Hon. JOHN W. TAYLOR, Chairman Committee of Elections : JANUARY, 1820. are to be a perpetual bar to all knowledge of the original transaction? To have the right to judge of an election, and not to be allowed to approach it; to be governed by the voice of the electors, and not be permitted to hear it, must appear deeply laden with inconsistency. I have understood that a distinction is to be taken between the cases of votes illegally returned by the The fifth section of the first article of the Constitu- town officers, and, on that account, not allowed by the tion of the United States provides "that each House canvassing committee, and the cases where votes were (of Congress) shall be the judge of the elections, re-given by the freemen, and not returned at all. The turns, &c., of its own members." It is respectfully considered that the term "election," in a political sense, must mean the designation or choice of a person to perform the duties of some office. An "election" is an act performed by freemen possessing proper qualifications. The manner of performing it is immaterial, only as it may, or not, be sanctioned by some particular law. If by viva voce, when the declaration of the electors is made, the election is complete. If by ballots, when these are deposited by the people in the custody of the legal receiver, the designation is consummated. The electing power has then performed its office. The choice is perfect. All that follows is but the collection or preparation of evidence to ascertain the fact. The sorting, counting, and recording of the ballots by town officers, and the re-examination and computation by others, are but so many steps taken not to make or complete an election, but to discover in what manner it has terminated. latter was the fact as relates to the votes of Goshen and part of the votes of Woodbury. This is explained by the evidence. It seems rational that a return, manifestly illegal, must be the same as no return at all. It appears difficult to discover a legal or equitable difference between a neglect to return the votes of the freemen, and a return so defective that no notice can be taken of it. Hence, it is respectfully inferred that an election is complete when the electors have delivered their suffrages or ballots into the hands of the legal depository. That no mistakes or neglects of the agents of the freemen can alter or annihilate the fact. That no power exists, or can exist, to prevent the House from choose to admit. ascertaining that fact by such evidence as it may A different construction would deprive that body of one of the most salutary restraints upon ignorance To judge of an election, therefore, must, of neces-effectual safeguard to their political rights. It would, and corruption, and would rob the electors of the most sity, imply the right of taking cognizance of the exer- in effect, be an admission that the honorable House cise of the electing power; of this, also, at the time must be composed of such as the officers of towns and when the designation is accomplished by the suffrages counties should think proper to send, and not those whom the freemen, by their suffrages, had elected. of the freemen. The laws of individual States, from convenience or necessity, created a tribunal to determine for themselves, in the first instance, the election of representatives. They have determined what shall be the evidence, and when produced. If no one is injured, no reason exists for a re-examination. It is true that the laws of a State may be binding on Congress when supported by the Constitution. That instrument has defined the limits of State power on this subject. It seems to be confined to the qualifications of electors, the times, places, and manner of holding elections. A State cannot prescribe to the House the rules of evidence, nor the time when that evidence shall be produced. It cannot declare that the report of a canvassing committee shall be conclusive in all cases whatsoever, nor the testimony on which it is founded, is all that may be used. The proceedings in the State may always be considered, prima facie, correct. If no impeachment is offered, they need not be doubted. But few decisions have come to my knowledge. All that may have an influence on the present case will readily present themselves to the minds of the honorable committee. Permit me, however, respectfully to refer to the case of Willoughby and Smith, from the State of New York. The votes of the electors were given for "Willoughby, junior." A part were returned by the inspectors as having been given for " Willoughby." Smith was declared elected by the State authority. The House received evidence to prove for whom the votes were given by the freemen. mond and Mallary. To correct one requires no more power than the correction of the other. I make a reference to the evidence from Woodbury: Crawford, Smith, and Hammond, were returned to the canvassing committee by the officers of that town, in the room of Rich and Mallary. To the latter persons the votes of the people of that town were given. The name is descriptio persona. The addition of By the laws of Vermont, all the provisions for se-junior describes another person, as different as Hamcuring the evidence of an election are calculated solely for the State tribunal. The power of the House to interfere is not acknowledged. It would be unreasonable to say that the House should be bound by laws never intended to operate on its privileges; and, if intended so to operate, must be nugatory. It cannot be inferred that, because the canvassing committee are required to receive the