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Life in its Lower, Intermediate, and Higher Forms; or, Manifestations of the Divine Wisdom in the Natural History of Animals. By PHILIP HENRY GOSSE, F.R.S. Pp. 370.

IN "Excelsior," a hopeful forerunner of, as we are prone to predict, numerous seasonable combinations of the true in Natural Science with the trustworthy in scriptural interpretation, "the greatest part" of Mr Gosse's present volume" was originally published in the form of successive papers."

It highly deserves its independent form. Sanctioned by the prestige of Mr Gosse's well-won reputation as an original observer, especially in the peculiarly rich province of British Marine Zoology, it is, like all his previous works, admirably adapted to render the study of "Life" popular, without making it vague or indefinite.

The Exegetical Study of the Original Scriptures, considered in connection with the Training of Theological Students. By ALEXANDER BLACK, D.D. Edinburgh: Shepherd & Elliot.

WE regard Dr Black's Letter as of uncommon value. Though limited in compass as compared with the intrinsic importance of its subject, it is, nevertheless, throughout clearly indicative of that familiar knowledge of the abundant treasures of linguistic science, which leaves its venerable author perhaps without a rival among modern British scholars. Nor can we desire any nobler discipline or richer culture for British preachers, than will be attained by a faithful acceptance of the fatherly counsels of one so eminent, not more by his exact philology, vast, varied, and profound erudition, and ready use of his resources, than by his sweet and serene spirit of attachment to his heavenly Master. We recommend this precious letter to the earnest regards of our readers.

Essai d'une Nouvelle Théorie sur les Idées Fondamentales, ou les Principes de l'Entendement Humain. Par F. Perron, Professeur de Philosophie à la Faculté des Lettres, Secretaire perpetuel de l' Academie de Besançon. Paris: Ladrange.

1843.

THE work of Professor Perron seems to have attracted less notice in this country than its merits deserve. It is a vigorous protest against the prevailing system of philosophy in France, and in the present state of European speculation, it may serve, we think, to counteract some of its extravagances, and to bring it into nearer accordance with the more sober and healthy psychology of our own country. Under this impression, but without committing ourselves to an unqualified approval of his theory in all its details, we have much pleasure in introducing it to the notice of our readers.

M. Perron is a professor of philosophy, and holds the honourable

office of Perpetual Secretary to the Academy of Besançon. He speaks of himself, incidentally and with great modesty, as having been an attached pupil and fervent admirer of JOUFFROY, to whose memory this work is inscribed; but every page of his treatise shews that, while he does due homage to the talents and genius of the founders of the Eclectic School, and is fully alive to the claims of Laromiguiere, Royer Collard, Cousin, and Jouffroy, to the admiration of his countrymen, he is not blind to the defects of their system, or to the errors which have been associated with it; and that, as a sensible, independent, and correct thinker, he is resolved to abjure the authority of even the greatest names, when that authority is adverse to the cause of philosophical truth.

He offers the present treatise as a preliminary to a larger work on logic, which is in course of preparation; and he characterises it as an attempt "to reform the foundations of science," by displacing the prevailing theory in regard to the nature and origin of our fundamental ideas, and substituting a new and sounder theory in its room. The theory which he repudiates under the name of "the modern theory of fundamental ideas," is that of Cousin; and it will be necessary, therefore, to advert briefly to its import and character, as an exposition of the laws of human thought.

According to Cousin, the reason of man, in whatever way it is developed, or to whatever object it is directed, is supposed to conceive of everything-sous la raison de deux idées; every fundamental idea having two distinct terms which have a necessary relation to each other. Of the two terms which thus enter into each of our fundamental ideas, the one is necessary, absolute, perfect, infinite; the other, finite, imperfect, phenomenal, relative; and when all the terms of the former class are reduced to one category, and all the terms of the latter to another, we have three fundamental elements of reason,—often described as a sort of rational Trinity-the finite, the infinite, and the relation subsisting between the two.

