if you ask him apart, tell you the shape of his nose or the height of his forehead; and every one could tell nature herself from an imitation; why not then, it will be asked, what is like her from what is not? For this simple reason, that we constantly recognize things by their least important attributes, and by help of very few of those, and if these attributes exist not in the imitation, though there may be thousands of others far higher and more valuable, yet if those be wanting, or imperfectly rendered, by which we are accustomed to recognize the object, we deny the likeness; while if these be given, though all the great and valuable and important attributes may be wanting, we affirm the likeness. Recognition is no proof of real and intrinsic resemblance. We recognize our books by their bindings, though the true and essential characteristics lie inside. A man is known to his dog by the smell-to his tailor by the coat to his friend by the smile each of these know him, but how little, or how much, depends on the dignity of the intelligence. That which is truly and indeed characteristic of the man, is known only to God. One portrait of a man may possess exact accuracy of feature, and no atom of expression; it may be, to use the ordinary terms of admiration bestowed on such portraits by those whom they please, "as like as it can stare." Everybody, down to his cat, would know this. Another por trait may have neglected or misrepresented the features, but may have given the flash of the eye, and the peculiar radiance of the lip, seen on him only in his hours of highest mental excitement. None but his friends would know this. Another may have given none of his ordinary expressions, but one which he wore in the most excited instant of his life, when all his secret passions and all his highest powers were brought into play at once. None but those who had then seen him might recognize this as like. But which would be the most truthful portrait of the man? The first gives the accidents of body-the sport of climate, and food, and time-which corruption inhabits, and the worm waits for. The second gives the stamp of the soul upon the flesh; but it is the soul seen in the emotions which it shares with many-which may not be characteristic of its essence the results of habit, and education, and accident-a gloze, whether purposely worn or unconsciously assumed, per e totall con hidde d all pet foam of allowed call and de being th tion cou hich God ad the mys it is with an; but he d without es are on the spirit in all be like power. It is gh operatio stening the ding to the the power of t ly contrary to all that is rooted and real in the mind. aceals. The third has caught the trace of all that was en and most mighty, when all hypocrisy, and all habit, etty and passing emotion-the ice, and the bank, and of the immortal river-were shivered, and broken, and up in the awakening of its inward strength; when id claim of some divine motive had brought into visithose latent forces and feelings which the spirit's own ›uld not summon, nor its consciousness comprehend; 1 only knew, and God only could awaken, the depth ystery of its peculiar and separating attributes. And h external Nature: she has a body and a soul like her soul is the Deity. It is possible to represent the out the spirit; and this shall be like to those whose only cognizant of body. It is possible to represent n its ordinary and inferior manifestations; and this e to those who have not watched for its moments of is possible to represent the spirit in its secret and tions; and this shall be like only to those to whose they have been revealed. All these are truth; but acthe dignity of the truths he can represent or feel, is of the painter,-the justice of the judge. CHAPTER III. THAT OF THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF TRUTHS-FIRST, ERAL ONES. I HAVE in the last chapter affirmed that we usually recognize objects by their least essential characteristics. This very naturally excites the inquiry what I consider their important $1. Necessity of characteristics, and why I call one truth more imAnd this question must portant than another. determining the relative importance of truths. be immediately determined, because it is evident, that in judging of the truth of painters, we shall have to consider not only the accuracy with which individual truths are given, but the relative importance of the truths themselves; for as it constantly happens that the powers of art are unable to render all truths, that artist must be considered the most truthful who has preserved the most important at the expense of the most trifling. Now if we are to begin our investigation in of the aphorism: Aristotle's way, and look at the pairóμɛva of the §2. Misapplication "General truths than particular ones. " ant than prior subject, we shall immediately stumble over a maxim which is in everybody's mouth, and which, as it is understood in practice, is true and useful, as it is usually applied in argument, false and misleading. "General truths are more important than particular ones." Often, when in conversation, I have been praising Turner for his perpetual variety, and for giving so particular and separate a character to each of his compositions, that the mind of the painter can only be estimated by seeing all that he