ican people are excluded from competition in the purchase of the monopoly. To all this I say, again, that much of it is assumption without proof; much of it is an argument against that which nobody has maintained or asserted; and the rest of it would be equally strong against any charter, at any time. These objections existed in their full strength, whatever that was, against the first Bank. They existed, in like manner, against the present Bank at its creation, and will always exist against all Banks. Indeed, as to the bill now before us, all the fault found with that is, that it proposes to continue the Bank substantially as it now exists. "All the objectionable principles of the existing corporation," says the message," and most of its odious features, are retained without alleviation;" so that the message is aimed against the Bank, as it has existed from the first, and against any and all others resembling it in its general features.

Allow me, now, Sir, to take notice of an argument founded on the practical operation of the Bank. That argument is this. Little of the stock of the Bank is held in the West, the capital being chiefly owned by citizens of the Southern and Eastern States, and by foreigners. But the Western and South-western States owe the Bank a heavy debt, so heavy that the interest amounts to a million six hundred thousand a year. This interest is carried to the Eastern States, or to Europe, annually, and its payment is a burden on the people of the West, and a drain of their currency, which no country can bear without inconvenience and distress. The true character and the whole value of this argument are manifest by the mere statement of it. The people of the West are, from their situation, necessarily large borrowers. They need money, capital, and they borrow it, because they can derive a benefit from its use, much beyond the interest which they pay. They borrow at six per cent. of the Bank, although the value of money, with them, is at least as high as eight. Nevertheless, although they borrowed at this low rate of interest, and although they use all they borrow thus profitably, yet they cannot pay the interest without "inconvenience and distress; and then, Sir, follows the logical conclusion, that, although they cannot pay even the interest without inconvenience and distress, yet less than four years is ample time for the Bank to call in the whole, both principal and interest, without causing more than a light pressure. This is the argument.

Then follows another, which may he thus stated. It is competent to the States to tax the property of their citizens, vested in the stock of this Bank; but the power is denied of taxing the stock of foreigners: therefore the stock will be worth ten or fifteen per cent. more to foreigners than to residents, and will of course inevitably leave the country, and make the American people debtors

to aliens in nearly the whole amount due the Bank, and send across the Atlantic from two to five millions of specie every year, to pay the Bank dividends. Mr. President, arguments like these might be more readily disposed of, were it not that the high and official source from which they proceed, imposes the necessity of treating them with respect. In the first place, it may safely be denied, that the stock of the Bank is any more valuable to foreigners than our own citizens, or an object of greater desire to them, except in so far as capital may be more abundant in the foreign country, and therefore its owners more in want of opportunity of investment. The foreign stockholder enjoys no exemption from taxation. He is, of course, taxed by his own government for his incomes, derived from this as well as other property; and this is a full answer to the whole statement. But it may be added, in the second place, that it is not the practice of civilized states to tax the property of foreigners under such circumstances. Do we tax, or did we ever tax, the foreign holders of our public debt? Does Pennsylvania, New York, or Ohio, tax the foreign holders of stock in the loans contracted by either of these States? Certainly not. Sir, I must confess, I had little expected to see, on such an occasion as the present, a labored and repeated attempt to produce an impression on the public opinion, unfavorable to the Bank, from the circumstance that foreigners are among its stockholders. I have no hesitation in saying that I deem such a strain of remark as the message contains, on this point, coming from the President of the United States, to be injurious to the credit and character of the country abroad; because it manifests a jealousy, a lurking disposition not to respect the property of foreigners, invited hither by our own laws. And, Sir, what is its tendency but to excite this jealousy, and create groundless prejudices?

From the commencement of the Government, it has been thought desirable to invite, rather than to repel, the introduction of foreign capital. Our stocks have all been open to foreign subscriptions; and the State Banks, in like manner, are free to foreign ownership. Whatever State has created a debt, has been willing that foreigners should become purchasers, and desirous of it. How long is it. Sir, since Congress itself passed a law vesting new powers in the President of the United States over the cities in this district, for the very purpose of increasing their credit abroad, the better to enable them to borrow money to pay their subscriptions to the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal? It is easy to say that there is danger to liberty, danger to independence, in a Bank open to foreign stockholders-because it is easy to say any thing. But neither reason nor experience proves any such danger. The foreign stockholder cannot be a director. He has no voice even in the choice of directors. His money is placed entirely in the management of the directors appointed by the President and Senate and by the

American stockholders. So far as there is dependence, or influence, either way, it is to the disadvantage of the foreign stockholder. He has parted with the control over his own property, instead of exercising control over the property or over the actions of others. And, Sir, let it now be added, in further answer to this whole class of objections, that experience has abundantly confuted them all. This Government has existed forty-three years, and has maintained, in full being and operation, a Bank, such as is now proposed to be renewed, for thirty-six years out of the forty-three. We have never for a moment had a Bank not subject to every one of these objections. Always, foreigners might be stockholders; always, foreign stock has been exempt from State taxation, as much as at present; always, the same power and privileges; always, all that which is now called a "monopoly," a "gratuity," a "present," has been possessed by the Bank. And yet there has been found no danger to liberty, no introduction of foreign influence, and no accumulation of irresponsible power in a few hands. I cannot but hope, therefore, that the people of the United States will not now yield up their judgment to those notions, which would reverse all our best experience, and persuade us to discontinue a useful institution, from the influence of vague and unfounded declamation against its danger to the public liberties. Our liberties, indeed, must stand upon very frail foundations, if the Government cannot, without endangering them, avail itself of those common facilities, in the collection of its revenues, and the management of its finances, which all other Governments, in commercial countries, find useful and necessary.

