sized in no uncertain way the author's rejection of orthodox methods and results (101). In 1916 Dodge spoke on the "Laws of Relative Fatigue," a title which suggests the course of some of his own studies, but which, at the same time, emphasized a problem that has become perennial in psychology and in certain allied sciences (21). In 1917 Yerkes reviewed the "history of the organizing of psychological military service" under the title "Psychology in Relation to the War" (111). As we have suggested, the war had inevitably to increase interest in psychotechnology, or "applied psychology" as it is more commonly known, and Scott's address in 1919 on "Changes in some of our conceptions and practices of personnel" shows the swing of the pendulum in this direction (78). There was no presidential address in 1918, a small meeting of the Association being devoted to military problems. In 1920 the age-old problem of mindbody relations was reviewed by Franz in a setting furnished by the modern psychopathic hospital rather than by philosophical speculation (28). Miss Washburn's address in 1921 was a sign of returning "normalcy normalcy" for it undertook to answer one of the challenges set by Watson's pre-war address on method (98). Under the title "Introspection as an Objective Method," she sought to show that introspection or "symptomatic language behavior" is as trustworthy as the methods accepted in other descriptive sciences.

(d) The necrology for our six-year period is large enough to remind us again that the science is rapidly passing into a third generation. Külpe, Meumann, Witasek, Fabre and Weismann in 1915; Münsterberg, Mach, Alzheimer, Müller-Lyer, Royce, Oppenheim, Norsworthy, Kidd, Horsley and Ribot in 1916; Brentano, Carus, Abramowski, Grasset, Tyler, and Dubois in 1917; Hering and Maudsley in 1918; Baird, Mercier, Ladame, Raleigh and Tamburini in 1919; Wundt, Flournoy, Hyslop, Southard, Leclère, Meinong, Delage and Siebeck in 1920; and Ladd, Lehmann, Verworn, Ewald, Boutroux and Erdmann in 1921, are the most important men in psychology and in related disciplines that have left their laboratories. to their students.

In spite of the heroic times through which the science has been passing, there are, at the present moment, no indubitable signs of a material or permanent change in its general character. It is doubtful, however, if such signs would be recognized should they appear, for American psychology, as a single illustration, is the product of so many and such diverse interests that one cannot recognize, at times, even its central problems. A science which has drawn its materials

from the highly sophisticated German philosophy of the last century, from the physics and physiology of the whole continent, from the biology and animal behavior of England and America, and from the studies of the French upon mental pathology may turn without warning in any direction, especially when the responsibility for a considerable part in the future development of the science has fallen upon a people who are not naturally given to a love of profound criticism and endless detail but who do have a tremendous capacity for practical affairs. A classified tabulation of the titles appearing in the Psychological Index during the last ten years and an inspection of the titles themselves seem, however, to suggest the following inferences: There has been a steady decrease of interest in mindbody relations of the philosophical kind, in general discussions of sensation, in visual sensations (except for 1921), in attention, in comparison and judgment, and in testimony. There has been a growing interest in auditory, cutaneous, olfactory, gustatory and organic sensations including the alleged "static" sensations. Under audition, for example, stands the attack made upon the Helmholtz theory by Wrightson and Keith (108, 11), Rich's study of tonal attributes (70, 71), and Watt's Psychology of Sound (100). The outstanding work of 1916, to take another example, was done by Henning on taste and smell (42, 43) in which the old Linnean and Zwaardemaker classification was replaced by six fundamental qualities forming the corners of a triangular prism upon which all other smell qualities might be placed. The system of taste qualities he arranged into a tetrahedron.

Perception, the functions of the muscles and glands, the various branches of psychotechnology, and social psychology also present distinct advances in interest. Aside from a few other departments which depend almost wholly upon laboratory facilities and which, accordingly, suffered during the war, most of the divisions of the science as listed by the Index have continued at the same level for a number of years. Historical notes, relations with other sciences, general problems, methods, apparatus, studies on the nervous system, psychophysics, affection and emotion, instinct, memory, thought, unusual mental states and functions, and animal psychology continue to command a modicum of interest. The number of papers in a given subject is not, of course, a reliable index of the quality of the papers, nor of their systematic importance, and it is quite possible, therefore, that a future survey will see in them a turn of the science in one direction or another.

If it is necessary to hazard a guess as to which way the science is turning one might be tempted to say that the leaven of behaviorism is at work and that the future will see less of the German tradition and more of mind and body as operating or performing in the business of living. It may be for this reason that psychotechnology, including under this term all the applications of psychological facts and principles to law, medicine, education, industry and the like, has developed at a greater rate than any other division of the science. As we have intimated, the war period was a "jubilee year" of "applied psychology." The movement initiated by Stern's "individual psychology" and Münsterberg's industrial enthusiasms has now passed wholly beyond its earlier position of minor interest in the discipline. Those who have looked with alarm upon the rapid way in which the various psychotechnologies have drained the science and laboratories of men and who have seen this drainage tremendously augmented by the war are inclined to believe that the science has fallen, in its youth, upon unfortunate times. On the contrary, those who felt that psychology was losing its contact with a mind whose chief characteristics were alleged to be found during actual mind-body operation and accomplishment, or those who felt that the discipline should administer primarily to the mentally sick, to the deficient, to the aberrant or to such processes as education, believe that the war and the demand for an applied science have saved the discipline from academic abstraction. As we have suggested, there is very little in the character of contemporary research to show which way, if in either, the main current of the science is apt to run. It may turn out that the biological tradition has thrown us a little off our feet by sending us after a mind whose very existence depends upon adaptation and use. A functional psychology, or, according to Titchener's analysis, a psychology of act, leads naturally to an emphasis upon practical values. On the other hand, it may turn out that we have buried ourselves too deeply in the German tradition with the result that mental analysis has taken us too far away from mind-body operation.