Cousin holds that there is between these two sets of ideas, or rather between these two terms of the same fundamental ideas, a relation of necessary reciprocity, and that the two terms are so strictly connected, that it is impossible the one can be present to the mind without the other. They must, therefore, be held to be simultaneous. The first term cannot be conceived without the second, nor the second without the first. In opposition, then, to each of the rival schools, who maintain-the one, that the human mind begins with the infinite or absolute, and descends to the finite or contingent, the other, that it begins with the finite or contingent, and ascends to the infinite or absolute, Cousin contends that the two terms of each fundamental idea are contemporaneous, and that the one necessarily supposes the other in the acquisition of knowledge. He draws a distinction, however, between the logical and chronological order of its acquisition, and holds that, while the ideas belonging to the first term are logically anterior to those belouging to the second, yet the latter are chronologically anterior to the former; in other words, that, although all the elementary ideas

of reason are acquired at one and the same time, the absolute is the logical condition of the relative element; while the relative is the chronological condition of the absolute. Such being the relation which is supposed to subsist between the correlative terms of each of our fundamental ideas, Cousin proceeds to explain their characteristic properties, and to offer a theory of their origin. He represents these fundamental ideas as derived from a reason, not belonging to us individually, but impersonal, absolute, and infallible, and propounds a theory which, if it can be said to have any intelligible meaning at all, amounts to a virtual deification of reason, and ascribes to it such attributes as belong only to God.

In attempting to displace Cousin's theory of fundamental ideas, and to substitute for it a new and sounder theory of his own, M. Perron treats the distinguished head of the Eclectic school with the utmost respect, and puts the most candid and favourable construction on every explanation which he has offered of his peculiar views. He admits that, in the reflective consciousness of a philosopher there may come to be established such a connection between the ideas which belong respectively to the correlative terms of Cousin's theory, as may make it easy and natural for him to pass from the one to the other; but affirms that, in the spontaneous and ordinary processes of human thought, and especially in the initial stages of it in infancy and childhood, the idea of the finite is not always associated with that of the infinite, and that there is no such necessary relation between the ideas belonging to the two terms, as that it is impossible for us to think of the one without also, at the same time, thinking of the other. He regards our fundamental ideas simply as the most general ideas which we can form. Consequently, instead of being the foundation of all our knowledge, they are its product; instead of producing our other ideas, they result from them; and they are, in relation to our knowledge, simply what genera are in relation to natural history. And as to their origin, M. Perron contends, that we may satisfactorily account for the production of all our ideas on the ordinary and generally admitted principles of psychology, without having recourse to any superhuman faculty of impersonal or infallible reason. He assumes that, in the first instance, our ideas are concrete, not abstract; particular, not general: that they relate to objects that are perceived as real, determinate, special; and that whatever be the object which first presents itself to our thoughts, we seize it in mass-we grasp it as a whole; and it is only afterwards that we distinguish its elements, and abstract its properties and modes. But he shews that the objects of knowledge have various properties and relations, and that the mind is capable of discerning these, of considering them each by itself, and so of forming abstract ideas, more or less general, until it reaches those which are the most general of all, and constitute the summum yenus, the class of fundamental ideas, the categories of human knowledge; and this by the ordinary processes of abstraction and generalization, without the aid of anything so transcendental as an impersonal, generic, or infallible reason.

But if our fundamental ideas be the results of inward mental processes, the fruits of mere abstraction and generalization, the question may be raised, What is their validity or worth? Have they any objective reality,-anything that corresponds to them in nature and reality? Many superficial thinkers seem to imagine that it is sufficient to discredit any set of ideas, if they characterize them as "mere abstractions," as if abstraction were not as natural and as unavoidable as any other function which belongs to the human mind, whether it be sensation, or memory, or reason, or even consciousness itself. It is vain to talk of "abstractions," as if they were arbitrary creations or capricious imaginings," of the human mind. They constitute the largest portion of our highest and most assured knowledge. The idea of number is an abstraction; but is arithmetic, therefore, unreal, or inapplicable to the practical affairs of life? The idea of magnitude is an abstraction; but is the science of mathematics, therefore, unreal or groundless?

