language. When to these philological accomplishments, we add the moral and religious qualities belonging to this veteran in the new crusade against Mohammedan and pseudo-Christian error, we have said enough to justify our strong expressions as to his pre-eminent fitness for the great work of translating the whole Bible into Arabic. Besides all this, it is to be remembered that Mr Smith holds a high place among that distinguished corps of labourers in the East, who have done so much honour to themselves and to their country, in the eyes of the most watchful, not to say most jealous, representatives of Christian Europe; so that even English generosity and candour have, in high and public places, awarded them the first rank among modern missionaries.

Of the version itself we shall not presume to speak as critics. We can only say, that by a simple and empirical comparison of what we have before us with the Arabic of lexicons and printed books, we have been strongly impressed with the simplicity and purity of its diction, which affords a grateful evidence, not only of the writer's learning, taste, and judgment, but of the wonderful extent to which the old Koranic Arabic is level to the comprehension of the modern oriental reader. The only outward circumstance with which we are disposed to quarrel, is the almost too complete assimilation of the work to an English Reference or Family Bible, with its figures in the text and citations in the margin. Even as to this question, which is one of usefulness, and not of show, we would not for a moment weigh our judgment against that of the translator; but we candidly confess that, as a matter of mere taste, we much prefer the aspect of the specimen of Matthew, which is free from these useful but disfiguring encumbrances.

We sincerely hope that this great work may be continued and completed by the same hand, without interruption or undue delay, from loss of health, or any other providential hinderance. There are no lives more precious to the Church, than those of competent translators of the Bible, whose places every day of fresh experience makes it harder and harder to supply, and for whose preservation, therefore, the whole Christian world is bound to pray.

ART. VII.-The Logic of the Christian Faith: Being a Dissertation on Scepticism, Pantheism, The A Priori Argynent, The A Posteriori Argument, The Intuitional Argument, and Revelation. By PATRICK EDWARD DOVE, Author of the Theory of Human Progression, The Elements of Political Science, &c. 1856.

REVEALED Truth has always had its assailants and its defenders, and the one has commonly given form and condition to the other. The point assailed has of necessity been the point defended, and the nature of the assault has determined, in a great measure, the nature of the defence. At one time the contest has been waged around the outworks, and the defence has been mainly a statement and vindication of the Evidences of Revealed Religion. At another, some vital point has been assailed, and the defence has produced not only a vindication of that point, but a more clear manifestation of its excellence, and a deeper conviction of its value than had previously been entertained. Such has always hitherto been the result, and being fully convinced of the truth of Christianity, we have not the slightest doubt that such will always be the result, till the full victory of truth be triumphantly achieved. Not only, therefore, are we not alarmed when new antagonists appear, and new forms of attack are attempted, from which we always anticipate new advantages to be gained, but we rather welcome the very desperateness of the assault, both as indicating the condition of the enemy, and as securing the increased brilliancy and importance of the victory, which must be gained. "Christianity," says one class of modern assailants, "is a worn out system :-it has no longer any power to influence the mind of man;-the religious consciousness of the age has outgrown it, and humanity must think out a new system for itself more accordant with its present advanced intelligence and enlightenment." This implies no war of outposts, no mere skirmishing about the evidences; but a bold assumption that the philosophy and the criticism of modern times have succeeded in sweeping away the Christian system, and may now set about constructing a system of their own. But may not this assumption be premature? Is it so manifest that Christian truth has lost all power to sway the human mind,-nay, that what used to be regarded as Christian Truth must now be viewed only as an exploded error? May it not be shewn that the Christian Faith is the highest Reason, and can not only be defended by an irrefragable Logic of its own, but can so employ that Logic as to prove that both Scepticism and Pantheism are necessarily unscientific and untrue? Such, as we firmly believe, is the

result in which the modern attack and defence of Christianity must necessarily end; for in a contest involving the primordial elements of all belief, to conquer or to perish are the only alternatives to both parties. It is evidently with a full consciousness of the nature of the present contest, and the issues depending upon it, that Mr Dove has written the elaborate and important work to which we proceed to introduce our readers. When, some five or six years ago, Mr Dove published his "Theory of Human Progression," that work was at once recognised by all competent judges as one of extraordinary merit, displaying not only great originality of thought, but also a rare amount of well-digested knowledge, remarkable clearness and precision of expression, and a style equally distinguished by its flowing ease and its nervous vigour. It was evident that a mind of great power had commenced its literary career, and sanguine expectations were justly entertained that its future productions would prove eminently beneficial to mankind, in that high region for which it was so well qualified, and in which it had chosen to employ its energies. A subsequent production proved that such expectations were not to be disappointed. The new work now before us, "The Logic of the Christian Faith," will, in our opinion, ere very long assume, and long retain, the position of being regarded as one of the ablest, most complete, and most successful vindications of Revealed Truth that any man in any age has yet been honoured to produce. The only hazard is, that its real value may not for some time be recognised, that it may not soon be so extensively read as it ought to be, and that it may not readily reach the hands of those who peculiarly need the instruction which it so thoroughly gives. That it must and will become extensively known, and take its place as a standard work, we entertain no doubt, but it is also too probable that it will not soon obtain such popularity as many an immeasurably inferior production almost imme diately gains. A book may be too good, too really valuable, to be popular in such an age of cheap, not to say frivolous, literature as the present. For such reasons we think we shall be at once discharging our duty, and conferring a benefit on the public, by directing attention to Mr Dove's work, and giving a condensed outline of its course of thought and argument. In doing so we shall avail ourselves as much as possible of the author's own language, though not always marking it as quotation, except in extracts of some length.

