THE NEW YORK PUBLIC LIBRARY

ASTOR, LENOX AND TILDEN FOUNDATIONS.

GENERAL MCDOWELL'S REPORT.

389

the morning. The plain was covered seeing great activity in this direction, with the retreating troops, and they much firing, and columns of dust, I beseemed to infect those with whom they came anxious for this place, fearing if it came in contact. The retreat soon be- were turned or forced the whole stream came a rout, and this soon degenerated of our retreating mass would be captured still further into a panic. Finding this or destroyed. After providing for the state of affairs was beyond the efforts of protection of the retreat by Porter's and all those who had assisted so faithfully Blenker's brigades, I repaired to Richduring the long and hard day's work in ardson's, and found the whole force orgaining almost the object of our wishes, dered to be stationed for the holding of and that nothing remained on the field the road from Manassas by Blackburn's but to recognize what we could no longer Ford to Centreville, on the march, under prevent, I gave the necessary orders to the orders from the division commander protect their withdrawal, begging the for Centreville. I immediately halted men to form in line, and offer the appear-it, and ordered it to take up the best ance at least, of organization. They returned by the fords to the Warrrenton road, protected, by my order, by Colonel Porter's force of regulars. Once on the road, and the different corps coming together in small parties, many without officers, they became intermingled, and all organization was lost.

"Orders had been sent back to Miles' division for a brigade to move forward and protect this retreat, and Colonel Blenker's brigade was detached for this purpose, and was ordered to go as far forward as the point where the road to the right left the main road. By referring to the general order it will be seen that, while the operations were to go on in front, an attack was to be made at Blackburn's Ford by the brigade (Richardson's) stationed there. A reference to his report, and to that of Major Hunt, commanding the artillery. will show that this part of the plan was well and effectively carried out. It succeeded in deceiving the enemy for a considerable time, and in keeping in check a part of his force. The fire of the artillery at this point is represented as particularly destructive. At the time of our retreat,

line of defence across the ridge that their position admitted of, and subsequently taking in person the command of this part of the army, I caused such disposition of the forces, which had been added to by the 1st and 2d New Jersey and the De Kalb regiments, ordered up from Runyon's reserve, before going forward, as would best serve to check the enemy. The ridge being held in this way, the retreating current passed slowly through Centreville to the rear. The enemy followed us from the ford as far as Cub Run, and owing to the road becoming blocked up at the crossing, caused us much damage there, for the artillery could not pass, and several pieces and caissons had to be abandoned. In the panic, the horses hauling the caissons and ammunition were cut from their places by persons to escape with, and in this very much confusion was caused, the panic aggravated, and the road encumbered. Not only were pieces of artillery lost, but also many of the ambulances carrying the wounded.

ments of the day. Time was taken for its preparation, and its writer had consequently the advantage, of which he availed himself, of the published reports of the Union officers; so that the paper is much more complete than is usual with documents of this kind. It bears date August 26, 1861, but was not given to the public for some time after, and then, as it was said, in a somewhat abridged form, curtailed of the comments of the writer on the subsequent conduct of the campaign by the Confederate government. The report was not in fact published til more than six months after the battle which it described, about the time of General Beauregard's departure from Manassas for a new field of opera. tions in the South.

not endeavor to make a stand there. The condition of our artillery and its ammunition, and the want of food for the men, who had generally abandoned or thrown away all that had been issued the day before, and the utter disorganization and consequent demoralization of the mass of the army, seemed to all who were near enough to be consulted-division and brigade commanders and staff to admit of no alternative but to fall back; the more so as the position of Blackburn's Ford was then in the possession of the enemy, and he was already urning our left. On sending the officers of the staff to the different camps, they found, as they reported to me, that our decision had been anticipated by the troops, most of those who had come in from the front being already on the road Immediately on the advance of Generto the rear, the panic with which they al McDowell from before Washington, came in still continuing and hurrying on the 17th July, as appears from this them along. At o'clock the rear-document, General Beauregard apprised guard (Blenker's brigade) moved, cover- the Confederate War Department at ing the retreat, which was effected dur-Richmond, by telegraph, of the fact, ing the night and next morning. The when government orders were at once troops at Fairfax station leaving by the transmitted for the reinforcement of his cars, took with them the bulk of the sup-command. General Johnston was directplies which had been sent there. My aide-de-camp, Major Wadsworth, stayed at Fairfax Court-House till late in the morning, to see that the stragglers and weary and worn-out soldiers were not left behind."

ed to bring his forces, if possible, from Winchester, and General Holmes, who was in the rear of Manassas, in Eastern Virginia, at Fredericksburg, was sent forward with his brigade. On being ad. vised of these measures, General Beaure. From this account of the battle of Bull gard at first intended that one portion Run, as it is succinctly narrated by the of Johnston's force should advance by a Union general with the candor of a gen-route below Leesburg and take the Union tleman and soldier, we may turn to the forces on their right flank and in the complement of the picture in the official rear at Centreville; but it was found report of the rebel commander, General that the means of transportation did not Beauregard. Like his statement of the admit of this, and a junction of the forces preceding engagement at Blackburn's was resolved upon within the lines of Ford, it is a minute, elaborate and well Bull Run, with the view of an immediate presented exhibition of the military move-attack on the enemy. General Johnston

THE LINE OF DEFENCE.