of the United States, would, under existing circumstances, be unjust in itself, and could not fail to excite their deepest sensibility."

So, then, Mr. President, we are reduced, are we, to the poor condition, that we see a Minister of this great Republic instructed to argue, or to intercede, with the British Minister, lest he should find us to have forfeited our privileges; and lest these privileges should no longer be extended to us! And we have forfeited those privileges, by our misbehavior in choosing rulers, who thought better of our own claim than of the British! Why, Sir, this is patiently submitting to the domineering tone of the British Minister, I believe Mr. Huskinson-[Mr. CLAY said, "No, Mr. Canning."-Mr. Canning, then, Sir, who told us that all our trade with the West Indies was a boon, granted to us by the indulgence of England. The British Minister calls it a boon, and our Minister admits it as a privilege, and hopes that his Royal Majesty will be too gracious to decide that we have forfeited this privilege, by our misbehavior in the choice of our rulers! Sir, for one, I reject all idea of holding any right of trade, or any other rights, as a privilege or a boon, from the British Government, or any other Government.

At the conclusion of the paragraph, the Secretary says "You cannot press this view of the subject too earnestly upon the consideration of the British Ministry. It has bearings and relations that reach beyond the immediate question under discussion."

And adverting, again, to the same subject towards the close of the despatch, he says, "I will add nothing as to the impropriety of suffering any feelings that find their origin in the past pretensions of this Government, to have an adverse influence upon the present conduct of Great Britain."

I ask again, Mr. President, if this be statesmanship? if this be dignity? if this be elevated regard for country? Can any man read this whole despatch, with candor, and not admit, that it is plainly and manifestly the writer's intention to promote the interests of his party at the expense of those of the country?

Lest I should do the Secretary injustice, I will read all that I find, in this letter, upon this obnoxious point. These are the paragraphs :

"Such is the present state of our commercial relations with the British Colonies; and such the steps by which we have arrived at it. In reviewing the events which have preceded, and more or less contributed to, a result so much to be regretted, there will be found three grounds upon which we are most assailable. 1st, in our too long and too tenaciously resisting the right of Great Britain to impose protecting duties in her colonies;" 2nd, &c.

"The opportunities which you have derived from a participation in our public councils, as well as other sources of information,

will enable you to speak with confidence (as far as you may deem it proper and useful so to do) of the respective parts taken by those to whom the administration of this Government is now committed, in relation to the course heretofore pursued upon the subject of the colonial trade. Their views upon that point have been submitted to the people of the United States; and the counsels by which your conduct is now directed are the result of the judgment expressed by the only earthly tribunal to which the late administration was amenable for its acts. It should be sufficient that the claims set up by them, and which caused the interruption of the trade in question, have been explicitly abandoned by those who first asserted them, and are not revived by their successors. If Great Britain deems it adverse to her interests to allow us to participate in the trade with her colonies, and finds nothing in the extension of it to others to induce her to apply the same rule to us, she will, we hope, be sensible of the propriety of placing her refusal on those grounds. To set up the acts of the late administration as the cause of forfeiture of privileges which would otherwise be extended to the people of the United States, would, under existing circumstances, be unjust in itself, and could not fail to excite their deepest sensibility. The tone of feeling which a course so unwise and untenable is calculated to produce, would doubtless be greatly aggravated by the consciousness that Great Britain has, by order in council, opened her colonial ports to Russia and France, notwithstanding a similar omission on their part to accept the terms offered by the act of July, 1825. You cannot press this view of the subject too earnestly upon the consideration of the British ministry. It has bearings and relations that reach beyond the immediate question under discussion."

"I will add nothing as to the impropriety of suffering any feelings that find their origin in the past pretensions of this Government to have an adverse influence upon the present conduct of Great Britain."

Sir, I submit to you, and to the candor of all just men, if I am not right in saying, that the pervading topic, through the whole, is not American rights, not American interests, not American defence, but denunciation of past pretensions of our own country, reflections on the past administration, and exultation, and a loud claim of merit for the administration now in power. Sir, I would forgive mistakes; I would pardon the want of information; I would pardon almost any thing, where I saw true patriotism and sound American feeling; but I cannot forgive the sacrifice of this feeling to mere party. I cannot concur in sending abroad a public agent, who has not conceptions so large and liberal, as to feel, that, in the presence of foreign Courts, amidst the monarchies of Europe, he is to stand up for his country, and his whole country; that no jot nor

tittle of her honor is to come to harm in his hands; that he is not to suffer others to reproach either his Government or his country, and far less is he himself to reproach either; that he is to have no objects in his eye but American objects, and no heart in his bosom but an American heart; and that he is to forget self, to forget party, to forget every sinister and narrow feeling, in his proud and lofty attachment to the Republic whose commission he bears.

Mr. President, I have discharged an exceedingly unpleasant duty, the most unpleasant of my public life. But I have looked upon it as a duty, and it was not to be shunned. And, Sir, however unimportant may be the opinion of so humble an individual as myself, I now only wish that I might be heard by every Independent Freeman in the United States, by the British Minister, and the British King, and by every Minister and every crowned head in Europe, while, standing here in my place, I pronounce my rebuke, as solemnly and as decisively as I can, upon this first instance, in which an American Minister has been sent abroad, as the Representative of his party, and not as the Representative of his country.

SECOND DAY. JAN. 26.