certificate of a town clerk or I understand that the qualifications of freemen, at constable as evidence, Congress is to receive no other. the time they appeared at the poll, have been after Again, each House shall be the judge of the elec-examined by the House. It is submitted whether this tion. How can this be done if the State authority is not decidedly more independent of State authorities, has the power to create an intervening obstacle? How a greater extension of the right of judging, than the can the House judge of a fact which they are not al- simple allowance of the undisputed votes of the eleclowed to examine? How are they capable of judging, tors, which, by the negligence of their servants, had if the errors and mistakes of every petty officer through not been returned in season for computation. whose hands the suffrages of the freemen must pass, It is said that, in 1804, a case from Georgia was de cided, that seems to have some relation to the principle embraced in the present. A reference is made to that case in the report of the honorable Committee of Elections in 1817. By the laws of that State, the votes are to be returned within a given number of days. Some of the votes for one candidate were not returned within the limited time. The person for whom a lesser number of votes were given, was declared elected. The votes given for the other, and not seasonably returned, were allowed by the House, and the person for whom they were given was admitted to his seat. Should, therefore, the honorable House be pleased to inquire whether Mr. Merrill or your petitioner was elected by the freemen of Vermont, the following statement of facts, it is believed, will be supported by ample testimony: The State of Vermont was entitled to six members. The election was by general ticket. The six who received the greatest number of votes were elected: Messrs. Rich, Crafts, Strong, and Meach, were chosen, to whom no opposition can be made. Mr. Merrill, the sixth, received the least number of votes of any one declared elected; his seat is the one contested. The whole number of votes counted to Messrs. Merrill, Griswold, and Mallary, is as follows. From the H. OF R. nine votes more than Mallary. By allowing Mallary the fifty-six votes given for him in Woodbury, Mallary will have over Griswold twenty-seven votes. Mr. Griswold's pretensions will then be set aside, as in all the other towns Mallary and Griswold had an equal number of votes. The votes of Fairhaven were lost on account of the certificate of the votes being returned not sealed. The votes of Plymouth were rejected on account of an informal certificate. The votes of Goshen were not returned. Notices were given by the magistrates of the time and place of taking testimony; which are returned with the depositions. I gave notice of my intention to contest the election, as by the letter forwarded with the evidence. I also wrote Mr. Merrill, desiring him to inform me at what time it would be most convenient for him to attend the taking of testimony. A copy of that letter is also transmitted. All which is respectfully presented to the honorable committee. R. C. MALLARY. B. Reply of the sitting member. state of the poll, these are the only persons con- To the Hon. JOHN W. TAYLOR, cerned : Merrill. Griswold. Mallary. 6,955 when all are counted, exclusive of the eight votes given Mr. Mallary in Mansfield. Chairman of the Committee of Elections: To answer some principles assumed by Mr. Mallary in his remonstrance, and to abridge, if practicable, the inquiry commenced by him, in support of his claim to a seat in the House of Representatives in my stead, I solicit the indulgence of the committee to the following exposition of the claims, rights, and principles, I urge in defence. It would seem, at the first impression, that it was alone necessary to bring the conflicting claims and the just rights of the freemen, summarily to the law of the State, and the practice and adjudications under it. Further reflection indicates the necessity of a more prolix and minute view of the case, and chiefly so, by reason of the positions assumed by my opponent, and the principles connected with it, and which are of first importance. The question embraces the important rights of suffrage, and it takes, within its scope, the State laws, authorities, and sovereignty. Comment upon the important and sacred characThe votes in Berlin and Wardsborough were un-ter of the right of suffrage need not be indulged, as doubtedly given for Mr. Merrill, and he is entitled to this is familiarly known, abundantly recognised, and their allowance. The following is an abstract of the testimony: clearly illustrated, in all our rules, codes of rights, and constitutions. Its value, its guards, its tenure, and the practical rules for the exercise of its power, are therein delineated with sufficient perspicuity and ability. However unnecessary it may be to enlarge upon this bearing of the case under consideration, I appre 1. The copy of canvass rolls. This shows the whole number of votes allowed to each candidate. It gives copies of the certificates from Fairhaven, Woodbury, Plymouth, and Mansfield. It shows that no votes were counted for Mr. Mallary from Fairhaven, Ply-hend it is not only pertinent, but essential to advert mouth, Woodbury, Goshen, and Mansfield. 