That is another question.

grapes sour? The authors must be praised, however, for making it clear to their readers that play is not a specific sensori-motor function, but that any and all sensorimotor functions may become acts of play.

Under "Perception" the authors discuss examples of the most important habits, from the simplest to those which go under the names of judgment, conviction, and belief. Under "Human Motives" they give the student a good idea of the meaning of a "delayed reaction" and of "volition." The chapter on "Social Psychology" makes very clear the fact that all social habits are accidental and not a natural part of a human being's equipment. An Appendix" gives a brief, but quite comprehensive account of the "conscious" states for the benefit of those many who believe to be unable to get along without them in psychology.

If the reviewer had not written his own textbook, which naturally suits his own views more completely, and if then he had to select a textbook for a beginners' course in psychology, this one of Smith and Guthrie he would unhesitatingly select in preference to all others on the market. Indeed, if he had to give a very abbreviated course, he would prefer this to his own. The authors have successfully omitted most of the "traditional, but unnecessary detail and the blind alley topics, an acquaintance with which has been considered a polite accomplishment in psychology."

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI

MAX F. MEYER

R. S. WOODWORTH. Psychology, A Study of Mental Life. New York: Holt, 1921. Pp. x+580.

The reviewer, whenever he sees a new psychology text, approaches it with the following questions: (1) How does the author delimit his field? In other words, how does he define psychology? (2) How does he subdivide his field? What categories does he use for chapter arrangement? (3) Is the author's endeavor mainly descriptive or mainly explanatory? And if explanation plays the dominant or at least an important rôle, what are the principles (laws, hypotheses) of explanation?

(1) Woodward separates psychology from sociology by the following distinction: Sociology studies the activities of a group of people taken as a whole, while psychology studies the activities of the individuals." (The reviewer would prefer the distinction by

reference to "institutional life.") He separates psychology from biology, or more especially from physiology, by saying: Psychology devotes itself to desire, thought, memory, and such 'mental functions,' while physiology concentrates its effort upon 'bodily' functions." He adds that this is only a rough distinction, which breaks down at many points. The reviewer rejects this distinction as not being an objective one; and yet may be preferable to a certain objective, but unreal, distinction which a certain group of psychologists is trying to popularize, holding that psychology studies "the whole animal," as if a physiologist would dream of studying, for example, the liver without reference to its service in the whole animal. The real distinction has been emphasized perhaps first by Miss Calkins: Everything psychological has a social significance.

"We do not find any clean separation." Therefore Woodworth concludes that "it would be correct, then, to limit psychology to the study of conscious activities and of activities akin to these. But to say, as used to be said, that psychology is purely an introspective science, making use of no other sort of observation, is absurd in the face of the facts." So he finally adopts the following definition: Psychology is the science of the conscious and near-conscious activities of living individuals." (He thus expressly excludes the souls of the dead.) To the reviewer it appears a matter of great regret that Woodworth in this textbook, which will undoubtedly have a great influence on the growing generation of psychologists in this country, did not succeed in freeing his definition from all reference to the conscious.

(2) The author seems to have conceived his twenty chapters (apart from the introductory) in four divisions, if the reviewer is a good mind reader. Each of these divisions consists of a first part in which objective facts predominate in the discussion and a second in which introspection plays its traditional rôle. Into the first division (but this is only the reviewer's impression) fall chapters II to IX. The more objective facts are related in the chapters II to VI under the terms "native and acquired traits, reflexes, and instincts." But in the chapters VII to IX, "Emotion, Inventory of Human Instincts and Primary Emotions, The Feelings" we are constantly reminded that psychology is the science of the conscious activities. The treatment is excellent provided we adopt the author's definition of psychology. And there is no doubt that the larger part of the public for aid in psychology teaching still adopt that definition or a similar one.

The second division seems to consist of the chapters X, XI, XII. The tenth chapter discusses the functions of the sense organs on fifty-seven pages. The subjective side then finds its dominating treatment in chapters XI and XII under "Attention" and " Intelligence." The author lays down the following six "great laws of attention," the law of selection, the law of advantage, the law of shifting, the law of tendency, the law of combination, the law of degrees. All these laws, however, are treated in a descriptive rather than in an explanatory manner, -as qualitative rather than as quantitative and truly scientific experiences. The chapter entitled Intelligence" concerns itself chiefly with the Binet tests.

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The third division, as the reviewer sees it, includes chapters XIII to XVII. The thirteenth chapter "Learning and Habit Formation" tells of the objective facts of the modifying process undergone by native reactions. The causes which "detach a response from a stimulus" are said to be three: pain or "failure" or "negative adaptation." However true this enumeration of the causes may appear superficially, the reviewer can not help saying, in passing, that he does not think highly of these "causes." To one accustomed to the explanations of the mathematicophysical sciences, those causes are hardly an "explanation." They are a qualitative description. The subjective side then plays its prominent rôle in the chapters Memory, Association and Mental Imagery, The Laws of Association, Perception."