We shall not enter on the enumeration of our fundamental ideas, or compare the list offered by M. Perron, with the categories of Aristotle and Kant. We advert to the work chiefly on account of its theological bearings. We are aware that a general impression exists, even among men of cultivated minds, that inquiries of this kind are purely speculative, and have little practical importance, or no connection with the business and duties of common life. But all experience testifies that a philosophical theory has many wide-spread ramifications, and that the opinions to which it gives credit and currency, although confined, in the first instance, to the few, may be rapidly diffused among the many, and that, when they become prevalent, they exercise a powerful influence on the religion, the morals, and the policy of the world. Every system of metaphysics will be found, sooner or later, to bring forth fruit after its kind, in whatever soil it may have taken root. It is chiefly on account of the indissoluble connection which we believe to subsist between the philosophical and the practical, that we hold it to be the duty of those who care for the highest interests of mankind, to keep a wakeful eye on the progress of speculative inquiry, to mark the first incipient tendency to aberration at those critical turning-points which may give a new direction to the whole current of human thought, and to subject every new theory to the most rigid scrutiny, with a view to ascertain its real value, as well as its relative bearings on the momentous interests of truth, religion, and morals. And one of the principal reasons which have induced us to notice the work before us, is, that it serves to illustrate the relations subsisting between the highest questions of metaphysics and the doctrines of our common faith, and places, in a clear and striking light, some of the points of contact, and even of collision, between the modern theories of philosophy and the ancient truths of theology, natural and revealed.

By the Author of The Faithful Promiser,

Memories of Bethany.
&c. London: Nisbet & Co., 1857.

It is not always for the sake of obtaining information, or for the purpose of engaging in profound thought, that mankind peruse books on religious subjects. We require devotional reading; we require therefore books the perusal of which is fitted to touch the heart and call forth devotional feelings. And as such books are needed in their turn, so there are always men whose mental characteristics impel them to write such books. The writers of devotional works seldom increase the permanent literature of any nation; but when their writings are evangelically true, abounding with gentle thoughts and holy feelings, and expressed in refined and pious language, they deserve to be regarded as a blessing to religious society. Many will read such books and profit by them, who would not obtain any advantage from more elaborate works, even if they could be induced to undertake their perusal. It is well, then, that every class of readers should have a corresponding class of authors, the wants of the one met by the productions of the other.

Its

Every earnest and pious reader has lingered with loving delight on the gospel narratives, that place so tenderly before us the pathetic home scenes of Bethany, where the loving Saviour enjoyed briefly a genial home in the bosom of one humble and affectionate human family. Several Christian authors have made that narrative the subject of devotional productions. The volume before us is one of these, and we very willingly add, one of the best of them. author has divided the subject into a series of chapters, each containing a scene or incident of the beautiful and touching story, and all combining to carry it forward to its conclusion, in a very attractive and interesting manner. He is evidently a man of a pious, refined, and gentle nature, with somewhat of a poetic fancy, by the use of which he gives a measure of elegance and ornament to his little book. We rather regret to say, what nevertheless our love of truth and honest sincerity in criticism demand, that his love of poetic diction leads him sometimes into the error of employing language not at all in harmony with the grave, simple, and sublime beauty and greatness of the gospel narrative. Anything like sentimentalism and mere prettiness of expression, is ill suited to the subject; and when this author ventures to dilute and adorn the language of the Apostle John, we feel inclined to doubt whether he can adequately feel and apprehend the unfathomable tenderness and solemn grandeur of the inspired record. The glassy glitter of semi-poetic phraseology will, no doubt, please some readers-this is a matter of taste; but, in our opinion, it is the blemish of a little book, which, in all other respects, we would cordially approve, as a very interesting and useful production.

VOL. FI.NO. XIX.

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