2. In Woodbury, Richards, Mallary, Rich, Strong, Griswold, and Peck, each had fifty-six votes. The officers in Woodbury, in making out the certificate, which was returned to the canvassing committee, omitted the names of Rich and Mallary, and returned, in the room of them, the names of "Crawford, Smith, and Hammond," for whom no votes were given. to it. It is equally as important to consider, that, from the quiet and pure character of the right of suffrage, contrasted with the turbulence, caprice, and passions of men, its exercise must, necessarily, be subject to such general and uniform rules of order as may be prescribed by the legislative power of the respective States, or of the Union. The Constitution of the Union has so declared; reserving to "the Congress," as the paramount power, the right, "by law, to alter the Mr. Griswold's were returned and counted; Mr. regulations of the respective States." The ConMallary's were not. By the statement from the can- gress" refraining to do this, the State regulations are vass rolls, it appears that Griswold had counted twenty-plenary, and must be sustained. The wise and ex16th CoN. 1st Sess.-28 perienced are, therefore, not at liberty to let it escape consideration, that the exercise of this right of sovereignty is not left a vagrant, capricious, or despotic act of power. In all well-regulated communities, it must be a creature of law and it is our pride and boast that this principle is recognised and protected. Our Government is emphatically a Government of laws, and not exactly a Government of precedents, which may be arbitrary, and shape an individual case. If the prescribed provisions of law are not strictly observed in this exercise of sovereignty, it is difficult to define the rules by which it is regulated and secured. It is apprehended to be a point established, that, in every legitimate exercise of the right of suffrage by the freemen, they are to yield obedience to existing ordinances and regulations, and cannot be supposed to act in their sovereign capacity, except they act in obedience to the express laws they have caused to be enacted. A perfect conformity to all the requirements would seem, therefore, essential to the consummation of the act of election. I also consider, that, while without the law, whether in their individual or corporate capacity, the freemen are estopped from claiming any right or privilege, nor can they confer any. Any non-conformity to the statute of elections by one portion of freemen, is never to be construed to impair the rights of another portion of freemen, who hold rights in consideration of their fidelity to the laws in such case made and provided. Imperfect rights can never sustain competition with perfect rights. JANUARY, 1820. That I may not be misunderstood, I ask leave to remark that, under a case of impeachment of State proceedings, the power of the House, and the duty of its committee, I apprehend is to inquire whether, in all the stages of proceedings, the Constitution of the Union, and the State regulations as to time, place, and mode of proceedings, have been observed; and if, in the investigation, it is found the State regulations are agreeably to the Constitution, and the requisites of the law have been regarded, the proceedings of the freemen and decisions of the State tribunals are in good faith to be recognised and accredited; otherwise the State law is an act of supererogation, and a nullity. Hence I admitted the persuasion, that the House of Representatives would never assume a power which can only be exercised by the Congress, and, therefore, the State laws and proceedings would be adjudged plenary, except previously modified by a law of Congress; and that, on the contrary, if the law is in derogation of the Constitution, or the proceedings are not pursuant to the statute, or provided the agents of the freemen have been fraudulent, or the tribunals of decision have been perverse and corrupt, then, indeed, the procedure is nugatory, and will be so declared; then the power of the House will be found remedial, and sufficiently ample. As a regard to the will and prerogatives of the freemen, and a tender care of their interests, is ever a paramount inclination and duty with a faithful Representative; and as this case may seem to involve their rights and interests, and a mistake in reasoning on this case may happen, whereby their just rights may, in fact, be sacrificed, I would inquire, for whom is this investigation instituted? Not for the freemen. They have no petition here; their rights are not implicated; they do not feel injured. I repeat, the freemen of Vermont have preferred no claim; and yet, as Reprecherish the rights of those freemen who have been industrious and faithful to their own rights, and who, by their diligence, have shown fidelity to the law. I repeat, they ask no other intervention; they haye taken no step; they care not. The law is the guardian of their rights, and they know it; and they ask no other exercise of guardianship here. The freemen of Vermont are also aware that vigilance is their only safeguard, the title deed of their immunities. They ask not for the few who have not been industrious and faithful to their rights; they ask not that the beneficial This settled order of business, touching elections, as and liberal system of legislative wisdom and providence prescribed by the respective States, it would seem, is should be made a sacrifice on the unhallowed altar of obligatory on the decisions of the House of Represen-indolence and indifference, or that the consummated tatives, regarding the elections of its members, unless rights of the faithful should be immolated. "the Congress, by law, have altered such regulations." This conclusion is founded on the fourth section of the Constitution of the Union; it is also founded on the broad basis of good sense, so far forth as it limits