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The fourth division begins with an objective statement to the effect that "reasoning" is a kind of "exploration" of a situation. But the statement is not analyzed either extensively or, to the reviewer, quite convincingly enough. Is exploration" not adopted here because this term is so strongly "subjective" and therefore so much more pleasing to the average reader than a more strictly objective term? The "conscious behavior" standpoint overwhelmingly dominates the last four chapters, "Reasoning, Imagination, Will, Personality." The nineteenth chapter, "Imagination," treats first of "mental manipulation," but the reviewer did not succeed in understanding what idea of "mental manipulation" would be exactly conveyed by this chapter to the average reader or student. It further treats of "play," but the reviewer did not succeed in convincing himself that the author attaches any definite meaning to the term "play in spite of the rather important rôle it plays in the text. The author's intention seems to be that of using the term play eclectically, so that no school of theorists can fail to find at least

some of its own views about play in the treatment offered.

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Maybe the reader of this review will be helped by a quotation (p. 492): "Play gratifies many instincts, not merely a single one. Further, it is very doubtful whether the whole satisfaction of play activity can be traced to the instincts, anyway, for play may bring in the native 'likes and dislikes,' which we saw to be irreducible to instinctive tendencies; and it may bring in acquired likes and interests developed out of these native likes. Play gives rise to situations that are interesting and attractive to the players, though the attraction cannot be traced to any of the instincts. The rhythm of dancing, marching, and of children's sing-song games can scarcely be traced to any of the instincts." The reviewer would certainly in every single case trace them thus and thereby get rid of the term play" entirely.

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The same chapter "Imagination" treats of daydreaming ("it is a sort of play"), worry ("fear daydreams also include worry"), nightdreaming ("it seems likely that dreams are like daydreams in affording gratification to desires"), Freud's theory of dreams, autistic thinking, invention and art. The twentieth chapter teaches (p. 528), that " voluntary action occurs when you realize the situation and are definitely conscious of yourself." The twenty-first chapter discusses personality as either integrated or partially dissociated, further the self, the unconscious and the subconscious.

(3) The book is a most excellent compilation of a mass of material much larger than what can be taught the average student in any single psychology course even throughout the year. But many teachers do not mind that. The reviewer understands readily that the average teacher will be captivated by its clear and entertaining style, captivated even to the extent of concluding (as at least one psychology teacher has publicly done), that the author's treatment has "harmonized thoroughly the rival claims of introspection and behavior for the major part of psychology." The reviewer does not share that rash optimism. While congratulating the author on the very high literary merits of his book, he cannot abstrain from expressing the opinion that this book has established no such harmony and that it is likely to have (obviously has already had) the regrettable effect of clouding the issue, in spite of the fact that the author does emphasize that "mental processes of all kinds are reactions" (p. 67).

It seems to the reviewer that Woodworth's text is mainly descriptive, and that the explanatory features, very naturally always less popular with the average reader or college student, have been sacrificed, not absolutely, but relatively, that is, in being overshadowed

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by the descriptive features. For instance, "a reflex may come to be attached to a new stimulus" (p. 298). "Voluntary control includes the ability to omit a response (p. 298). "Detachment of an impulse or emotion from its natural stimulus is very much in evidence" (p. 299). "Man may observe that the dinner bell means dinner, whereas the dog does not observe" (p. 303). "Man learns by impulsively doing in some instances, by rational analysis in others" (p. 313). The reviewer quotes these few examples in order to illustrate his view that traditional description prevails; he has looked in vain for "explanations" of these descriptive facts. Perhaps it was excusable and even wise thus to place the relative emphasis, in order to reach a larger audience. Does not even Watson, who is regarded by many as "the" radical behaviorist, include in his textbook a chapter on "emotions" justifiable and justified by nothing but the fact that such a chapter has always been included in the traditional and subjective "psychologies"? Nevertheless, is it not time for psychology to get out of that condition in which (descriptive) botany and zoology found themselves forty years ago? MAX F. MEYER

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI

JAMES SULLY. My Life and Friends: A Psychologist's Memories. New York: Dutton (no date). Pp. 344.

G. STANLEY HALL. Recreations of a Psychologist. New York: Appleton, 1920. Pp. 336.

MARGARET MÜNSTERBERG. Hugo Münsterberg: His Life and Work. New York: Appleton, 1922. Pp. 449.

Unlike medicine and law, psychology has made little use of the case method except in psychoanalysis. But even the orthodox psychologist may at times derive profit and pleasure from a study of the individual, particularly when that individual is himself a psychologist. In reading the Letters of William James one is struck most of all by the vivid picture of the author's personality. To many of the younger generation the name of Sully, Hall, or Münsterberg represents merely a textbook or a footnote reference. In the three volumes before us these three pioneer psychologists are revealed as living personalities.

James Sully's Life and Friends is a chatty narrative, written in easy, attractive style. The first part gives a life-like picture of the author's life from childhood on. The story is told quite objectively. In fact it is too objective at times; for we can only guess at the