tyrants of the village, by whose presence all freedom of speech and action will be taken away.

Sir, I shall be told that these are imaginary evils; but I hold to this maxim, that power was never given, (of this kind especially,) but it was exercised; nor ever exercised, but it was finally abused. We must not be amused with handsome probabilities; but we must be assured that we are in no danger, and that this Congress could not distress us, if they were ever so much disposed.

To pay the debts, &c.

These words, sir, I confess, are an ornament to the page, and very musical words; but they are too general to be understood as any kind of limitation of the power of Congress, and not very easy to be understood at all. When Congress have the purse, they are not confined to rigid economy; and the word debts, here, is not confined to debts already contracted; or, indeed, if it were, the term "general welfare" might be applied to any expenditure whatever. Or, if it could not, who shall dare to gainsay the proceedings of this body at a future day, when, according to the course of nature, it shall be too firmly fixed in the saddle to be overthrown by any thing but a general insurrection? — an event not to be expected, considering the extent of this continent; and, if it were to be expected, a sufficient reason in itself for rejecting this or any constitution that would tend to produce it.

This clause, sir, contains the very sinews of the Constitution. And I hope the universality of it may be singular; but it may be easily seen, that it tends to produce, in time, as universal powers in every other respect. As the poverty of individuals prevents luxury, so the poverty of public bodies, whether sole or aggregate, prevents tyranny. A nation cannot, perhaps, do a more politic thing than to supply the purse of its sovereign with that parsimony which results from a sense of the labor it costs, and so to compel him to comply with the genius of his people, and to conform to their situation, whether he will or not. How different will be our conduct, if we give the entire disposal of our property to a body as yet almost unknown in theory, in practice quite heterogeneous in its composition, and whose maxims are yet entirely unknown!

Sir, I wish the gentlemen who so ably advocate this in

strument would enlarge upon this formidable clause; and I most sincerely wish that the effect of their reasoning may be my conviction. For, sir, I will not dishonor my constituents, by supposing that they expect me to resist that which is irresistible the force of reason. No, sir; my constituents wish for a firm, efficient Continental government, but fear the operation of this which is now proposed. Let them be convinced that their fears are groundless, and I venture to declare in their name, that no town in the commonwealth will sooner approve the form, or be better subjects under it. Mr. JONES (of Boston) enlarged on the various checks which the Constitution provides, and which, he said, formed a security for liberty, and prevention against power being abused; the frequency of elections of the democratic branch; representation apportioned to numbers; the publication of the journals of Congress, &c. Gentlemen, he said, had compared the people of this country to those of Rome; but, he observed, the comparison was very erroneous: the Romans were divided into two classes, the nobility and plebeians; the nobility kept all kinds of knowledge to their own class; and the plebeians were, in general, very ignorant, and when unemployed, in time of peace, were ever ready for revolt, and to follow the dictates of any designing patrician. But, continued the worthy gentleman, the people of the United States are an enlightened, well-informed people, and are, therefore, not easily imposed on by designing men. Our right of representation, concluded Mr. J., is much more just and equitable than the boasted one of Great Britain, whose representatives are chosen by corporations or boroughs, and those boroughs, in general, are the property, or at the disposal, of the nobility and rich gentry of the kingdom.

[The vice-president having informed the Convention, in the forenoon, that he had received a long letter from the Hon. Mr. Gerry, the same was read as soon as the Convention proceeded to business in the afternoon. When the vicepresident had read the letter, Mr. Gore rose, and objected to the reading a state of facts respecting the construction of the Senate in the federal Convention, which accompanied the letter; not, he said, "from a wish to preclude information from his own mind, or from the minds of the Convention, but from his duty to his constituents, and the desire he had to guard against infringements on the orders of the

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Convention." Mr. Gore was interrupted, as being out of order, but was proceeding on his objection, when the Hon. Judge Dana begged Mr. Gore's leave to say a few words. which he did; after which he retired from the Convention, until the consideration of the letter should be gone through with.]

WEDNESDAY, January 23.- Mr. PIERCE rose, he said, to make a few observations on the powers of Congress, in this section.

