IN modern times the maturity of the art military has been productive of singular effects in the concentration of great power in a small body of men. A handful of troops, drilled, disciplined and armed according to scientific rules, and guided by experienced and skilful officers, may be productive of the most important results, and even change the destiny of nations. A marked example of this has been exhibited during the last few years in the case of China. That nation, some two centuries since, was overrun by the warlike Tartars of the north, and the Manchow dynasty established. Under the policy adopted by that government, she remained secluded from the rest of the world down to 1843, and the population had reached 300 million souls; at that time the British government having difficulties with China, sent 4000 soldiers under Sir Gordon Bremer to blockade Canton. A nation occupying the islands of the North Sea, and numbering some 26 million of inhabitants, attacked the ancient nation of China, outnumbering them 13 times, with a force of a few thousand men, and that little army was sufficient to enable its leaders to dictate terms to so mighty a nation. A small polished axe in the hands of a skilful woodman, will at a few well applied strokes bring down the sturdiest oaks. In a similar manner, that small highly disciplined band of Englishmen, in a few weeks shook a power that had been undisturbed for ages, and by bringing it within the intercourse of nations, laid the foundation of a mighty revolution. So great are the results flowing from the application of science to the direction of force. Nor are all armies alike. We have recently seen an army composed of 2000 Americans, utterly defeat, in two successive engagements, three times their number of Mexicans, under skilful leaders. These great results flow from the superiority of skill and intellect in the direction of masses. Napoleon, in his memoirs, informs us that two Mamelukes kept three

Frenchmen at bay, because they were better armed, better mounted and better exercised; but a hundred Frenchmen were a match for a like number of Mamelukes, and 1000 French could easily beat 1500 Mamelukes. The cavalry generals, Murat, Leclerc, and Lasalle, formed in three lines; when the Mamelukes attacked the first line, the second came to its assistance on the right and left. The Mamelukes wheeled to turn the flanks of the new line; at that moment the third charged them, and they were always broken. Such is the effect of tactics and evolutions.

The difference between tactics and strategics was but indifferently well understood until fully developed by Napoleon. The difference between them may be stated in saying that the mixing of colors, preparing canvass and choosing brushes, are the tactics of a painter. Strategics are how to paint. The former received great improvement as connected with modern weapons, from the king of Prussia. The true principle of the latter was the discovery which Napoleon was born to make, and he conquered the European continent in developing it. It had always been assumed that what was true of the relative position of troops in actual combat, was also true of armies at a great distance from each other. That is to say, since the invention of fire-arms forces have necessarily been drawn up in long thin lines; therefore, if an army was attacked upon one or both of its flanks it was almost sure to be defeated. The reason was, that in such a position no effectual resistance could be offered until a change in front was made to correspond with that of the enemy, and making this change under the pressure of his attack was impossible without disorder. It was always assumed, therefore, that an army between two others, no matter how distant, was also in a dangerous position. Napoleon saw at once that if the armies were distant from each other, this central position was the strong and not the

weak point. As long as the central army had time to concentrate upon one enemy before the other arrived, the chances were all in favor of the central position. This general principle, combined with other causes, was the source of his success, and he was in the latter years combatted by the allies in the only manner that he could be resisted successfully, which was by systematically retiring when he advanced upon any one force. It was the application of the highest order of intellect to military affairs, at a time when the combinations of Europe against republican France offered the broadest field for the developement of genius. The progress of the art of war was illustrated by the conquest of Europe. It was the exclamation of Wellington, on hearing of the masterly operations of Napoleon around Ratisbon, in 1809, that "the art of war never was perfected until then." Subordinate to the vast field of strategics are the tactics of armies, or the organization and preparation of those different arms which, in a master hand, are the instruments of great results. There are many able tacticians, who have but little notion of strategy. Thus Napoleon remarked of the heroic Lannes, that "no officer could so skilfully handle 20,000 men in the field;" but at the time of his death at Essling, he was just beginning to have a notion of strategics. Again, the great genius of the French emperor was displayed as much in following up a victory as in gaining it. To this end he extended those branches of military force that are most efficient in improving victory. At one time the French cavalry numbered 90,000 men; of these in one instance 30,000 men, after helping to defeat the enemy as infantry, were mounted on horses taken from him, to complete his defeat. This subsequently caused a controversy to spring up among the martinets, tacticians and adjutants, as to whether a cavalry recruit was better or not for having learned to act on foot. The great principle by which the best application of force to suit the occasion was made never occurred to them. The success which the undisciplined armies of revolutionary France obtained over neighboring states was not because of the excellence of their materials, but because, as Napoleon expressed it, "Carnot had organized

