De la Nature, &c. Traduit du Latin.-A Differtation on the Nature of Things, with Remarks on their Energy and Action. Tranflated from the Latin. 12mo. Frankfort. On the Science of Ontology, or the nature of things in general, this writer obferves, that philofophers mistake in denying existence to modes, and confining it to fubftances: and that because it is in many cafes impoffible for phyfical experiment to make the diftinction; as for inftance, between matter and motion, as might be exemplified in numberless inftances. It is prefumed, fays he, that there are certain things in the Univerfe, which are in their nature unchangeable, fuch as the primary elements of bodies: but, granting this, thefe elements are too minute to be the objects of phyfical experiment and palpable examination. All other objects, viz. fuch as come under experimental inveftigation, or are palpable objects of fenfe, are, fays he, confeffedly compound. No matter, therefore, what is the fimple nature of the primary elements of which they are compofed. So far as they differ from each other, they, the compounds, are of a different nature, and it is, in their diftinguishing compofition, that their nature confifts. Thus the original component parts or fubftance of any compound form are not the characteristical Effence of fuch compound, but the mode in which those parts or substances are combined or compounded.

Every thing in the material Univerfe may, therefore, according to this profound and ingenious inveftigator, be arVol. V.

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ranged

ranged under three general claffes; viz. Phyfical, Mathematical, and Moral: which three divifions comprehend every object in nature.

Phyfical things he calls the palpable objects of sense, such as may be feen, felt, heard, fmelt, and tafted: including the various productions of the foffile, vegetable, and animal kingdoms, the phenomena of the fidereal fyftem, and the productions of human art.

Mathematical things, he calls objects purely intellectual, or fuch as may be conceived, imagined, and understood. Such are all abstract ideas, the figures, and even primary elements of bodies, the fpecific forms of plants and animals, and the artificial forms of all works of Art.

Moral things are a mixt fpecies, compounded of the two former, and partaking the nature of both; their effence being partly phyfical and partly mathematical, the objects both of the fenfe and of the imagination or underftanding. They are not, fays he, merely entia rationis, as mathematical things are, because they cannot fubfift without a phyfical being; and yet they are not phyfical beings, because they are conftituted jointly of phyfical qualities and moral relations. Such are human perfonages and characters, kings, fathers, husbands, citizens, &c. as alfo civil and political inftitutions, fuch as families, corporations, ftates, kingdoms, and empires.

The exiftence of all thefe three kinds of Beings, fays our philofopher, is equally certain and real, though not equally durable. While they fubfift, or their combination of parts continues, their exiftence is incontrovertible, and their effence. is that very combination: every thing being truly defined by thofe circumstances which diftinguish it from every thing elfe. Speaking of the definition of phyfical objects, he remarks that there is no difference between the qualities of things and the things themselves, except as a part differs from the whole; every perceptible object confifting of, or being a mere affemblage of, the qualities by which its exiftence is known. For, if thefe qualities were annihilated, the thing itself would no longer exift; there being no fubftractions without qualities, as fome fuppofe, in which fuch qualitiès refide. Thus, the effence of the germs of vegetables and animals confifts in the mode of ftructure, or organization of their parts; which organization, when expanded enough to be perceptible, becomes a phyfical object, though, while concentrated and too minute to be perceived, it is only a mathematical or (as our author fometimes calls it) a metaphyfical one. The fame argument is extended to works of art. Nobody calls in question,

fays

fays he, the existence of his house, while it is kept watertight and tenantable; nor of the wind or water-mill in his neighbourhood, while it continues to grind his corn. And yet the duration of mills and houfes is fhort and precarious. If either were fhattered to pieces by lightning, or washed away by an inundation, there is no doubt, allo, that they would make as little queftion of their annihilation; notwithftanding every fingle article of the materials, of which they were built, might be ftill in being. The owners would yet have no houfe to live in, no mill to grind their meal.

In this manner our author proceeds through his three dif tinctions; in which, with all due deference, however, he does not appear to be fufficiently diftin&t. Had he divided all the objects, of whofe nature we are inquifitive, when we enquire into the nature of things, into material and mental, that is, objects of fenfe, objects of the imagination, and objects mixed of both, he had been equally and perhaps more intelligible.Indeed almost all objects rank under the latter clafs, which go under the popular and equivocal term of things; fo that it is poffible that our own divifion might not be fufficiently accurate, without more illuftration than we can at prefent bestow on it.— There are, notwithstanding the objections to be made to the general plan of this treatife, a number of ingenious, and not lefs profound, reflections on fubjects of great curiofity to fuch as attend more to the folid than the fuperficial parts of natural philofophy. We fhall extract a few, of which, almost unnoticed, notice was taken on the publication of this ingenious treatife in the orig nal Latin.-In fpeaking of that fentation of Force (fo much laboured by Mr. Maupertuis), which we experience and exert in refifting any fubulance impelling or obtruded on the organs of fenfe, he obferves, that from this fenfation it is that we derive the fimple idea of Power But, as we cannot expreis or dehine this idea any otherwise than by calling it a capacity of exer ing a force in tome certain direction, nor have any other name, or can affign any other immediate caufe, for our exerting it in any direction, than that of the will, to will, or defign, is evidently the effence of all metaphyfical Beings. It may feem ftrange, fays he, to impute will to the primary elements of bodies; but every object which refifts, or exerts force, muit neceffarily do it in fome one direction exclufive of all others; how then fhall we denominate a tendency to that particular direction, but by the term we give to the like capacity of exerting force in ourfelves? But give this tendency whatever name we pleate, it is plain, that the moft fimple of all metaphyfical Beings, or

