deceit, lust, law-breaking-she impels us to an opposite set of qualities: mildness, kindness, liberality, fairness, truthfulness, humanity. temperance, chastity, obedience. These conceptions must enter into the idea of the end of human action. These must be included in the supreme law of human action. These points indicate the place to which the lines of duty all tend. The supreme law of human action must be found in the point to which all such lines converge. It may be conceived as the Ideal Centre of such special moral tendencies as we have spoken; and thus, as the Idea of Morality."-p. 162. Here we have a great many things, such as liberality, fairness, and so forth. all pointing to the great Idea of Goodness; but how are these things to be defined? how are they to be known, or what is it that constitutes their moral quality? Until this be shown, we may be told, "in a general way," that they all point to the "Idea of Morality;" but as to what that idea is, we shall be as far from having any knowledge as before; to our minds it will have "neither a local habitation," nor "a name."

"We may proceed somewhat further," says our author, "in the determination of this Ideal Centre, or Idea of Morality." What is it, then? Why, The Supreme Law of human nature must be a Law which belongs to man as man; a thing in which all men sympathize, and which binds together man and man by the tie of their common humanity," &c., p. 162. But what is it? "It excludes all that operates merely to separate men; for example, all desires that tend to a centre in each individual, without any regard to the common sympathy of mankind; and especially, all affections which operate directly to introduce discord and conflict; as we have seen, accordingly, that it excludes malice and anger, and directs us to mildness and kindness." Very well; but what is it that is to do all this? "The absence of all the affections which tend to separate men, and the aggregate of the affections which tend to unite them, may be expressed by the term Benevolence."p. 162-3. Well; but what is benevolence? It includes "all the ties of love which bind men together."... "This affection of love to man as man, is a part of the supreme law of human

action: and the idea of a complete and universal benevolence is a point in the direction of the Ideal Centre, or a part of the Idea of Morality of which we have spoken."-p. 163.

After all, this brings us not one inch nearer to the nature of the great idea of moral goodness; for the question still returns, what is benevolence? Is it a mere passive state of the sensibility, or does it also include a state of the will? what is its distinguishing attribute? wherein does its moral character consist? This question must be answered, before we can have any idea of moral goodness. It is by a similar process, that our author reaches his four other cardinal virtues, of truth, of justice, of purity, and of order; and shows them all to be parts of the "Idea of Moral Goodness." This is a tedious process, one would think, to arrive at self-evident truths.

His remarks on the subject of order are so characteristic, that we shall refer to them. "The Supreme Law of Human Action," says he, "in order to operate effectively upon men's minds, must be distinctly and definitely conceived, at least in some of its parts and applications. But all distinct and definite conceptions of Laws of Human Action must involve a reference to the relation which positive Laws establish. Hence, moral rules, in order to be distinct and definite, must depend upon Laws; and MUST SUPPOSE LAWS TO BE FIXED AND PERMANENT. It is our duty to promote, by our acts, this fixity and permanence; and the Duty, of course, extends to our internal actions, to Will, Intention, Desire and affection, as well as to external acts. We must conform our dispositions to the Laws; obey the laws cordially, or administer them carefully, according to the position we may happen to hold in the community. This disposition may be denoted by the term Order, understood in a large and comprehensive sense."

p. 165. . . ." The Idea of Order in this comprehensive sense is part of the Central Idea of Morality."—p. 166.

"Thus," says our author, "we have five Ideas, Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, and Order, which may be considered as the elements of the Central Idea of Morality, or as the cardinal points of the Supreme Rule of Human Action."-p. 166.

But yet the idea of moral goodness,

to which our author set out to conduct us, has not been attained. We have seen what he calls its parts;" but why these parts partake of the nature of the whole, or what the nature of the whole is, we have not yet seen. It surely will be disclosed, one would think, before the author is done; it seems that it already begins to dawn upon us. For we are told, "We are not to conceive these Ideas, (his five great" cardinal points") as distinct and separable, but rather as connected and combined in a fundamental and intimate manner. Thus, we have already mentioned moral qualities which partake of more than one, as Liberality partakes of Benevolence and Justice; Honesty of Justice and Truth. And all these dispositions, Benevolence, Justice, Truth. Purity, Order, may be considered to be included in the Love of Goodness."-p. 166. But alas! what is goodness? This is the idea we have been in search of, and to which our author undertook to conduct us.The great central idea of morality-of goodness, is then, we are told, the love of morality or goodness. But we still ask, what is morality? what is goodness?

