any given point on that line in a shorter time. than the hostile army requires to reach the same point. In this respect an invading army always operates at a disadvantage. For the defending force being in its own country can generally retire in several different directions, or it has several lines of retreat; while the invader usually has but the line by which he has advanced; he dares not operate much to one side or the other of that line, for in so doing he would expose it to the enemy, who might thus interpose between the invading army and its point of safety, or, in other words, might thus intercept its communications; to regain which the invader must either fight a battle in a position where defeat would be ruin, or he must make a long détour by forced marches, having thus lost his time and discouraged his soldiers.

The Attack.

The General having placed his force in a proper position, has now to attack.

Drill.

The basis of all excellence in bringing an army into action is drill. No man can be a General without being perfectly master of the art of handling his troops of all arms.

All movements within reach of an enemy must be made in that particular manner which will enable the

line of battle to be formed with the least possible delay. Much may depend on the formation in which the General decides on attacking any particular point, and it is obvious that his troops must be capable, from being thoroughly drilled and exercised, of carrying out his dispositions quickly and accurately. Unquestionably of two armies equal in all other respects and equally handled by their commanders, that one must win which can manœuvre with the greatest rapidity and precision. For instance, at a critical point and moment the loss of a battle might be caused by brigades, advancing to attack in line, crowding in and overlapping one another, thus causing serious confusion and diminution of front; while, on the other hand, the involuntary divergence of the same brigades would leave gaps in the line which a skilful enemy would not be slow to avail himself of.

It is not supposed that in the smoke and turmoil of a battle movements can be executed with quite the same regularity as at a review, but a closer approximation will be made to that desirable object, the better the officers and men are drilled. Yet in giving all due importance to the art of moving troops, it must be remembered that, although no one can be a General without possessing that art in a high degree, it is only one of the many tools with which he must work, and that a man may be a perfect drill

in the literal meaning of the term, without having an idea beyond the mechanical part of it.

Frederick the Great paid more attention to mere parade drill than any modern General, and he undoubtedly owed many of his great victories, as well as on several occasions his escape from serious disaster, to the superiority of his troops in this particular over those it was his fortune to encounter. Had the armies opposed to him been equally well drilled with his own, though he must always have deserved the name of a great General, he would hardly have left the reputation of a successful one.

Skill in using Weapons.

The skill possessed by the soldiers of all arms in the use of their particular weapons is evidently another vital ingredient of success. This also depends on exercise. The modern improvement in small arms renders it probable that the fire of the infantry will in future form the most important element in the decision of a battle. Until lately the small-arm practice of our army has been a farce. The improvement which has taken place is due to the late commander-in-chief, Lord Hardinge. His school of musketry is admirable, and there is little doubt that its good effects would have been very apparent had the war lasted another year. It has been said that our minié rifles did great execution at Inkerman; but

if we compare the number of rounds expended by us in that battle with the number of men hurt on the side of the enemy, we may then judge what results would be achieved if we gave our soldiers such a training as should insure the third only of their shots. taking effect.

The just combination of the three arms, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, is a problem of high tactics which will be considered hereafter; on the solution of which the fate of a battle must hinge.

It may be remarked, however, that the force of cavalry is in general imperfectly understood.

Cavalry.

The moral force of infantry against cavalry is infinitely greater than the physical. The charges executed by cavalry at reviews up to the faces of squares to receive a volley which is the signal of "threes about," is an injurious practice. The horses soon learn they are not intended to go in.

Instead of this, it would be far better that the cavalry were exercised in charging a square of dummies and in riding over them.

But no formation of infantry can resist the shock of horses ridden, as English dragoons do ride, in earnest. Who that has read of the light cavalry brigade at Balaklava, but believes implicitly that that splendid chivalry would have swept away

any infantry formation as foam before the hurricane. Many saddles would have been emptied doubtless, as many were; but the survivors would have got in,

as the survivors did, and there would then have

been short work of the infantry.

Moral Considerations.

The foregoing presents a short and imperfect consideration of the material agents which a General employs in war. The moral agents have not been touched upon; they exist in the mind of the great commander. The most urgent are, knowledge of human nature and skill in influencing men through their fears, passions, interests, or habits. They cannot be better described than in the following words of Napoleon, which will also form a fitting termination to this chapter:

"Achilles was the son of a goddess and a mortal. It is the emblem of the Genius of War. The divine part of the art is all that which is derived from moral considerations of the character, talent, and interest of your adversary; of the opinion and spirit of the soldier, who is strong and victorious, or feeble and vanquished, according as he believes himself to be either; the earthly part consists in the arms, entrenchments, positions, orders of battle, everything in short which relates to the combination of material engines."