branch of the British Parlia ment, and of decisions of points of order, with the assent of the two Houses, and sanctioned by long usage, its highest authority was, in being regarded as a branch of the great body of the common law of England, which had never been admitted to have any force in the Government of the United States. He knew that parts of the common law had been recognized in some of the individual States, but had been expressly repudiated by the decisions of the highest judicial tribunals from the Government of the Union. The rules and orders and principles of practice in the English courts even, do not apply to the courts of the United States, and therefore Congress, by her own laws, have made provision for this subject. He would not say, that in the absence of our legislation, the courts might not frame rules for their own government; but he would say, that any rule which should be adopted either for the Senate or the courts, would derive its validity from their recognition, and not from its force elsewhere. Now it would be seen, he said, not only that neither House of Congress had adopted the whole body of the Lex Parliamentaria as the rule of their proceedings, but that they had formed a body of rules of their own, rejecting the great mass of the English practice, and materially altering such parts as they pleased to engraft on their own rules. The Senate more especially, in the formation of their rules, have wholly omitted the order of 1604, which has been introduced into this discussion. [FEB. 11, 1828 tice was resorted to, and that he would not question the propriety of such reference, he utterly denied it for any other purpose. He protested against such resort for the In support of his position as to the force of the Lex purpose of deriving power from the rule of 1604 to conParliamentaria in the Senate, the Senator from Maryland trol debate, or of suppressing words spoken, by degradhad also referred us to Mr. Jefferson's Preface to the Ma-ing or otherwise punishing the member using them. He nual. But in the absence of any rule recognising the trusted if such power should ever be assumed, it would English law of Parliament, it could scarcely comport with not be quietly submitted to. the dignity of argument to suppose that a general opinion If the law of the English Parliament had no force here, hazarded in a Preface, would legalize that which the Se-it was incumbent on us, he said, to look to what each nate had discarded. If the Preface had proposed to re- House of Congress had themselves done upon this sub fer to past decisions upon particular rules, or to illustrate ject. The House had gone much farther than the Senate a practice which, by the sanction of the Senate, tacit or and changed materially the English practice. Among otherwise, might have introduced a rule, it might for such other things, their rules provide that "the Speaker shall purpose be valuable; but it does not propose even this. preserve order and decorum ;" and to this there is no si Referring to the power conferred on each branch of the milar rule in the Senate. Also, that “if any member, in Legislature, to determine the rules of its proceedings, it speaking, or otherwise, transgress the rules of the House remarks, that the Senate have accordingly formed some the Speaker shall, or any member may, call to order :" "rules for its own government, but those going only to and they, moreover, expressly declare that "a member, "a few cases, they have referred to the decision of their speaking, shall confine himself to the subject under de"President, without debate and without appeal, all ques- bate, and avoid personality;" and then prescribe the "tions of order arising either under their own rules, or manner of stopping the member violating the rule, and "where they have provided none; and hence the neces- the terms on which he may be permitted to resume the "sity of recurring for its own government to some known discussion. "system of rules, that he may neither leave himself free "to indulge caprice and passion, nor open to the impu"tation of them." It is evident that these observations of Mr. Jefferson refer to the rule which he is to adopt for his own decision on questions of order as they may arise; not assuming power to raise them of his own mere motion. He concedes to the Senate the power of making their own rules, and admits himself to be bound by those already made. Now, it so happens, that by those rules actually framed by the Senate, this subject of order in debate is expressly regulated, and in such manner as that the Vice President cannot himself call to order for words spoken, nor interpose his judgment in any way, until one Sena shall be called to order by another. The question of order thus arising, is referred to the decision of the Vice President, without debate and without appeal. If the remarks of Mr. Jefferson meant more than this, [Mr. McL. said,] he should be compelled to dissent from them; but he thought they meant no more. The rules of the Senate vary essentially from those of the House, and, though embracing most cases of disorder arising from other causes than words spoken in debate, they are silent as to pertinency of remark, and do not prohibit personality. On this subject, the Senate rules prescribe merely that a Senator, when speaking, “shall address the Chair, standing in his place, and when he has finished shall sit down;" and then, by the sixth and seventh rules, now proposed to be amended, provides as follows: "6th. When a member shall be called to order, he shall sit down until the President shall have determined whether he is