Goodness, we are told, is "a conformity to the supreme law of human action;" and "the supreme law of human action is a love of moral good as good, and the desire to advance towards it as the ultimate and only real object of action. To this object, all special affections, all external objects and the desires of such objects, all intercourse of men, all institutions of society, are considered as subordinate and instrumental. And thus, this Love of Good includes, excites, nourishes, and directs to their proper ends, those more special Affections and Dispositions of which we have spoken." We wish the reader to understand, once for all, that we do not feel ourselves bound to point out the tenth part of the error and confusion which may be found in the extracts that we make from the work before us; we have no criticism to offer at present in regard to the strange notions necessarily implied in the above passage, as well as in nearly all of the lucubrations of the author. We simply wish to notice the fact, that it conducts us to the position, that moral goodness is a conformity to the supreme law, and that the supreme rule enjoins moral goodness!

A further description of the conduct conformable to the supreme rule is contained in the following words: "In order to describe the character and conduct conformable to the Supreme Rule, we may speak of it as the character and conduct of a good man.— That is right which a good man would do. Those are right affections which a good man would feel.”—p. 166.— Now, we do not suppose that our author means to assert, that every thing which a good man does is morally good; for it is too plain, that many of his actions are indifferent in a moral point of view-even supposing him to be a perfect man. But if he means that all the actions which a good man does, as a good man, or which goes to coustitute his goodness, are conformable to the supreme rule, this is only to repeat in a very awkward way, the proposition that goodness is a conformity to the supreme rule. All that we can learn from such teaching is, that goodness is a couformity to the supreme rule, and that the supreme rule enjoins goodness. This is absolutely all that we can gather from Dr. Whewell on this all-inportant point; and we regret that he did not impart his information without such an astonishing profusion of words

We cannot follow our author through his remarks on the "Virtues of the Affections;" the "Virtues of the Mental Desires;" the "Virtues connected with Truth;" the Virtues relating to the Bodily Desires;" the "Intellectual Virtues ;" the "Reflex Virtues and Vices;" nor through his dissertation concerning our "duties" in regard to the same things. To most minds, this arrangement and nomenclature will be a sufficient index to the contents of this portion of his book; and besides, our limits require us to view the work before us, not in relation to the various details, but in relation to the great landmarks of moral science. We have already considered its doctrines concerning the relation between morality and law; the origin of our moral sentiments, and the idea of goodness; we shall conclude with a brief notice of its positions in regard to the nature and authority of conscience.

From what the author has said with respect to the origin of our moral sentiments, we might conclude that his views in regard to the nature and func tions of conscience are vague and in

definite. Accordingly, in speaking of conscience, he multiplies epithets, and piles one upon another, but he throws no light on the subject. He tells us, for example, that conscience as a law "is a stage in our moral and intellectual progress"— p. 261; and again, that conscience is never fully formed, but always in the course of formation." -p. 263. Now, in regard to such expressions, as well as in regard to the general character of our author's teaching, we wish to make a remark, in order that we may not be misunderstood in our strictures on his work. We do not say, then, that a true sense may not be put upon such expressions, as well as upon hundreds of others, bearing a similar stamp, to which we should object. They may be true; but how much truth they contain, or wherein their truth consists, is what can be known only to those who are already intimately acquainted with the science of morals. The author, no doubt, sees a truth in all his expressions; and we dare say he would be greatly surprised to find that any man should be so dull as to misunderstand him; and yet we will venture to affirm, that if he had formed a clear and steady view of the truth, at which he so darkly and obscurely aims, and had seen it in all its bearings, he would have found it impossible to express himself as he has done. The reader who is familiar with the truths of moral science may, therefore, see these truths imperfectly reflected in the pages of this work, without being misled by the fragmentary or distorted images they present; just as the mind of the geometrician will eliminite the idea of a perfect circle from the most clumsy attempt to represent it by a diagram. But the unlearned student, who comes to the work in question for instruction, will be just as apt to see his own crude fancies, or preconceived errors. reflected therein, as he will be to behold the bright and beautiful image of truth. If he should have any thing of a thoughtful and meditative mind, he will perceive that the author has in some places expressed more, and in some less, than the truth; but exactly where the line which separates truth from error is to be drawn, he will not be able to determine; unless he can find in his own bosom, or in some other teacher, a better guide than "The Elements of Morality."

The great question which our author discusses in regard to conscience, is this:-Is he who acts according to his conscience always right? This question, whether viewed in relation to individual conduct, or in relation to many of the great practical interests which agitate the Christian world at the present day, appears to be one of immense magnitude and importance. The importance of the question, however, we cannot undertake to unfold aud illustrate at present: it must appear to the most superficial observer that it is of sufficient magnitude to engage our most serious attention. We shall proceed, then, to consider the manner in which our author has solved this question.