victory." The great war minister had so arranged the campaigns that the armies were of necessity victorious.

The new principles of war illustrated by the French arms, and the terrible vehemence with which they were executed, occasioned many changes in old notions; among others, the truth became apparent that fortified places had lost very considerably of the value they formerly held either in the imagination of mankind or in reality. In modern war the use of fortresses is reduced nearly to their simple effects upon communications. A fortress which secures exclusively to the possessor a certain passage of a river or a mountain pass, is valuable, as a gate is valuable which keeps one man out and lets another in. In this sense a fort is called a "key," and like a key is of importance only when it is the key to something. The idea that fortresses in an open country will check an invading army for fear of the operations of the garrison on its rear, is obsolete. If a force retires before a larger one, it will, by throwing garrisons into forts, weaken itself still further. The effect of fortresses, in the present state of affairs, is reduced to the degree in which they may promote operations against men, and therefore the importance of them has become secondary to the organization of the army.

The countries of Europe have all large standing armies kept up in time of peace, from the supposed necessity of being always prepared for war, in order to avert attack. Whenever diplomacy takes an angry turn, a great expenditure is usually incurred in arraying and raising men, building ships, &c. To assist diplomatic bargains, movements of troops and a great clatter in the arsenals is thought necessary. It would appear that a nation is not thought strong unless her people are hept always with arms in their hands, as if those men would be incapable of becoming soldiers when occasion calls for their services. Thus the United States have been sneered at because their army is small and their government economical. The leading journals of Europe scarcely regard us as a power, because there are but 8000 men in the army. Yet recent events have shown that one-fourth of that army was sufficient to protect our southern

frontier against four times the force, and to invade the enemy's territory; that armies larger than any England ever had on foot can in a few weeks be placed at a threatened point; that economy of money in time of peace makes expenditure in time of war more easily borne; that the country is full of skilful and well educated military men, sufficient to officer an army of 200,000, and the aptitude of the people for military exercises will not, we think, be questioned. In respect to materiel, the resources of this country are exhaustless. With all these elements of creating the instrument, and the acknowledged ability of our tacticians, we will not doubt that strategical genius will be found when required. In fact, from the progress of the science of war, it must result that the maintenance of armies will become unnecessary; that the preservation of the science in its vigor will always suffice for a nation's wants.

The regular army of the United States is now organized as indeed are most modern armies, into staff and administrative departments, and four arms of service, viz, infantry, cavalry, artillery and engineers. The numbers of these are 558, officers and general staff, two dragoon regiments, 1,205, four artillery regiments, 2,303, eight infantry regiments, 3,371, and 427 unattached, being at West Point and elsewhere, making a total of 14 regiments and 8,349 men. The men of the army are enlisted for three years, and are mostly foreigners, German and Irish. The English army has a similar organization, and is composed of 1,703 general officers, 22 regiments of cavalry, 8,303 men; 91 regiments of infantry, 85,797; 8 regiments of artillery, 7,732, and 1200 engineers, sappers and miners. This large force is composed of 51,474 English, 41,218 Irish, 15,239 Scotch. There is a great disproportion between the number of men actually serving as soldiers under the British government and under that of the United States. But it does not follow, because England has kept up so large a force since 1815, at an annual expense of $25,000,000, that therefore her military strength is greater than that