In the preface Mr Dove informs us that "The present dissertation attempts to trace the progress of human thought and human reasoning from the absolute negation of belief up to the highest and most complex form of credence. It is, therefore, entitled The Logic of the Christian Faith,'-meaning thereby,

not a discussion of the doctrines of the Christian faith, but a discussion of its logical defences-the object being to remove the difficulties that are supposed to derive their power from systems of philosophy."-" In meeting the philosophic difficulties which have been supposed to lie in the way of a positive theology, the endeavour has been to encounter them fairly on their own ground,-not to understate them, or avoid them, but to shew, by the plainest and most evident appeal to the common reason of mankind, that those difficulties arise from fallacies, from illicit processes, or from an imperfect analysis of thought. The argument, therefore, proceeds on the principle of shewing,1. That a theologic argument is not, and cannot be, the demonstration of a theorem, but the solution of a problem. 2. That philosophic Scepticism is untenable, inasmuch as science does actually attain to the knowledge of causes, and uses causes in the ordinary operation of indubitable calculation. 3. That Pantheism is merely a mode of viewing the universe which might be entertained by a single individual, if existing alone, and having no intercourse with other beings or fellow-creatures. 4. That the induction from nature is altogether unsatisfactory, and cannot lead to an Infinite Person. 5. That the moral argument is absolute, and therefore infinite. 6. That the moral idea being projected into the region of nature, the two regions become united, and nature is seen to arise from the will of the Moral Deity. 7. That the only possible mode of arriving at objective truth is by a Revelation from an Infinite Being; which Revelation shall be subjective in its evidences, and objective in the matter of its truth. Such are the philosophic conclusions. With what validity they have been proven the reader must determine." Some readers, accustomed to the higher regions of philosophic thought, may be able to perceive at once that a work constructed on these principles must be conclusive on the subject which it discusses, unless it has been vitiated by some almost unimaginable fallacy. Others, while not so clearly apprehending the full scope of the dissertation, will perceive that it cannot fail to introduce and discuss subjects of unspeakable importance, and will be eager to accompany the author in his elaborate disquisition. A somewhat detailed view of the work, in its general aspect, may help to render its design still more apparent, even in the outline which we are about to attempt.

An Introduction of considerable length states and explains the Nature and Scope of an Argument intended as a proof of the Divine Existence. Book I. treats of Scepticism, and is divided into two chapters, the first of which explains what scepticism is, the second states special objections to the sceptical philosophy. Book II. deals with Pantheism. Book III. states the a priori Argument. Book IV. is a disquisition on the a

posteriori Argument, in two chapters. Book V. is a very full and elaborate statement, in two chapters, of what Mr Dove terms the Intuitional or Composite Argument. Book VI. on Revelation, concludes the work with a singularly lucid, original, and convincing disquisition on the characteristics of the Revealed word of God-the Bible. This, which is still but a mere enumeration of the divisions of the work, and the subjects treated of respectively in each division, may enable the reader to apprehend the strictly philosophical, logical, and comprehensive character of the book; and may convince him that a thoughtful study of it must be of incalculable advantage to every earnest and intelligent person. The method of the work, and its whole construction, is completely scientific, proceeding from first principles onwards to undeniable conclusions.

In commencing any disquisition of an abstruse kind, it is absolutely necessary that there be a clear understanding of the primary position assumed, and the method to be pursued, as well as of the end sought to be attained. The end sought to be attained is, proof of the existence of the Divine Being. Does not an inquiry so profound and so infinitely important imply, that an argument intended to prove this should be so carefully selected, that there must be nothing fallacious in the very nature of such an argument? It must be either the demonstration of a theorem, or the solution of a problem. On the supposition that the existence of such a Being is doubtful, the argument assumes the form of a theorem, which requires to be demonstrated but on the supposition that the existence of such a Being is absolutely certain, the argument assumes the form of a problem, which requires to be solved. The argument cannot legitimately assume the form of a demonstration, because in doing so it must be assumed or postulated that human reason can reduce to logical form the evidence that God exists; and also that human language can express that evidence in such a complete manner as to render the conclusion logically indisputable. But both of these assumptions, or postulates, may be denied. We cannot reduce the fact of our own existence to logical form, and we cannot construct an argument demonstrating our own existence to other men; yet we can conceive nothing more absolutely certain than that we exist. The argument to prove the existence of God ought not to assume the form of a theorem to be demonstrated; both because the necessary postulates may be denied, and because the existence of a being, as of self, can be believed where demonstration is impossible to the mere representative reason. But when the argument assumes the form of a problem to be solved, the solution is not an attempt to prove the existence of God; but it is an endeavour to trace in our own minds, and in language if possible, all the steps of thought