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evident propositions; but this is a mistake even in regard to the philosophy of his own favorite science. The truths of geometry are deduced from its definitions, and not from its axioms: the properties of a circle and of a triangle flow from the definitions of a circle and of a triangle, and not from any selfevident truth, nor from any combination of such truths. Indeed, no truth, in any department of human knowledge, can be deduced from axioms or selfevident propositions.

We should not judge Mr. Whewell, however, with any degree of severity, for not seeing this great negative idea of the Baconian philosophy; for it is a subject to which neither Brewster, nor Brougham, nor Hallam, nor Macauley had even attempted to do justice: its immense value and importance has been entirely overlooked by them. It has fared much better in the hands of Playfair, and Herschel, and McClaurin. It has also been exhibited, to a certain extent, by Locke and Stewart; but it has never been developed and illustrated with that fulness and variety of detail, which its vast importance in regard to almost every branch of science demands. We shall recur to it, perhaps, in some future number of our journal; at present we must return to our author.

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The elements of morals are, then, to be deduced from certain axioms, Analogous, in morality, to the axioms in geometry." Now, where are these axioms to be found? Shall we look for them at the beginning of the book, where the axioms of geometry are always placed? If so, we shall be sadly disappointed; for in that place there are no axioms, nor any thing like them. Where shall we find them then? Thanks to the author for answering this question; or we should never have been able to solve it for ourselves. They stand in no particular relation to the great body of truth to which they are supposed to lead; and if, in our unaided researches, we had passed over them a thousand times, we should never have suspected them of being self-evident truths. They are simply the five propositions contained in articles 269, 270, and 271, of the "infinite series" to which they belong.

And when we have found them, what are they? Are they like the axioms of geometry, self-evident truths?

or, like the definitions of that science, clear intuitions of the reason? So far from this, they are clumsy statements of various systems of morals, which have been advocated by different philosophers. This may seem incredible, but it is nevertheless strictly true. We can dwell upon this part of our subject, however, only long enough to verify our remarks in relation to one of his selfevident truths.

This self-evident proposition, as it is called, is a one-sided and fragmentary view of the great system of Butler. It is presented in the following terms:

"We have seen that the idea of Purity implies the contemplation of mere appetite and desire, as the Lower Parts of our nature, which are to be governed by, and made subservient to, the Moral Sentiments and Reason, the Higher Parts. We may state this as a Moral Principle, that the Lower Parts of our Nature are to be governed by, and subservient to, the Higher. This is the Principle of Purity." Now, we do not object to this principle as truth; for we believe that it is, when properly understood, most profoundly true. It is the great leading idea of Butler's system of morals, under whose "dark and crabbed style," as Mackintosh calls it, there is contained, as Dr. Chalmers has more truly said, "the most precious repository of ethical principles extant in any language." If Mr. Whewell had taken the solid gold of Butler, and beaten it out into shining leaf, as many a modern author has done, in order to adorn his pages, we should have uttered no complaint; we should have admired his wisdom.

But the use which he has made of Butler's philosophy, is far different from this. In the first place, the great leading idea of that system is set forth as a self-evident proposition, "analogous to the axioms of Geometry;" though it required the most profound analysis, on the part of its author, to render it intelligible, and cause its deep truth to be seen. By a severe and rigid analysis, Butler showed what is meant by the higher and lower parts of our nature, and without this analysis his doctrine would not have been even clear to the mind. It has acquired the suffrages, we believe, of the great thinkers who have devoted themselves to the study of moral philosophy; but

it still has many and violent opponents.
Dr. Wardlaw, for one, entirely miscon-
ceiving it, and supposing it to come in-
to conflict with the doctrines of reve-
lation, has declaimed eloquently against
it, and thereby led many astray. And
there are others, who, blindly imagin-
ing that to speak of "the supremacy of
conscience," is to derogate from the
absolute authority and glory of divine
revelation, have looked upon the scheme
of Butler as heathenish and profane.
Others again, including all your Ben-
thamites in morals, will stare at you if
you announce such a doctrine, and ask
what is meant by higher and lower
parts of our nature? Is not the desire
of happiness the sole spring of action?
To such persons, the great principle of
Butler, so far from being self-evident,
appears simply a gross absurdity. With
them, the greatest happiness principle,
(the very principle Butler labored to
overthrow,) is the self-evident dogma,
from which all the rules of morals are
to be deduced: all talk about higher
principles they set down as transcen-
dental jargon. In view of these things, it
is difficult to say whether it is the more
amusing or amazing, to witness the
undaunted hardihood with which Mr.
Whe well assumes the principle of But-
ler as a self-evident truth. We know
of nothing parallel to it, in all our lite-
rature, except the conduct of Bentham,
who assumes the diametrically opposite
principle as self-evident, and then pro-
ceeds to deduce the elements of mo-
rality" from it, as if it had never been
called in question. What a delightful
oblivion, in both cases, of the whole
history of moral science!

