think we ought to contribute more than we do, to the alleviation of her burthens.

WHATEVER may be said of these proposals on either side of the Atlantic, this is not a time, either for timidity or rashness. We perfectly know, that the great cause now agitated, is to be conducted to a happy conclusion, only by that well tempered composition of counsels, which firmness, prudence, loyalty to our sovereign, respect to our parent state, and affection to our native country, united must form.

By such a compact, Great-Britain will secure every benefit, that the parliamentary wisdom of ages has thought proper to attach to her. From ber alone we shall continue to receive manufactures. To her alone we shall continue to carry the vast multitude of enumerated articles of commerce, the exportation of which, her policy has thought fit to confine to herself. With such parts of the world only, as she has appointed us to deal, we shall continue to deal; and such commodities only, as she has permited us to bring from them, we shall continue to bring. The executive and controuling powers of the crown will retain their present full force and operation. We shall contentedly labour for her as affectionate friends,

in time of tranquility; and cheerfully spend for her, as dutiful children, our treasure and our blood, in time of war. She will receive a certain income * from us, without the trouble or expence of collecting it—without being constantly disturbed by complaints of grievances, which she cannot justify, and will not redress. In case of war, or in any

* The train of officers, employed by Great-Britain, consume a very large part of what she takes from us. She therefore increases our distresses to make up for that consumption. They will hereafter grow more and more oppressive, we more and more uneasy, she more and more disturbed. We could raise the same sum in a much more easy, equal, and cheap manner, than she can do. The attention of small states extends much more efficaciously and beneficially to every part of the territories, than that of the administration of a vast empire. The representatives in assembly, who are taxed, when the people are taxed, and accountable to them, will have double motives to take care, that the raising and expending money is managed in the best way. The house of commons would not bear to examine every particular relating to the just taxation of every county on this continent, and to settle all the accounts fairly. If they could go through the immense labour, it would be impossible for them to do any other business. In short, by not doing it, they would be unjust; by doing it, they would be useless. Equity and reason demonstrate, that such a power belongs not to them. We have had remarkable instances on this continent some few years ago, of the crown being according to all the forms of business charged with articles, that never went to the use of the crown. These were perquisites, and who could be so puritanical as to blame the civil word. It is said, our barracks cost about £.8000 of this money—and that the barracks at another place, not deserving a comparison with ours, cost £.40,000 sterling. We built our own, ourselves, and were as saving and careful as we could be, it may be supposed. If money is raised upon us by parliament; of one thousand pounds, taken out of our pockets, not one hundred, in all probability, will be usefully applied to the service of the crown. Deficiencies will ensue they must be supplied-other acts are made-still others-till our h" unrepresented blades of grass," too fre

Speech of Lord Camden. I Blackstone, 270.

emergency of distress to her, we shall also be ready and willing to contribute all aids within our power and we solemnly declare, that on such oc

quently and closely cut down and exposed to the burning heat of an unsetting sun, ever"in its meridian," perish to their deepest roots.'

"There is not upon earth (says the excellent Gordon) a nation, which having had unaccountable magistrates, has not felt them to be crying and consuming mischiefs. In truth, where they are most limited, it has been often as much as a whole people could do to restrain them to their trust, and to keep them from violence; and such frequently has been their propensity to be lawless, that nothing but a violent death could cure them of their violence. Some men will never think they have enough, whilst they can take more; nor be content with a part, when they can seize the whole." i

"That the business of most kingdoms has been ill managed, proceeds from this; it imports the lower rank of men only, and the people (whose cries seldom reach the prince, till it is too late, and till all is past remedy) that matters should be frugally ordered, because taxes must arise from their sweat and labour. But the great ones, who heretofore have had the prince's ear and favour, or who hoped to have him in their possession, were swayed by another sort of interest; they like profusion, as having had a prospect to be gainers by it, they can easily set their account even with the state; a small charge upon their land is more than balanced by a great place, or a large pension."k

See the lord keeper North's account of abuses in the conduct and disposal of the public money in the time of king Charles II.1 Those who, in our times, are the conductors of the same kind of dirty work, may compare the modern ingenious ways and means with those of their worthy predecessors.

