The bill for the relief of the heirs and legal representatives of Nicholas Vreeland, deceased, was read the second time.

The bill for the relief of certain persons who have paid duties on certain goods imported into Castine, was read a third time, and passed.

Mr. HORSEY presented the memorial of the Columbia Institute, praying the grant of a part of the public reservation of ground in the City of Washington, for purposes connected with the said institution; and the memorial was read and referred to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

Ordered, That a member be added to the Committee on the District of Columbia, in place of

Mr. OTIS excused.

And Mr. LLOYD was appointed.

Ordered, That a member be added to the Committee on the Judiciary, in place of Mr. OTIS excused.

And Mr. PINKNEY was appointed.

The Senate then, on motion of Mr. LEAKE, proceeded to the appointment of a Committee on Indian Affairs, pursuant to the rule adopted yesterday; and Messrs. LEAKE, KING, JOHNSON, of Kentucky, JOHNSON, of Louisiana, and LOWRIE, were appointed to compose the committee.

BANK OF THE UNITED STATES.

The Senate then proceeded, according to the order of the day, to consider the following resolutions, submitted on the 28th of December by Mr. LOGAN, of Kentucky:

1. Resolved, That, as the content and happiness of the people cannot be expected under collisions and the want of harmony between their governments, that therefore the Committee on the Judiciary be instructed to inquire whether provision may not be duly made by law for the removal from any State of the branches of the Bank of the United States, upon the request of the Legislature of such State; except, during those periods of war, when the public good and the exigencies of the nation shall otherwise require.

2. Resolved, That said committee be also instructed to inquire whether the charter of the Bank of the United States cannot be so amended, as that any citizen of the United States may obtain information from the bank or its branches of the amount of debts due, or which shall have been contracted therein, by any person or persons whatsoever, either as principal or endorser.

And that, in order more effectually to guard against the partialities and favoritism into which institutions of the kind are so prone to run, and to prevent, in some degree, as a consequence thereof, sacrifices of property, and the seduction of civil and political rights

SENATE.

Mr. LOGAN said he rose to discharge, according to the best of his powers, an important and highly responsible duty. It would be perceived, he said, that the resolutions under consideration had in view three distinct objects:

1. As regards the harmony of these united governments and the peace and content of the people. 2. As regards the partialities and abuses into which banking institutions are but too prone to run, in violation of the avowed object and of that political spirit which bring them into existence.

3. As respects their agency in furthering imposition upon an unwary and unsuspecting people, by affording too often the apparent evidence of wealth and ability, where in fact it may not exist; and locking up the truth as a secret too sacred to be told.

At the threshold of this discussion, permit me, said Mr. L., to assume as an axiom in politics, that no legislative act is sound and well founded having the tendency to increase the inequality in the wealth of society, and as a consequence to widen the grades of social intercourse, beyond what is produced by the different degrees of industry, economy, enterprise, and good fortune; unless, indeed, it be necessary for public purposes and general utility. That such is the tendency of banking corporations, continued Mr. L., seems clearly deducible from this fact: that they not only confer the privilege of making money out of money, agreeably to some fixed standard regulating the rate of interest-a privilege common to all society-but they also possess the faculty, derived from the aid and sanctity of law, of making money upon their credit; so that the result might be the same, both as regards the community and the corporation, whether you permit directly double interest on their capital employed, or legal and usual interest only, but with as much more on the emission of credit: as the gain would be to the one, so would be the loss to the other; except only, so far as the public should profit therefrom, through a well-regulated spirit of enterprise and useful improvement by a just and reasonable distribution of their means in various sections of the nation.

Sir, the proposition, in its plain and undisguised form, to give to any set of men the privilege, by law, of taking a higher interest for the use of their money than is generally permitted, would, I apprehend, find but few advocates among the representatives of a free people. If, therefore, such would be the probable effect of any institution of the Government, we ought certainly to look for reasons of a public nature to justify the policy. Here, (pardon the inquiry,) did you, sir, or did any member of this national assemblage, ever 3. Resolved, That the said committee be further in-vote for the establishment of such a corporation, structed to inquire whether provision cannot be regularly made by law for requiring that, from and after the day of the proper officers of those banks shall certify to this Government the names, with the sums, of all persons and firms, indebted in their respective banks, where the amount shall exceed the sum of $and the duration of those debts shall have been for a greater length of time than The resolutions having been read—

but from an understanding of an implied promise and undertaking on their part, that they would promote the general convenience and public good? In other contracts and treaties, however solemn and sacred, to disregard the intended object and viclate an essential duty, presented a proper case for redress before some of the regular functionaries of the Government. But where, sir, is the cancelling power, if, instead of doing good, the bank shall

determine to do harm? And, surely, in the same ratio it has the capacity to do good, it has the power to do evil. Does it belong to the judiciary to correct their abuses? They have as little to do with public matters of political cognizance, as you have to do with those of judicial concern. Let us be careful to keep separate the legislative-correcting power of the Government, from that properly belonging to the judiciary. But whilst we regard, most sacredly regard, that of the judiciary, not to be construed out of the political rights of the nation.

