pain do not constitute the end which appeals to human beings as worthy of their distinctive nature. We do not justify our conduct to ourselves on hedonic principles, for it can hardly be asserted that we are overwhelmed with shame whenever we choose the less pleasant course in preference to the more pleasant. Pleasure and pain are judged worthy or unworthy by reference to something else. On the other hand, these impulses are not to be suppressed, since the moral being is not required to attempt the impossible. His duty is to regulate his particular tendencies in accordance with his ideal of worth; he is not called upon to alter the essential constitution of his being.

The supreme end, therefore, does not require the absolute suppression of the hedonic tendencies. Further, every action which is in harmony with the end is accompanied by that pleasure and satisfaction which constitute what is called 'happiness.' The pleasure which the fulfilment of duty brings with it is not necessarily greater in amount than the pleasure which would otherwise be attained. Happiness is not dependent on mere amount of pleasure. It has been urged that duty should not, ultimately at least, involve any sacrifice of pleasure, that the complete coincidence of duty and pleasure 1 is an ethical postulate. In other words, morality has no justification unless duty and pleasure are somehow essentially connected. This contention, however, implies that the vital distinction between

16 'Happiness' is the term usually employed in this connection, but as thus used it is evidently indistinguishable from pleasure as such.

happiness and mere pleasure is overlooked. It also implies misunderstanding of the essential nature of morality. As the universe is constituted, there are no conditions which must be fulfilled to render moral action obligatory. Morality is unconditional in a double sense. It is not a matter of choice, for man is an integral part of an ordered system, and moral obligation is in consequence an essential element in his nature. It is not dependent on extrinsic results; the moral end is desired for its own sake. The end which the individual feels obliged to realise, is the end which appeals to him in virtue of its intrinsic nature. Being what it is, it appeals to him because he is what he is. This signifies that the moral end is not dependent in any sense on the connection between duty and pleasure, for the moral end is not the attainment of pleasure, and hedonic results as such are therefore extrinsic to it. There is no room for the particular ethical postulate here in question; there is no place for any ethical postulate.

It cannot even be asserted that the coincidence between duty and pleasure is a metaphysical postulate based on the rationality of the universe. Morality is rational if the end sought by the individual is in harmony with the universe. On any other terms, of course, moral effort would be vain and irrational. It has been shown, however, that moral obligation is a manifestation of the principle of order in the universe. Accordingly there is neither metaphysical nor ethical justification for the demand that the moral agent should receive full

hedonic compensation for his efforts. The discrepancy between virtue and amount of pleasure is not a vital fact either for ethics or for metaphysics. The human being is content if he can realise the end which is worthy of his capacities. He may sacrifice pleasure in doing this, but he gains happiness.

The general results of this inquiry into the principles of human conduct may now be briefly summarised. The psychical individual as such has a definite character which expresses itself in a multiplicity of primary reactions. These reactions are directly conditioned by the constitution of his nature; are not determined by pleasure-pain; and are themselves the sources of hedonic results. They also give significance to persons, things, and events. When this significance is recognised, a peculiar reaction of feeling takes place which is called 'emotion.' The various emotions are different feelings in reference to different objects, and give rise to special impulses. All these particular tendencies assert themselves as opportunity offers, and if left to themselves are perpetually at variance with one another. The psychical individual, however, is an organic being, and there is a principle of synthesis in his nature. He has an ideal of worth, and feels obliged to act in accordance with it. What the individual regards as worthy of himself is the realisation of his distinctive nature. All his particular impulses must be brought into the service of this end, and regulated according to its demands. In other words, there is an all-inclusive end for the organism

as a whole, and this end has a necessary reference to the essential nature of the organism.

of necessity a moral being, for the moral impulse is simply the effort to systematise all particular tendencies by reference to an end which possesses intrinsic worth. The moral impulse in turn conditions pleasure-pain and affects the emotional life. Finally, it must be recognised that each psychical organism is not self-contained, but is part of a wider whole. The content of moral obligation, therefore, is defined by the distinctive nature of the individual and of his environment, that is, by his place in the system of things. The moral law is thus an expression of the fact that man is an organic part of an organic whole.

INDEX.