how they develop into more complex behavior such as learning, memory, thinking, etc.

On the whole the tendency toward newer and different forms of organizing material seems to be to get closer to a nonsubjectivistic description of the adaptational functions of the psychological organism. The implication follows that the psychologist is describing some actual natural processes, some objective happenings. Incidentally it seems to us the statements tie up better with what one can observe than would otherwise be the case. In fact, the newer attitudes make psychological facts into concrete events. In a certain sense this means that psychological materials are appreciated more and more on their own account and thus the psychologist does not find it necessary to reduce his data, whether stimuli objects or response action, to introspective abstractions in order to give them the semblance of science.

IV. CONSCIOUSNESS

The tendency toward objectification is no less shown when we trace out some of the changes with respect to the conception of consciousness in the recent textbooks. To start first with a book written by one of the foremost American representatives of the structural or mentalistic viewpoint we find that Titchener's volume (12) indicates considerable modification in this direction. In the first place, the use of the term consciousness is entirely eliminated from the volume as a definite tool. And it is our opinion that this change in the Beginner's Psychology is correlated with a greater utilization of the nervous system as a determining principle in psychology than is true in Titchener's Textbook. In abjuring the use of the term consciousness Titchener explains that it is rejected because it stands for knowledge or awareness, whereas the psychologist any more than the physicist has nothing to do with such things. Titchener's entire discussion at this point appears to us as a striking attempt to put the facts of psychology upon a more objective and natural science basis than has hitherto been the case in his books. In the present volume Professor Titchener insists that sensation must be thought of as an objective fact precisely as one thinks of a metal or other object of physics or chemistry. Let us note that the psychology of this book as well as that of the Textbook and others is based upon a division of natural facts into two kinds, physical and mental, but in the present book (13), we detect a stronger note of objectivity, although on the whole the objectivity is on a different level than in other books under review.

Turning now to a volume (3) whose author definitely proclaims an eclecticism, namely Breese, we find that in addition to an admission of behavior and action materials the writer intends to make consciousness completely persuasive of all psychological facts. In this matter he goes contrary to the traditional textbook in which the reflexes are presumed to be partially or completely distinct from control or connection with consciousness. The import of this attitude is, we believe, that the materials of psychology are being considered more as unitary objective facts.

To the writer it seems that this is a different state of conditions than the viewpoint represented in such a book as Münsterberg's (8), in which, while there is a very complete connection between neural apparatus and conscious states, there is still left over a complete series of psychological facts which are not subject to the same laws as hold in the domain of natural science facts. This contrast is marked, in spite of the fact that Münsterberg's action theory was meant to establish a thoroughgoing or mechanistic objective viewpoint.

We have already seen when studying the nervous system how Warren (13) makes consciousness objective by identifying it with neural functions. There are here symptoms of a marked inclination toward an objective psychology.

Smith and Guthrie (11) appear to us to indicate the development of a more objective position in psychology by relegating the discussion of consciousness to one chapter at the end of the book. They declare that psychology must be a science of behavior because of its greater exactness when interpreted in that way, but they would not, however, dispense completely with the discussion of consciousness because it still is a matter of interest.

As extreme instances of the objectifying tendency there are appearing textbooks which dispense with or appear to dispense with the conception of consciousness entirely. Or else they make that which is most popularly known as consciousness into an integrated factor in responses. Examples of this situation are to be found in Meyer (7) who treats of the psychological materials and facts as definitely objective responses of another person.

Watson (14) of course dispenses with the conception of consciousness as any separate thing different from the ordinarily objectively visible facts and gives the impression at least that he means to make all the data of psychology consist of the actions of the body as a whole. At the same time this author rejects such terms as sensations, attention, etc., which have traditionally carried the significance of subjective as over against objective psychological facts.

V. SENSATIONS

Besides the notable change in the general problem of consciousness we can clearly recognize a transformation in the treatment of some specific psychological topics, and especially is this true for sensations. Indeed we find here very remarkable variations which are indicated by the fact that sensations are made into actions more definitely than has ever before been the case. We have already referred to Titchener's (12) emphasis that sensations must not be looked upon as knowledge factors but as definite objective processes. Warren even describes language in terms of kinesthetic sensations and in so doing obviously makes sensations into motor and actional facts.

This statement about sensations being actions is of course matched by the psychologists who make ideas also into actions. This is a more definite attitude even than that which makes language into kinesthetic sensations. Now in this same connection the problem of imageless recall offers us eloquent testimony of the newer psychological trend. Ogden's discussion (9) of imageless thought suggests without doubt that even for the structuralist such action can be very definitely described in terms of behavior rather than in terms of sensory material. The same thing is true of Woodworth's (15) suggestion concerning non-sensory recall.