Sir, it is not every interest derivable, from law which can bid defiance to legislative provision and control. Were this the case, how soon might the representatives of this day render future legislation a bubble, and close forever the scene to amendment and improvement, accordingly as experience and expediency might suggest. There is no law but is intended to confer an interest of some kind. But the question is, whether that interest will give such a right, as may be asserted in opposition to the regular revising power of the legislative department of the Government? Can it be severed from and transferred forever from that ever-existing sovereignty of legislation, and converted into private right, so as to be beyond the reach of legislative touch, and the control of expediency? The grant of the nation's lands, though for a dollar, if unmingled with fraud, passes the right, and the grantee will hold. Not so of civil rights they are inalienable-so connected with, and inseparably interwoven in the body politic, that the root cannot be regularly eradicated. The Government may hold forth her favors and privileges, but there is still an existing power to watch over and correct, from time to time, all political excess. And hence I infer, said Mr. L., that the smallest civil right cannot be forever transferred, or even for twenty years, although it shall be for a bonus, if the public good shall otherwise require. Nor is the common sense of my countrymen deluded by this goodly boon. They are aware of the ultimate source from whence it comes; that, for the privilege of checking on them, the corporation consents to pay back a part.

But, Mr. President, I would not be understood as intending or wishing, under the existing state of things, to prostrate every institution of the kind. Only admit the power-the Constitutional rightto watch over and restrain abuses, and then act on expediency. Keep unobstructed the avenue of light, that the operations of that hidden body may be seen and understood, to this great sentinel of public liberty and public justice. Suffer this Government not to forget that she must stand sponsor for the deeds of others over whom she may watchwhom she has been instrumental in bringing into political existence, and whose transactions may be of vital importance to the great body of society.

JANUARY, 1820.

ible, why this reluctance and pertinacious refusal? Why not grant this reasonable courtesy to the same body who gave it existence, when, by so doing, you may essentially contribute to the repose of public apprehension? Is it because every thing is so certainly right, that it would be only gratifying idle curiosity; or is it because we fear light and knowledge on the subject?

I hope, sir, said Mr. L., that we are not disposed to touch, rashly and prematurely, the solemn acts of this Government; that we will regard public faith with a tender eye, as connected with the character and honor of the nation. This is enjoined, because it is a duty to retain the confidence and affections of every portion of your people; for, on that confidence and love, the energies of this nation essentially depend; and by a due regard to the interest of all, as far as can be done consistently with higher duties, we shall not only have performed a moral, but have discharged, moreover, a political duty. But, sir, there is a point beyond which that duty will cease, and give place to those of paramount obligation. The same reason still applies, and commands that it should be so. The interest becomes adverse, and the private must yield to general convenience and utility. The first and highest duty of the statesman is to take care of the public safety-of her peace and her happiness. To do this, we may be unavoidably drawn into an unpleasant examination of events, and to trace them back to painful causes. And whilst I admit the correctness of the remark, that we are sometimes the subjects of groundless apprehension, it ought also to be conceded that its opposing character is delusive hope and trusting chance.

Mr. President, to cherish a unity of feeling and friendly understanding between our governments, is as vitally important to the content and repose of the Republic, as to nurse with care the tender ligaments which connect the head and other indispensable members of our system. Is there any thing that you and this House would not do to remove every cause of State inquietude and distrust, which the welfare of the nation does not prohibit? Does good policy forbid your touching this subject? In what respect will it affect the necessary operations of the Government, and how injure the essential interest even of the bank? She has but to act the part of a faithful, an impartial mother, and she may harmonize the whole great family; even the proscribed and the step-child, with industry and prudence, may profit from her kindness and charity. But suppose her conduct to be directly the reverse, and where is the check? Not even the reproach of an impartial world.

By refusing to act on this subject, said Mr. L., may we not betray this Government into the suspicion that she feels a more parental care for the interest of the bank than for the rights of States and of the people? Will you do nothing towards Sir, is there any thing unreasonable in this re- allaying jealousy and restoring public confidence? quest? Is it incompatible with the interest and Perhaps, sir, but a little time, and we hear the purposes of that institution? I hope not. But if question-are you for the bank, or are you for the it be, then I am free to acknowledge that my so- States and the people? As invidious and mortilicitude increases to understand its operation, and fying as may be the course, I fear we are on the to know its purposes. And if it is not incompat-high way to provoke it. Let me, then, entreat you,

that neither dignity nor ease of station shall prevent a solemn and particular review of the ground before us. Whithersoever we look, sir, whether to the East or to the West, to the North or to the South, we are presented with some portending events, connected with this subject, of an unfavorable aspect. Why, therefore, hesitate to leave with the State governments and your banks to make their own bargain, or otherwise provide for their withdrawal, in order to save the peace and tranquillity of society? If they can harmonize, you may then expect it; and, if they cannot, why continue the spirit of discordance, to the great detriment of governmental unity and friendly understanding.

