which shall only put us on a footing of equality with Great Britain, our enemy."

On the 20th of August, our ministers propose, that the former treaties, so far as they respect the rights of privateers, shall be renewed, but that it shall be optional with the United States, by the payment, within seven years, of three millions of francs, either in money or in securities issued by the French Government for indemnities to our citizens, to buy off this obligation, or to buy off all its political obligations, under both the old treaties, by payments in like manner of five millions of francs.

On the 4th of September, the French ministers submit these propositions :

"A commission shall regulate the indemnities, which either of the two nations may owe to the citizens of the other.

"The indemnities which shall be due by France to the citizens of the United States shall be paid for by the United States, and in return for which France yields the exclusive privilege resulting from the 17th and 22d articles of the treaty of commerce, and from the rights of guaranty of the 11th article of the treaty of alliance."

The American ministers considered these propositions as inadmissible. They, however, on their part, made an approach to them, by proposing in substance, that it should be left optional with the United States, on the exchange of the ratification, to relinquish the indemnities, and in that case, the old treaties not to be obligatory on the United States, so far as they conferred exclusive privileges on France. This will be seen in the letter of the American ministers of the 5th of September.

On the 18th of September, the American ministers say to those of France

"It remains only to consider the expediency of a temporary arrangement. Should such an arrangement comport with the views of France, the following principles are offered as the basis of it :

"1st. The ministers plenipotentiary of the respective parties, not being able at present to agree respecting the former treaties and indemnities, the parties will, in due and convenient time, further treat on those subjects; and until they shall have agreed respecting the same, the said treaties shall have no operation."

This, the Senate will see, is substantially the proposition which was ultimately accepted, and which formed the second article of the treaty. By that article, these claims, on both sides, were post

poned for the present; and afterwards, by other acts of the two Governments, they were mutually and forever renounced and relinquished.

And now, Sir, if any gentleman can look to the treaty, look to the instructions under which it was concluded, look to the correspondence which preceded it, and look to the subsequent agreement of the two Covernments to renounce claims, on both sides, and not admit that the property of these private citizens has been taken to buy off embarrassing claims of France on the Government of the United States, I know not what other or further evidence could ever force that conviction on his mind.

I will conclude this part of the case, by showing you how this matter was understood by the American Administration, which finally accepted the treaty, with this renouncement of indemnities. The treaty was negotiated in the administration of Mr. Adams. It was amended in the Senate, as already stated, and ratified on the third day of February, 1801, Mr. Adams being still in office. Being thus ratified, with the amendment, it was sent back to France, and on the 31st day of July, the First Consul ratified the treaty, as amended, by striking out the second article, but accompanied the ratification with this declaration-" PROVIDED THAT BY THIS RE

TRENCHMENT THE TWO STATES RENOUNCE THEIR RESPECTIVE

PRETENSIONS, WHICH ARE THE OBJECT OF THE SAID ARTICLE.

With this declaration appended, the treaty came back to the United States. Mr. Jefferson had now become President, and Mr. Madison was Secretary of State. In consequence of the declaration of the French Government, accompanying its ratification of the treaty, and now attached to it, Mr. Jefferson again referred the treaty to the Senate, and, on the 19th of December, 1801, the Senate resolved that they considered the treaty as duly ratified. Now, Sir, in order to show what Mr. Jefferson and his administration thought of this treaty, and the effect of its ratification, in its then existing form, I beg leave to read an extract of an official letter from Mr. Madison to Mr. Pinkney, then our minister in Spain. Mr. Pinkney was at that time negotiating for the adjustment of our claims on Spain; and, among others, for captures committed within the territories of Spain, by French subjects. Spain objected to these claims, on the ground that the United States had claimed redress of such injuries from France. In writing to Mr. Pinkney (under date of Feb. 6, 1804), and commenting on this plea of Spain, Mr. Madison says "The plea on which it seems the Spanish Government now principally relies, is the erasure of the second article from our late convention with France, by which France was released from the indemnities due for spoliations committed under her immediate responsibility to the United States.

This plea did not appear in the early objections of Spain to our claims. It was an after-thought, resulting from the insufficiency of every other plea, and is certainly as little valid as any other.

"The injuries for which indemnities are claimed from Spain, though committed by Frenchmen, took place under Spanish authority; Spain therefore is answerable for them. To her we have looked, and continue to look, for redress. If the injuries done to us by her resulted in any manner from injuries done to her by France, she may, if she pleases, resort to France as we resort to her. But whether her resort to France would be just or unjust, is a question between her and France; not between either her and us, or us and France. We claim against her, not against France. In releasing France, therefore, we have not released her. The claims, again, from which France was released, were admitted by France, and the release was for a valuable consideration in a correspondent release of the United States from certain claims on them. claims we make on Spain were never admitted by France, nor made on France by the United States; they made, therefore, no part of the bargain with her, and could not be included in the release."