of the United States. It is true that by the use of this force England has acquired territory of great value, but scarcely sufficient to cover the outlay of the $1,000,000,000 that her people have paid for it since the peace of Paris. It was not the military strength that France possessed at the outbreak of the revolution that enabled her to go on and conquer Europe; it was the concentration of strength and the development of genius, as she progressed, which enabled her to do it. Nor did her greatest generals improve by experience. Even in the case of Napoleon himself, he acknowledged that his chef d'œuvre in war was his first campaign in Italy. He further remarked that Turenne alone appeared to have gained by experience, and his talents were the result of study. In this view, the military strength of the United States is as great as that of England. As to actual service, the English troops during the last thirty years have had no more experience than the United States militia. The army of England can have but little advantage, and that of a very temporary nature, over that of the United States. It is originated and organized in the same manner; as an instance we may look at the royal artillery, of which the royal regiment of horse artillery is a corps of preference, a "crack regiment," in which the offices are the reward of great merit in the remainder of the arm. The artillery arm is nominally divided into regiments. Artillery acts by batteries and not by regiments. The term battery when applied to artillery means a certain number of cannon, with the men, &c. required to serve them. A battery is usually six pieces, four of them 6 lb. guns, and two 12 lb. howitzers. The royal artillery is composed of 72 companies of 80 men each, one-half of them are in the colonies, from Canada to New Zealand. To each company there are two captains, two 1st lieuts. and one 2d lieut. The pay is, lieut. colonel £320, captain £220, lieut.£120, 2d lieut. £100. The men must be 5 feet 8 inches in height, of large frame and considerable bodily strength, and their pay is 1s. 4d. per day. There is no promotion from the ranks except to

VOL. XIX.-NO. XCVII.

2

quarter-masters and adjutants of invalid battallions, and occasionally commissions in the line regiments are promoted to the royal artillery. The royal regiment of horse artillery, which is the head of the arm, is composed of seven troops of horse of 80 men each, of which one troop is called the rocket troop, from being usually practiced with that weapon. These troops never leave England, except in time of war. Five are usually located in England, with two guns to each troop, and two troops in Ireland, with four guns each. The war complement is four 6 pounders and two 12 pound howitzers. The men for this corps are selected from the whole arm, and receive 1s. 6d. per day. They are instructed in the care of horses and in field movements. Each troop has two captains, three 1st lieuts., two sergeant majors, three sergeants, three corporals, and four bombardiers. The officers are selected as vacancies occur, from the body of the regiment, and always for their merits and services. The pay of a lieut. colonel is £400, or $2000, captain £320, lieut. £290. Portions of this corps were in every action of the Peninsular war, and five captains were knighted for their services. Napier tells us that one of the most brilliant achievements of the war, was by a troop at Fuentes d'Onor. The regiments of the line have the name of some battle where they most distinguished themselves, on the colors; but the royal artillery having been always present, they bear the word "Ubique," and the words "Waterloo" and China" are now added.

66

All the officers of the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers pass through the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich. They are required to pass a rigid examination in mathematics, fortification, drawing, history, geography, natural philosophy, French, and grammar.— They enter between 15 and 17 years of age, and remain 3 years. The Artillery rank before the Engineers, but the latter get the most pay. The appointments to the academy are in the hands of the Master-General of Ordnance, Sir George Murray, and are always given to sons of the nobility, gentry, or naval or military officers. Each cadet pays £120 per annum, and the whole expense which each incurs is about £1200 per annum. All promotion from the academy is by pro