He contends, that he who acts against his conscience is always wrong," —p.262. To disobey the commands and prohibitions of conscience, under any circumstances, is utterly immoral; it is the very essence of immorality,"--p. 266, and so in various other places. Now, it appears perfectly obvious to us, that if it is always wrong to act against conscience, it can never be wrong to act in obedience to it; that if it is immoral to refuse to obey its commands, it cannot be immoral to obey them. Whenever we are called upon to obey the dictates of conscience, we must either refuse or obey; and hence, if it is wrong to refuse, it must be right to obey. It is always our duty to fly from wrong; and hence, as refusing to yield to the dictates of conscience is, as the author concedes, wrong, it cannot but be right to yield. We cannot possibly conceive of a clearer or more irresistible inference; and yet our author refuses to make it. He admits that it is always wrong to refuse obedience to conscience; but yet he will not allow that it is always right to render obedience to it.

On the contrary, after having propounded the question, is he who acts according to his conscience always right? he replies, "it is evident, that to answer this question in the affirmative, would lead to great inconsistencies in our Morality."-p. 262. He then begins to talk about the imperfections of conscience, and the danger of following it in all cases. "Under the influence of education, laws, prejudices and passions, the standard of right and wrong, which exists in men's minds for

the time, is often very different from that which the Moralist can assent to. Men have often committed thefts, frauds, impositions, homicides, thinking their actions right; though they were such as all Moralists would condemn as wrong. Such men acted according to their conscience. Were they thereby justified?"-p. 262. Our author does not seem to perceive, that he has, by means of an ambiguous word, stifled his position. We do not say, that both his positions may not be true, but we say, that they do not relate to the same object of thought. The truth is, that although his positions are all true, in certain senses; yet the misfortune is, that in treating of this subject, he does not hold his mind steadily to one thing, but suffers it to fly from point to point in the midst of the ambiguities of his phraseology. Though his assertions are all correct, yet by permitting them to fly in different directions and aim at different objects, appearing to be the same only because they have a common name; he has left the question he undertook to discuss in a state of no little preplexity and confusion. We do not deny his doctrines; we understand them fully and we will venture to affirm, that any man, who has solved the problem in question clearly and satisfactorily to his own mind, will understand Mr. Whewell better than he understands himself.

There is a distinction lying at the bottom of this subject to which we must attend, or it will forever remain enveloped in great difficulty and confusion. To unfold and illustrate it, let us suppose that A does a certain act in obedience to his conscience. Now, the question is, does it follow that this act is right, simply because his conscience commanded it? To this question, we may reply in the affirmative or negative, according to the use and application of the term right. If A had not performed the act, he would have done violence to his conscience; which, it is admitted, is of "the very essence of immorality." Hence, it was his duty to do it; and the act was morally right in him. Using the term right, then, in reference to the moral conduct of the agent A, we do not hesitate to say, that the act in question was right, because it was done in obedience to the dictate of conscience.

But the term right is frequently ap

plied to actions abstractly considered, and without reference to the agent.Thus, an act is said to be right when it is such as ought to be done, by those who have the power and opportunity to know it to be right and to do it.Such an act is said to be " right in itself," and without reference to the intention of any agent. In this sense of the word, the act of A, which we have pronounced right, because it was done in obedience to his conscience, may be wrong; that is to say, it may be such that he would feel bound not to do it, provided his conscience were perfectly enlightened. Hence, the same action may be both right and wrong at the same time, in these very different senses; and it was an inattention to the above distinction, which has been clearly made and insisted on by Stewart, and Read, and Price, that has led our author into so much perplexity.

It cannot be objected, that this makes conscience "the ultimate standard of morality," or clothes it with the attributes of infallibility. The ground we have taken, is perfectly consistent with the truth, that conscience is liable to innumerable errors, and needs to be enlightened. Nor does it imply, that we may rest contented to live and act in conformity with the present dictates of our conscience, without seeking to advance in a knowledge of duty. On the contrary, it is one of the dictates of conscience itself, that we ought to use all the means in our power to obtain light. Conscience is not so much an enlightening principle, as it is a principle to be enlightened; and the injunction to seek for light, is one of its most important mandates. We simply assent, that the present dictate of conscience is the immediate rule of action; he who violates it, is guilty of wrong, and he who obeys, does right. No matter what we may take as the standard of right in the abstract, whether we take expediency, or the relations of things, or the word of God, or Mr.Whewell's great principle of order; we must still, ex necessitate rei, adopt conscience as the immediate rule of duty. We must follow this as the immediate rule of conduct; it is impossible to conceive of any other. No man can guide himself by a light which he does not see; and to act in conformity with what he sees and feels to be his duty, is to be governed by the dictates of conscience.