finitude in general, which finds expression in the principle, Omnis determinatio negatio est. Spinoza, subject as he is in large measure to this principle, suggests the deeper truth, namely, that the finite, instead of merely negating, realises the infinite, that the perseverare in esse suo of the finite is also the 'perseverance' of the infinite in its proper being. And we have found that, in the moral life as we know it, the finite principle of individuality does not contradict the infinite principle of personality. Why, in the future more than in the present, should the one contradict the other? (2) The objection rests upon a confusion of moral with intellectual unity and identity. The ethical unity, which consists in identity of will, implies, we have seen, a real independence of will; apart from such independence, there could be no surrender of the finite will to the infinite. The maintenance of the ethical relation between God and man implies, therefore, the persistence of the human will or self, in the future as in the present. The dissolution of this would mean the dissolution of the ethical life itself, and the grounds on which we refuse to accept this have already been sufficiently indicated. Our origin and our destiny are one; it is because we come from God that we must go to him, and can only rest in fellowship with him who is the Father of our spirits. That fellowship-the fellowship of will with Will-in the present is our best pledge of its continuance in the future. The fellowship with the Eternal cannot but be eternal, and such fellowship is of the very essence of the moral life. God is the Home of his children's spirits, and he would not be God if he banished any from his presence; nor would man be man if he could reconcile himself to the thought of such an exile. LITERATURE. Plato, Phado, Apology, 40-42; Republic, x. 608-621; Meno, 81; Phædrus, 245. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason (Abbott's trans.), bk. ii. Fichte, The Vocation of Man, bk. iii. (Smith's trans. of Fichte's Popular Works). J. Martineau, A Study of Religion, bk. iv. A. C. Fraser, Philosophy of Theism (Gifford Lectures), Second Series, Lecture x. J. Fiske, The Destiny of Man. G. A. Gordon, Immortality and the New Theodicy. INDEX Abstinence, 244. Adams, H. C., quoted, 306. Altruism, of modern Hedonism, 22, Amiel, referred to, 61. Anthropocentric standpoint of Anthropomorphism, 430. tivity, 143; the mean, 153, Arnold, Matthew, quoted, 4, 168, Asceticism, 147, 161, 167, 189, Automaton theory, Herbartian, 48, Bain, A., on 380; Kantian, 203. Aristotle, his view of ethics, its. 208; Baldwin, J. ethics, 28 note, 3. 304, 321; its relation to on the sovereignty of pleasure Coercion, political, 290. Capitalism, 285, 330. Common-sense and ethics, 36. Conduct, what is meant by, 4; Conscientiousness, 215. Continuity, of moral life, 53; of Controls, Spencer's theory of, 102. Cosmic process, 95, 406. Carlyle, 229, 257; quoted, 252 Cudworth, 171. note. Cave, Plato's, 254, 256. Character, and nature, 49; fixity of, 54; hedonistic view of, criti- Charity, 274, 332. Culture, 240, 247; physical, 249; Custom, 215. Cynics, the, 145, 154, 311. Choice, 46; dynamical and teleo- Cyrenaics, the, 83, 190. logical aspects of, 116. Church, the, 283, 346; and State, Citizenship, Greek, 16, 282, 334; Clough, A. H., quoted, 234. D'Arcy, C. F., 33 note, 439. |