in order or not; and every question of or der shall be decided by the President, without debate. but, if there be a doubt in his mind, he may call for the sense of the Senate. "7th. If the member be called to order for words spo ken, the exceptionable words shall immediately be taken down in writing, that the President may be better enabled to judge of the matter." It would be recollected, he said, that the Senate hav- To him it appeared obvious, that, by these rules, the ing made no rule pointing out words which should be right to call to order for words spoken was reserved to deemed disorderly, that question, whenever the occasion the members of the Senate, who were themselves deemarose, was exclusively referred to the decision of the Vice ed to be the best judges of the propriety of interrupting President. In such case it would be wholly discretionary discussion. In this view, it remained only to prescribe with him to rely on his own conception of order, to erect the mode of procuring a decision when such question a standard for himself, or resort to another existing in should be made, and this he thought the sole object of other bodies; to hold the member to strict order, or leave the rules already quoted. The sixth rule, requiring the him with the same latitude as was indulged in the Eng. member to sit down, "to afford the President an oppor lish Parliament previous to the rule of 1604. But Mr. tunity of determining whether he was in order or not," Jefferson meaning "not to leave himself free to indulge would have been unnecessary, if it had contemplated the "in caprice or passion, nor open to the imputation of call to be made by the President, since he must be sup "them," announces to the Senate his intention of resort-posed to have determined that before making the call.. ing to some known system of rules for the government of And the seventh rule, requiring the words to be taken his decisions, and therefore compiled the Manual from the down, the better to enable the President to judge, equal- 1 British practice, not as binding upon the Senate or him- ly excludes the idea of the call proceeding from him. In a self, beyond their own pleasure, but as a light to guide such case, his judgment must have been previously form his steps where the rules of the Senate had left any thing ed; but, as he might be inattentive to the course of re dark. He referred to the "Lex Parliamentaria," to en- mark at the moment of a call by a member, the necessity lighten his judgment in questions of order, either as it of reducing the words to writing was obvious. respected decorum in debate, or order in other proceed- Mr. McL. said, if the views he had summitted were not i ings, in the same manner as the Judges of the Courts re- erroneous, the Vice President had determined correctly sort to the "Lex Mercatoria," or other parts of the body in declining to call a Senator to order for words spoken of the common law, for sound principles relative to mer-in debate; and he was the more confirmed in this result, cantile transactions, or the numerous other cases arising since it had not been even attempted to trust him with for their decision Mr. Jefferson thus announced to the any power of enforcing his call, should he undertake to Senate his determination to adopt a rule for his own deci- make it. sions until they should please to adopt a better. It was Mr. McL. said he was not disposed to enlarge the pow for a rule of decision merely, that the parliamentary pracers of the Vice President in this respect, and was content Fr. 11, 1828.] Powers of the Vice President. [SENATE. But the member, or denying him the privilege of debating, with the existing rules of the Senate. Whether he looked By the principles of our free Government, and according to the habits of our people, a liberal latitude of debate is proper and allowable. What words may be disorderly, is not unfrequently a question full of difficulty, more likely to be satisfactorily decided by the Senators themselves, according to their own sense of propriety, than by another person, in conformity with any system of rules whatsoever. From the character of Parliamentary discussion, a scope of remark, more or less discursive and desultory, was to be expected, and he thought strictly allowable. His experience in this body had taught him that there Political disquisition, in many instances, defied the rewas little necessity for any rule here, respecting order and straint of logical precision; and, in the discussion of the decorum in debate. The dignified forbearance and liberal great political measures of this Government, connecting comity which had uniformly marked the deliberations of themselves with the policy of an administration, and the the Senate, themselves, created a law, and imposed re- character and ambition of public men, a free and excestraints, more efficient than any written rule. They arose sive range of debate was essential to the liberty of speech from a consciousness of the possession of the ultimate and the dearest privilege of the citizen. To detect, in power to enforce respect for the rules of decorum, by all cases, what would be such a departure from the proother means, when these failed. In such a body, he said, per license as would be deemed impertinent and disorthat was the only efficient law. It was the great moral derly, was scarcely practicable. In such a body as this, we influence of the power of the body for its own preserva- cannot erect a common standard for all. Every man is ton, which, like that of punishing for contempt, or breach not a dialectician, or severely disciplined by the rules