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is not so. Provided the point of junction of the different corps d'armée, which advance by different lines, be beyond the possible reach of the enemy's attempts, and the forward movement of the united army from that point be on a single line, the principle of the last maxim will have been adhered to in both cases.

As regards the last maxim also, it may be remarked that a distinction must be made between a line of operations and a line of retreat or communication.

It is a maxim of Napoleon's, to have but one line of operation towards his decisive point, but equally so to have as many lines of retreat from that point as possible; as the following will show.

Maxim 5. "When two armies are ranged in battle, and one of them has but one point to retreat upon, while the other can retreat on all the points of the compass, all the advantage is with the last. It is in such a case that a commander should be bold to strike great blows, and manoeuvre on his enemy's flank; Victory is in his hands." (Napoleon.)

Maxim 6. It is one of the most important principles of war to unite the scattered bodies of an army at the point which is the most distant and the best protected from the attempts of an enemy. (Napoleon.)

This is deduced from Principles 1 and 3.

For let

a b be the general front of an army, whose parts are

b

posted at a, c, and b; let the enemy be advancing from the direction e. If e be the point on which the bodies at a, c, and b are to concentrate, their union may be safely effected supposing intelligence of the enemy's approach to have been received, when he is still at a greater distance (in time) from e than the most distant of the scattered bodies of the army. If that is not the case the enemy will be on interior lines, and will arrive at e before the army can there unite, and will thus be enabled to apply Principle 1 at its expense by beating its successively arriving detachments in detail.

If d, in rear of a b, were the point of concentration, the above evil could not arrive.

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Example. Turenne. In 1645 Turenne was at the head of 12,000 men, of whom 5000 were cavalry. He crossed the Rhine from Spire, advanced and

took Stutgard, crossed the Neckar, advanced to the Tauber river, and established his headquarters at Mergentheim a small town on its left bank. His opponent the Count de Merci, whose force consisted of 16,000 men, being distant two marches, Turenne distributed his force in quarters of refreshment around Mergentheim. On the 2nd of May at daybreak learning that Merci was advancing towards him with his whole force, he ordered the concentration of his army at Erbsthausen six miles in front of Mergentheim on the road by which the enemy was advancing. Turenne went himself to Erbsthausen and found only 3000 infantry and part of the cavalry arrived in his intended position, at the moment when the Bavarian army came in sight at the distance of less than a mile. There was a wood on the French right, which he occupied with his infantry in a single line. The left was composed of the cavalry also in one line. Merci's right was of cavalry, his left of infantry with cavalry in rear. The Bavarian infantry advanced to attack the French right posted in the wood. Turenne sensible that all was lost if his right was forced, charged at the head of his cavalry, drove the Bavarian cavalry of the right wing off the field, and took all their guns and twelve standards; meanwhile however his infantry had abandoned the wood and fled in disorder. The Bavarian cavalry of the left wing then traversed the wood and fell upon

the flank and rear of Turenne's victorious troopers; they were broken; Turenne escaped with difficulty. He fortunately met, at some distance from the field of battle, several fresh squadrons on their way to join him, with whom he showed a bold front, and gained time to restore the formation of his army and to effect an orderly retreat.

Observations.

Turenne violated Principles 1 and 3 by indicating a spot for the concentration of his army six miles to his front in the direction of his advancing enemy. He gave Merci greatly the advantage of interior lines, which enabled him to arrive at the point of concentration before half of Turenne's army was there assembled, and to apply Principle 1 at his expense, by attacking the French fraction with his whole force.

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Maxim 7. To operate by lines distant from each other and without intercommunication, is a fault which generally leads to another. The advancing columns of an army must be in constant communication with each other, so that an enemy cannot penetrate between them. (Napoleon.)

Maxim 8.- The communication between the different fractions of an army, whether in position or in movement, must always be perfectly open and

easy.

Maxim 9.

To besiege a fortified place whose possession would be useless to yourself, and which

gives the enemy no power of annoyance, is to waste time and means.

The places which an invading army is justified in besieging are such as come within the meaning of the definitions of strategical points and decisive points.

1st. Those whose possession by the army will undoubtedly strengthen its line of communication.

2nd. Those whose possession by the enemy will enable him to act upon that line.

3rd. Those whose possession by the army will enable it to execute the plan of campaign in the most successful manner.

4th. Those whose possession by the enemy will enable him to frustrate the plan of campaign.

To besiege places other than these would be to waste time, means, and men; the last, not only by the loss incurred in the actual siege, but also by the strength of the garrison required to defend the acquisition.

The siege of a regular fortress, particularly when a hostile army will endeavour to save it, is one of the most arduous and difficult operations of war; and nothing can be undertaken by the army in furtherance of the plan of campaign so long as such siege continues; unless indeed the strength of the army is very superior to that of the enemy on the theatre of war.

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