stituency, thus realizing more adequately a perfect theory of political representation. We object, decidedly, to the abbreviation of the Senatorial term from four to two years, which the Convention has proposed. We have on a previous occasion stated our preference for longer legislative terms, and we are still unable to realize the wisdom of the course pursued by this Convention, or of the tendency which seems to exist generally throughout the country, to shorten the tenure of office. We are aware that it springs from a wise inclination on the part of the people to increase the accountability of their officer and representative. The error consists in supposing, as modern politicians seem prone to suppose, that the more dependant an officer or representative is upon his constituency, the more valuable and faithful will be his service, and that his dependence and accountability will increase as the term for which he is appointed, is shortened, neither of which propositions do we believe to be correct. Our grounds for this conviction may furnish an interesting topic for consideration when we can give it our undivided attention. At present we must content ourselves with the simple expression of our regret, that the Convention should have made this one, we believe the only, step backward in the philosophy of government; and we also regret, exceedingly, that the sessions of the Legislature were not limited to once in two years, unless for special cause. 3. It will farther perfect our popular representation by placing restrictions upon the appropriation of State power and credit, to private uses. The immense political patronage to be swayed by the predominant political party, under a loose construction of the old Constitution, and the exercise of which has furnished forth already some of the darkest and most revolting pages in our political history, render any commendation of the provisions upon this subject in the new Constitution entirely superfluous. To protect the credit of the State, and the honor and property of its citizens from the improvidence or corruption of legislators, was the primary and controlling motive of the people in calling for con stitutional reform, and due guaranties upon this subject should serve more than any other to purify the popular representation, by removing a giant brood of temptations to its corruption. The Convention have provided in the first place, as follows, against the contraction of public debt : "8. No money shall ever be paid out of the Treasury of this State, or any of its funds, or any of the funds under its mapropriation by law; nor unless such paynagement, except in pursuance of an apment be made within two years next after the passage of such appropriation act; and every such law making a new appropriation, or continuing or reviving an appropriation, shall distinctly specify the sum appropriated, and the object to which it is to be aplaw to refer to any other law to fix such plied and it shall not be sufficient for such sum. in any manner, be given or loaned to, or "9. The credit of the State shall not, in aid of any individual, association or corporation. "10. The State may, to meet casual deficits of failures in revenues, or for expenses not provided for, contract debts; but such debts, direct and contingent, singly, or in ceed one million of dollars; and the mothe aggregate, shall not, at any time, exdebts, shall be applied to the purpose for neys arising from the loans creating such which they were obtained, or to repay the debt so contracted, and to no other purpose whatever. "§ 11. In addition to the above limited power to contract debts, the State may insurrection, or defend the State in war; contract debts to repel invasion, suppress but the money arising from the contracting of such debts shall be applied to the purpose for which it was raised, or to repay such debts, and to no other purpose what ever. "12. Except the debts specified in the tenth and eleventh sections of this article, no debt shall hereafter be contracted by or on behalf of this State, unless such debt gle work or object, to be distinctly specishall be authorized by a law for some sinfied therein, and such law shall impose and provide for the collection of a direct annual tax to pay, and sufficient to pay the interest on such debt as it falls due, and also to pay and discharge the principle of such debt within eighteen years from the time of the contracting thereof. shall, at a general election, have been submitted to the people, and have received a majority of all the votes cast for and against it, at such election. "No such law shall take effect until it "On the final passage of such bill in "Corporations may be formed under general laws; but shall not be created by special act, except for municipal purposes, and in cases where, in the judgment of the Legislature, the objects of the corporation cannot be attained under general laws. All general laws and special acts passed pursuant to this section, may be altered from time to time or repealed. * * "The Legislature shall have no power to pass any act granting any special char ter for banking purposes; but corporations or associations may be formed for such purposes under general laws." We have italicised a provision in the first section, which we fear portends an infinity of litigation and legislative pettifogging. It found a place there, we suppose, from the want of sufficient time for the members to become sure that they saw and appreciated all the important consequences that could result from adopting the strict rule, which in time they will find would have been the wise one. II. The new Constitution will diminish local and special legislation. The private and special applications to the Legislature have so multiplied under the present Constitution of NewYork, that it is almost impossible to secure the thorough discussion and passage of any law of a strictly general character. Special laws occupy over four-fifths of each volume of the laws which have been published in this State for several years past. The fact that the Legislature has the power to listen to and grant such applications, is the foundation of the difficulty; it explains why that body is occupied incessantly from the commencement to the close of its annual session in the passage of special acts, and finally rises year after year with a calendar of three or four hundred bills, including usually all of a general and strictly public character, not dispos ed of for the want of time. It accounts also for the selection of delegates to the Legislature, with no qualifications for the duty, save pliancy and obedience to the instructions of the particular interest or clique for whose purposes, and by whose agency they obtain their election. These evils, we trust, will be materially mitigated under the proposed Constitution, by the operation of several of its provisions, of which the following are the most important: 1. No bill can pass without the assent of a majority of all the members of both Houses. 