chaos can emerge despite the natural tendency to order and system.

The principle of inertia gives activity a bias in the direction of the customary, for it is hostile to all innovation. It is directly opposed, however, by a tendency which springs from a basal need of the organism, and is expressed in the desire for change. When a function has been continuously exercised for a length of time, the desire for variation of activity makes itself felt, a desire which has no reference to the relation between expenditure and accumulation of energy. After intellectual labour, or the employment of any of the higher functions, the need of giving scope to other functions is apt to be distinctly perceptible. In consequence of this, all natural tendencies come to be realised and the balance of the organism is preserved. Here change appears as mere variety, but the need of change also shows itself in the tendency to seek or welcome the absolutely new. The existence of this tendency can be proved by a great diversity of facts. The vagaries of fashion, the desire for travel, the unpleasantness of monotony, the charm of imaginative literature, the disinterested interest excited by inventions and discoveries, are all inexplicable unless there is a distinct desire for novelty as such. In all creative activity, again, this desire plays an important part. While it is impossible by fiat of will to originate anything in art, science, or practical life, yet the mind can be set to work in one direction, and the result, if novel, can be seized upon and preserved in X objective form. The desire for novelty, if excessive,

I

X

leads to mere instability, and in the case of individuals with a narrow range of interests it may produce very undesirable results. When subordinated to higher interests, however, it is a principle of development, an element of consciousness which is an important factor in the evolution of the

race.

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Hitherto the relation of the individual to his fellows has not come into distinct prominence, but attention must now be directed to a basal tendency which springs from the essential incompleteness of isolated individual existence. This tendency is expressed in sociability, or the desire of associating with others. That sociability is the direct outcome of a primary need is evident from the fact that artificial isolation takes rank as one of the greatest possible evils. To quote from Professor James: Solitary confinement is by many regarded as a mode of torture too cruel and unnatural for civilised countries to adopt. To one long pent-up on a desert island, the sight of a human footprint or a human form in the distance would be the most tumultuously exciting of experiences."1 Sociability cannot be explained solely on the ground that association with others makes life easier and safer. The tendency has a more ultimate origin. An individual cannot fully realise his capacities in isolation. He misses his true vocation in life if the aid and stimulus of his fellows is lacking. He is not self-sufficient, and accordingly has a tendency to complete himself by association with his kind.

1 Principles of Psychology, ii. p. 430.

In the lower stages of mental development this primary social inclination leads to mere gregariousness. At higher levels, however, discrimination enters, and the selection of definite associates takes place. Friendship and affection are the specialised forms of fellow-feeling which mark the more intimate relationship; they are feelings in reference to those members of the community who are fitted to satisfy more fully than others the need of self-completion. As such they are sharply differentiated from the basal need which occasions them. They form a new tie between individuals, and abolish the distinction between alter and ego. The difference between sociability and general fellow - feeling is equally obvious. There is of course the intrinsic difference between a feeling - attitude and a mere tendency to act. Further, though the two are in this case intimately associated, the emotion may be inhibited by counteracting forces. Sociability may thus exist by itself, in isolation from the natural emotional response. A selfish person, for instance, may show little kindly feeling towards his associates and yet manifest sociability in a marked degree.

On the principle that "nature implants contrary impulses to act on many classes of things," James seems to regard sociability and shyness as contrary 'instincts.' The two phenomena, however, do not stand on the same level. Even a very shy person would not flourish under solitary confinement on a desert island or elsewhere. Unlike sociability, shyness is not a primary impulse corresponding to a basal need. It springs from a self-distrust which

proceeds in large measure from an undue consciousness of the self in its particularity. There are no exceptions to the rule that association with others is a primal necessity. An individual who came

into the world with a constitutional aversion to all human society would be a monstrosity. Sociability is conditioned by the requirements of individual existence as such, and from the nature of the case it can have no direct opposite.

A different class of primary impulses now demands consideration. Every individual strives to preserve his existence, and also to express it or make it effective in some way. In other words, every one X has an impulse towards self-preservation, and a tendency to self-assertion. In both cases, capacities and functions are employed in the service of a definite end, and for this reason these springs of action are not so unmediated as the others which have been mentioned. They are primary in the sense that they are 'blind' impulses, which are independent of cognition and hedonic experience, and cannot be destroyed by reflection. It is true that a conscious being, when under the influence of either of those impulses, knows what he is doing, but it is not so easy for him to explain why he is doing it. The direction taken by his activity is clear, but why he is carried along in that direction is the thing to be explained. The only reason which can be assigned for the impulse in either case is the agent's intrinsic nature. The individual is so constituted that he is impelled to act as he does. The evolutionist can perhaps account for the existence of the natural bias

in one direction or the other. He can assert that the immediacy and universality of the self-preservation tendency is an obvious outcome of natural selection, since any being devoid of this primary impulse would speedily perish in the struggle for life. The statement is not so plausible in regard to self-assertion, for this tendency may endanger the existence of individuals and communities alike. Such questions, however, do not concern us at present. All that is necessary is to indicate in what sense these tendencies are basal principles of activity.

The impulse to self-preservation has already been mentioned in another connection and can be briefly dismissed. It is evidently prior to, and independent of, reflection or hedonic calculation. Death is regarded as an evil solely because there is a strong desire to live. For the same reason the 'right' to existence is claimed as something natural and inalienable. While every being clings to life instinctively, the influence of this tendency may be counteracted by contrary impulses. This does not happen without conflict, however, and courage or resolution is required to conquer the impulse to self-preservation even when life is in other respects undesirable. < Self-assertion in any strict sense of the term is a distinctively human impulse, since it presupposes a consciousness of self as opposed to not-self. Everything in the universe, as a matter of fact, affects other things, but a self-conscious being has a distinct desire to be an influence of some sort. He is not content merely to be and continue to exist, but desires to do or achieve something, make some