discretion, and the range of decisions, to the system of rules prescribed in the law of each respective State. It shields, also, from the imputation of caprice and irregularity, the exercise of the right of suffrage, the manifestations of the will of the freemen, and the decisions of the representative body of the nation: and, inasmuch as the law of the State is not in derogation of the Constitution, or any law of the Union, but pursuant to the Constitution, I feel much confidence that the statute of the State, the practices of the freemen, and the official expositions and decisions under it, will be respected. From this view of the principles bearing upon the case, I am persuaded that the depositing, assorting, and counting of the ballots rendered by the freemen, and the sealing up and returning the amount deposited, in the form, time, and manner expressly prescribed, to the ultimate State tribunal of decision, in order that the aggregate will of the freemen may be known, is imperatively required to consummate the act of elec-sentatives, it becomes the House and its committees to tion, and perfect a choice. The requisites of the statute of the State are guards placed around the sacred character of the elective right, to preserve its purity, and give to its exercise all the necessary protection and solemnities; are therefore to be considered parcel of it, and essential; and their particular application by the law and usages of Vermont, is by the freemen; and I dwell with much emphasis upon the fact, it is their act, as they select and appoint special agents, whose character and conduct they know, and in whom they repose especial confidence. I beg leave to say, had I respected the rights of the freemen less, or had I been less sensible of the paramount motives which influence honorable members, I should have withheld reiterations of these facts; I should have contented myself with saying the freemen are not injured. Decide as members may, the freemen of Vermont have their full representation; the freemen of the Union are not injured, for Vermont has but its due proportion of representation. Who are these petty town and county officers, whom my opponent speaks of as giving members to this House? They are the fathers and guardians of the freemen's interests; the choice men of each corporation; selected, yes, approved and appointed by the freemen themselves, as their legal and respected depositaries, and their agents to perform and fulfil for them the law, that not one jot or tittle thereof fail of its accomplishment; their acts are the acts of the freemen. This question should be stripped of all bias for the freemen, except to sustain the institutions which define and regulate their immunities. By whom is it asked that State regulations should be disregarded? Certainly not by the freemen. Such as have neglected the legal modes and certainties, and abandoned their rights which the law sustains, would have been estopped, by reason of their own laches, from asking the prostration or suspension of a State system; for the favor of law is not towards them.. I beg leave to ask, of whom is the destruction of a State system required? The Constitution and law of the Union are not asked; but it is asked of a branch of Congress, the people's Representatives. And shall one branch of the law-making power do it, under the arbitrary doctrine of precedent alone? No. Ours is a Government of express laws. Adjudicated precedents of practice are, not unfrequently, beneficial, and perfect the provident work of a Legislature, and, in all cases of doubt and ambiguity, they the rather lean to prop freemen's diligence and fidelity. For any individual, then, should "shame light" upon a system established by a State sovereignty? The answer is to the case and in point. The case is a case of strict right between individuals. H. OF R. town, wanting in any of the requirements of the law, must be deemed illegal, and be rejected. Comment is probably unnecessary, yet I trust I shall be indulged in remarking, it is an acknowledged principle that the will of the freemen, unaccompanied by any act, cannot consummate a choice, because there can be no manifestation of their will. In towns where the choice is to be determined by ballot, the will of no individual freeman can be accounted any thing, except he makes deposite of his vote in the ballot box, for canvass, at the legal time and place. And in order that the aggregate vote of the freemen may be manifested, every political corporation must make deposite of the amount of its votes at the legal place, to the appointed board, and in legal time. As, in the first instance, the ballot deposite is the highest possible manifestation of the will of the individual freemen, precisely in the same manner, in the second instance, the deposite is the highest and most solemn manifestation of the aggregate will of the freemen of the State. The portion omitting to do this prescribed act have abandoned their rights, and, by their own laches, have rendered their rights imperfect and inchoate, and the power of reclaiming or perfecting them is lost. Before I proceed to an examination of the precedents quoted by my opponent, I respectfully ask leave to urge that the use of precedents arrayed against the In this view of the subject, I proceed to remind the check usages, or precautionary ordinances of States, committee of my opponent's remark, that "the pro- is only to be justified on an extraordinary occasion. ceedings in the State may always be considered prima They are to be used with great caution and the soundfacie correct." The proceedings