Among others, pretended want of money in the treasury, in order to have a pretence for giving an exorbitant price for necessaries.-Lending the crown AT EIGHT PER CENT. money which was raised at five and six. Paying with the public moncy, pretending it to be private, and taking interest. De

i Cato's LET. III. 78. k Daven. II. 262.

1 Dalrymp. MEM. II. 84.

casions, if we or our posterity shall refuse, neglect or decline thus to contribute, it will be a mean and manifest violation of a plain duty, and a weak

Be

preciating the public debts and funds, buying them of the holders at half their worth, and afterwards by interest getting them paid in full. Pretending to give up all power in recommending to places for a consideration, and then insisting on recommending still, and so getting both ways. Rolling over losses upon the crown, or public, while the gain was to sink into private pockets. A father stopping a large sum in his own hand, which was to have been paid the public creditors. fore be can be brought to account, be dies. The money sinks into the pocket of bis heir. He obtains a pardon of all his father's debts. Gross frauds in office found out. Then new officers and salaries set up as checks. The new prove as great knaves as the old, and form a scheme of collusion and mutual understanding. But the public pays for all, and the power of the court is strengthened. An old placeman begs leave to sell. Pockets the money, and by and by, through interest, gets a new place gratis. Extravagant men squander their own money in their public employments of embassadors, governors, &c. and charge the public with more than they have really spent, while what they really spent was ten times more than necessary. The business of old offices transferred to new: but the profits of the old still kept up, though become sinecures. An old servant of the public retires upon a pension. He who succeeds him, by interest, gets it continued to him. Another gets an addition to his salary, and then sells his place for a great deal more than it cost him, and so an additional load is laid on the public: for the addition must be continued, because the place was bought. An annual sum is granted by the public for a public use, as keeping up a harbour, or the like. A private man, by interest, gets a grant of the jobb: the public concern is neglected, and the public pocket picked. Crown lands perpetually begged and given away to strengthen the court interest. The crown constantly kept in debt, and parliament solicited to pay those debts occasioned merely by the voracity of the court. Commanders of fleets order a superfluous quantity of stores. sion between them and the store masters, this superfluous quantity is sold again to the king, and the money sunk in their pockets. Sometimes the store-masters gave receipts for more than was received into the king's stores, and the money was divided among the plunderers. The king's works done by the day, whereas it would

By collu

t

and wicked desertion of the true interests of this province, which ever have been and must be bound up in the prosperity of our mother country. Our union, founded on mutual compacts and mutual

have been cheaper by the great. Money pretended to be coined gratis. Lists of large sums newly coined produced. But the contrivance was to make the pieces unequal, and then the too heavy picces were carried back to the mint, and the profit sunk in private pockets, &c.

Secret service is a huge cloke thrown over an immense scene of corruption; and under this cloke we must not peep. Our court-men tell us, there must be large sums expended in this way, and those sums cannot be accounted for; because the services done for them must never be known.

But we find, that the commons

A. D. 1708 addressed queen Anne for accounts of pensions paid for secret service to members of parliament, or to any persons in trust for them; and that "the queen ordered said account to be laid before the house.”m

It is well known, that

Contracts are a great fund of ministerial influence. our ministry do not accept the most reasonable offer; but the offer which is made by those who have the greatest parliamentary interest; and that in war time, every man, who furnishes for the government, is enriched; in France the contrary; which shews, that we manage our public money much worse than the French ministry do theirs. In the late war it is notorious, that several of our purveyors and commissaries got estates sufficient to set them up for earls and dukes. But as Burnet says, "the regard, that is shewn to members of parliament among us, causes that few abuses can be inquired into, or discovered.

POL. DISQU. book V. page 274-277.

What redress could a poor plundered, unrepresented colony obtain against a Verres, supported by a strong parliamentary influence. We know what several governors of Minorca have dared to do. A governor of Gibraltar has ventured to oppress even the garrison of that important place. The very drudgery of examining accounts, would probably secure him. If cast, the injuries could not be recompensed. A successor might prove as bad-" Victrix provincia plorat." The victorious province weeps.

ni DEB. COM. IV. 119.

n HIST. OWN TIMES, III. 279.