50,000 men; of whom 25,000 were detached under Bevern. Prince Charles had 32,000 men available for either operation, after leaving 10,000 for the defence of the city.

The army of Daun, after being reinforced, was superior to the Prussian army on the right bank; it was therefore to be expected Daun would endeavour to raise the blockade. Under these circumstances, Bevern's corps of observation should not have been removed to a greater distance than one day's march, instead of three as it was at Kollin, and its position should have been strongly entrenched. It would thus have been within reach of being supported by Frederick with a part of his blockading force, to resist the attack of Daun, who might thus have been beaten and repulsed before the besieged were aware of his approach. Besides this, considering the aggregate numerical inferiority of the Prussian troops on the right bank (viz. 50,000 Prussians to 97,000 Austrians, the last total being composed of 42,000 under Prince Charles, and 55,000 under Daun), the six weeks which intervened between the battles of Prague and Kollin should have been employed by Frederick in securing the position of his blockading force by the construction of lines of circumvallation, in accordance with the remarks on such lines in Chapter V.

It is difficult to conceive on what grounds Frederick

decided on attacking the enemy's right wing at the battle of Kollin, when he found himself placed by accident almost in the same relative position to the Austrian left wing which it was the object of his rash march to assume towards the other.

In another point of view also the attack on the Austrian left wing was the most advantageous, since Daun, defeated, could not have retreated on Prague to reinforce Prince Charles, because the Prussian army would have been between the two, but must have retraced his steps to Moravia. On the other hand, if Frederick had succeeded in his meditated attack on the Austrian right wing, Daun, defeated, would have retreated upon Prague, the road to which was left open by the Prussian flank march; and he would thus have effected the very object which Frederick fought the battle to prevent.

The Austrian position was weak on the left flank ; it was otherwise good. It observed Maxims 12. and 13., inasmuch as it had the choice of two lines of retreat, viz. on Prague and Moravia, and, if cut off from the one, it might have adopted the other. It peculiarly observed Maxim 16., in being covered by villages strongly occupied along the front; and Maxim 17. as regards the security of the right flank, which the village of Krezor in front, and the wood and village of Radowenitz in echellon to the rear, completely protected.

Frederick by his advance to fight at Kollin, violated Principles 1., 2., and 3. Principle 1. as

already explained; Principle 2. because he exposed his communication with Prague, which was his natural line of retreat, to the attacks of Prince Charles. Defeated, he could not retreat upon Prague to meet Prince Charles in front, with a victorious enemy following him in rear. He was therefore obliged to effect his retreat on Nymbourg, and was thereby thrown on very exterior lines.

BATTLE OF HASTENBECK, 1757.

Marshal d'Estrées led a French army of 80,000 men across Westphalia, and advanced to the Weser in the design of invading Hanover which was defended by an army of 60,000 Hanoverians, Hessians and Brunswickers, under the Duke of Cumberland which was in position at Hastenbeck.

Position of the Duke.

The right rested on the River Weser; the centre was in rear of the village of Hastenbeck; the left, which was thrown back, occupied the heights of Ochsen. The extent of his line was about 5000 yards. His front from Hastenbeck to the right was covered by an impassable marsh. This part of the position was also on high ground which sloped down to the marsh in front; his line of retreat was on the fortress of

Y

Hameln situated about three miles in rear of his right flank.

On the 24th of July the French marshal took up a position opposite the enemy; and perceiving that the Duke's right and front were so well protected and that the left was also very difficult of access, he resolved to turn the left. Eor this purpose he detached a force under M. de Chevert during the night to make a circuitous march round the left of the enemy and to seize the village of Afferde in rear of that flank. Chevert arrived at his destination at five in the morning of the 25th, and succeeded in taking possession of the village and maintaining it, because the Duke having only posted two batteries on his left their fire was silenced by Chevert's guns.

On the 25th the French marshal perceiving that he could hope for no success unless he could gain possession of the heights occupied by the enemy's left, sent orders to Chevert to attack them. Chevert marched in the middle of the night and attacked the enemy's left wing from the side of Afferde, at the same time that Armentieres led another body of troops against it from the French main body. The French marshal led the left wing of his army in person against the Hanoverian right by two roads which crossed the morass, and against the centre at Hastenbeck; but owing to obstacles he did not arrive until late in the day. Chevert was then com

pletely master of the heights on the left; and the Duke would have had great difficulty in retreating had it not been that the Prince of Brunswick with 1200 men ascended the heights on the left of Chevert and made a vigorous attack on his left flank, which, owing to the intricate nature of the ground and the difficulty of judging of the number of his assailants, made him believe their force much greater than the reality, and obliged him to retire for a time in disorder. The French marshal too alarmed by this result, and by the sight of some cavalry in rear of his army which made him believe a reinforcement was coming to the enemy, ordered a general retreat.

The troops of Chevert, however, now aware of the small number of their opponents, returned to the attack and regained their lost ground; but in the interval the Duke of Cumberland gained time to effect his retreat in tolerable order and to carry off his guns.

Observations.

The position of the Duke of Cumberland observed the Maxims 16. and 17. in that his front was covered by the morass over which there were only two practicable passages by causeways; and as to his flanks, that the right was absolutely protected, and the left posted on ground difficult of access. But he neglected Maxim 18. by failing to strengthen his left