Imagens das páginas
PDF
ePub

109

CHAPTER IV.

THE EXISTENCE OF PRIMARY TENDENCIES

TO ACTION.

An inquiry into the conditions of the primary emotions brings to light, as we have seen, the existence of principles of activity which are not hedonic and are more fundamental than the impulses which spring from emotion. This can be shown to be a natural and necessary outcome of a thorough investigation of the nature of emotion. Feeling-attitude is determined explicitly and exclusively by the recognition of the importance or significance of certain aspects of reality. Since objects derive importance and significance from our interests, it may be said that no emotional reaction takes place unless the situation possesses interest of some sort. The particular concepts (injury, danger, repulsiveness, &c.) which condition the different emotions indicate the different ways in which objects are significant. In dealing concretely with the various emotions it is necessary to examine these concepts and the cases to which they are applied. This examination of the particular occasions which elicit emotional response

[ocr errors]

inevitably throws light on the range of human interests. Further observation of the same concrete cases enables us to gain an insight into the source of the interests in question. It then becomes evident that the primary interests are dependent on primary principles of activity. Moreover, we must carry our inquiries to this stage if we wish to understand the true place which the emotional life occupies in the economy of the mind.

The nature of the problem which here forces itself on our attention now becomes evident. That problem is essentially identical with the question in regard to the nature and source of human interests. In view of what has been said, however, the best method of approaching the subject is equally evident. The theory of emotion not only necessitates an inquiry into the nature of human interests, but also furnishes a direct method of reaching the root of the matter. Feeling-attitude being always conditioned by some aspect of reality which stands in a significant relation to our interests, if we ascertain the circumstances which are, as a matter of fact, emotionally stimulating, we shall find actual cases by means of which the range of interest and its sources can be determined in a concrete way. This is the method of approach which we shall proceed to employ.

When the problem is thus placed on a concrete footing, it is clear, in the first place, that the hedonic relations of things do not always account for the significance which objects possess. It cannot be asserted that emotions are always determined by the relations in which objects stand to pleasure-pain.

In other words, interest and hedonic value are not synonymous. The very existence of such emotions as admiration and respect proves this conclusively. Admiration is excited by the mere fact that a fellowbeing realises in some way our ideal of worth. It is absolutely independent of hedonic considerations. The person is admired because he is what he is, apart from and even despite his hedonic relations to the self or to other individuals. Similarly, respect is evoked by efficiency as such. Whether this efficiency has pleasant or unpleasant results for ourselves or others, is absolutely irrelevant. Yet efficiency and the realisation of worth have significance since they arouse emotion. They must therefore appeal to some other interest than pleasure-pain. What holds true without exception in the case of admiration and respect can be shown to be true in most instances where other emotional reactions are concerned. Anger and fear, for example, are excited by events which involve injury or evil, that is, by events which are antagonistic to our interests. If pleasure-pain were the sole object of interest, evil or injury would be identical with pain. That this is not true can be proved by reference to the facts. An object which awakens superstitious dread is feared because it is altogether unusual and totally unaccountable. Since its relations to the self are absolutely uncertain, it obviously may inflict some injury against which no defence is possible. It is therefore judged to be a source of danger, and its possible actions become the object of fear. The peculiar intensity of the dread thus occasioned is due to the fact that the very

nature of the possible evil, like everything else connected with the object, is absolutely undefined. The emotion would never attain abnormal proportions if there were no dire uncertainty in regard to the kind of evil to be expected. This uncertainty clearly would not exist if pain and evil were identical. Again, death is not feared merely because it is regarded as painful or because life is pleasant. A painless death may be dreaded by one who finds the present life a hedonic failure, and who at the same time is not troubled by any thoughts about a future existence. Even when death appears as a painful event, the fear is apt to be out of all proportion to the pain anticipated. In regard to anger the case is not less clear. When an ambitious person is enraged by the failure of some undertaking, it is absurd to say that he is thinking solely of the hedonic consequences which his want of success has involved. He has set his heart on success; hence failure in itself is a pronounced evil, since it is opposed to the dominant interest of the moment. Other instances readily suggest themselves to prove that events which are not intensely painful may nevertheless be profoundly exasperating. If we turn to other emotional reactions, further evidence can be obtained in regard to the main point here at issue. To avoid unnecessary amplification, however, we shall content ourselves by referring, in conclusion, to the evidence furnished by the emotion of pity. In this case the emotional reaction is directly at variance with the hedonic aspect of the situation which is most prominent. Any fellow-being in dis

tress may arouse pity, despite the fact that in the circumstances the object is necessarily a source of pain. This seems to prove that interest in objects is not determined exclusively by hedonic relations.

It can be maintained, therefore, that persons, things, and events may be significant in relation to interests which have no reference to pleasure-pain. If we now continue our examination of concrete cases we shall gain an insight into the nature and source of those interests which are not hedonic. This will enable us, later on, to define the range of human interests with more accuracy of detail.

The realisation of worth on the part of our fellows is significant enough to arouse a special emotion. If, however, the individual himself had no natural tendency to realise an ideal of worth, he would have no interest in reference to which the worth of his fellows would have significance. If, on the other hand, the individual has a natural impulse to act in this way, a certain mode of behaviour possesses intrinsic interest and is therefore significant when it is exhibited by others. In the same way, the efficiency of others would not arouse respect unless the agent had a direct and personal interest in efficiency as such. This particular interest can be explained only if we suppose that each individual has a natural tendency to make his existence effective in some way. The influence of this self-assertive tendency can be detected in connection with other emotional reactions. Since every agent has a natural impulse to express himself in effective action, he is keenly interested in the success of anything

H

« AnteriorContinuar »