direct reference to this subject; the rest illustrate equally other general rules, and will be found elsewhere.

In 1653, Turenne commanded the French army of 16,000 men, of which 10,000 were cavalry. A Spanish army of 30,000 men, under the Archduke and Condé, invaded Picardy, and threatened to march on Paris, where there was great consternation. Opinions were divided as to the best course to pursue. Some proposed to employ 5000 of the infantry to garrison the places which were on the Archduke's line of operations on Paris, and with the remainder to harass the enemy's line of march, to cut off his stragglers, intercept his convoys, &c.

Others rejected the idea of dividing the army, and proposed that it should take post behind the Oise to defend the passage of that river; and when forced, that it should fall back on Paris where it could be joined by the succours which delay would bring from the provinces.

Turenne favoured neither scheme. It was impossible to prevent the passage of such a river as the Oise; yet, when the enemy should succeed in forcing it, he as well as the Parisians would magnify the success, and its influence on the morale of the army would be most depressing.

The plan which he adopted was to march always in a parallel line with the enemy at the distance of

twelve or fourteen miles; to wage a warfare of marches and manœuvres. His soldiers would thus have no reason to believe themselves inferior to the enemy, and time would bring reinforcements which might enable him to assume the offensive. The conception was on the whole skilfully executed.

On the 13th of August, however, the army of Turenne was surprised when near Mont St. Quentin by the intelligence of the approach of the Spanish army.

The alarm was great; Turenne drew up his force in order of battle; but his left was so badly posted, being commanded on all sides by heights which the superiority of the enemy would enable him to occupy, that to remain in his position was certain defeat. Meanwhile the enemy was approaching. The country which separated the hostile armies being mountainous, Turenne resolved instead of retreating as an ordinary general might have done to advance, in the certainty of finding a better position than that which he was about to quit. Accordingly he had not marched more than two miles and a half when he found what he sought. His left rested on an almost inaccessible height, and his front was covered by a stream which flows into the Somme at Peronne. At three in the afternoon the Spanish army presented itself. Condé wished to attack Turenne at once; but the Archduke said his troops

were fatigued and they must first have a night's. rest. The French profited by the delay to entrench themselves; and next day the Spanish generals

thought their position too strong. After remaining before it three days the Spanish army decamped.

Observations. In this campaign Turenne's plan was doubtless attended with great risk, but it was only a choice of evils, and any other would have sooner enabled the enemy to march on Paris. Turenne was well aware also that the Archduke was not a very enthusiastic ally of Condé, and that he would not risk his army where success did not seem certain. The Archduke's policy was to foment the civil troubles of France, and to take a few fortresses which would strengthen his own Flemish frontier. Condé's object was to march on Paris at all hazards, to revive the party of the Fronde, and to assist the revolt of Bordeaux. Turenne's scheme was framed on the sagacious consideration of these moral circumstances. Again, if he had retreated from Mont St. Quentin behind the Somme, the enemy would have followed, and Turenne must either have risked a battle elsewhere to arrest his march, or have left open to him the road to Paris. In either case, his retreat would have exercised a depressing influence on the French, and a proportional encouragement on the Spaniards. But his occupation of so bad a position at Mont St. Quentin, and his allowing

himself to be surprised by the enemy, are not to be excused.

Sir C. Napier understood as well as any commander, and practised with as much skill, the means of raising the spirit of his soldiers. He removed existing causes of depression, and acquired their unlimited confidence by the calm justice and sagacity of his sway, as well as by the fiery energy with which he undertook and accomplished the apparently most hopeless enterprises, thereby creating a belief in his invincibility both among friends and foes. The last complimented him with the title of the "Devil's Brother." No commander ever possessed or deserved in a higher degree the love of his troops.

Examples. On his first arrival in India he found the existence amongst the officers and men of a most pernicious belief in the superiority of the Afghan matchlock over the British musket, both as regards range and precision. Aware how depressing would be the effect of such a belief in the event of hostilities, if allowed to continue," he resolved to refute it practically; and, to draw attention to the refutation, he adopted an ingenious device.

"Provoking a warm admirer of the matchlock to produce a Mahratta equal with that weapon to a musketeer, he meanwhile selected some men and

officers of the sepoys, practised with them himself, until he discovered the best shot, and then daily contended in person with this man. They were nearly equal; the camp became interested; bets were multiplied; and the partisans of each weapon were fairly pitted against each other, not only for the trial, but in the thoughts of the soldiers: this was the general's object. Thus he bent the stiffened neck of the prejudice, and at the end of two months the supporter of the matchlock admitted that he could not win; moreover it was proved that while the matchlock could only be fired five or six times in half an hour, the musketeer could fire sixty shots, and send twenty home to the mark at 150 yards' distance. Then, to use the General's words, the matchlock was laughed at, and the musket got its place again..'

Sir C. Napier's march through the desert to Emaum Ghur, of which the great Duke of Wellington said, "It is one of the most curious military feats which I have ever known to be performed, or ever read of in my life;" and his extraordinary campaign (completely successful) against the robber tribes of the hills, are instances of his self-reliant daring. The last achievement challenges favourable comparison with any military operation on record. He acquired the love of his troops by showing