ficiency in study, and in an average of 20 years 3 out of 5 obtain commissions. This corresponds very nearly with our West-Point system, except that the appointments are not confined to nobility, and the cadets are paid by government. A greater number graduate annually at West-Point than at Woolwich. The West-Point cadets are the most thorough, because they have all to live by it as a profession. The Woolwich cadets being all nobles, and most of them wealthy, and to hold the office when won requiring an annual expense from private means, the chances are, that more science is acquired at WestPoint than at Woolwich. The degree of military knowledge diffused through the people of the United States is therefore as great as in England. If they do not incur as great an expense in time of peace to keep up the drill of the men, they are not, therefore, the weaker. On the other hand the national wealth, which constitutes the sinews of war, increases the more rapidly. The expensive organization of England would give her greatly the advantage were the two nations to send out expeditions to any given point; as for instance in the case of the African coast. Under the Ashburton treaty the United States undertook to keep a certain number of guns there to attempt to suppress the slave trade-a useless and most onerous engagement; so much so, that already the English minister has complained that the required number were not present. To send troops to England or off this continent will probably never be undertaken; and in the present prospect of affairs no European power or powers will ever be able to send a sufficient force to this continent with the object of attacking the United States. The art of war, as matured under the system of Napoleon, can, therefore, have but little practical application to the United States. The scientific knowledge and the understanding of the higher principles of the art, are all that it is required of our people; and with that knowledge they are stronger without a standing army than the most powerful European government resting on its military force. It is coming to be understood that the number of guns owned by a government, or the number of men it drills daily, do not constitute its strength, nor are they a guaranty of the national prosperity.

There were theological persons in Ancient Egypt, good judges probably of their business, who walked in solemn procession to water dead sticks planted in the sand; thus illustrating the vanity of earthly endeavors. We in modern New-York have legal individuals, good judges also, no doubt, who eight times in each year, in February, March, April, June, August, September, October and December, water with their wisdom, and cherish with their protection, the arid points of practice of the courts; fully impressing upon suitors the folly of those who suppose that Justice is to be obtained from Law. In the second century, in the land of darkness, and in religious observances, we might look with indulgence upon a quiet absurdity which merely made the perpretrators ridiculous, and no one unhappy-but that in the nineteenth century, a people, who pride themselves upon their utilitarian common sense, should permit their judicial officers, in the business concerns of every day life, to listen to arguments, and to make decisions upon points as quibbling and as empty as the quiddities and entities of our mediæval progenitors, would be scarcely conceivable to a stranger who was not aware of the centuries it requires to eradicate popular custom or opinion, however absurd.-"I have often thought, if the wisdom of our ancestors had excluded all persons with red hair from the House of Commons, of the thousand convulsions it would occasion to restore them to their natural rights! What mobs and riots would it produce? To what infinite abuse and obloquy would the capillary patriot be exposed ?" The blind devotion of the English for every thing they peculiarly possess, has descended upon the children of their colonists in the matter of the Common Law-a system

of jurisprudence in many respects unfitted to our peculiar institutions; but we live on and suffer on under this "red-haired" dispensation. If we dare grumble at the palpable inconsistencies of the Law of Evidence, at the unfair and unrepublican system of Bail, at the folly of maintaining in this country the vestiges of the feudal law of real property, and hint at the expediency of a code, the bar, one and all, gray-haired counsellor to the scarce fledged attorney, are down upon us with " Ignorance! Innovation! Uncertainty! a System hallowed by ages!"-Hallowed by ages? The old woman's reason for eating peas with a knife-she always had done so. If the system needs amendment, let us at least attempt it. What can be more essential to the welfare of a wise people, than the proper adaptation of the rules by which all the concerns of life are carried on, to their habits, characters and occupations?

We have no idea, however, of striking at the Common Law as a system. Neminem oportet esse legibus sapientiorem. Let us return, then, to the publication before us.

The ordinary points of law arising in suits, are tried at four general terms in the year by the three judges in bench, as is very well known by our NewYork readers. But other questions arise in "Practice," which is a kind of law-judge-made. Suitors are stopped in limine. There is a word or two misplaced in the papers; the court cannot be trifled with. In the vestibule of the temple of justice sits a man who examines whether the pilgrim has complied with all the ceremonies requisite to gain his admittance to the shrine. Wo be to him if he has omitted a genuflexion or a prayer! This man is holding a Special Term; he does it