of will, is distinguished from desire by secondary characteristics alone, while effort stands in the same. relation to impulse. The conclusion to which all this points is that emotion is an aspect of consciousness fundamentally distinct from conation. This position does not imply that emotion and will are regarded as distinct 'things,' more or less externally related. On the contrary, we have emphasised the essential and necessary connection between emotion and tendency to act. Indeed, one of the main objects of this volume is to show that emotion is an important factor influencing human conduct. When emotion fails to issue in impulse, effort, or desire, special counteracting circumstances will be found at work. In short, the distinction here maintained is a distinction between aspects of consciousness. Emotion, like pleasure-pain, cannot be abstractly separated from conation nor abstractly identified with it. The final result of this whole discussion regarding the nature of emotion is now evident. Emotion is not only introspectively distinct from cognition, pleasure-pain, and conation, but has, in addition to its unique character as a conscious fact, definite conditions of its own and other features absolutely peculiar to itself. It is, therefore, unanalysable and irreducible, and must be regarded as an ultimate and primary aspect of mind. This conclusion would appear more plausible if the term 'emotion' were less misleading. The word suggests too easily mere 'commotion,' and inevitably tends to give rise to the preconception that emotions have no place in the regular economy of the mind, and no appli cation to the ordinary affairs of life. This prejudice can be fully dispelled only by careful observation of the particular states which the term denotes. Accurate investigation will disclose the fact that emotions permeate the mental life in the same way as pleasures and pains. Slight anxieties, evanescent irritations, momentary dislikes and repugnances, for example, will be found unobtrusively present and effective on numberless occasions in ordinary life. Any statement in regard to the nature of emotion, therefore, should be tested by reference to the particular states which the term 'emotion' denotes. 4I CHAPTER II. CURRENT THEORIES OF EMOTION. THE argument of the previous chapter would be incomplete if it were not supplemented by a critical examination of the various methods by which modern psychologists have attempted to explain away the distinguishing characteristics of emotional states as such. This chapter accordingly will be devoted to a criticism of the typical theories at present in vogue. After discussing the identification of emotion with pleasure-pain, and the view that emotion is a mere result or accompaniment of tendencies to act, we shall take up the James-Lange theory in its various forms. We shall then deal with the contention that excitement is emotion, or, at all events, an essential element of it; and, finally, consider the hypothesis that emotion is explicable in terms of pleasure-pain and cognition. It is not possible to classify the various theories in a perfectly systematic way, on account of the complex interrelation which frequently exists, but under the heads we have given, the different hypotheses can be arranged conveniently enough for purposes of exposition, and with a rough approximation to accuracy. Horwicz has worked out in great detail the theory that emotion is pleasure-pain as such, and may therefore be taken as the representative of this point of view. According to this writer, the pleasures and pains of sense, 'moral' feelings (hate, love, pride, gratitude, contempt, &c.), æsthetic, intellectual, and religious feelings, differ from one another only in degree of complexity. The higher feelings develop out of the sense pleasures and pains,1 though the latter are themselves not altogether simple.2 The primary feelings differ qualitatively from one another.3 They combine to form new feelings, and each complex thus formed is a unity which possesses a character peculiar to itself. The lower combinations in turn enter as constituents into higher complexes, and the latter again are synthetic unities with specific qualities of their own. If this account of the matter be correct, it is obvious that there must be an indefinite number of possible combinations. It might, however, be maintained (1) that pleasure-pain admits of quantitative distinctions alone, and consequently that there is no multiplicity of qualitatively different elements capable of forming a large number of new combinations, (2) that in point of fact there is no indefinite diversity of concrete 'feelings' such as our author postulates. Further, the testimony of language seems directly opposed to the view adopted by Horwicz. If ordinary pleasures and pains are complexes of distinct elements, and emotions are combinations of such complexes, it is not clear why 2 Ibid., pp. 7, 467. 4 Ibid., pp. 368, 467. 1 Psychologische Analysen, ii. 2, p. 4. Ibid., pp. 4, 22. the various emotional states should be referred to by different names, while the particular hedonic states are not thus favoured. On this theory, moreover, one would naturally expect a great number of complexes at the emotional level, while there is only a strictly limited number of distinctive terms to be distributed among the different combinations. The main difficulty of the position, however, has been brought to light in the author's treatment of love. He describes this state as a highly organised complex which is formed by the combination of all the feelings excited by the person who is the object of the emotion.1 Despite the qualitative differences of its components, this complex constitutes a unitary feeling with a unique character, and has always the same hedonic colouring, although its elements may vary in this respect. The quality of the constituents makes no difference, nor their character as pleasures or pains.2 Leaving out of consideration the first assertion, let us direct attention to the second. Horwicz maintains that so long as the feelings aroused by the object of the emotion are strong, it is indifferent whether they be pleasures or pains. Intense pains as well as strong pleasures lead to love,3 and yet the emotion is a strong pleasure. In short, love is a strong pleasure, and it may be produced by a combination of pleasures and pains, or may be mainly, if not wholly, a synthesis of pains. Horwicz says emphatically that the highest pleasure may be felt when the elements entering into the complex 2 Ibid., p. 460. 1 Psychologische Analysen, p. 459. 4 Ibid., p. 454. |