some similitude to it, either in its nature, or in the sound of the word by which it is expressed; or that hath some relation to it, either in time or place: and then, by recalling this, which is easily remembered, you will (by that concatenation or connection of ideas which Mr. Locke takes notice of) draw in that which is thus linked or joined with it; which otherwise you might hunt after in vain. This rule is of excellent use to help you to remember names.

6. What you are determined to remember, think of before you go to sleep at night, and the first thing in the morning, when the faculties are fresh: and recollect, at evening, every thing worth remembering the day past.

7. Think it not enough to furnish this storehouse of the mind with good thoughts; but lay them up there in order, digested or ranged under proper subjects or classes; that, whatever subject you have occasion to think or talk upon, you may have re. course immediately to a good thought, which you heretofore laid up there under that subject, so that the very mention of the subject may bring the thought to hand; by which means you will carry a regular common place book in your memory. And it may not be amiss, sometimes, to take an inventory of this mental furniture, and recollect how many good thoughts you have there treasured up under such particular subjects, and whence you

had them.

Lastly, Nothing helps the memory more than often thinking, writing, or talking, on those subjects you would remember. But enough of this.

CHAPTER XVI.

Concerning the mental taste.

XV. AMAN that knows himself, is sensible of, and attentive to, the particular taste of his mind, especially in matters of religion.'

As the late Mr. Howe judiciously observes, there is, beside bare understanding and judgment, and diverse from that heavenly gift, which, in the Scripture, is called grace, such a thing as gust and relish belonging to the mind of man, (and. I doubt not, with all men, if they observe themselves) and which are as unaccountable, and as various, as the relishes and disgusts of sense. This they only won. der at who understand not themselves, or will consider nobody but themselves. So that it cannot be said, universally, that it is a better judgment, or more grace, that determines men the one way or the other; but somewhat in the temper of their minds distinct from both, which I know not how better to express than by mental taste; and this hath no more of mystery in it, than that there is such a thing be. longing to our natures as complacency and dis. placency in reference to the objects of the mind. And this, in the kind of it, is as common to men as human nature; but as much diversified in indivi duals as men's other inclinations are.'

Now this different taste in matters relating to religion, (though it may be sometimes natural, or what is born with a man, yet) generally arises from the difference of education and custom. And the true reason why some persons have an inveterate disrelish to certain circumstantials of religion, though ever so justifiable, and at the same time a fixed esteem for others, that are more exceptionable, may be no better than what I have heard some very honestly profess, viz, that the one they have been used

to, and the other not. As a person, by long use and habit, acquires a greater relish for coarse and unwholesome food, than the most delicate diet; so a person long habituated to a set of phrases, notions, and modes, may, by degrees, come to have such a veneration and esteem for them, as to despise and condemn others which they have not been accustomed to, though perhaps more edifying and more agreeable to Scripture and reason.

This particular taste in matters of religion differs very much (as Mr. Howe well observes) both from judgment and grace.

However, it is often mistaken for both. When it is mistaken for the former, it leads to error; when mistaken for the latter, to censoriousness.

This different taste of mental objects is much the same with that which, with regard to the objects of sense, we call fancy; for, as one man cannot be said to have a better judgment in food than another, purely because he likes some kind of meats better than he; so neither can he be said to have a better judgment in matters of religion, purely because he hath a greater fondness for some particular doctrines and forms.

But though this mental taste be not the same as the judgment, yet it often draws the judgment to it, and sometimes very much perverts it.

This appears in nothing more evidently than in the judgment people pass upon the sermons they hear. Some are best pleased with those discourses that are pathetic and warming, others with what is more solid and rational, and others with the sublime and mystical. Nothing can be too plain for the taste of some, or too refined for that of others. Some are for having the address only to their reason and understanding, others only to their affections and passions, and others to their experience and consciences. And every hearer or reader is apt to judge according to his particular taste, and to esteem him the best preacher or writer who

pleases him most; without examining, first, his own particular taste, by which he judgeth.

It is natural, indeed, for every one to desire to have his own taste pleased; but it is unreasonable in him to set it up as the best, and make it a test and standard to others: but much more unreasonable to expect, that he, who speaks in public, should always speak to his taste which might as reason. ably be expected by another of a different taste. But it can no more be expected, that what is delivered to a multitude of hearers should alike suit all their tastes, than that a single dish, though pre. pared with ever so much art and exactness, should equally please a great variety of appetites; among which there may be some perhaps very nice and sickly.

It is the preacher's duty to adapt his subjects to the taste of his hearers, as far as fidelity and conscience will admit; because it is well known, from reason and experience, as well as from the advice and practice of the apostle Paul, that this is the best way to promote their edification. But if their taste be totally vitiated, and incline them to take in that which will do them more harm than good, and to relish poison more than food, the most charitable thing the preacher can do in that case is, to endea. vour to correct so vicious an appetite, which loathes that which is most wholesome, and craves that which is pernicious. This, I say, it is his duty to attempt in the most gentle and prudent manner he can, though he run the risk of having his judgment or orthodoxy called into question by them, as it very possibly may; for, commonly, they are the most arbitrary and unmerciful judges in this case, who are the least able to judge.

There is not, perhaps, a more unaccountable weakness in human nature than this, that, with regard to religious matters, our animosities are generally greatest where our differences are least; they; who come pretty near to our standard, but stop

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short there, are more the object of our disgust aud censure, than they who continue at the greatest distance from it; and it requires the greatest know. ledge and command of our temper to get over this weakness. To whatever secret spring in the human mind it may be owing, I shall not stay to enquire; but the thing itself is too obvious not to be taken notice of.

Now, we should, all of us, be careful to find out and examine our proper taste of religious things; that, if it be a false one, we may rectify it; if a bad one, mend it; if a right and good one, strengthen and improve it. For the mind is capable of a false taste, as well as the palate, and comes by it the same way, viz. by being long used to unnatural relishes, which, by custom, become grateful. And having found out what it is, and examined it by the test of Scripture, reason, and conscience, if it be not very wrong, let us indulge it, and read those. books that are most suited to it, which, for that reason, will be most edifying. But, at the same. time, let us take care of two things; 1. That it do not bias our judgment, and draw us into error. 2. That it do not cramp our charity, and lead us to censoriousness.

CHAPTER XVII.

Of our great and governing views in life.

XVI. ANOTHER part of self-knowledge is, to

to know what are the great ends for

which we live.'

We must consider what is the ultimate scope we drive at, the general maxims and principles we live by, or whether we have not yet determined our end,

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