2. No private or local bill, which may be passed by the Legislature, shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title. 3. Corporations-not municipal-are to be formed under general laws, where their objects can thus be attained. 4. " The Legislature shall have no power to pass any act granting any special charter for banking purposes, but corporations may be formed for such purposes under general laws." 5. The credit of the State is not in any manner to be given or loaned to, or in aid of, any individual association or corporation. The most important provision of all to be made in the Constitution against special legislation, was, unfortunately, stricken out. That would have made the State liable to be prosecuted in courts of law. This mode of enforcing the payment of State debts would have furnished a righteous protection to honest State creditors, from the indifference or ignorance of the Legislature, and to the Legislature a measure of protection against the corrupting influences of dishonest creditors, and relieve that body from a weight of business which can only be disposed of in a legislative assembly at the expense of neglecting graver and more widely interesting legislative duties. III. The proposed Constitution must inevitably secure a more speedy, pure, and economical administration of justice, for the following, among many other reasons: 1. It provides for an entire separa tion of the judicial from the legislative power, so that the people of New-York may have no apprehension for the future of beholding their Senate engaged in the passage of unconstitutional laws, and then converting itself into a Court of Errors, to establish the constitutionality of such laws by solemn adjudication as a Court of Final Appeal. 2. It makes the judges of all the courts elective by the people, and for a term in no case exceeding eight years -securing thereby in the incumbent accountability to his constituents-to the people, judges without reference to the partisan schemes and policy of a central appointing power, and also an opportunity to be rid of an objectionable officer, without waiting for his superannuation. For reasons which we have stated on a previous occasion, we believe this change will bring to the bench a higher average of merit than the bench has been, or is likely to be, illustrated by, under the appointing sys tem. We sincerely regret that the State judges should have been made elective from judicial districts, rather than by general ticket from the whole State. It is a clear departure from the principle upon which the doctrine of popular elections is founded; and will render the exemplification of the elective principle, as applied to the judiciary, less triumphantly successful than its friends could have wished. The error, doubtless, occurred, in part, from the desire of the minority party in the Convention to secure the occasional election of an officer from their numbers to the bench, and partly from an entire misunderstanding of the vital distinction between a representative and a judicial officer. Nothing is clearer than that the smaller the constituency, the more adequately can it be represented by the delegate of its choice, and that dividing the responsibility of representing a constituency between two or more delegates weakens the accountability and fidelity of all; and so far disqualifies them for their representative function. But a judicial officer is not a representative officer. He is simply an interpreter of the laws. It is most important that he should not take any opinion from the shades of public sentiment about him, except those pervading sentiments, favorable to public morality and virtue, which are unchangeable. By multiplying the judges, to be elected by a constituency, their accountability is not divided nor weakened a particle. Judicial responsibility is only divided by multiplying the judges who occupy the same bench in the same case. On the other hand, there is a clear injustice to a large portion of the State, who are obliged to receive a judge to determine the law for them in the court of last resort, who is elected from a district, comprising only an eighth, and that, perhaps, in a remote part of the State, and who is only accountable to that faction of the State for his official conduct. The determination of the Convention upon this subject was demonstrably undemocratic, unjust, and inexpedient, even to those of our Whig friends, through whose instrumentality it prevailed, and who are counting upon its casual patronage. 3. Another purifying and economising change proposed in the judicial system, and one worth all the expense and labor of the Convention, is embodied in the following provision: § 20. No judicial officer, except justices of the peace, shall receive to his own use any fees or perquisites of office." This one section will do more than any other change without it, could possibly have done, to exalt the dignity, self-respect, and public character of the judiciary-to secure prompt and definitive action upon cases in litigation-to discourage litigious and sinister proceedings on the part of mischievous clients, or their lawyers-to discountenance and eradicate unnecessary form and technicality in our system of legal procedure-to discourage ill-considered, or procrastinating appeals - to cheapen necessary litigation, and finally to elevate the character of the legal profession, the members of which, as a body, have far more influence for good or for evil upon the institutions and opinion of the community they inhabit, than the same number selected from any other class or pursuit. 4. The improvement in the judicial system, to which we have referred, is farther secured, by the abolition of Courts of Equity, as distinct judicial tribunals, and the combination of law 1846.] and equity jurisdiction in the same offi- State, and report thereon to the Legislature from time to time." cers. The merit of this change consists rather in the tendencies it will establish, than in the direct results it can accomplish. It will tend to do away gradually with the absurd distinction between law and equity, and to occupy the judiciary simply with the administration of justice, by destroying the constant temptation which besets separate jurisdictions, to enlarge their powers. 66 If," as we have previously had occasion to remark in this journal, single officer administered both codes, he would have a constant desire to unite them, and step by step the differences would merge, as they have grown up, until finally, the name only will be left to perpetuate the distinction." It is not hazarding much to say, also, that the necessity of administering both codes, will make the judges themselves more accomplished and liberal-minded lawyers. 5. The testimony in equity cases is to be taken in like manner, as in cases at law, and the interminable, expensive and unsatisfactory examinations now required to be made before Masters and Examiners, are to be dispensed with, thus guaranteeing to the parties the privilege of having the witnesses give in their testimony in the presence and within the observation of the court. 