Mr. Webster said, in reply to some remarks of Mr. Forsyth, that it was, in his judgment, a great mistake, to suppose that what was now called the American "pretension," originated with Mr. Adams, either as President or Secretary of State. By the way, it is singular enough that the American side of this question is called, in the instructions before us, a pretension too long persisted in; but the British side of it is called a right, too long and too tenaciously resisted by us. This courteous mode of speaking of the claims of a foreign Government, and this reproachful mode of speaking of the claims of our own, is certainly somewhat novel in diplomacy. But, whether it be called, respectfully, a claim, or, reproachfully, a pretension, it did not originate with Mr. Adams. It had a much earlier origin. This "pretension," now abandoned, with so much scorn, or this claim, said, reproachfully, to have been first set up by the late administration, originated with George Washington. He put his own hand to it. He insisted on it; and he would not treat with England, on the subject of the colonial trade, without considering it.

In his instructions to Mr. Morris, under his own hand, in October, 1789, President Washington says

"Let it be strongly impressed on your mind, that the privilege of carrying our productions, in our vessels, to their islands, and bringing in return the productions of those islands to our own ports and markets, is regarded here as of the highest importance; and you will be careful not to countenance any idea of our dispens

ing with it in a treaty. Ascertain, if possible, their views on this subject; FOR it would not BE EXPEDIENT TO COMMENCE

NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT PREVIOUSLY HAVING GOOD REASONS TO EXPECT A SATISFACTORY TERMINATION OF THEM."

Observe, Sir, that President Washington, in these instructions, is not speaking of the empty and futile right of sending our own vessels, without cargoes, to the British West Indies; but he is speaking of the substantial right of carrying our own products to the islands, for sale and consumption there. And whether these products were shut out by a positive act of Parliament, or by a tariff of duties, absolutely and necessarily prohibitory, could make no difference. The object was to provide, by treaty, if it could be done, that our products should find their way, effectually and profitably, into the markets of the British West Indies. This was General Washington's object. This was the "pretension” which he set up.

It is well known, Sir, that no satisfactory arrangement was made, in General Washington's time, respecting our trade with the British West Indies. But the breaking out of the French Revolution, and the wars which it occasioned, were causes, which, of themselves, opened the ports of the West Indies. During the long continuance of those wars, our vessels, with cargoes of our own products, found their way into the British West India Islands under a practical relaxation of the British Colonial System. While this condition of things lasted, we did very well without a particular treaty. But when the European wars, and our war, all ceased, then Great Britain returned to her former system; then the islands became shut against us; and then it became necessary to treat on the subject. And, Sir, we proposed to treat; our Ministers were, successively, instructed to treat, from that time forward. And, Sir, I undertake to say, that neither Mr. Madison, who was then President, nor his successor, Mr. Monroe, gave any authority or permission to any American Minister to abandon this pretension, and give it up, or even to waive it, or postpone it, and make a treaty without providing for it. No such thing. On the contrary, it will appear, I think, if we look through papers which have been sent to the Senate, that, under Mr. Madison's administration, our Minister in England was fully instructed on this subject, and expected to press it. And as to Mr. Monroe, I have means of being informed, in a manner not liable to mistake, that he was, on this subject, always immovable. He would not negotiate without treating on this branch of the trade; nor did I ever understand, that, in regard to this matter, there was any difference of opinion whatever, among the gentlemen who composed Mr. Monroe's Cabinet. Mr. Adams, as Secretary of State, wrote the despatches and the instructions; but the policy was the policy of the whole

administration, as far as I ever understood. Certain it is, it was the settled and determined policy of Mr. Monroe himself. Indeed, Sir, so far is it from being true, that this pretension originated with Mr. Adams, that it was in his administration that, for the first time, permission was given, under very peculiar circumstances, and with instructions to negotiate a treaty, waiving this part of the question. This has been already alluded to, and fully explained, by the honorable member from Kentucky.

So, then, Sir, this pretension, asserted in the instructions to have been first set up by the late administration, is shown to have had President Washington for its author, and to have received the countenance of every President who had occasion to act on the subject, from 1789 down to the time of the present administra

tion.

But this is not all. Congress itself has sanctioned the same "pretension." The act of the 1st of March, 1823, makes it an express condition, upon which, and upon which alone, our ports shall be opened to British vessels and cargoes from the West Indies, on the same duties as our vessels and cargoes-that our products should be admitted into those islands, without paying any other or higher duties than shall be paid on similar productions coming from elsewhere. All this will be seen by reference to the third section of that act. Now, remember, Sir, that this act of Congress passed in March, 1823, two years before the commencement of Mr. Adams's administration. The act originated in the Senate. The honorable Senator from Maryland, who has spoken on this subject to-day (Mr. Smith), was then a member of the Senate, and took part in the discussion of this very bill; and he supported it, and voted for it. It passed both Houses, without material opposition in either. Now, Sir, how is it possible, after referring to this law of 1823, to find any apology for the assertion contained in these instructions, that this claim is a pretension first set up by Mr. Adams's administration? How is it possible that this law could have been overlooked, or not remembered? In short, Sir, with any tolerable acquaintance with the history of the negotiations of the United States or their legislation, how are we to account for it that such an assertion as these instructions contain, should have found its way into them?

But the honorable member from Georgia asks, why we lay all this to the charge of the Secretary, and not to the charge of the President. The answer is, the President's conduct is not before us. We are not, and cannot become, his accusers, even if we thought there were any thing in his conduct which gave cause for accusation. But the Secretary is before us. Not brought before us by any act of ours; he is placed before us by the President's nomination. On that nomination we cannot decline to act. We must VOL. II. 8