of of privilege, required no written code; which was within logic. We are not to forget the composition of the Letis and around us, accompanied us in all our walks, was gislature of the Union, the wide range from which its our shield and buckler, and, though strong as iron, was members are selected, or the diversity of their minds, hayet light as air. He believed this moral force was weak-bits, and education. We come here inspired with a patriened by too much speciality in regulations of order, as otic ardor, placing a high value upon the virtues of the the multiplying rules of order not unfrequently led to People, holding the Government in all things strictly acdisorder. After all, he said, our main reliance was upon countable for its actions, and our constituents expect from our own sense of self-respect, of what was due to the us a free exposure of our opinions of men and measures. Senate, to the country, and to ourselves, and the know- It is in this way that much useful information is diffused edge of a higher power to be exerted, when every thing throughout the Union, and the attention of the People fixelse failed. On slight occasions, the exertion of any powered upon the operations of the Government and the conduct over this subject would be injudicious-in those of great emergency, that of the Senate only would be proper. A call to order, if confined to admonition merely, would be unavailing where this power ought properly to be exerted; but it is the power of enforcing obedience to the call, by punishment proper for the offence, by degrading of public men. The People who send us have a right to expect the representative to be tolerated and heard, though he may not be skilled in all the niceties of parlia mentary order. He meant not to excuse indecorous language, or mere personality, but he thought the liberty of speech flourished best untrammelled by too much rule; but, regulated by those salutary restraints imposed by the influence of a liberal education, good taste, and strong native sense of the speaker and his audience, close argument, in strict conformity with cold logical deduction, might best comport with his habits of thought and action; and a mild, but firm, exposure of political abuses, might fall less harshly upon his ear, and produce equal effect upon his mind; but he would not, for that reason, bring all others to the same standard. Nor would he disguise the pleasure with which he often heard and was instructed by the brilliant efforts of a bolder and more highly gifted genius, which, defying all rule, sported in its own peculiar element. It had been aptly said, by one of the greatest orators of modern days, "that it was the nature of genius to break "from the fetters of criticism, though its wanderings "were sanctioned by its majesty and wisdom when it ad"vances in its path-and was tamed into dulness when "subjected to rule." Mr McL. said, the liberty of this country could not exist without a rational freedom of speech and action, which should only be prevented from degenerating into licentiousness. In the language of the orator from whom he had already borrowed, "he must "be content to take Liberty, the last best gift, just as she is-we may parc her down into bashful irregularity, "and shape her into a perfect model of severe scrupulous "law, but she would then be Liberty no longer.” He desired not to be understood, by these observations, as extending impugnity to every thing that may be utter ed in debate on this floor, but as contending merely that the line of this indulgence cannot well be fixed by rule. The liberty of speech here implies as much observance of order, positive or otherwise, as is consistent with the right boldly and freely to expose to the People the real character of all subjects which it concerns their interest to know. What that latitude is, cannot be well promulgated in the abstract, but should be judged of in the particular instance, and by those whose deliberations were to be affected. He did not doubt that the ultimate power in the Senate, to which he had adverted, was sufficient for this purpose; and, if used with a wise forbearance, few occasions would call for its interference. It was his pride to hope and to feel that the Senate was not immediately exposed to the violence of political storms, which, though they might sometimes sweep over us, unless we followed them, and mingled in the tumult, would leave us on the high ground on which the Constitution had placed us. Mr. SMITH, of South Carolina, said that he should not have thought of offering the amendment now under consideration; but, while the rules were under discussion, he thought it best to make them as perfect as possible. At present all things were tranquil; but the peace and harmony of the country might not always remain, and it was desirable that all measures should be taken to preserve it. If the question involved in this amendment had already gone forth among the People, and caused some commotion, it was high time that it should be finally settled. He had always considered it the right ex vi termini of the President to quell all disorders of whatever description. The question was, whether it should not be the right of the President to call to order, giving the privilege to any member to call for a revision of the decision by the Senate. It was a rule of the Senate for thirty-five years, for the President to call to order, and he, himself, had been the subject of it. He had been called to order by his late venerable friend Mr. Gaillard. He had appealed to the Senate to say whether he was out of order, and the decision was, that there