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member, more than if the scheme and information were given privately at the Secretary's office? Nor, Mr. Chairman, do I approve what the gentlemen say with respect to calling on the Secretary for information; it will be no mark of inattention or neglect, if he take time to consider the questions you propound; but if you make it his duty to furnish you with plans of information on the improvement of the revenue and support of public credit, and he neglect to perform it, his conduct or capacity is virtually impeached. This will be furnishing an additional check.

It has been complained of as a novelty; but, let me ask, gentlemen, if it is not to an institution of a similar kind that the management of the finances of Britain is the envy of the world? It is true, the Chancellor of the Exchequer is a member of the House that has the sole right of originating money bills; but is that a reason why we should not have the information which can be obtained from our officer, who possesses the means of acquiring equally important and useful knowledge? The nation, as well as the Parliament of Britain, holds a check over the Chancellor: if his budget contains false calculations, they are corrected; if he attempts impositions, or even unpopular measures, his administration becomes odious, and he is removed. Have we more reason to fear than they? Have we less responsibility or security in our arrangement of the Treasury department? If we have, let us improve it, but not abridge it of its safest and most useful power. I hope the committee will refuse their approbation of the

present motion.

Mr. LIVERMORE. I shall vote for striking out the clause, because I conceive it essentially necessary so to do. The power of originating money bills within these walls, I look upon as a sacred deposite, which we may neither violate nor divest ourselves of, although at first view it may appear of little importance who shall form a plan for the improvement of the revenue. Although every information tending to effect this great object may be gratefully received by this House, yet it behooves us to consider to what this clause may lead, and where it may terminate. Might it not, by construction, be said, that the Secretary of the Treasury has the sole right of digesting and reporting plans for the improvement of the revenue? This construction may appear a little extraordinary, but it is not more so than some constructions heretofore put upon other words; but however extraordinary it may be, it may take place, and I think the best way to avoid it, will be to leave out the words altogether. It is certainly improper that any person, not expressly entrusted by our constituents with the privilege of taking their money, should direct the quantum and the manner in which to take it.

But if there is not the danger I have mentioned, of giving power exclusively to this officer, I would ask gentlemen, and I submit it to their candor to say, whether it must not have a tendency to render the minds of the members indifferent on the subject, if the business is to be arranged and conducted by another, who, we are told, is

[JUNE, 1789.

better capable of understanding it than ourselves? Certainly, we shall hardly think it worth while to trouble our heads about the business. How far this will disappoint the object of our election may be plainly seen. For my part, I think the power too great to be entrusted in any hands but those of the Representatives of the people, where the Constitution has deposited it, unless it be to a committee especially appointed by the House for that purpose.

Some allusions, Mr. Chairman, have been made with respect to the origin of this power. Gentlemen have intimated that it was copied from the powers vested in the First Lord of the Treasury. I am not of this opinion. I rather believe the committee, in searching for precedents, have turned to the former appointment of a Superintendent of Finance under the late Confederation, and, having discovered this enumerated among his powers, have copied it into the bill, not adverting to the different circumstances of the present and former Congress; for to them alone was not confined the power of originating revenue plans. Besides, it might be safe in them, because they possessed the Legislative and Executive power; they could abolish his plans and his office together, if they thought proper; but we are restrained by a Senate, and the negative of the President. We have no power over him, therefore we ought to be cautious of putting dangerous powers into his hands.

Mr. SEDGWICK.-If the principle prevails for curtailing this part of the Secretary's duty, we shall lose the advantages which the proposed system was intended to acquire. The improvement and management of the revenue is a subject that must be investigated by a man of abilities and indefatigable industry, if we mean to have our business advantageously done. If honorable gentlemen will for a moment consider the peculiar circumstances of this country, the means of information attainable by the individual members of this House, and compare them with the object they have to pursue, they will plainly perceive the necessity of calling to their aid the advantages resulting from an establishment like the one contemplated in the bill; if they weigh these circumstances carefully, their objections, I trust, will vanish. Coming, Mr. Chairman, as we do, from different parts of the Union, from States where the objects of revenue are different, where the circumstances and views of the people are different, and in a great degree local, it appears to me that no one member can be so fortunate as to possess the extensive knowledge attainable by this officer. Another circumstance induces me to draw the same conclusion. We shall find systems adopted to defeat the collection of the revenue, but it will be impossible for any of us to become so well acquainted with these machinations as to defeat their object; but from the advantageous position we give the Secretary of the Treasury, and the multifarious objects of his attention, he may watch over and detect their plans; he will have a better capacity to propose a remedy than any member of the Legislature.

JUNE, 1789.]