The

Certainly, Sir, words could not have been used which should more clearly affirm that these individual claims, these private rights of property, had been applied to public uses. Mr. Madison here declares, unequivocally, that these claims had been admitted by France; that they were relinquished by the Government of the United States; that they were relinquished for a valuable consideration; that that consideration was a correspondent release of the United States from certain claims on them; and that the whole transaction was a bargain between the two Governments. This, Sir, be it remembered, was little more than two years after the final promulgation of the treaty; it was by the Secretary of State, under that administration which gave effect to the treaty in its amended form; and it proves beyond mistake, and beyond doubt, the clear judgment which that administration had formed upon the true nature and character of the whole transaction.

I have said nothing, Sir, of the Louisiana treaty, because neither that treaty, nor any thing done under it, affects this question in the slightest degree. Great mistakes, I am aware, have existed on this point. The honorable member from New York (Mr. WRIGHT) candidly acknowledged that he himself had partaken in this misapprehension; but as he, and others who have opposed the bill, admit that the Louisiana treaty is not connected with this subject at all, I will not detain the Senate with remarks upon it. Suffice it to say, that the demands, provided for by that treaty, were only certain debts, arising in contract, or due for detention of vessels by

embargo, and for certain vessels, not condemned at the date of the treaty of 1800, and that none of them arose from illegal captures and condemnations. And the Senate will see, that, to avoid all ambiguity on that point, this bill expressly excludes from its provisions all claims which were paid, in whole or in part, under that treaty.

It only remains to show the reasonableness of the amount which the bill proposes to distribute. And this, it must be admitted, can only be fixed by estimate, and this estimate may be formed in various ways. So far as can be learned from official reports, there are something more than six hundred vessels, with their cargoes, which will be supposed to form claims under this bill. Some of them, it is probable, may not be good claims; but a very great majority of that number will be, no doubt, just and fair cases.

Then, the question is, What may be regarded as a just average value of each vessel and cargo? And this question is answered, in a manner as satisfactory as the nature of the case allows, By ascertaining the average value of vessels and cargoes, for which compensation has been awarded under the treaty with Spain. That average was 16,800 dollars for each vessel and cargo; and, taking the cases coming under this bill to be of the same average value, the whole amount of loss would exceed ten millions of dollars, without interest.

On this estimate, it seems not unreasonable to allow the sum of five millions, in full satisfaction for all claims. There is no ground to suppose that the claimants will receive, out of this sum, a greater rate of indemnity than claimants have received who had claims against Spain, or than other claimants against France, whose claims have not been relinquished, because arising since 1800, will receive, under the provisions of the late French treaty.

Mr. President, I have performed the duty of explaining this case to the Senate, as I understand it. I believe the claims to be as just as were ever presented to any government. I think they constitute an honest and well-founded debt, due by the United States to these claimants-a debt which, I am persuaded, the justice of the Government, and the justice of the country, will, one day, both acknowledge and honorably discharge.

SPEECH

ON THE APPOINTING AND REMOVING POWER, DELIVERED IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, ON THE 16TH OF FEBRUARY, 1835, ON THE PASSAGE OF THE BILL ENTITLED "AN ACT TO REPEAL THE FIRST AND SECOND SECTIONS OF THE ACT TO LIMIT THE TERM OF SERVICE OF CERTAIN OFFICERS THEREIN NAMED."

MR. WEBSTER said, the professed object of this bill was the reduction of executive influence and patronage. I concur (said Mr. Webster) in the propriety of that object. Having no wish to diminish or to control, in the slightest degree, the Constitutional and legal authority of the presidential office, I yet think that the indirect and vastly-increasing influence which it possesses, and which arises from the power of bestowing office, and of taking it away again at pleasure, and from the manner in which that power seems now to be systematically exercised, is productive of serious evils.

The extent of the patronage, springing from this power of appointment and removal, is so great, that it brings a dangerous mass of private and personal interest into operation in all great public elections and public questions. This is a mischief which has reached, already, an alarming height. The principle of republican governments, we are taught, is public virtue; and whatever tends either to corrupt this principle, to debase it, or to weaken its force, tends, in the same degree, to the final overthrow of such governments. Our representative systems suppose, that, in exercising the high right of suffrage, the greatest of all political rights, and in forming opinions on great public measures, men will act conscientiously, under the influence of public principle and patriotic duty; and that, in supporting or opposing men or measures, there will be a general prevalence of honest, intelligent judgment and manly independence. These presumptions lie at the foundation of all hope of maintaining governments entirely popular, Whenever personal, individual, or selfish motives influence the conduct of individuals on public questions, they affect the safety of the whole system. When these motives run deep and wide, and come in serious conflict with higher, purer, and more patriotic purposes, they greatly endanger that system; and all will admit that, if their extent become general and overwhelming, so that all public