Gentlemen, he said, in different parts of the house, (Messrs. Dalton, Phillips, and Gore,) had agreed that Congress will not lay direct taxes, except in cases of war; for that, to defray the exigencies of peace, the impost and excise would be sufficient; and, as that mode of taxation would be the most expedient and productive, it would undoubtedly be adopted. But it was necessary Congress should have power to lay direct taxes at all times, although they will not use it, because, when our enemies find they have sufficient powers to call forth all the resources of the people, it will prevent their making war, as they otherwise would. As the Hon. Mr. Phillips used this proverb, "A stitch in time will save nine," his meaning, I suppose, was, that we should have war nine times, if Congress had not such powers, where we should once if they had such powers. But these arguments to me are not conclusive; for, if our enemies know they do not use such powers except in a war, although granted to them, what will be the difference if they have the powers only in the time of war? But, Mr. President, if Congress have the powers of direct taxes, in the manner prescribed in this section, I fear we shall have that mode of taxation adopted, in preference to imposts and excises; and the reasons of my fears are these: When the impost was granted to Congress in this state, I, then being a member of court, well remember the gentlemen in trade, almost with one consent, agreed that it was an unequal tax, bearing hard on them; for, although it finally was a tax on the consumer, yet, in the first instance, it was paid by persons in trade; and also that they consumed more than the landed interest of dutied articles; and nothing but necessity induced them to submit to grant said impost, as that was the only way Congress could collect money to pay the foreign debt, under the regulations they were then under; and I fear part of this

state's members in Congress, when this Constitution is adopted, will resume their own opinion, when they can lay direct taxes; and, as Rhode Island has always been against an impost, and as they have an equal representation in the Senate, and part of Connecticut will be interested with them, and the Southern States having no manufactures of their own, and consuming much more foreign articles than the Northern, it appears to me, we are not certain of availing ourselves of an impost, if we give Congress power to levy and collect direct taxes in time of peace.

While I am up, Mr. President, I would make some observations on what has been passed over, as I think it is within the orders of the house. The Hon. Mr. Sedgwick said, if I understood him right, that, if he thought that this Constitution consolidated the union of the states, he should be the last man that should vote for it; but I take his meaning to be this, according to the reasoning of Mr. Ames that it is not a consolidation of the Union, because there are three branches in the Union; and therefore it is not a consolidation of the Union; but, sir, I think I cannot conceive of a sovereignty of power existing within a sovereign power, nor do I wish any thing in this Constitution to prevent Congress being sovereign in matters belonging to their jurisdiction; for I have seen the necessity of their powers in almost all the instances that have been mentioned in this Convention; and also, last winter, in the rebellion, I thought it would be better for Congress to have stilled the people, rather than the people from amongst themselves, who are more apt to be governed by temper than others, as it appeared to me we were, in the disqualifying act, as, in my opinion, we then did not keep strictly to our own constitution; and I believe such a superior power ought to be in Congress. But I would have it distinctly bounded, that every one may know the utmost limits of it; and I have some doubts on my mind, as to those limits, which I wish to have solved. I have also an objection as to the term for which the Senate are to be in office; for, as the democratical branch of the federal legislature is to continue in office two years, and they are the only check on the federal, and they, the Senate, to continue in office six years, they will have an undue influence on the democratic branch; and I think they ought not to continue in office for a longer time

than the other; and also, that, if they conduct ill, we may have a constitutional revolution in as short a period as two years, if needed. The Hon. Mr. King said, some days past, that the Senate going out by classes, if rightly considered, were not for but four years; because one third part was never more than six, another four, and a third two; therefore the medium was four; but I think that way of arguing would argue, that if they were all to go out at the end of six years, that they were but three years in office; because half their time they were under the age of three years, and the other half over the age of three years in office; therefore his arguing to me in that respect was not well founded.

Col. VARNUM, in answer to an inquiry, why a bill of rights was not annexed to this Constitution, said, that, by the constitution of Massachusetts, the legislature have a right to make all laws not repugnant to the Constitution. Now, said he, if there is such a clause in the Constitution under consideration, then there would be a necessity for a bill of rights. In the section under debate, Congress have an expressed power to levy taxes, &c., and to pass laws to carry their requisitions into execution: this, he said, was express, and required no bill of rights. After stating the difference between delegated power and the grant of all power, except in certain cases, the colonel proceeded to controvert the idea that this Constitution went to a consolidation of the Union. He said it was only a consolidation of strength, and that it was apparent Congress had no right to alter the internal relations of a state. The design in amending the Confederation, he said, was to remedy its defects. It was the interest of the whole to confederate against a foreign enemy, and each was bound to exert its utmost ability to oppose that enemy; but it had been done at our expense in a great measure, and there was no way to provide for a remedy, because Congress had not the power to call forth the resources of every state, nor to coerce delinquent states. But under the proposed government, those states which will not comply with equal requisitions, will be coerced; and this, he said, is a glorious provision. In the late war, said the colonel, the states of New Hampshire and Massachusetts, for two or three years, had in the field half the Continental army under General Washington. Who paid those troops? The states which raised them were called