Treasury Department.

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I do not apprehend any undue influence opera-sibility to be essentially necessary to secure the ting on the members of this House, because I am public welfare: make it his duty to study the subpersuaded there will ever prevail an independent | ject well, and put the means in his power; we and indignant spirit within the walls of Congress, can then draw from him all the information he hostile to every venal attempt. Nor do I believe it possible to color, with a semblance of justice, either false or base measures against the public welfare; the wisdom of this House can never be thought so meanly of. I trust a majority will always be found wise and virtuous enough to resist being made the tools of a corrupt administration. I, therefore, with confidence, approve the object of the clause.

has acquired, and apply it to its proper use. Without such an officer, our plans will be ineffectual and inconsistent. I have seen too much the want of a like officer in the State Legislatures, not to make me very desirous of adopting the present plan. It has been said, that the members coming from the different parts of the Union are the most proper persons to give information. I deny the principle. There are no persons in the Government to whom we could look with less propriety for information on this subject than to the members of this House. We are called from the pursuit of our different occupations, and come without the least preparation to bring forward a subject that requires a great degree of aslocality of our ideas, which is too commonly the case, and we shall appear not very fit to answer the end of our appointment. Witness the difficulty and embarrassments with which we have hitherto been surrounded. If we had the subject digested and prepared, we should determine with ease on its fitness, its combination, and its principles, and might supply omissions or defects without hazard; and this in half the time we could frame a system, if left to reduce the chaos into order.

I will mention one other circumstance, of no inconsiderable force, in favor of the bill. Coming, as I said we do, from districts with different ideas, perhaps different objects to pursue, much time will necessarily be consumed before a current is found in which the mind of the majority will run; and even then, gentlemen will not be cer-siduous application to understand; add to this the tain they have procured all the information that could be obtained. It appears, therefore, to me, from the reason and nature of things, to be our duty, as wise legislators, to form such a reservoir for information as will supply us with what is necessary and useful at all times.

Mr. BOUDINOT.-A proper jealousy for the liberty of the people is commendable in those who are appointed and sworn to be its faithful guardians; but when this spirit is carried so far as to lose sight of its object, and instead of leading to avoid, urges on to the precipice of ruin, we ought to be careful how we receive its impressions. So far is the present measure from being injurious to liberty, that it is consistent with the true interest and prosperity of the community. Are gentlemen apprehensive we shall be led by this officer to adopt plans we should otherwise reject? For my part, I have a better opinion of the penetration of the representation of the people than to dread any such visionary phantom.

Mr. HARTLEY rose to express his sentiments, as he did on every occasion, with diffidence in his own abilities; but he looked upon the clause as both unsafe and inconsistent with the Constitution. He thought the gentleman last up proved too much by his arguments; he proved that the House of Representatives was, in fact, unnecessary and useless; that one person could be a better judge of the means to improve and manage the revenue, and support the national credit, than the whole body of Congress. This kind of doctrine, Mr. Chairman, is indelicate in a republic, and strikes at the root of all legislation founded upon the great Democratic principle of representation. It is true mistakes, and very injurious ones, have been made on the subject of finance by some State Legislatures; but I would rather submit to this evil, than, by my voice, establish tenets subversive of the liberties of my country.

Let us consider whether this power is essentially necessary to the Government. I take it to be conceded by the gentlemen, that it is absolutely so. They say they are willing to receive the information because it may be serviceable, but do not choose to have it communicated in this way. If the Secretary of the Treasury is the proper person to give the information, I can see no other mode of obtaining it that would be so useful. Do gentlemen mean that he shall give it piecemeal, by way of question and answer? This will tend more to mislead than to inform us. If we would judge upon any subject, it would be better to have it in one clear and complete view, than to inspect it by detachments; we should lose the great whole in the minutia, and, instead of a system, should present our constituents with a structure composed of discordant parts, counteracting and defeating the operation of each other's properties. Make your officer responsible, and the presump-on this body, is disagreeable, and it is dangerous, tion is, that plans and information are properly digested; but if he can secrete himself behind the curtain, he might create a noxious influence, and not be answerable for the information he gives. I conceive this great principle of respon.

Notwithstanding what I have said, I am clearly of opinion it is necessary and useful to take measures for obtaining other information than what members can acquire in their characters as citizens; therefore, I am in favor of the present bill; but I think these words too strong. If it was modified so as to oblige him to have his plans ready for this House when they are asked for, I should be satisfied; but to establish a legal right in an officer to obtrude his sentiments perpetually inasmuch as the right is conveyed in words of doubtful, import, and conveying powers exclusively vested by the Constitution in this House.