could be no appeal. It seemed to be assumed by some gentlemen, that they were going to place a tyrant in the Chair, and that against his lawless rule it was necessary to provide. This did not produce [FEB. 11, 1828. any effect on his mind. While a Vice President was in the Chair he had no fear. While the presiding officer of the Senate was one in whom the People had confidence, and who reached his elevation legally, he saw no cause of apprehension. In the House of Representatives, the members or the Chair have the right to call to order. If it did not exist in the office of Vice President, the Senate had the right to give it to him; and he was in favor of doing so. As to the supposition that the Vice President was not a member of the Senate, he did not believe the position could be maintained, as he was firmly of the opinion that he was made part of the body by the Constitution. It was true that all the powers formerly ex ercised by the Chair had not been considered inalienable. For instance, the manner of nominating committees had been changed several times, and at present that duty was transferred to the Senate itself. But there were other powers which were entirely incidental to the Chair, and could be vested no where else. A gentleman gets up, and makes a certain proposition. Does not the Chair tell him he is out of order? This is done every day. When two members rose also at the same time, power was given to the presiding officer to say whose turn it was to speak first. If the principle now attempted to be established were correctly founded, why should this power pertain entirely to the presiding officer? Why should not one of the forty-eight members do this? It would be idle to argue in this way; and it was, Mr. S. considered, strong proof that the Vice President had all the powers incidental to his situation. If they looked even to ordinary societies, they should find that they elected their President, who, by the election, was invested with all necessary powers for directing the business of the meetings. He becomes at once the judge of what is to be done, and the director of the mode in which it shall be done. I, for one, said Mr. S., am for giving power to the Chair, if there is any serious doubt of his possessing it. I think there is no danger in giving him such a power. If two members were to quarrel across the house, would the Chair decline interfering? Or, suppose that a Senator were to go at length into the consideration of a subject entirely foreign to the question in hand, and talk of the Army or the Navy when the question of the proper location of a road was before the Senate? or discuss the expediency of an appropriation, when no appropriation was contemplated? Would the Chair sit silent and permit this irrelevancy? Certainly not. If he did, an individual night talk here a whole day, and arrive at nothing. There were rules, the enforcement of which could not be taken from the Chair without making the Senate a mere nullity. It would be, in fact, throwing a new and inconvenient duty into the hands of the members, by setting them to watch over and administer the rules, which, in reality, belongs to the President. The House of Representatives was so fully convinced. of the necessity of some vigorous depository of this power to preserve order, that they had taken away the right of appeal from the call of the Chair. He believed that every deliberative body must have a presiding officer, and that individual ought to have the requisite authority for con serving the order of the meeting, and advancing the pro gress of the public business. That this duty might not be embarrassing, and to relieve the feelings of the Chair man, an appeal to the body ought to be allowed. If therefore, no other person made the motion, Mr. S. should move that the President have power to call to order, and a right of appealing to the decision of the Senate. Mr. KING said that, in reply to the gentleman from Mary land, he owed it to himself to say, that his remarks had been made in answer to the gentleman from Ohio, who thought the Constitution gave to the Vice Presi sident the power of calling to order without appealing to the Senate. It was in regard to this statement that he FEB. 11, 1828.] Powers of the Vice President. [SENATE. To me had said that such a construction would clothe the Pre- Mr. M'KINLEY here explained. He said, that he had sident of the Senate with a tremendous power. But he not meant to contend, that the Senate had no power, or did not believe any such thing. He was of opinion that that any Senator had not the right, but merely that it was the Senate had a right to give the power to the Vice Pre- not the duty of any particular Senator to exert this right, sident to call to order, with or without an appeal. of calling a member to order for words spoken in debate, Mr. McKINLEY merely rose to give the opinions which Mr. TAZEWELL resumed. I am happy to hear from would influence his vote. He looked upon all objections the Senator from Alabama, that he admits the right of the to the amendment as having a bearing upon the Consti- Senate, and of each and every member of this body, to tutional question. It had been said that the Vice Pre- exercise the power which the amendment proposes to sident was not a member of this body. If this declaration confer upon the Chair. The difference of opinion bewere modified so as to be that he was not a Senator, he tween this honorable Senator and myself, in relation to would agree to it. But he maintained that he was a this subject, is then reduced to a very narrow space inmember. The argument appears to be grounded