the

the primary elements of things, are fimple powers, tending to exert a force, or to refift each other in all or in certain particular directions. It is from the co-existence of a multiplicity of the elements, that our Philofopher deduces the phenomenon of extenfion or fpace. It is true, fays he, that fuch elements may be fupposed to exift feverally without space, as they are of no more dimenfions than fo many mathematical points; but it is to be remarked, that even a number of mathematical points cannot co-exift without defcribing fome definite quantity of space; for though they have no dimenfions, they have locality; that is, any two of them have each a place diftinct from one another, otherwife they would not be two points, but one: thus, though each fhould take up no fpace of itself, they must be diftinguished or feparated by fome space, how fmall foever; fo that an infinite number of them would defcribe an infinite fpace, notwithstanding it is univerfally allowed, that mathematical points are unextended. Again, it is from the peculiar difpofitions of thefe elements towards each other, or from the relations which the different tendency of their feveral directions bear to each other, that he deduces the form of material atoms, the modification of the fpecific corpufcles of foffile bodies, and the organization of the germina of plants and animals: the effence of all which he determines to confift in their united defign, or in the fyftem or combination of the feveral diftinct wills, or different directions of the fimple elements compofing them; that is, their specific forms.

The effence of the mind, he declares, in like manner, to confift of the organization, or the specific form, of the animal gerin; the intellects of all animals differing from each other according to the organization of their bodies, and their intellects ceafing with fuch organization. By the mind, however, fays the Author, I do not mean, what Theologues ufually understand by the human foul: that a living body dies on the diffolution of its organs, is certain; that animals when dead ceafe to perceive and reflect, is alfo certain; that intellect then, which diftinguified them when living, difplays itself no longer; fo that the mind, whofe exiftence was inferred from it, muft ceafe to exift likewife. The human foul, as it is conceived by Theologues, is a very different thing, being a fimply uncompounded Being; or unextended, intuitive, and immortal fpirit: the exiftence of which, he fays, is not difcoverable by Philo ophy, but only from Revelation. Philofophers, continues he, may make what arbitrary diftinctions they pleafe between foul and body, but they cannot prove the propriety of them by any phyfical experiment whatever. And

hence

hence the existence and immortality of the foul would for ever remain a doubt with us, were it not from the affurance we receive, as it is revealed to us immediately from God in the Holy Scripture. Our late philofophical Commentators on the Bible deny, however, in contradiction to this writer, that the immortality of the foul is a fcripture doctrine, making a diftinction between the doctrine of the foul's furviving the body, and the revival of foul and body at the general Refurrection.

In treating of the energy or action of things, our philofopher obferves that much hath been written, and to very little purpose, about the principles of action in matter: but we cannot, fays he, feparate our idea of the action of phyfical fubftances from that of motion; bodies, in general, having no other mode of action than that of changing their place. For with regard to the general quality of refiftance effential to all fubftance, he does not confider it as phyfical action, but as metaphyfical energy. Bodies totally divefted of motion, or lying perfectly at reft, if any fuch there be, are totally void of action. As the effence of phyfical beings confifts alfo frequently of modes and relations, fo is phyfical action frequently miftaken for fubftance; several finall bodies in motion being undiftinguishable from a larger body apparently at rest: thus a lever, revolving with great velocity round a center, 'fhall appear to be a circular fuperficies. Hence he infers, that the palpable figure and dimenfions of all bodies are the effect of the motion of their component parts, and that the form and magnitude of fuch bodies do not arife from the af femblage and appofition of the primary elements of bodies; which, as before, have neither figure nor dimenfions. The form and extenfion of bodies, continues our Author, are mere phenomena; to account for which, by imputing form and extenfion to their primary elements, is to take that for granted which we pretend to demonftrate. The elements being admitted fuch as above-described, he proceeds to enquire into the reafon for their cohefion, in the formation of folid bodies: an enquiry the more curious as the mode of it is totally new; this enquiry, to the bett of our reading and remembrance, having never before been attempted on mechanic principles. On this head he takes notice, that it is fomewhat furprizing, Phyfiologifts fhould have fo much perplexed themselves to explain the more complicated phenomena of particular bodies, as Magnetifin, Electricity, and the like, without having explained the fimple cohefion of the parts, or the tenacity of all bodies in general. The cohefion of the parts of bodies is, according to our Author, the mechanical effect of the refistance given to their motion by the fluid immediately furrounding

them;