Woodworth, in this chapter on sensations, further exemplifies a more objective attitude toward these psychological processes. Not only does he very emphatically support the statement that sensations are responses but he takes cognizance of very recent experiments and discussion which tend very definitely to establish sensations as objective qualities of things. Thus he suggests that Henning's work will revolutionize the psychology of olfactory sensations.

Coming to Watson (14) we have a very precise attempt to make sensations into objective facts. As we might expect Watson prefers to make sensations consist of the operation of physical end-organs with possibly the addition of the neural and motor apparatus connected with those organs.

Meyer (7) makes no provision at all for the discussion of sensation in the way it is ordinarily done but rather handles the material usually treated under this heading by way of describing the response of the psychological machine, called the "other one" to the spectrum, sound signal, etc.

To consider another specific topic we might mention the extremely factual treatment that Woodworth (15) gives to imagination, including as he does under this heading manual skill, construction and play. Also the discussion of emotions and perception by this author and others indicates the expanding objectivity we are trying to point out.

VI. ENLARGED SCOPE OF TEXTBOOKS

The enlarged scope of recent textbooks cannot fail to suggest the modified attitude we are tracing. Not only do the more recent books display a changing character in the way psychological facts are discussed but they also include types of facts which previously were not treated at all. For example, diverse kinds of learning in their various phases find a very large place in recent works. In fact, in some books, Woodworth's (15) for example, learning constitutes a prominent part of the total materials handled. Various phases of learning of a concrete sort even displace the older material on association of ideas in the chapter on memory and association. In our opinion this fact symbolizes a more matter of fact method of describing psychological reactions, for the enlarged scope of the books appears to be based upon a stimulus-response foundation. In some books, however, even an extreme emphasis of learning facts does not mean an enlargement of psychology's scope but rather only a change of attitude or emphasis with respect to the traditional material found in psychological texts. Such a situation is exemplified by Watson who replaces thinking, memory and all the other so-called mental processes by learning materials. That is, Watson does not enlarge the scope of his book but merely attempts to throw out the old subjectivism to make room for the new objective material. In this case the fact that he does not enlarge his scope in order to carry the traditional material along with the new, rather reinforces our hypothesis than weakens it.

We might also add that in general the newer textbooks attempt to bring out and stress the actions of the person; this is illustrated by an increased stressing of physiological changes and other conditions which influence behavior including the surroundings in general. Very much to this same point, namely the emphasis on responses in psychological discussion, is the introduction of Freudian materials. These materials are made use of in various parts of the textbooks; for example, Woodworth introduces the discussion of psychoanalytic materials in his discussion of dreams, with the result that dreams are handled as any ordinary sort of behavior. They are made into concrete forms of responses rather than successions of states of mind as the traditional statement of dreams expressed it. Angell (1) makes use of Freudian conceptions in his discussion of thinking, and here again thought takes on more the form of responsive behavior than is ordinarily the case.

Brierly (4) in a very recent textbook makes her whole discussion center to a great extent around the Freudian factors. Her whole psychology turns about the problem of the wish and other psychoanalytic conceptions. We must repeat again that the enlargement of the scope of psychological discussions has tended very directly toward a behavior goal, with the consequence that such discussions are escaping from the confining walls of subjectivistic tradition.

VII. CONDITIONS CONTRIBUTING TO AN OBJECTIFYING TENDENCY

Briefly we might turn to a consideration of some of the conditions which are responsible for or correlated with this objectifying tendency in psychology. It is all the more necessary to try and point out such contributing conditions inasmuch as we may have already suggested that the mere adherence to a physiological viewpoint has not been especially conducive to the establishment of an objective psychology. The same thing may be true in the case of these other conditions, which we plan to point out. It is hardly possible to overestimate the great influence which the work of the physiologist on conditioned reflexes has had on the development of psychology. One of the fundamental points this work has brought out has been the emphasis on stimulus factors in behavior. In the first place, it was observed that the interesting thing about the behavior of an organism was the way in which the responses of that organism are attached to a stimulus and can be shifted from one stimulus to another. Or to put it in other words, it was observed that the responses of an individual could be attached to additional or conditioning stimuli. These observations resulted in the shifting of the attention of the psychologist from some non-verifiable cause or condition of behavior to the observable mechanism of coördinating an organism's responses with stimuli.

Possibly it is not too much to assert that when psychology comes to be fully and exclusively studied from such an objective standpoint as the treatment of the conditioned reflex suggests, then and then only will psychology have attained to a Galilean revolution in statement