has ever done, and that nothing can be prophesied of a picture coming into existence on his easel, but that it will be totally different in idea from all that he has ever done before; and when I have opposed this inexhaustible knowledge or imagination, whichever it may be, to the eness of explana ual repetition of some half-dozen conceptions by Claude oussin, I have been met by the formidable objection, ated with much dignity and self-satisfaction on the part antagonist-" That is not painting general truths, that is painting particular truths." Now there must m taken be something wrong in that application of a principle which would make the variety and abunwhich we look for as the greatest sign of intellect in the the greatest sign of error in the painter; and we shall ngly see, by an application of it to other matters, that, without limitation, the whole proposition is utterly false. stance, Mrs. Jameson somewhere mentions the exclaof a lady of her acquaintance, more desirous to fill a n conversation than abundant in sources of observation : t an excellent book the Bible is !" This was a very truth indeed, a truth predicable of the Bible in comith many other books, but it certainly is neither striking portant. Had the lady exclaimed—“ How evidently is le a divine revelation !" she would have expressed a partruth, one predicable of the Bible only; but certainly e interesting and important. Had she, on the contrary, ed us that the Bible was a book, she would have been re general, and still less entertaining. If I ask any one mebody else is, and receive for answer that he is a man, ttle satisfaction for my pains; but if I am told that he is ac Newton, I immediately thank my neighbor for his information. The fact is, and the above instances in the may serve at once to prove it if it be not self-evie pred- dent, that generality gives importance to the sub ality Darticu ject, and limitation or particularity to the prediIf I say that such and such a man in China is an opiumsay nothing very interesting, because my subject (such is particular. If I say that all men in China are opium[ say something interesting, because my subject (all men) al. If I say that all men in China eat, I say nothing ing, because my predicate (eat) is general. If I say that in China eat opium, I say something interesting, because licate (eat opium) is particular. y almost everything which (with reference to a given sub ject) a painter has to ask himself whether he shall represent or not, is a predicate. Hence in art, particular truths are usually more important than general ones. How is it then that anything so plain as this should be contradicted by one of the most universally received aphorisms respecting art? A little reflection will show us under what limitations this maxim may be true in practice. 5. The impor It is self-evident that when we are painting or tance of truths describing anything, those truths must be the most of species is not owing to their important which are most characteristic of what is generality. to be told or represented. Now that which is first and most broadly characteristic of a thing, is that which distinguishes its genus, or which makes it what it is. For instance, that which makes drapery be drapery, is not its being made of silk or worsted or flax, for things are made of all these which are not drapery, but the ideas peculiar to drapery; the properties which, when inherent in a thing, make it drapery, are extension, non-elastic flexibility, unity and comparative thinness. Everything which has these properties, a waterfall, for instance, if united and extended, or a net of weeds over a wall, is drapery, as much as silk or woollen stuff is. So that these ideas separate drapery in our minds from everything else; they are peculiarly characteristic of it, and therefore are the most important group of ideas connected with it; and so with everything else, that which makes the thing what it is, is the most important idea, or group of ideas connected with the thing. But as this idea must necessarily be common to all individuals of the species it belongs to, it is a general idea with respect to that species; while other ideas, which are not characteristic of the species, and are therefore in reality general, (as black or white are terms applicable to more things than drapery,) are yet particular with respect to that species, being predicable only of certain individuals of it. Hence it is carelessly and falsely said, that general ideas are more important than particular ones; carelessly and falsely, I say, because the so-called general idea is important, not because it is common to all the individuals of that species, but because it separates that species from everything else. It is the distinctiveness, not the universality of the truth, which renders it important. And the so called pa predicable things out f& All truths able as they characteristic. they se secondaril from one portant id separate th of that spe the whole but the pa happen to into which not only o ticity, etc.. case immed tant and n long-nosed tinguish hi but the imp developmen him as man qualities wh Thich make 17. Otherwise irathe of species are valuable, because beautiful. there are oth to the ordina general, and mean the in which it is n just be notice rather than t erties which are the perfe |