In order to justify its alarm for the security of our independence, the message supposes a case. It supposes that the Bank should pass principally into the hands of the subjects of a foreign country, and that we should be involved in war with that country, and then it exclaims, "What would be our condition?" Why, Sir, it is plain that all the advantages would be on our side. The Bank would still be our institution, subject to our own laws, and all its directors elected by ourselves; and our means would be enhanced, not by the confiscation and, plunder, but by the proper use of the foreign capital in our hands. And, Sir, it is singular enough, that this very state of war, from which this argument against a Bank is drawn, is the very thing which, more than all others, convinced the country and the Government of the necessity of a National Bank. So much was the want of such an institution felt, in the late war, that the subject engaged the attention of Congress, constantly, from the declaration of that war down to the time when the existing Bank was actually established ; so that, in this respect, as well as in others, the argument of the message is directly opposed to the whole experience of the Gov

ernment, and to the general and long-settled convictions of the country.

I now proceed, Sir, to a few remarks upon the President's Constitutional objections to the Bank; and I cannot forbear to say, in regard to them, that he appears to me to have assumed very extraordinary grounds of reasoning. He denies that the Constitutionality of the Bank is a settled question. If it be not, will it ever become so, or what disputed question ever can be settled? I have already observed, that for thirty-six years, out of the fortythree, during which the Government has been in being, a BANK has existed, such as is now proposed to be continued.

As early as 1791, after great deliberation, the first Bank charter was passed by Congress, and approved by President Washington. It established an institution, resembling, in all things now objected to, the present Bank. That Bank, like this, could take lands in payment of its debts; that charter, like the present, gave the States no power of taxation; it allowed foreigners to hold stock; it restrained Congress from creating other Banks. It gave also exclusive privileges, and in all particulars it was, according to the doctrine of the message, as objectionable as that now existing. That Bank continued twenty years. In 1816, the present institution was established, and has been, ever since, in full operation. Now, Sir, the question of the power of Congress to create such institutions, has been contested in every manner known to our Constitution and laws. The forms of the Government furnish no new mode, in which to try this question. It has been discussed over and over again, in Congress; it has been argued and solemnly adjudged in the Supreme Court; every President, except the present, has considered it a settled question; many of the State Legislatures have instructed their Senators to vote for the Bank; the tribunals of the States, in every instance, have supported its Constitutionality; and, beyond all doubt and dispute, the general public opinion of the country has at all times given, and does now give, its full sanction and approbation to the exercise of this power, as being a Constitutional power. There has been no opinion, questioning the power, expressed or intimated, at any time, by either House of Congress, by any President, or by any respectable judicial tribunal. Now, Sir, if this practice of near forty years; if these repeated exercises of the power; if this solemn adjudication of the Supreme Court, with the concurrence and approbation of public opinion,-do not settle the question, how is any question ever to be settled, about which any one may choose to raise a doubt? The argument of the message, upon the Congressional precedents, is either a bold and gross fallacy, or else it is an assertion without proofs, and against known facts. The message admits, that, in 1791, Congress decided in favor of a

Bank; but it adds that another Congress, in 1811, decided against it. Now, if it be meant that, in 1811, Congress decided against the Bank on Constitutional ground, then the assertion is wholly incorrect, and against notorious fact. It is perfectly well known, that many members, in both Houses, voted against the Bank, in 1811, who had no doubt at all of the Constitutional power of Congress. They were entirely governed by other reasons given at the time. I appeal, Sir, to the honorable member from Maryland (Gen. Smith), who was then a member of the Senate, and voted against the Bank, whether he, and others, who were on the same side, did not give those votes on other well-known grounds, and not at all on the Constitutional ground?

[Gen. Smith here rose, and said, that he voted against the Bank in 1811, but not at all on Constitutional grounds, and had no doubt such was the case with other members.]

We all know, Sir (continued Mr. Webster), the fact to be as the gentleman from Maryland has stated it. Every man who recollects, or who has read, the political occurrences of that day, knows it. Therefore, if the message intends to say that, in 1811, Congress denied the existence of any such Constitutional power, the declaration is unwarranted—is altogether at variance with the facts. If, on the other hand, it only intends to say, that Congress decided against the proposition then before it, on some other grounds, then it alleges that which is nothing at all to the purpose. The argument, then, either assumes for truth that which is not true, or else the whole statement is immaterial and futile. But whatever value others may attach to this argument, the message thinks so highly of it, that it proceeds to repeat it. "One Congress," it says, " in 1815, decided against a Bank; another, in 1816, decided in its favor. There is nothing in precedent, therefore, which, if its authority were admitted, ought to weigh in favor of the act before me." Now, Sir, since it is known to the whole country, one cannot but wonder how it should remain unknown to the President, that Congress did not decide against a Bank in 1815. On the contrary, that very Congress passed a bill for erecting a Bank, by very large majorities. In one form, it is true, the bill failed in the House of Representatives; but the vote was reconsidered, the bill recommitted, and finally passed by a vote of one hundred and twenty to thirty-nine. There is, therefore, not only no solid ground, but not even any plausible pretence, for the assertion that Congress, in 1815, decided against the Bank. That very Congress passed a bill to create a Bank, and its decision, therefore, is precisely the other way, and is a direct practical precedent in favor of the Constitutional power. What are we to think of a Constitutional argument which deals, in this way, with his