in a State, done est discretion, at all times, and are never to be adopted fairly, and conformably to law, in my opinion, are to destroy legal certainty, or to extend the consummore than prima facie correct; they are as record mation of an act beyond the statute period of concluevidence, which cannot be contradicted or altered by sion. Even the sovereign power of Congress has its parol testimony. Neglect or mistake may defeat the limitations, and an integral portion of that authority rights of the freemen, by reason of not perfecting the has its restraints. I hold it correct in principle, that, evidence of a fact, or the legal manifestation of their until the Constitution shall have been modified, or will. The plea of neglect, or mistake, cannot be urged until the Congress shall have altered, by law, the State to contradict, vary, or destroy a legal proceeding, nor election regulations, and made a uniform course of defeat a legal and vested right. State proceedings practice, the decisions touching elections cannot be may be destroyed, by showing there was corruption. uniform, but must be graduated to the varying and Actual fraud, or corruption, in any stage of the pro- peculiar regulations of each State respectively. The ceedings, and in whatever shape it satisfactorily ap-requisites of return, &c., prescribed in the law of Verpears, eradicates an otherwise consummated right; because it determines it no record, no act. I urge these doctrines the more strenuously, because the case under consideration is a question of strict right between two individuals. My opponent does not allege corruption, nor prove fraud; his parol testimony therefore is inadmissible, and altogether insufficient to impeach legal State proceedings, and my rights, which are sanctioned by the highest tribunal thereof, and consummated by the signature of the Chief Magistrate and the seal of the State. I consider my right to a seat in the House of Representatives identified with the rights of the greatest number of diligent freemen, with the law, and the decisions of the State authorities. I contend, for yet other reasons, that the statute of Vermont is to be in force, and its requirements to be held inviolate. Deducible from it are the soundest rules of evidence; the best of which the case is susceptible. I hold on to this ground with the more confidence, because, in so doing, I conform to the decisions of the last and final tribunals of the State-I mean the tribunal of canvass, and the representatives of the State in General Assembly, to whom the committee of canvass report. Here it was solemnly and explicitly decided by actual vote, after due debate and deliberation, that the votes of the freemen in any incorporated mont, were suggested by practical abuses, or wellfounded apprehensions of imposition on the fair rights and will of the freemen, and were intended as checks and adequate guards against their recurrence and existence. The like evils may only sectionally occur, and the like apprehensions may arise from causes purely local. The like remedies and precautions will not, therefore, generally demand legislative interposition. And to break down provisions of this character by the power of precedents, adopted under other circumstances, cannot be friendly to the dearest rights of freemen. The uniform principles of decision in the New England States, as I have been informed by honorable gentlemen, have been strictly with their laws. And if the laws and decisions of States are to be held of no weight and nugatory, I am of opinion the safer course is for "the Congress" to alter the State regulations by law, and that the altering or nullifying them by mere precedents is questionable and rarely to be tolerated. Inasmuch as precedents of this character are alleged by my opponent to exist, I proceed to examine them. The detailed report of cases, with all the facts and reasons governing the precedent, are necessary to find its analogy and relationship to the case in consideration. The cited case of Georgia is an entirely differ H. OF R. ent case. exhibits a most unnatural state of things; as the only power, competent to create a new power, is the "Congress." and they may do it by law. In the present case I desire it may not be forgotten that the return is the act of the freemen, and the omission of return by any portion is their own laches, as the returning agent is a creature of their own appointment, and his legal neglect concludes a forfeiture. The The reasons for non-compliance with the law regarding returns, was not urged as a laches of the freemen, but was a providential prohibition. The maxim that the "act of God injures no man," in this case has all its force, and is not to be disputed; the decision was correct. It can have no bearing in the present case, which was an abandonment by the freemen of their legal rights, as, in the case of the town of Goshen, they neglected to make return, not only The case from Massachusetts, of Baylies and Turwithin the legal period, but even to this day. And in ner, named by an honorable member of the committee, the towns of Fairhaven, Plymouth, and Mansfield, the regarding the addition or omission of "junior," is a case was determined against them, under solemn ad- case, in my apprehension, distinctly marked as inapjudication, by reason of their own acts. They did not plicable. The freemen, in that case, felt aggrieved, obey the law, by reason of indolence, or a want of and they petitioned. In the investigation of the case diligence, neither of which is a competent plea to delay in which this decision was had, it was found