6. The district judges may be migratory, and pass from county to county each successive term, or as the Legislature may determine. In this way a dangerous form of judicial favoritism to the bar may be, in a great measure, prevented local or sectional prejudices escaped by the judges-a larger acquaintance with the range and operation of the law in its application to the wants and condition of society, acquir. ed by them, and a check given to that familiarity on the part of the bar and suitors, with the chance infirmities of judges, which is calculated to weaken the moral authority and due credit of the tribunal over which they preside. 7. The Legislature is required at its first session, after the adoption of this Constitution "to provide for the appointnent of three commissioners to revise, reform, simplify, and abridge the rules of practice, pleadings, forms and proceedings of the Courts of Record of the The duty of these commissioners wisely executed-and to attempt it, is to secure an incalculable improvement upon the present system of judicial procedure in the State of New-Yorkwould, by the aid of the judicial organization proposed by the Convention, render the officers of the law, ministers of justice, instead of being what they are now too frequently forced to become legalised instruments of oppression. 8. It is likewise wisely provided, that the "laws and judicial decisions shall be free for publication by any person." For the destruction of the infamous monopoly of this privilege, held at present by individuals, every class of the community should be grateful, but most especially the legal profession, upon whom, of course, it has weighed most directly and oppressively. We have chiefly to regret in the proposed judiciary system, in addition to the objections we have already alluded to, that the army of local justices of the peace had not been disbanded by the construction of a simpler system of county justices, who should pass from town to town throughout their counties, The merit of such a and be occupied exclusively with judicial business. change, we are assured, was apprecia- The We have also to regret that the juThere diciary organization for the whole State had not been made uniform. was no propriety in excepting NewYork city from the good or the evil consequences of the system which is to prevail over the rest of the State. But notwithstanding these, to us, serious mistakes, we are satisfied that not only the State of New-York, but the whole country, will have matter for congratulation in the adoption of the judiciary plan we have been considering. IV. The financial credit of the State will be effectually and permanently se cured, and her existing debts fully pro- to the citizen a more ample freedom of opinion and pursuit. vided for. To these ends the new Constitution provides that the State shall contract no debt exceeding $1,000,000, unless to meet the exigencies of insurrection or war, except for some single specified object, and with the express approval of the people, signified by a direct vote; and a direct tax must at the time be levied sufficient to pay the annual interest of said debt, and extinguish the principal within eighteen years. It was for such a guaranty, that the necessity for a Convention was first experienced; and though other reforms of perhaps greater intrinsic importance have been superadded, yet to those who have shared in the heat and labor of those long and painful controversies, in the camp and on the plain, in the Legislature, and before the people, growing out of extravagant notions of public improvement and expenditure entertained generally by our political opponents, and unfortunately by some of our political allies-it is to those who have thus combated this slovenly style of statesmanship, a matter of just triumph and congratulation, to find incorporated into our fundamental law, such ample and comprehensive endorsement of every single point of doctrine which they have ever claimed or required. To secure the liquidation of existing debts, and the completion of certain unfinished public works, it is provided that, of the net revenues arising from the canals of this State, $1,300,000 for ten years and $1,700,000 thereafter are to be set apart as a Sinking Fund, to pay the principal and interest of the canal debt; $350,000, until the canal debt is paid, and afterward $1,500,000, to pay the other (or general fund) debt of the State, and $200,000 per annum, (which after eight years may be increased to $350,000,) are to be appropriated from the canal revenue toward defraying generally the expense of the State Government, making $1,850,000 immediately, and $2,400,000 after ten years, to be appropriated from the canal revenues, until the State debt is paid. The balance of the canal revenues is to be sacredly appropriated to the prosecution and completion of the Erie enlargement, Black River and Genesee Valley Canals. 1. The third article in the bill of rights provides that~“the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall for ever be allowed in this State to all mankind; and no person shall be rendered incompetent to be a witness on account of his opinions on matters of religious belief; but the liberty of conscience hereby secured, shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of this State." To measure the credibility of a witness by the number or attributes of the Gods he professes to believe in, is scarcely as wise as to make the length of his hair the standard of his veracity. If he be dishonest, he can multiply or substract from the number of his Divinities, to suit the tastes of his tribunal. On the other hand, he can only shorten his hair, he cannot always lengthen it, with the same facility to suit every emergency. 2. The absurd exclusion of ministers of the Gospel from office, which is enforced under the old Constitution, will be no longer known, and we trust now, that these gentlemen will be led to take their fair share in the practical, as well as spiritual interests and responsibilities of life, and place themselves where they may be judged upon their merits, without having their characters and conscience coddled and nursed by constitutional superintendance. VI. It will secure greater purity and fairness in the enjoyment of the elective franchise. 1. By the first section of the second article of the proposed Constitution, it is provided that every person offering to vote shall have been a citizen-naturalized or otherwise at least ten days, and for thirty days a resident of the district from which the officer voted for is to be chosen. This will prove a valuable restraint upon fraudulent voting, and in some measure contribute to exclude the votes of a large class of strangers, who are brought to the polls at every election, the blind instruments of corrupt and designing politicians. 2. It has, likewise, wisely been de→ V. The new Constitution will secure termined by the Convention, to submit |