Having assumed the principle of
Butler as a self-evident truth, Mr.
Whewell proceeds, "I hope I may
once more refer to the Analogy of Geo-
metry; and remind the reader, that all
the controversies which turn on matters
below the axioms, do not affect the super-
structure built upon them."-p. 9. Now,
this is very true, in regard to Geometry:
no disputes can shake its axioms; they
"look down with scorn on the Sophist;"
but what shall we say of Mr. Whe-
We do not
well's axioms in morals?
deny their truth; but we will say,
what we had supposed was known to

every moral philosopher, that unless
the matters which lie below them are
true, his whole system of rules deduc-
ed from them, rests on a hollow and
false foundation. No matter what
questions we may raise respecting the
nature of "the evidence of the Axioms
and definitions of Geometry," we must
adopt the axioms and definitions them-
selves; for the sufficient reason, that
they are necessary truths, which no
human mind can deny. But not so with
Mr. Whewell's moral axioms. Unless
the analysis of Butler be correct, his
system is false. Mr. Whewell has
most grossly deceived himself by a
false analogy; and assumed, as self-
evident, the very thing which, above all
others, is to be established. Mr. Ben-
tham might have done the same thing;
he might have contended, "that men
may dispute and wrangle as much as
they please about matters which lie
below his axioms, such, for instance, as
the existence of conscience; but this
cannot disturb the axioms themselves,
or shake the superstructure built upon
them."-p. 9..

This is not all. The matter will ap-
pear still more strange, when we con-
sider the object of Mr. Whewell in
thus setting out from self-evident truths
or propositions, in order to deduce a
system of rules from them. We shall
state this in his own words: "The
construction of the elements of Geome-
try," says Mr. Whewell, (still pursuing
his analogy,) "besides being the creation
of a precious and imperishable body of
scientific truth, was the first step in the
philosophy of geometry." The author
distinguishes, it will be perceived, be-
tween the elements of geometry and
the philosophy of geometry. In like
manner, he distinguishes between the
elements and the philosophy of morali-
ty; and it is his avowed object, to de-
duce the former from certain unques-
tioned and unquestionable axioms, in
order that he may prepare the way for
the latter. Thus, it seemed to me,"
says he, "that the construction of the
elements of morality ought to precede
any attempt to settle the disputed and
doubtful questions which are regarded
as belonging to the Philosophy of Mo-
rality."-p. 8. Mr. Whewell evidently

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We do not wish to be misunderstood; for, as a legal reformer and jurist, we entertain the highest respect for Bentham.

regarded this as a grand undertaking "the difficulty of constructing a solid system of morality," says he, "may be expected to be, in some degree, great, in proportion to its great value and extensive bearings, when once constructed."--p.7. One of these great advantages is, that it will lay the foundation for a true system of moral philosophy. It is with this view that our author declines, as he supposes, the questions of moral philosophy, and confines himself to selfevident truths, and rigid deductions from them. Thus the elements of morality are constructed: out of these elements the true system of moral philosophy is to arise; and yet one of the self-evident truths from which they are deduced, is neither more nor less than a partial statement of Butler's system of moral philosophy! It must be confessed, that this is a very novel method of settling all the disputed points in moral philosophy, namely, to assume a system of moral philosophy; to call it a self-evident truth; to deduce the elements of morality from it; and then, out of the elements thus deduced, to reconstruct the system from which they are drawn.

