conation. Here we find an aspect of consciousness which cannot be described in terms of cognition, pleasure-pain, or emotion, and when we compare it with those other aspects of consciousness the verdict of introspection seems unmistakable. The contention that conation is not an ultimate fact proceeds from the prejudice in favour of Presentationism already referred to. The doctrine of Presentationism, if carried out to its logical conclusion, leaves no room for pleasure-pain any more than for conation, since the former, like the latter, cannot be presented as an object. The mere existence of pleasure-pain as a conscious fact proves that the world as idea or as sensation does not coincide with the knowable world. We must experience much. that cannot be presented as object if we are aware of what is most intimately ourselves, and are conscious of ourselves as distinct from objects. There is no valid reason, therefore, for rejecting the evidence of introspection in favour of regarding conation as an ultimate fact of consciousness.

In the course of this preliminary statement we have indicated that emotion also must be regarded as an ultimate aspect of consciousness. In view of the weight of authority against this position, the arguments which support it must be set forth at considerable length. We shall proceed at once to this task for two reasons. In the first place, if emotion is proved to be an ultimate aspect of mind with a distinctive influence on action, the prevailing theories in regard to the principles of human conduct will necessarily require modification. In the

second place, when we come to deal with the conditions under which the special emotions arise, we shall find ourselves brought into contact with the primary tendencies of the psychical organism. The theory of emotion, in short, opens one of the best avenues of approach to the general problem which is the subject of this inquiry.

A STUDY IN THE

PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS.

CHAPTER I.

THE NATURE OF EMOTION.

WHILE most psychologists agree in maintaining that emotion is not an ultimate aspect of mind, there is no consensus of opinion as to its precise nature and constitution. Emotion has been described as organic sensation (Lange); pleasure-pain (Horwicz); a fusion of feeling and organic sensation (Külpe); pleasure-pain in association with the idea of its cause (Höffding); a mass of sensuous and representative material with a predominant affective tone (Sully); instinct-feeling (Marshall); a strong primary feeling of pleasure or pain, accompanied by a change in the course of ideas, and strengthened by the feelings associated with the ideas called up (Wundt); rank feeling of excitement (James1); a complete psychosis 1 Psychological Review, I., v. p. 525.

A

66

1

involving cognition, pleasure - pain, and conation (Ward). This is sufficiently bewildering in itself, but the confusion is still further increased by the fact that many writers do not keep consistently to one point of view. Bain starts with the position that emotions are 'secondary, derived, or complicated feelings." It appears later, however, that love, anger, and possibly fear, are "original fountains of sentiment or feeling.”2 Then emotion is classed, along with intellect and action, as one of the chief divisions of the mental powers.3 Finally, we find that particular emotions are defined in terms of pleasure - pain or impulse.1 Wundt, after expounding the theory already mentioned, comes to the conclusion that "the universal animal impulses are the earliest forms of emotion."5 Höffding and others show the same tendency to depart from their original position, and to identify emotion more or less closely with conation.o

The root of the trouble seems to be that emotion is explained away before a serious effort is made. to ascertain with accuracy its real nature. In attempting to rectify this omission, we must begin with an examination of the fact as it appears in consciousness. It is evident that direct observation alone affords absolutely reliable information with regard to the qualitative distinctions of psychical states. The application of the introspective method to emotion is not so hopeless an undertaking as one

1 The Emotions and the Will, 3rd ed., p. 3.

2 Ibid., p. 73.

3 Ibid., p. 95.

4 Ibid., pp. 142, 173, 177.

5 Menschen- und Thierseele (1892), pp. 421, 422; Eng. trans.,

pp. 386, 387.

• Psychology, English trans., p. 235.

is accustomed to suppose. All emotions do not involve commotion, and the less violent states can be accurately observed. We can in a measure supplement the results obtained by the use of this method. If, for example, the phenomenon under investigation not only seems fundamentally distinct from other aspects of mind, but is found in addition to have special conditions and effects, the testimony of introspection gains in objective validity.

The simplest and most natural way of opening the inquiry will be to take concrete instances. When ill-feeling, for example, is aroused, into what constituents can the total consciousness of the moment be resolved? Under ordinary circumstances we can distinguish at once the cognition of the object, the pain of the injury or series of injuries, the awareness of certain organic disturbances, and an impulse towards a definite course of action. But the statement that we have this emotion is not equivalent to the assertion that we are pained, know the cause, have various organic sensations, and feel impelled to act in a particular manner. The emotion cannot be identified with any one of these elements, or any combination of them. It implies that, in consequence of his actions with reference to us, we feel disposed towards some one in a certain way, and that, as a result of this feeling-attitude, actions of a special sort and these alone appeal to us. The 'plain man' in describing his state of mind will say that he has 'illfeeling towards' the object of his hate, 'feels as if he could' inflict on him all manner of harm. Similarly, liking or affection for a person is not the