on the deed. He admits the right of the Senate, and of each fact that the Senate does not elect him. We complain of its members; and denies that the presiding officer of that we do not elect him-that he is not a member-but this body enjoys this right at present. He thinks it exagainst whom do we complain? Against the People of pedient, however, that this officer should possess such a the United States. They elect him; and they, by the power, because it is not the special duty of any particuConstitution, declare that he shall preside over the de- lar Senator to exercise the right which confessedly belongs Eiberations of the Senate. I say, then, said Mr. McK., it to him. And thinking so, the Senator from Alabama is is the Vice President to whom the powers naturally be willing to grant such a power to the Chair, provided it is longing to a presiding officer should be accorded. Who limited and restricted as the amendment proposes. I conis to do the duty but him? Who else should preserve cur in the greater part of this opinion, although not for order, so necessary to the effectual performance of the the reason assigned by this honorable Senator. duties of Senators? It had been said that he possessed it has always appeared, that the rights of public agents no inherent power. I do not, said Mr. McK., understand | of all kinds, were bestowed upon them, not for their own, the term. He was not aware that any officer of Govern. but for the public good; and therefore, that all such rights ment possessed inherent power; he rather thought all conferred, were in truth but duties imposed. Being dupowers under the Constitution were delegated. He would ties, we have not the right to abandon their discharge, ask in what the difference consisted between the duties while we retain the station to which such duties attach: of the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the but we are bound to meet the responsibility they impose, President of this body? He did not see the great dis- without seeking to transfer the duty, and with it the retinction that had been imagined. But the great objec-sponsibility, to any other. As, however, it is unquestiontion was, that the Vice President not being responsible to ably within the competency of the Senate to do this act, this body, we cannot expel him in case of misconduct. and as some trifling convenience may possibly result from But again, I ask, whose fault is it that we are so restricted? it, (limited as it is proposed to make the power granted) And again, I answer, that of the People and the Consti- I should have been quite indifferent as to the fate of this on. And are we to fly in the face of the Constitution, amendment, but for arguments of a very different kind and say that, because the presiding officer is elected dif- from those urged by the Senator from Alabama, which rently, we will not give him the power necessary for have been offered in its support, by our Senators, who he proper performance of his duties? Order must be have declared their purpose to vote with him in its favor. preserved by some one; and it is preserved by the Vice To such arguments I can never yield even the assent of President in the Senate, under a clause in the Constitution. silence; and it is rather to contest their correctness and It was surely not the particular duty of a member to call truth, than to oppose the amendment offered, that I have other to order. He is the interested person, and ought risen to address the Senate. to be free from all interference in the duty. There should be an authority above him to judge cooly of the propriety of the procedure. He wished to know whether there was not a general rule in every deliberative body for this purpose? Where did the discretion rest, but in the hands of the presiding officer? The Vice President is a member of this body; he has a modified influence in makg of all laws, as he has the casting vote, and can ap-it be true, that this power is derived to the presiding offiwe or negative every measure. Was it not proper that te power should be delegated to the Vice President, f the forty-eight Senators, to preserve order? He Light there could be no question of the expediency of this measure; and under this impression was in favor of the amendment. Mr. TAZEWELL remarked, that if it was correct to y, as the Senator from Alabama who had just taken his at had said, that the Senate had no power, nor was it right of any Senator, to call a member of that body torder, for words spoken in debate, he would ask, from hence is derived the power to adopt this amendment? Pobject is, to invest the Chair with a power, which it was to have been conceded by all, the presiding offiof this body does not now possess, at least under the esting rules. Now, if it be true, that the Senate itself hath not such a power, can it be contended, that they may traster to another, rights or powers which they do not themselves possess? Surely it cannot be correct to give what the donor hath not to bestow; nor can the grantee derive any thing from such a discussion. The Senator from Ohio Mr. [RUGGLES] has supported this amendment, because, as he supposes, it conveys no new power to the presiding officer of this body, but is merely declaratory of a pre-existing right of that officer, a right which that Senator styles "an inherent right," appertaining to him virtute officii, and which is derived not from our rules, but from the constitution itself. Now if cer of this body from the constitution, from whence does When the Senator from Ohio, and others who have argued like him, speak of inherent rights, and mean thereby |