One gentleman (Mr. AMES) has said, that the Secretary would be responsible for the plans he

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introduces. Very true; but how are we to detect the impositions they contain; for, he says, we require more time and leisure to make the scrutiny than falls to our lot, so that it does not afford the degree of responsibility which his observations supposed.

Mr. GERRY expressed himself in favor of the object of the clause; that was, to get all the information possible for the purpose of improving the revenue, because he thought this information would be much required, if he judged from the load of public debt, and the present inability of the people to contribute largely towards its reduction.

He could not help observing, however, the great degree of importance they were giving this, and the other Executive officers. If the doctrine of having prime and great ministers of State was once well established, he did not doubt but we should soon see them distinguished by a green or red ribbon, or other insignia of Court favor and patronage. He wished gentlemen were aware of what consequences these things lead to, that they might exert a greater degree of caution.

The practice of Parliament in Britain is first to determine the sum they will grant, and then refer the subject to a Committee of Ways and Means: this might be a proper mode to be pursued in this House.

Do gentlemen, said he, consider the importance of the power they give the officer by the clause? Is it not part of our Legislative authority? And does not the Constitution expressly declare that the House solely shall exercise the power of originating revenue bills? Now, what is meant by reporting plans? It surely includes the idea of originating money bills, that is, a bill for improving the revenue, or, in other words, for bringing revenue into the treasury. For, if he is to report plans, they ought to be reported in a proper form, and complete. This is giving an indirect voice in Legislative business to an Executive officer. If this be not the meaning of the clause, let gentlemen say what is, and to what extent it shall go; but if my construction is true, we are giving up the most essential privilege vested in us by the Constitution. But what does this signify? The officer is responsible, and we are secure. This responsibility is made an argument in favor of every extension of power. I should be glad to understand the term. Gentlemen say the Secretary of the Treasury is responsible for the information he gives the House. In what manner does this responsibility act? Suppose he reports a plan for improving the revenue, by a tax which he thinks judicious, and one that will be agreeable to the people of the United States; but he happens to be deceived in his opinion; that his tax is obnoxious, and excites a popular clamor against the minister-what is the advantage of his responsibility? Nothing. Few men deserve punishment for the error of opinion; all that could be done would be to repeal the law, and be more cautious in future in depending implicitly on the judgment of a man who had led us into an impolitic measure. Suppose the revenue should

[JUNE, 1789.

fall short of his estimate, is he responsible for the balance? This will be carrying the idea further than any Government hitherto has done. What then is the officer to be responsible for, which should induce the House to vest in him such extraordinary powers?

It was well observed by the honorable gentleman over the way, (Mr. PAGE,) that when his bill or plan is before the House, we must take or reject 'the whole; for if the individual members are so uninformed on the subject as they have been represented, it will be next to presumption to prepare an alteration; we should be told it was his duty officially to present plans, and our duty officially to pass them; that he is better informed than any other man, nay, better than the collective wisdom of the country. But this argument goes further still, and it may be justly asked, what occasion is there for a session of Congress? It incumbers the nation with a heavy expense, without rendering it any service. For, if we can neither alter nor improve the Secretary's plans, we can only consume our time to no avail. Under these circumstances, it will be patriotic to lay down our authority, and vest it in the great minister we have established.

Mr. LAWRENCE.-I do not see consequences so dangerous as some gentlemen seem to apprehend; nor did they appear to them, I believe, when the subject was last under consideration. I recollect Mr. Chairman, that some difficulty was made about establishing this office, because it was feared we could not find men of sufficient abilities to fill it. The duties were then properly deemed of a high and important nature, and enumerated as those proposed in the bill. It was supposed by an honorable gentleman, that the powers here expressed might be lodged in a board, because an individual was incompetent to undertake the whole. But now we have the wonderful sagacity of discovering, that if an individual is appointed, he will have capacity to form plans for improving the revenue in such an advantageous manner, as to supersede the necessity of having the represen tatives of the people consulted on the business; he will not only perform the usual duties of a Treasury Board, but be adequate to all purposes of legislation. Í appeal to the gentleman for his usual candor on this occasion, which will assure us that he has wire-drawn his arguments.

I hope, sir, if we give this power to an individual, we shall have judgment enough to discover whether his plans are consistent with the public happiness and prosperity; and while we exercise this judgment, there can be no cause to apprehend the chimerical effects portrayed by the gentleman last up.

It is said to be giving him the power of legisla tion. Do we give him power of deciding what shall be the law? While we retain this power, he may give us all the information possible, but can never be said to participate in legislative business; he has no control whatever over this House. I see no danger, but a great deal of benefit, arising from the clause; by making it his duty to study the subject, we may reasonably expect information.

