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CHAPTER V.

THE PRIMARY PRINCIPLES OF ACTIVITY.

THE first principle to be noted is the tendency of function to realise itself. This simply means that man is essentially an active being, has a natural tendency to activity, and necessarily acts in the direction prescribed by his powers and capacities. He must act in some way, and necessarily acts in accordance with the constitution of his nature. Activity is pleasant because there is a basal tendency to act. In its primary manifestations, therefore, it is not determined or influenced by pleasure, and is desired for its own sake. Consequently functions tend to be realised without forethought of any description, since the exercise of function is action in the concrete. In harmony with this is the fact that a special opportunity for the employment of a particular function is in itself a special temptation to act in that direction. If action is suppressed, uneasiness' manifests itself. This is not mere pain or consciousness of want; it is function in a nascent stage of excitation. 'Uneasiness' may appear, without external provocation, if a function has been

unduly restrained. Repression of function, however, cannot be maintained for a length of time without affecting the general economy of the organism.

The functions which are physically determined include the exercise of all the physical powers, whatever they may be. In addition to these are various capacities which are essentially psychical. Mere curiosity, or the desire to know irrespective of the ulterior significance of what is known, points to the existence of cognitive powers and the innate tendency to use them. A higher phase of intellectual capacity manifests itself in the desire to systematise our explicit judgments about reality. Distinct from either of these is the faculty which mediates between the theoretical and the practical. It deals with the application of general rules to particular cases, the adaptation of means to ends. All the special capacities which individuals exhibit, involve the exercise of functions in specialised directions or in particular combinations, and therefore come under the general rule. The various emotions are also functional reactions, but they are not primary. They are mediated in a double sense, inasmuch as they presuppose the recognition of the relation in which objects stand to our interests in general.

In connection with the tendency of function to manifest itself without consideration of consequences, the influence of a limitative principle must be emphasised. The individual tends to realise his functions because he is an active being, but there is a limit to his activity since there is a limit to the amount of energy at his disposal. After expenditure

of energy comes the necessity for accumulation. Consequently, along with the tendency to expend energy there is a natural tendency to retain or economise it. For convenience this may be termed the principle of 'inertia.' The existence of this modifying factor is shown by the inclination to follow the path of least resistance-an inclination which accounts for the formation of habits, and is largely responsible for the phenomena of unconscious imitation. It is easier to tread a beaten path than to strike out a new one, easier to do what others are doing than to judge and initiate for oneself. Hence the agent tends unconsciously to repeat his own actions, and to follow the lead of others. It is the same general tendency which raises ready doubt as to the advantages or morality of any departure from tradition or custom. Innovation always involves increased expenditure of energy, and, though change might mean economy in the long-run, it is easier at any moment to let things be. The strength of the limitative principle varies with age, circumstances, and disposition, but a being with limited energy is never totally free from the tendency to economy. Hence our whole existence is a ceaseless conflict and compromise between activity and inertia. They wax and wane alternately, for expenditure or accumulation must always be succeeded by its opposite. In our most strenuous moments we take the easiest path to our end; after arduous labour comes the desire for rest. But rest is not absolute repose. The need of activity pursues the active being, and he must play in some form or another in his moments

of ease. That is, he must compromise between activity and inertia, for play in its natural and spontaneous form is simply activity expressing itself in the easiest way.

From this point of view many facts can be rendered intelligible. Ease of movement is æsthetically pleasing, because it is a combination of efficiency and economy. Activity is not always more pleasant in proportion as it increases in intensity, since expenditure may outrun accumulation. The varying strength of the limitative principle accounts for the further fact that the point beyond which activity becomes excessive is not fixed. This in turn explains why relative passivity and strenuous activity are alike pleasant at different times. The general oscillation observable in conscious processes also finds its explanation in the existence of a varying limit to the natural tendency towards activity. One instance of this rhythmical movement is specially noteworthy on account of the consequences it involves. The individual is continually oscillating between a state of self-concentration and a state of decentralisation or relaxedness, for concentration implies an expenditure of energy which cannot always be kept up. In the condition of decentralisation, the individual's actions conform to the ideo-motor type. An idea is immediately realised, without any consideration of consequences, simply because it is suggested to the mind. It seems to arouse activity by its mere presence. Here, as elsewhere, however, the idea has no impulsive power of its own. It evokes activity because it falls in line

with some tendency; it aids and abets but does not originate. The immediacy of the response is due to the absence of central control. Usually any tendency is restrained or inhibited by an awareness of its relation to the agent's dominant interests, that is, by a consciousness of its place in some system of tendencies. Self-concentration being absent, no check or hindrance exists, and the action takes place at once. The individual is reduced to his component elements, and the parts function separately. The agent is a mere bundle of tendencies which are realised as occasion offers, without reflection or calculation. While actions may approximate to the ideo-motor type for other reasons, pure ideo-motor activity implies decentralisation. The significance of the whole phenomenon is that it points to the existence of a number of tendencies which have an impulsive power of their own apart from everything else. Manifestly these tendencies, if left to themselves, conflict with one another. This does not prove that the individual's nature is a chaos into which order cannot be introduced. System is not impossible, for in any organic synthesis the parts possess an independent character of their own, though they are subordinated to the whole. Moreover, system is not only possible but natural, since there is, as we shall find, a natural principle of synthesis. If selfconcentration does not exist, however, this principle cannot be effective, and concentration is not always possible on account of the limitation of energy. The recognition of the presence of a limitative principle, therefore, helps us to understand why temporary