Superior Court of Buffalo, December, 1895. [Vol. 15. There was no riot, tumult, large fire or extreme breach of the peace; there was more or less disorder, but it may be assumed that it was not greater than usually prevails in the city of Buffalo. The language of the provision of the charter with which we are dealing is not such as we should expect from one skilled in the drafting of statutes, but its real meaning may be determined, I think, with less difficulty than is frequently met with by courts in similar cases. We may broadly assume, for the purposes of this proceeding, that when the statute in question says "no two platoons to be on duty at one and the same time," it means simply that no member of one platoon shall be required to do duty with another platoon, on the theory that the greater number, or the whole platoon, includes the lesser number, or some part of the platoon; that when the statute says that "platoons shall not wear uniforms when not on active duty, except when, in the discretion of the board, public demands are such as require the aid and assistance of a second platoon," it means simply that no patrolman shall wear his uniform when not on actual active duty, and when the statute says the board may, in its discretion on such occasions, order on duty all three platoons, it means simply that they may order on duty any part of said three platoons. Such is evidently the meaning of the law. Now a careful comparison of the statute with the record before us and the determination sought to be annulled makes it plain, 1. That the defendants designated the number of patrolmen to be assigned to each police precinct. 2. That the defendants divided the patrolmen in each precinct into three platoons. 3. That no patrolman is required to wear his uniform except when he is on actual active duty. 4. That no member of either of the three platoons is required to perform active patrol duty at the same time that a platoon other than that of which he is a member is performing active patrol duty. Misc.] Superior Court of Buffalo, December, 1895. If the word "duty" as used in the statute means actual active patrol duty, as I think it does, then the defendants must succeed in this controversy, because they have not violated the law, but have complied with all of its requirements. The "duty," of the relators within the meaning of the charter is measured by the service which they are obligated to perform as patrolmen. The word as used in the charter has no reference or relation to their conduct in religion, morals or ethics. The duty of the relators to respond to a call for service within the line of their vocation in case of an emergency is the same whether they be at the station house or in their own homes, or whether they be in uniform or not when the call is made. In either case it is their "duty" to respond and perform in a proper manner the necessary service, and it is only while they are performing such service that they are on "duty" within the meaning of the charter. My conclusion upon this point, therefore, is that the word "duty," as used in the charter, means actual and active duty as distinguished from being kept in reserve or within call for such actual and active duty. The fact that the defendants use the expression "reserve duty" does not imply that they give to the word a definition different from what I consider the correct one, and even if it did it would not prove the fact to be as it may be claimed by the relators their language. indicates. The relators when held in reserve are not on duty, therefore, within the meaning of the charter, but they are thus kept in reserve to be placed on duty if an emergency shall make it necessary, and in the absence of any emergency during the time they are held in reserve they are set at liberty from the restraint which has been put upon their movements, without having performed a moment of such active duty as by the charter they are required to perform as patrolmen. Ia my opinion there is no conflict between the charter and the determination of the defendants sought to be annulled. For the purpose, however, of further considering the matter in hand, we will assume for the sake of the argument Superior Court of Buffalo, December, 1895. [Vol. 15. made by the relators that the relators are doing "duty" within the meaning of the charter when they are held in reserve. Then, as members of different platoons are on duty at one and the same time, the question arises, in what manner and by whom is it to be determined whether or not public demands are such as to require such service? I can find no basis for the claim made by the relators in this behalf, that is to say, that such service can be required only in cases of riot, tumult, etc. The charter, as we have construed it for the purpose of this proceeding, is given its broadest possible meaning, and is in effect that on occasions when public demands require it such service may be exacted of the relators. The words "public demands "and" occasions" refer to and identify the same thing or subject-matter, namely, a necessity for having members of different platoons on duty at one and the same time. The very nature of the case makes it clear to me that the defendants, in administrating the affairs of their department, must necessarily act for the most part upon apprehensions of danger to the con:munity which may or may not prove to have been well founded. They must necessarily heed and act upon rumors, news items in the daily press and other publications, confidential communications, surmises or guesses, if you please so to designate them, and information of a more or less reliable nature derived from countless sources, as well as upon their own personal knowledge concerning the matters with which they have to deal. In such a condition of things it is easy to see that an emergency may arise at any moment requiring members of different platoons to be on duty at one and the same time, when to prove the fact that the emergency exists by such evidence as would be received by a court of justice, trying a controverted question of fact, would be an absolute impossibility. For this reason alone, as it seems to me, it must be held that the defendants are vested with the discretionary power to determine and decide for themselves when, in the language of the charter, "public demands are such as require that members of different platoons shall be on duty at one and the same time." Misc.] Superior Court of Buffalo, December, 1895. To hold that the relators are entitled to litigate with their superior officers the question as to whether or not public demands require the services of more or less of the members of the three platoons of patrolmen in a precinct at one and the same time would be subversive of all discipline and of that wholesome respect for constituted authority so essential to the efficiency of the police force of a great city. The case of People ex rel. Purdy v. Fitch, 147 N. Y. 355, relied upon by the relators as authority for the contention that the writ of certiorari will lie in such a case as the one at bar does not, in my opinion, support the contention. That and many other cases hold, and in fact the rule is elementary, that where, as in that case, a board or officer exercises judicial functions, and no other adequate remedy is available to correct errors made by it or him, the aggrieved party may prosecute the writ of certiorari, but that and all other cases to which my attention has been called where the writ was upheld are clearly distinguishable from the one at bar, in that the determinations reviewed were based on evidence which was certain and definite, and could be intelligently weighed and considered by a court on a review of the matter; whereas, in the case at bar, the evidence upon which the defendants made the determination complained of may or may not have been of that character, and even if it were of that character in the particular instance under consideration, action by them on the same line, while exercising their functions as a board of police, must frequently and probably usually will be based on facts satisfactory to them, but which, if submitted to a court in a subsequent controversy as to the fact whether public demands. were of a specific nature on a certain date in the past, would seem puerile and foolish. My conclusion is that the writ should be dismissed, with costs. Trrus, Ch. J., and HATCH, J., concur. Superior Court of Buffalo, December, 1895. [Vol. 15. JOSEFA ZRSKOWSKI, Plaintiff, v. JOHN MACH, as President, Defendant. (Superior Court of Buffalo General Term, December, 1895.) PLEADING JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION - BENEVOLENT SOCIETIES. A cause of action against a benevolent society for damages sustained by plaintiff by being subjected to the stigma and disgrace of having her husband buried in the potter's field because of the failure of the society to pay the benefit and provide burial according to its agreement, is one arising out of the breach of contract, and may be joined with a cause of action for failure to make such payment and provide for such burial. DEMURRER to the complaint. Harring & Smith, for plaintiff. John W. Fisher, for defendant. TITUS, Ch. J. The defendant demurs to the complaint herein on the ground that two causes of action have been improperly united. The complaint alleges that the defendant was the president of an unincorporated association, of which the plaintiff's husband at the time of his death was a member in good standing; that in consideration of premiums paid by him the association agreed to pay to the plaintiff, his widow, within sixty days after notice of his death, the sum of $750, as insurance on his life, together with the necessary doctor's fees and funeral expenses, said fees and expenses to be paid and said funeral to be arranged for immediately after death by the said association. That the notice of his death was duly given more than sixty days before the commencement of this action, and that the defendant neglects or refuses to pay the same. The complaint then proceeds, without separately numbering the causes of action, with: "The plaintiff is a poor woman with limited means, and because of the failure of said association to arrange for and provide, and because said association wholly neglected to and refused to arrange for and provide, after the said death, |