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How is it said, that the power of reporting plans for the improvement of the revenue, is the power of originating money bills? The Constitution declares that power to be vested solely in this House. Now, will gentlemen say a money bill is originated by an individual member if he brings it forward? It cannot be originated, in my opinion, until the sense of the House is declared; much less can a plan for the improvement of the revenue be said to be a money bill.

Mr. GERRY admitted that he gave it as his opinion, that it was not an easy thing to find a proper person for conducting the finances in this country; there were but few in Europe who possessed abilities equal to the undertaking. He said before, that he knew but one in America, and believed there were not many to be found. These were his sentiments then, and he had made no discoveries since that warranted a change of opinion. But perhaps the advocates of the bill are acquainted with a gentleman fit for the business; if they are, it is more than he pretended to be, unless, as he said before, it was an honorable member of the Senate, who had made more progress in acquiring a knowledge of this difficult science, than any other person he had heard of.

He would not proceed on this subject, because the House had determined to appoint such an officer, and thereby put an end to the debate. By that vote, they supposed they could find a man equal to the task; he hoped they might, but he was really apprehensive of a disappointment, when he considered the confused and embarrassed state of our public debts and accounts; however,

he submitted to the voice of his country.

The gentleman last up, said he, did me the honor of noticing what I said on a former occasion; but I appeal to himself whether my words were conveyed in the language of the bill. Did I advise any thing like this? Has not the gentleman sagacity enough to discover that my arguments went no further than this, that he was the proper person to give information respecting the public revenues and expenses, the mode of collecting, and the probable remedy for abuses?

[H. OF R.

versive of the principles laid down in the Constitution.

The gentleman says, a bill is not originated until it has obtained the sense of the House; what is it then? The bill now under consideration has not obtained the sense of the House, yet I believe that gentleman himself conceives it to be a bill; he uses the term when he is speaking of it, and will hardly deny that it has originated. Í think, sir, whenever the House order a committee to bring in a bill, or give leave to a member to read one in his place, that by that order they originate the bill; and here it is that I am apprehensive of a diminution of our privilege. By this law you give the Secretary the right of digesting and reporting all plans, which is but another word for bills, for the management and improvement of the revenue, and supporting public credit. To what an extent these last words may reach, I shall not pretend to say; but certainly they may include the operations of more departments than one. If the clause will bear the construction I have mentioned, it is altogetber unwarrantable. I said, I differed from the gentleman with respect to the origin of bills, but perhaps this phrase may be applicable to a bill on its passage; all bills, from the time they are admitted before the House, may be said to be on their passage; but they are originated, as I take it, at their

introduction.

Mr. FITZSIMONS was not certain that he under

stood the objections which were made against the clause; but if he did, it was a jealousy arising plans of revenue to the House. No gentleman, from the power given the Secretary to report he believed, had objected to his preparing a plan, and giving it in when it was called for. If this were the case, perhaps harmony might be restored to the committee by changing the word report into prepare; he would therefore move that amendment,, in order to try the sense of the House.

Mr. MADISON. After hearing and weighing the various observations of gentlemen, I am at a loss to see where the danger lies. These are precisely the words used by the former Congress, on two occasions, one in 1783, the other in a subsequent ordinance, which established the Revenue Board. The same power was also annexed to the office of Superintendent of Finance, but I never yet heard that any inconvenience or danger was experienced from the regulations; perhaps, if the power had been more fully and frequently exercised, it might have contributed more to the public good.

But certainly this House contains more information relative to the proper means of supporting the national credit, and how far our constituents are capable of sustaining an increase of taxes, or which mode of assessment would yield more satisfaction. Yet gentlemen propose to give the power of advising the House, in all these cases, to the Secretary of the Treasury. It was always my opinion, that the representative body, from their sense of feeling, was a better judge of taxaThere is a small probability, though it is but tion than any individual, however great his saga-small, that an officer may derive a weight from city, or extensive his means of information. this circumstance, and have some degree of inThe gentleman says, we only give him power fluence upon the deliberations of the Legislature; to give information; that is what I wish, but the but compare the danger likely to result from this clause goes further. Is digesting and reporting clause, with the danger and inconvenience of not plans merely giving information? These plans having well-formed and digested plans, and we will have to undergo the consideration of the shall find infinitely more to apprehend. InconHouse, I grant; but they must have some influ-sistent, unproductive, and expensive schemes, will ence coming from such high authority, and if be more injurious to our constituents than the they have this in any degree whatever, it is sub- undue influence which the well-digested plans of

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a well-informed officer can have. From a bad administration of the Government, more detriment will arise than from any other source. The want of information has occasioned much inconvenience and unnecessary burdens under some of the State Governments. Let it be our care to avoid those rocks and shoals in our political voyage, which have injured, and nearly proved fatal to, many of our cotemporary navigators.

