following the beaten enemy down the slopes, entered Lowositz pellmell with them.

The Austrian general now abandoned that village, and retaining his left and centre in their original position, drew back his right which he posted facing towards the course of the Elbe, which there takes a turn. Frederick judged this new position unassailable; he feared to attack the enemy's right, as the assailants would have had the Elbe in their rear, and he considered the rest of the Austrian line, covered by the marshy stream, to be too strong. Frederick therefore ordered Bevern to advance with a strong force by the village of Tschiskowitz to turn the enemy's left flank, which obliged Braun to retire across the Eger.

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Observations.

The excellence of Frederick's position consisted in this, that it completely blocked up the road by the left bank of the Elbe to Pirna, where the Saxon army was shut up, which it was Braun's object to relieve. The Austrian marshal could not hope to force his way through an army in so strong a position defended by a powerful artillery. Frederick's attack was made on the false assumption that the Austrian main body had crossed the Elbe, and that he had in front of him nothing but a strong rear-guard which it was his object to destroy. Had he been aware of

the real state of the case, he would have awaited the Austrian attack, which probably never would have been made. Frederick's object would have been accomplished by maintaining his position; he would have been wrong with an inferior force to throw away the advantage of his strong ground to attack where the enemy had all the advantage of ground, merely for the purpose of forcing him to retire.

The Prussian position united in its favour Maxims 11. 12. 16. and 17.

In their order of battle, the Austrians violated Maxim 19. (see the concluding remark of that maxim), since they paralysed the greater part of their force by shutting it up behind the marshy stream, whence it could not conveniently be brought into action.

Frederick was in consequence enabled to bring the greater part of his force to bear against the village of Lowositz, which was the decisive point of this field of battle.

Frederick applied Maxim 25. for the purpose of dislodging the enemy from his second position. It may be thought that the above reasoning should apply equally to the Austrian second position as to the first, and that Frederick should have been satisfied with holding his ground; but those who argue thus betray great ignorance of war.

In the first case Frederick's object was secured by

X

his maintaining his position, and it would have been hazardous to abandon it to attack the strong position of the enemy; it would also have been a grave error to have endeavoured to force the enemy to retire by turning his flank before the battle, as it would have opened to him the road to Pirna, where Braun would have united with the Saxon army, and where he would have found himself in a friendly country (Saxony) interposed between the Prussian army and its own frontier. But after the battle, Frederick had the moral effect of his victory to go upon, and rightly judged that he might obtain a greater success than he could have calculated on before. It was

the moral effect of their defeat which induced the Austrians to abandon their position from the fear of their flank being turned.

The cavalry fight is an instance of the victory always remaining to that general who can produce the last reserve.

BATTLE OF Prague.

It has already been related in the campaign of 1757 that Frederick arrived with his army on the left bank of the Moldau before Prague on the 2nd May. Prince Charles of Lorraine commanded the Austrian army of 60,000 men on the heights of Zisca above Prague, on the right bank of the Moldau. (See Plate VI.)

On the 4th Frederick and Charles were still in the

same positions. Schwerin, commanding a Prussian corps, was at Bunzlau, on the right bank of the Elbe opposite Brandeis; and the Austrian general Daun was en route from Moravia by the road of Kollin to reinforce Prince Charles.

On the 5th Schwerin crossed to the left bank of the Elbe, and advanced from Brandeis to unite with Frederick.

The same day Frederick threw a bridge across the Moldau at Podhaba and crossed to the right bank, unmolested by the Austrians, although within 4000 yards of their camp. And on the morning of the 6th he united Schwerin's force to his own at the village of Prositz.

Austrian Position. The left occupied the heights of Zisca; the right, the hills which overlook the village of Kyge; the front was covered by a stream whose banks were marshy, which has its source in the pond of Sterboholzy, runs round the Austrian right and front by the villages of Sterboholzy, Potscherwitz, Hostawitz, and Kyge, and falls into the Moldau halfway between Podhaba and Prague. The heights occupied by the Austrians are on the left high and steep, but begin to lower near Kyge, and thence falling, they lose themselves in the plain of Sterboholzy, which is favourable for the action of cavalry. Prussian Position. Right, at village of Prositz; centre, in front of Gibel; 1 ft, beyond Sattalitze.

The Prussians also occupied a chain of heights parallel to those of the Austrians, and distant from them about 2 miles.

The two armies were about equal in numbers, but Frederick's army was superior in all else.

From the nature of the ground between the heights occupied by the two armies, and of the stream which covered the Austrian front, Frederick judged that an attack in front would fail; he therefore sent Marshal Schwerin at a gallop to see if it was possible to turn the enemy's right flank. Schwerin returned with the information that the Austrian right did not reach so far as Sterboholzy, and that it was en l'air; Frederick accordingly carried his army to the left to turn the Austrian right flank. Prince Charles to meet this threw back the whole of his right wing, so that his new position was as follows (shown at AA in Plate VI.):

The right, on the heights which overlook the plain of Sterboholzy; the centre, overlooking Kyge; and the left, as before, on the heights of Zisca; the Austrian order of battle was thus two sides of a square, each being about 7000 yards long; the cavalry on the extreme right in the plain (shown at a' • in the Plate).

As soon as the right of the king had reached Kyge he halted; his front extended from Kyge on the right to beyond Sterboholzy on the left. This