This is not all. According to Butler, virtue consists in acting in conformity to the dictates of conscience, to "the moral sentiments and reason;" or, in other words, virtue consists in obeying the superior principles of our natures rather than the inferior, whenever there is a conflict between them. Now, this is assumed by Mr. Whewell as one of his axioms; and yet, supposing it to be true, (and we do not doubt its truth,) all his other axioms are included in it. It is not a co-ordinate principle with them; it comprehends them all. Every man's conscience, for example, or his reason and moral sentiments, teaches him that he should speak the truth; that he should obey the law of the land; that he should render to each man his due; and that he should love his fellow man. Hence, we cannot conform to the highest principle of our nature without conforming to Mr. Whewell's four other great axiomatic principles-the principles of truth, of order, of justice, and of benevolence, in so far as they can be followed. The two of these rules which precede, and the two which follow, the great principle standing midway between them in

his enumeration, are merely branches of that principle, and not co-ordinate principles with it. This principle has been mutilated, it is true, by Mr. Whewell, and called "the principle of purity," in opposition to common usage; but still as it is in itself, and as it should be preserved in its integrity by every disciple of Butler, it is the great luminous centre from which all inferior rules emanate. It is usually spoken of among philosophers, not by the name of "the principle of purity," but by that of "the supremacy of conscience;" a very inconvenient principle, by the by, for those who, like our author, would, in all cases, as we shall hereafter see, enforce an unqualified and passive submission to human laws.

We now proceed to notice another very remarkable feature in the work before us.

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No intelligent person can read it carefully, without being struck with the arbitrary arrangements of thought which occur on almost every page. If the author had not told us, that he wished us to understand that he had tried to make it a work of rigorous reasoning," we should have supposed he had proceeded in his work with the most complacent disregard of the rules and trammels of logic. Thus, to select a few examples out of an immense multitude, the author says. "The rules of action may command actions as means to an end; thus: Steal not, that thou be not whipt.” Now, any other person who had not fallen out with the natural order of things, would have supposed, that the whipping is the means, and the prevention of stealing is the end, on the part of the lawgiver. Not so with Mr. Whewell: he supposes that the "command" thou shalt not steal, is given in order to prevent whipping. Equally rigid is the logic, by which he proves that "moral rules exist necessarily." "Man must act with reference to parents, wife and children, therefore there must he families."-p. 57. This is an assertion which we select from a string of equally arbitrary propositions. If Mr. Whewell had just inverted this order, and deduced his premises from his conclusion, it would have been far more satisfactory to ordinary minds. If he had said, "there must be families, and therefore we must act with reference to parents, wife and children," we

should, for our part, have been better pleased with his logic. But Mr. Whewell, it seems, is not disposed to say any thing in a natural way; and hence, he concludes, that "we must act with reference to parents, wife and children" -(what! before we have them?)therefore we must have them. It seems to be a matter of great indifference with the learned author, whether he arranges his ideas in one order or another; whether he represents things as standing in one relation to each other, or in the diametrical opposite relation. He tells us, for example, that "the internal actions, desire, affection, intention, will, point to external acts; they have acts for their objects, and derive their character and significance, as right or wrong, from the external acts to which they thus point."-p. 158. Let the reader be not startled by this astounding announcement; for it is merely "an element" of morality, which by no means excludes the contradictory element. It does not, for a moment, prevent our author from coming round to the common sentiment of mankind, that external acts derive their character and significance as right or wrong, from the intention from which they proceed. For he tells us, and with an equal air of auracular authority, that the volition which aims at theft is morally wrong. The intention which points to the theft is also morally wrong. The desire of that which belongs to another is morally wrong. These internal acts are wrong, even if the external acts do not take place." Nay, he even informs us, that "External actions, as the motions in our limbs, and the motions thereby produced in material things, and in the state of other persons, are not our actions, except so far as they are the consequences of our intention and will. When we have willed, what follows is a consequence of laws of nature, extraneous to us; and derives its character of right or wrong, so far as we are concerned in it, from the will, and that which preceded the will." Now, we shall say nothing about the strange philosophy implied in both of these passages; we intend merely to notice the strange fact, that the internal act not only derives its moral character from the external act, but the external act also derives its moral character from the internal act. We might notice

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many other things of the same kind; but we must proceed to consider points of deeper and graver import. In considering them, we shall see that our author has not only changed the natural order of particular thoughts and principles, but that he has also seized whole departments of human knowledge, and transposed and inverted them in the same arbitrary and sovereign manner.

To ascertain and define the relations which subsist between morality and the laws of the land, is a great problem, in the solution of which the least inaccuracy may be attended with serious consequences to the best interests of man. In his attempts to throw light on this great problem, Mr. Whewell has begun wrong, proceeded with the utmost embarrassment and comparison, and ended in the most despicable of all solutions. We intend to make these positions good.

