CHAPTER V..

OF IDEAS OF TRUTH.

word truth, as applied to art, signifies the faithful either to the mind or senses, of any fact of nature.

We receive an idea of truth, then, when we th" perceive the faithfulness of such a statement.

of

art.

The difference between ideas of truth and of lies chiefly in the following points.

Eer

ita

First, Imitation can only be of something material, but truth has reference to statements both of the qualities of material things, and of impressions, and thoughts. There is a moral as well l truth,-a truth of impression as well as of form,— t as well as of matter; and the truth of impression ght is a thousand times the more important of the two. uth is a term of universal application, but imitation is that narrow field of art which takes cognizance only al things.

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Secondly, Truth may be stated by any signs or symbols which have a definite signification in the those to whom they are addressed, although such signs lves no image nor likeness of anything. Whatever in the mind the conception of certain facts, can give ruth, though it be in no degree the imitation or ree of those facts. If there be-we do not say there is here be in painting anything which operates, as words y resembling anything, but by being taken as a symsubstitute for it, and thus inducing the effect of it, channel of communication can convey uncorrupted ough it do not in any degree resemble the facts whose n it induces. But ideas of imitation, of course, relikeness of the object. They speak to the perceptive only truth to the conceptive.

Thirdly,-And in consequence of what is above stated, an idea of truth exists in the statement of one attribute of any§ 4. Third differ- thing, but an idea of imitation requires the resemblance of as many attributes as we are usually

ence.

cognizant of in its real presence. A pencil outline of the bough of a tree on white paper is a statement of a certain number of facts of form. It does not yet amount to the imitation of anything. The idea of that form is not given in nature by lines at all, still less by black lines with a white space between them. But those lines convey to the mind a distinct impression of a certain number of facts, which it recognizes as agreeable with its previous impressions of the bough of a tree; and it receives, therefore, an idea of truth. If, instead of two lines, we give a dark form with the brush, we convey information of a certain relation of shade between the bough and sky, recognizable for another idea of truth; but we have still no imitation, for the white paper is not the least like air, nor the black shadow like wood. It is not until after a certain number of ideas of truth have been collected together, that we arrive at an idea of imitation.

§ 5. No accurate truths necessary to imitation.

Hence it might at first sight appear, that an idea of imitation, inasmuch as several ideas of truth were united in it, was nobler than a simple idea of truth. And if it were necessary that the ideas of truth should be perfect, or should be subjects of contemplation as such, it would be so. But, observe, we require to produce the effect of imitation only so many and such ideas of truth as the senses are usually cognizant of. Now the senses are not usually, nor unless they be especially devoted to the service, cognizant, with accuracy, of any truths but those of space and projection. It requires long study and attention before they give certain evidence of even the simplest truths of form. For instance, the quay on which the figure is sitting, with his hand at his eyes, in Claude's seaport, No. 14, in the National Gallery, is egregiously out of perspective. The eye of this artist, with all his study, had thus not acquired the power of taking cognizance of the apparent form even of a simple parallelopiped. How much less of the complicated forms of boughs, leaves, or

mos? A form is nec

called a tru

grees of tru approach instantly off tinguishing deceptive in If we were t eernment of falsehood: h truth of colo men's minds. Hesh unbroke

the real and

defed and c

poses of imita and certainly and if these form and col plete. I wou out of its pla

articulation, a blances of tru

dace deceptio discerning pu deavoring to efable expres amateur came

French pictur little inclined

suffered from gradually incre

-Titian never

highly probabl

my ear. "Pa

de plus beau !

That particular

Ithough, therefore, something resembling the real cessary to deception, this something is not to be th of form; for, strictly speaking, there are no deuth, there are only degrees of approach to it; and h to it, whose feebleness and imperfection would fend and give pain to a mind really capable of disI truth, is yet quite sufficient for all the purposes of magination. It is the same with regard to color. to paint a tree sky-blue, or a dog rose-pink, the disof the public would be keen enough to discover the but, so that there be just so much approach to lor as may come up to the common idea of it in 1s, that is to say, if the trees be all bright green, and ken buff, and ground unbroken brown, though all d refined truths of color be wholly omitted, or rather contradicted, there is yet quite enough for all purnitation. The only facts then, which we are usually aly cognizant of, are those of distance and projection, se be tolerably given, with something like truth of color to assist them, the idea of imitation is comvould undertake to paint an arm, with every muscle place, and every bone of false form and dislocated n, and yet to observe certain coarse and broad resemtrue outline, which, with careful shading, would inption, and draw down the praise and delight of the public. The other day at Bruges, while I was ento set down in my note-book something of the inression of the Madonna in the cathedral, a French ame up to me, to inquire if I had seen the modern tures in a neighboring church. I had not, but felt ned to leave my marble for all the canvas that ever 'om French brushes. My apathy was attacked with ncreasing energy of praise. Rubens never executed ever colored anything like them. I thought this bable, and still sat quiet. The voice continued at 'Parbleu, Monsieur, Michel Ange n'a rien produit.

"De plus beau ?" repeated I, wishing to know cular excellences of Michael Angelo were to be in

timated by this expression.

"Monsieur, on ne peut plus-c'est

un tableau admirable-inconcevable: Monsieur," said the Frenchman, lifting up his hands to heaven, as he concentrated in one conclusive and overwhelming proposition the qualities which were to outshine Rubens and overpower Buonaroti -"Monsieur, IL SORT!"

This gentleman could only perceive two truths-flesh color and projection. These constituted his notion of the perfection of painting; because they unite all that is necessary for deception. He was not therefore cognizant of many ideas of truth, though perfectly cognizant of ideas of imitation.

§ 6. Ideas of

sistent with ideas of imitation.

We shall see, in the course of our investigation truth are incon- of ideas of truth, that ideas of imitation not only do not imply their presence, but even are inconsistent with it; and that pictures which imitate so as to deceive, are never true. But this is not the place for the proof of this; at present we have only to insist on the last and greatest distinction between ideas of truth and of imitation-that the mind, in receiving one of the former, dwells upon its own conception of the fact, or form, or feeling stated, and is occupied only with the qualities and character of that fact or form, considering it as real and existing, being all the while totally regardless of the signs or symbols by which the notion of it has been conveyed. These signs have no pretence, nor hypocrisy, nor legerdemain. about them;-there is nothing to be found out, or sifted, or surprised in them;-they bear their message simply and clearly, and it is that message which the mind takes from them and dwells upon, regardless of the language in which it is delivered. But the mind, in receiving an idea of imitation, is wholly occupied in finding out that what has been suggested to it is not what it appears to be it does not dwell on the suggestion, but on the perception that it is a false suggestion: it derives its pleasure, not from the contemplation of a truth, but from the discovery of a falsehood. So that the moment ideas of truth are grouped together, so as to give rise to an idea of imitation, they change their very nature-lose their essence as ideas of truthand are corrupted and degraded, so as to share in the treachery of what they have produced. Hence, finally, ideas of truth are

:

the foundat art. We sha fter the in former: bu

which we sh deceives by

he beautiful

lation, and ideas of imitation the destruction, of all shall be better able to appreciate their relative dignity investigation which we propose of the functions of the but we may as well now express the conclusion to shall then be led-that no picture can be good which y its imitation, for the very reason that nothing can ul which is not true.