A gentleman has asked, what is meant by responsibility? I will answer him. There will be responsibility in point of reputation, at least a responsibility to the public opinion with respect to his abilities; and supposing there is no personal responsibility, yet we know that men of talents and ability take as much care for the preservation of their reputation as any other species of property of which they are possessed. If a superior degree of wisdom is expected to be displayed by them, they take pains to give proofs that they possess it in the most unequivocal man- | ner; this of itself will insure us no small degree of exertion.

With respect to originating money bills, the House has the sole right to do it; but if the power of reporting plans can be construed to imply the power of originating revenue bills, the Constitution is inconsistent with itself, in giving the President authority to recommend such measures as he may think expedient or necessary; but the construction is too unnatural to require further investigation.

I have admitted there is a small probability of a small inconvenience, but I do not think it any more an argument against the clause, than it would be an argument against having windows in a house, that it is possible the wind and the rain may get in through the crevices.

Mr. LIVERMORE expressed an apprehension that the clause originated from a clause in an ordinance of the former Congress; he found now he was not mistaken; but he wished gentlemen to distinguish, in the manner he had attempted to do, between the properties of this Congress and that, from which they might discover the impropriety of adopting it.

He thought gentlemen had sufficiently extolled the excellence of this office, and its advantages. He remembered that the grant of this power to the officer who formerly presided at the head of the finances, had produced some morsels of this kind; the five per cent. impost, a poll tax, and a land tax, if his memory served him right, were submitted; how far these were likely to meet the approbation of the Union, he did not say; but certainly one of them would meet few patrons. From this specimen, he did not form so favorable an opinion as some gentlemen expressed of the revenue plans, prepared, digested, and reported by a Secretary of the Treasury.

Mr. PAGE added, that the late Congress were obliged to submit their plans to the State Legislatures; consequently, there was less danger of undue influence. As this was his principal fear, he would vote against every thing like giving him authority to bring his plans before the House.

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[JUNE, 1789.

Mr. LIVERMORE declared the amendment proposed by Mr. FITZSIMONS unsatisfactory, and by no means removing the ground of complaint.

Mr. TUCKER likewise objected to the amendment, because its effect would be precisely the same with the words standing in the bill. Why, said he, should the Secretary be directed to prepare plans, unless it is intended that the House should regularly call for them? The views of the gentleman are to have a uniformity in the system of finance; but how can this be effected, without the plans are always brought before us? Whatever the House shall presume to do on independent principles, may break in upon the Secretary's system, or make him vary his propositions, in order to accommodate them to what we have done. If we must adopt plans for the sake of uniformity, we must adopt them at all times, or lose our object.

However useful it may be to obtain information from this officer, I am by no means for making it a matter of right in him to intrude his advice. I admit, information may at all times be acceptable, but I think advice should never come but when required. Are we to be advised on all occasions, because we don't know when to require it? Are the members of this House incapable of asking for assistance when they want it? Why have we not affronted the other branches of the Government, as well as this House? Why have we not said that the Secretary of Foreign Affairs should prepare and digest plans for the formation of treaties, and report them to the President and Senate, who are exclusively to manage that concern? The cases are exactly similar; but we did not choose to offer them such an indignity. If it is right in one instance, it is equally so in every other. We ought to have given the Secretary at War an opportunity of exercising his ingenuity, in devising plans of fortifications to strengthen our shores and harbors; we ought, in every case, where we have to decide, appoint officers with the same view to aid our deliberations, and, in fine, to perform the whole duties for which we were elected.

Mr. HARTLEY expressed himself satisfied with the amendment proposed by Mr. FITZSIMONS.

Mr. STONE was not afraid of giving the officer the power of reporting plans, because he was sure Congress would, in every case, decide upon their own judgment. A future Congress would not pay such a deference, even to their predecessors, as to follow in their footsteps, unless they were convinced of the good policy of their measures. He thought, if the House wanted to make use of the information acquired by the Secretary, they ought to give him notice of their intention; consequently, something of this kind was proper in the bill.

Mr. SHERMAN thought the principle held up by the clause, was absolutely necessary to be received. It was of such a nature as to force itself upon them; therefore it was in vain to attempt to elude it by subterfuge. It was owing to the great abilities of a financier, that France had been able to make the exertions we were witnesses of a few years ago, without embarrassing the nation.

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