Our best philosophers have, and for good reasons, supposed that the principles of morality should be considered before the law of the land; because they are higher and more sacred in their natures. But Mr. Whewell does not like this arrangement; he finds it necessary to his purpose, to treat of the municipal law first, and then of "morality which depends" upon the law of the land. His avowed reason for this bold innovation is very remarkable. "We must treat of Rights before we treat of Duties," says he; "for as we have said, the terms which express Rights are necessarily employed in laying down moral rules.”-p. 72. Now, although the term right is used in Blackstone's Commentaries, as well as in Butler's Moral Philosophy, it does not follow that it is, in both cases, used in the same sense. A man may have a right to do many things under the law of the land, which are not morally right in themselves; and, e converso, many things are right in a moral point of view, which the law of the land does not enjoin, so as to establish legal rights upon them. The idea of the morally right, and that of a legal right, are perfectly distinct, and cannot be identified without leading to the utmost confusion of thought and expression. Hence, there was no necessity of explaining legal rights, and giving us a treatise on the municipal code, in order

to enable us to understand the rules of that all this holy wrath is excited, Morality. If the author had under- not by a violation of morality, but by taken to treat of the human spirit, a violation of established rights. This would he have introduced the subject is not all. If nothing were estawith a learned dissertation on ardent blished by human laws, our moral senspirits and all other subtle fluids which timents could not be outraged; because go by the same name; because the human laws are necessary, it seems, to term which expresses them must be em- develope the moral sentiments. ployed in treating of the human spirit? If so, it would have opened a wide field for the peculiar genius of the author; and we should have had a perfect counterpart to the work before us: a learned treatise on physics as a necessary introduction to the study of metaphysics! But the real inducement which has

led Mr. Whewell to adopt the method in question, is far more powerful than the reason assigned for it. It is to exalt "the Establishment" and all established things. It is to restore the "Leviathan" in all the plenitude of his power. It is truly amazing to see, how little regard the author pays to great principles of morality, when they stand in the way of his reverence for the law of the land. Throughout his "elements of morality," it seems to be one perpetual struggle to exalt the law: all things good on earth seem to proceed from it as well as the emoluments of its supporters, and opposition to it excites a more lively indignation than the most flagrant outrages against the eternal principles of truth and justice.

"Thus," says our author,

The sentiments, the wrath and the indignation, of which the author has just spoken, he calls, "Jural Sentiments;" and he informs us, on the same page, that they

"Are the germs of Moral Sentiments, of a larger and deeper import. The Sentiment of Indignation against Wrongs, when expanded and unfolded by habitual thought, leads us to the condemnation of all dispositions which tend to produce Wrongs. All such dispositions are disapproved of, as immoral. In like manner, the Sentiment of Rights, when extended and unfolded by the thoughts of what is due to others, as well as ourselves, (and the author repeatedly asserts that we can know what is due to others or to ourselves only by the law of the land,) produces a

Sentiment of Obligation, and hence a Sentiment of Duty, or, as it is often termed, a Sense of Duty."-p. 79.

Now, here we have the genesis of the sense of right and wrong: the pedigree of our moral sentiments; "without the existence of the State, we have no rights :" they are all derived from the law of the land; we get angry when these are violated, and we nurse and cherish and cling to our "wrath as something good." And well we may, for it is the germ of our moral sentiments, and it only requires to be "entertained," "expanded and unfolded," in order to open out into the awful sentiment of Duty. If this be the true origin of our moral sentiments, Mr. Whewell has certainly done right in beginning his "Elements of Morality" with the Commentaries of Blackstone, and in concluding them, for the greater perfection of the moral sentiments, with the Equity Jurisprudence of Story. Indeed, these learned works, these beautiful outlines, should be placed in the hands of our little children, in order that their moral sentiments may have an opportunity to expand and come into conscious life, in the only possible way, under "the gladsome light of jurisprudence," inNow, let it be borne in mind, stead of being left to struggle in vain

"Rights being established, wrongs, the violations of these Rights, excite a stronger feeling than the mere privation or interruption of our gratifications. Rights, being assigned to each person by Rules to which the common Reason of mankind assents, we resent the violation of these Rights not only as an assault upon an individual, but as an aggression upon all mankind. When we receive a wrong, we know that we have with us the resentment of all our fellow-men, at the infraction of a Rule which all acknowledge. We entertain our resentful emotions with complacency; they become strengthened and rooted by this conviction of general sympathy. The anger which we feel, is no longer the impulse of our individual feelings: IT IS AN AFFECTION OF THE COMWe not only entertain our wrath; we cling to it as something good, and admire it as something laudable. We deem our indignation to be virtuous."-p. 78, 79.

MON HEART OF MANKIND.

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