We shall turn, now, to the second large part of our task, viz., that of enumerating and commenting upon the historical and biographical notes and the large systematic histories. We shall review, first, the general histories, and secondly, the more limited or special historical notes. Only one major contribution has been made to the general history of psychology during the period under survey. The period was prefaced by Baldwin's History of Psychology, the first

general history to appear in English, and Klemm's Geschichte der Psychologie, which was translated into English by Wilm and Pintner. In 1921, however, the second and third volumes of Brett's History of Psychology appeared, thus completing a task which he had set for himself in 1912 when his History of Psychology, Ancient and Patristic, was published. As will be recalled, 348 pages in the first volume were consumed in tracing the development of psychological thought from Thales to Augustine. The second volume continues to record, on the plan established in the first, in chronological order, "the steps by which psychology has reached its present stage of development." It includes also an estimate of the condition and contribution of all those phases of human thought to which psychology is allied. The second volume contains four parts given respectively to (a) the background of medieval thought; (b) to medieval doctrines; (c) to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; and (d) to the eighteenth century. The third volume falls into two parts, the first dealing with the "age of transition" and the second describing modern psychology. Fechner, Lotze, Stumpf, Wundt, Mach, Avenarius, Horwicz, Brentano, Lipps, Hartmann, Bain, Spencer, the Mills and James are referred to generously in the third volume.

Brett's history, taken in conjunction with those that have been published prior to the period now under survey, represents a high type of historiography. We still have, however, no history of psychology (37). An historical survey which spends four-fifths of its space in getting as far as 1860 is but a prolegomenon to the history of the science. Of the prolegomena, Brett has written one of the best. The science needs, however, a general history which will do for the whole science what Warren has done for the Association Psychology (97). This study was presaged in 1916 by a chapter on "Mental Association from Plato to Hume" (96), a study which began with Aristotle's establishment of the problem under his principles of similarity, contrast and contiguity and his doctrine of the fusion of experiences. The study, which constitutes Chapter II in the book, goes on to review the contributions of the post-Aristotelians, of Descartes, Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. Chapters III, IV, and V in the book are devoted to Hartley, Brown, Spencer, and Lewes. Chapter VI summarizes the preceding five chapters. Chapter VII sketches the development of Associationism on the Continent. The remainder of the volume (three long chapters) gives a comprehensive summary of the experimental studies upon association and a

statement of some of the relations of association to systematic psychology.

A number of other excellent special historical reviews have appeared although none of them is so searching or so complete as Warren's. The first of these, during our period, was Bentley's study of the psychological antecedents of phrenology (6). The writer found that “the historical importance of Gall touches not so closely the vagaries of his doctrine of phrenology as the fact that he sought empirically to integrate the psychological and anatomical knowledge of his time." (6, p. 115). The foundations of Gall's system are found, in part, in French Sensationalism and, in part, in the doctrine of faculties and in the German empirical psychology of the close of the eighteenth century. Another special study of importance has been done by Stratton on early Greek physiological psychology as it appears in a fragment by Theophrastus (82). Stratton finds in Theophrastus the "most important source of our knowledge of the earlier Greek physiological psychology"". . . for an acquaintance with what these earlier investigators knew and thought of the observable processes of the mind-the processes by which we gain our impressions of the outer world and reproduce and elaborate these impressions; the processes of pleasure and pain; and the connection which all these and emotion and purpose have with the different parts or states of the body-of all these matters that are so important for modern psychology Theophrastus gives in this fragment a report far fuller than we find in Aristotle's De Anima, even when this is supplemented by the historical material in the other works of Aristotle. And one may in perfect justice go even farther and say that for a knowledge of Greek psychology before Plato-apart from the question as to the nature of the soul, which Theophrastus almost wholly ignores-we are indebted to Theophrastus for more than to all the other ancient authorities combined" (pp. 15-16). Stratton's study is divided into three sections, the first dealing with Theophrastus as a psychologist of sense perception, and as a reporter and critic of other psychologists, the second with the text and translation of the text, and the third with notes upon the translation and upon the original text.

Boas has uncovered an interesting item in the history of affective psychology (10). In a dissertation by J. J. Reich, a pupil of the famous G. E. Stahl, of Halle, the argument is made in typical scholastic fasion that "emotional phenomena " cause such disturb