that Turor change the operation of law, or to arrest and subvertner, senior, lived out of the district, and was ineligible its commandments. The case of Georgia, by an exam- by the law, and as dead; and therefore the freemen ination of it in its details, shows that the returning are not to be supposed to vote for a person dead in officer is admitted to have made use of all due dili-law, or natually dead. I believe it is a settled princigence. And the allegation was, that, by reason of an ple in judicial proceedings, that the affixing or omitunusal and tremendous storm, or hurricane, by which ting the appellation of "junior," may be sufficiently the country was inundated, bridges were swept away, certain; and it becomes a fact to be inquired into, and the ways were rendered impassable, he was pre- whether the person be well designated and known vented by this act of God from fulfilling the law. by either description, as well by one name as the There is, therefore, no similitude in the cases, and the other; and I consider, in a case of ineligibility, or precedent does not apply, and in fact is no precedent; actual death, the fact is clearly ascertained. it is a solitary case. The fact to be decided was as to cases of "jun." are a matter of fact, and may be inthe admission of proof of the alleged act of providen- quired into, and are not to be measured by the same tial prohibition regarding return. So far as regarded rule as legal laches, which produces a forfeiture. It is this point, it may be received, and stand as an unsetto be judged of according to the best evidence protled, solitary precedent. Inferences, remarks, or de- duced. And, in my judgment, the distinction is palcisions, beyond the point in issue, or submission, are pable between this class of cases and the present case, exta-judicial and without the case, and cannot be where in the original return an entirely distinct name drawn in as precedent. This I judge to be a distinction is entered. Mallory and Hammond, in no case, can correct in principle, and warranted by practice. The come under one and the same description of person, present case was a non-observance of law, without or be understood, under any circumstances less than any alleged providential excuse; it was an essential legislative interference, which may give a new name, legal laches of the freemen-the fact is acknowledged as designating one and the same person. The case by my opponent, that the law was not complied with. of Woodbury, by my opponent, was brought to this The decision called for was, I repeat, as to evidence class of precedents; the cases are not analogous, for regarding the cause of failure, and they decided not the reasons assigned. If we pass to the evidence to "receive any evidence on that point;" all besides is which my opponent has produced, we shall find that to be considered argument. It might be logic in that the settled rules of evidence, in constant practice peculiar case. There is, however, an important dis-in our courts, invalidate his evidence. The original tinction in that from the present case which I have here mentioned. The doctrines of precedent should never set statutes at defiance, and bring into contempt the acts of a Legislature; they are to be taken in their most strict sense, and are never to abolish express, fixed, Constitutional law. The doctrine of precedent, in any other view, is perilous and dangerous in the extreme. It assumes power without control, on the spur of the occasion, and after the fact, and makes its decision the law and the judgment." If there is "fixed law," it must be followed if there is no law, "the judgment on any particular case is the law of that single case only, and dies with it." And this is more emphatically a sound principle, under our Govern officially sealed certificate returned is the declared and best evidence, and made so by express law. And this evidence, by my opponent's exhibit, shows no such fact as his having received any vote in the town of Woodbury. The copy record of a town is by no means equal evidence. The case appears to me analogous to the case of a deed of conveyance; for instance, the original and sealed deed conveys two hundred acres of land; the copy of it spread upon the record puts down the amount conveyed at one hundred acres. I apprehend no legal doubt could be raised on a question made, which ought to have the precedence, and which is the highest and best evidence, the original or the copy. The statute in section six, in my view, intimates that the Legislature had the same view. They The extra-judicial remarks in the cited precedent not only made the sealed, original certificate, done in case are of such dangerous measure as to place States statute form, the legal evidence in the previous secin a humiliating predicament. The freemen, in their tions, but in the cited section they direct "that the sovereign capacity, pursue duties and perform acts, committee appointed by the General Assembly, for the agreeably to their laws, which they enacted as bar- purposes mentioned in the act," "shall preserve and riers of safety, and within which they reposed in con-lodge the original certificates with the Secretary of fidence. Yet, after all, a precedent never promulgated State, until after the first session of Congress for which can sink its character and importance; destroy, by a the said election is held." touch, the mainspring of its power, and dissolve all its sanctions and securities. It is a predicament which ment. The guards and provisions of the act of the Legislature of Vermont are to be regarded as so many admo |