So any words tending to injure a merchant or tradesman are actionable; whether they reflect upon the honesty of his dealings, his credit, or the excellence of the subject matter in which he deals. And the action seems to extend to words spoken of a person in any lawful employment, by which he may gain his livelihood. The defendant said, "Thou hast received money of the king to buy new saddles, and hast cozened the king, and bought old saddles for the troopers." And the words were held actionable; for it was said, it was not material what employment the plaintiff held under the king, if he might lose his employment and trust thereby, and that it was immaterial whether the employment was for life or for years. The defendant said of a person employed by the under-postmaster to carry about post letters, on which he had a profit,†"He has broken up letters, and taken out bills of exchange." After verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, one cause of error assigned was, that no action would lie for scandalizing such an employment; and Hale was of opinion, chiefly from the quality of the employment, that the judgment ought to be reversed; for he said that a man should not speak disparagingly of his cook or groom, but an action would be brought, if such action could be maintained. The humility of the employment or occupation seems, however, to be no objection to the action either in law or reason; and it has long been clearly established, that an action is maintainable for mali *Mar. 82. 1 Vin. Ab. 465. pl. 19. Sir R. Greenfield's case. † 1 Vent. 275. cious misrepresentations of the characters of menial servants,—a subject which will afterward be more fully considered. In the case of Seaman v. Bigg,* in the reign of Cha. I., it was held, that the words, "Thou art a cozening knave, and hast cozened thy master of a bushel of barley," spoken of a servant in husbandry, were actionable; and the court said, that though true it is, generally, an action will not lie for calling one cozening knave, yet where they be spoken of one who is a servant, and accomptant, and whose credit and maintenance depends upon his faithful dealing, and he by such disgraceful words is deprived of his livelihood and maintenance, there is good reason it should leave an action for loss of his credit and means. So the words, "He is a cheating knave," applied to a lime-burner in his employment, have been deemed actionable. But a jobber or dealer in the public funds, is not considered as a known trader, and possessing a character as such. It does not appear necessary, that the party should gain his living in the character to which the slander is applied, but it is sufficient, if he habitually act in that character, and derive emolu ment from it. The rule, however, does not seem to extend to representations, which affect nothing more than casual instances, in which the plaintiff has assumed such a character. So that words misrepresenting the value of a horse, or particular piece of furniture, which the proprietor wishes to dispose of * Cro. Car. 480. † 1 Lev. 115. Terry v. Hooper. 12 Bos. and Pul. 284. would not be actionable, unless some special damage resulted from them. Next as to the degree of certainty and precision requisite to make the words actionable. The only question arising upon this point seems to be-do the words in any degree prejudice the plaintiff in his office, profession, or employment? if they do, they are actionable; the quantum of damage being a mere question of fact for the consideration of the jury. Words in general belonging to this class must relate to the plaintiff's integrity, his knowledge, skill, or diligence, his credit, or to the subject matter in which he deals. The effect of such imputations will be separately considered. To impute want of integrity to any person who holds an office of trust or of profit is actionable : as to say of a judge,* that " His sentence was corruptly given."(1) Or of a justice of the peace,† "I have often been with him for justice, but could never get any thing at his hands but injustice."(2) Or, "He covereth and hideth felonies, and is not worthy to be a justice of the peace." Where a person holds an office or situation, in which great trust and confidence must be reposed in him, words impeaching his integrity generally, + 4 Rep. 16. (1) Per Parker, C. J. 13 Mass. Rep. 253. Chipman v. Cook, 2 Tyl. Rep. 456. Dole v. Van Rensselaer, 1 Johns. Ca. 279. (2) See Lindsey v. Smith, 7 Johns. Rep. 360. But the words must have express relation to his official character, or they will not be actionable. Oakley v. Farrington, 1 Johns. Ca. 129. and without express reference to his office, are actionable; since they must necessarily attach to him in his particular character, and virtually represent him as unfit to hold that office or situation. Thus it has been held, that to say of a bishop "He is a wicked man,"* is actionable. The defendant said of a justice of the peace and deputy lieutenant,† "He is a Jacobite, and for bringing in the prince of Wales and popery." And the words were held actionable, though it did not appear that the speaker applied the words to his offices, because, without any such application, they imputed such religious opinions and political principles, as rendered him in law unfit for those situations. So where the defendant said of the plaintiff, who was a justice of the peace, "I am in danger of my life, my blood is sought, and I was like to have been murdered; I was at Sir J. Harper's (the plaintiff's) house, and John Harper drew me forth to see a gelding in the stable, and then Thomas Beaumond, Sir H. Beaumond's son, did throw his dagger at me twice, and thrust me through the breeches twice with his rapier to have killed me, all this was done by the instigation of Sir J. Harper, and I can prove it." In this case, although no misconduct in office was particularly pointed out, it was held that the action well lay; the instigation to do such an outrageous act being against the plaintiff's oath, and a great misdemeanor, for which he was liable to fine and to be put out of the commission. The defendant said to the plaintiff, who was one * 2 Mod. 159. † How v. Prinn, Holt, 652. 1 Sir J. Harper v. Francis Beaumond, Cr. J. 56. of the attorneys or clerks of the King's Bench, and sworn to deal duly without corruption in his office, "You are well known to be a corrupt man, and to deal corruptly." And upon giving judgment for the plaintiff, it was said, quod sermo relatus ad personam, intelligi debet de conditione personæ.* The defendant said of the plaintiff, who was an attorney, generally,† "He is a common barretor." After verdict, though it was objected, that the words were not actionable, having been spoken of the plaintiff as a common person, and not in relation to his office, yet the court held that the action was maintainable, since it is a great slander to an attorney to be called and accounted a common barretor, who is a maintainer of brabbles and quarrels, and said that words are to be construed secundum conditionem personarum of whom they are spoken. The defendant said of an attorney, "Thou art a false knave, a cozęning knave, and hast gotten all that thou hast by cozenage, and thou hast cozened all that have dealt with thee." And the court held that the words were actionable, as touching the plaintiff in his profession. (1) An attorney brought an action for the words,|| "I have taken out a judge's warrant to tax Phillips's (the plaintiff's) bill, I'll bring him to book, and shall have him struck off the roll." Lord Kenyon C. J. ruled, at nisi prius, that the words were not actionable; and added, had the words been, "He deserves * 4 Rep. 16. † Cro. Car. 192. (1) See 1 Binn. 184. |