SENATE.

What may be thought necessary and proper at one time, by the Legislature, may not be thought so at another time: events may have unfolded themselves, evincing the necessity and propriety of a change. Or that which at one session may be approved, as best calculated to carry into effect a given power, may, at another, from a change of Representatives, be disapproved of and amended, or a different mean established.

One Legislature cannot give to her acts of policy perpetuity, or a claim for years. It is always competent for a succeeding Legislature to revise such acts of their predecessors.

What a Legislature cannot do directly, is not permissible to be effected indirectly.

Perhaps we shall be told that the agreement has A law which is necessary and proper for carryalready been made, and that the States ought to ing into effect any of the powers given by the Conabide by it. With this Government, who, when stititution, is in its nature, and for the accomplishacting on the subject of policy and public interest, ment of its purposes, political, and cannot be is herself not exempt from error and correction, converted from its true character, by connecting the argument will have received its just weight. therewith, and tacking thereto, private rights; beBut there is another answer which I beg leave to cause that would be to effect indirectly what could give: The banks were, I presume, invited to the not be done directly, and thereby put in the power States, in the expectation that they would, as of one Legislature to perpetuate her acts of policy branches of an institution of the Government, en- upon succeeding Legislatures; and because a prídeavor to administer, with an impartial hand, to vate interest in the institution, having no other the wants and situation of the country, as far as foundation than as attached thereto, cannot, as a practicable, and a just regard to the interest and mere incident, change the true character of that safety of the institution would permit; thereby in-political mean. Their privileges, to say the most creasing public confidence, and cementing more closely the interest and feelings of the people to the measures of Government. Whether this expectation has been disappointed, will hereafter be the subject of inquiry. At present, said Mr. L., it is sufficient to observe that if, in the spirit of friendship and hospitality, the banks have been invited into the bosoms of the States, and, instead of cultivating peace and good will, have been instrumental in producing discord and contention, by pursuing a course unfriendly to the prosperity of the States, and in violation of one of the principal objects of the charter, that, like the man who is unmindful of his obligation to hospitality," they, with him, will have justly incurred the same merited sentence.

But suppose, sir, said Mr. L., that I am wrong in my opinion as to the power of legislative bodies in general over banking privileges, (and if I am I fear the error will go with me to my grave, for I have been under its delusion for upwards of fifteen years,) yet there is another view of the subject favorable to the Constitutional power of this Government over her bank. It is believed to be conceded by all, that Congress has not the power to establish a bank for private purposes merely; that it can only be done as a mean of necessity and propriety for carrying into effect some of the delegated powers to this Government. What is a necessary and proper" act for the accomplishment of those great, substantive, and specified powers, is a question purely of expediency, depending, in its exercise, on a well regulated discretion, adapted to the nature of the subject, and a most scrupulous regard to other existing correlative rights. Expediency is the creature of experiment, which time and experience mould to suit their purpose.

6

of them, have received admittance within the pale of the Constitution, through an instrument of the Government, contrived as an instrument of expedience, embark, subject to all the vicissitudes to which that, from its character, is liable to undergo.

Nor have I here contended for any thing opposed to the opinion of the Supreme Court of the Union; on the contrary, the principles, thus far, are clearly supported by the decisions of that tribunal.

In the case of the Dartmouth College against Woodward, (4 Wheaton, 629,) the court say: The parties in this case differ less on general principles, less on the true construction of the Constitution in the abstract, than on the applica'tion of those principles to this case. This is the point on which the cause essentially depends. If the act of incorporation be a grant of political power; if it create a civil institution, to be employed in the administration of the Government, &c., the subject is one in which the Legislature may act according to its own judgment, unrestricted by any limitation of its power, imposed by the Constitution of the United States."

And, again, in the same opinion, page 638, say the court: "The character of civil institutions does not grow out of their incorporations, but out of the manner in which they are formed, and the objects for which they are created. The right to change them is not founded on their being incorporated, but on their being the instrument of Government, created for its purposes.'

Now, the inference deducible from this opinion, is perfectly clear in its application to the question before us; which has also been decided by that court, in the case of McCulloch against the State

Bank of the United States.

suppose they are not impartial and are not just? Then the answer is, it is wrong that we should know it, or have any other check against its repetition. And, whilst you would administer to us the comfort derivable from the fact, that there are honorable gentlemen of great integrity in those institutions, we are, nevertheless, fearful of that predominant passion of man, avarice: an inordinate thirst for wealth and power. Is it, then, that our best hope is, that man is without avarice, unjust avarice, and free from ambition? If he is, then, verily, we are safe-otherwise, we have no secur3. That those persons, with the means thus fur-ity. Their deeds are in secret. How, sir, would nished, have been enabled to supply themselves out of the money in the State, to live and speculate upon her wealth, and exhaust her resources.