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elusion as a jury could be, ought not to have directed the issues.—Nicol App., Vaughan Res., B. 505.

LAND TAX REDEMPTION ACTS.

By the act 42 Geo. 3, c. 116, s. 98, it is required that, upon a sale of lands for the redemption of the land-tax, the purchase-money shall be paid into the Bank of England, to the account of the Commissioners for the liquidation of the National Debt, and no discharge from the land-tax is obtained until the money is so paid.

In the year 1800 the guardians of M., an infant, under the powers of this act, sold lands belonging to him for the redemption of the land-tax; the purchase-money was paid by H., the purchaser, into the hands of solicitors, who were employed professionally, both by the guardians and the purchaser, and remained in their hands unlil 1807, when M. came of age, and his guardian accounted with him; and afterwards he settled accounts with the solicitors to whom the purchase-money had been paid, and took a security for a balance due to him, in which the purchasemoney was included. Under these circumstances the money was not paid into the Bank according to the act, and H. continued to pay the land-tax upon the premises purchased by him. No proceedings were taken on either side until 1825, when M. brought an ejectment to recover possession of the premises; and the devisee and trustees under the will of H., who was dead, filed a bill to restrain the proceedings at law: Held, that H., knowing of the omission to pay the money into the Bank, and the consequent defect in his title, could have no relief in equity.—Hicks v. Morant, M. & K. 643.

LIEN.

A father conveyed real estates to trustees, upon trust to sell and re-purchase annuities granted by his son, and pay the son's debts at their discretion, and, subject thereto, upon trust for the father for life, with remainder to his son in fee. An annuitant, mentioned in a schedule to the deed, and stated to have entered up and docketed a judgment upon a warrant of attorney which accompanied his security, has no lien, by virtue of his judgment, upon the produce of the trust-estates when sold. (Walwyn v. Coutts, 3 Mer. 607.)—Foster v. Blackstone, M. & K. 307.

MORTGAGE.

A mortgagee in possession of a West India estate is not entitled to charge the mortgagor with commission on the amount of bills paid, on the value of the consignments, or on the costs and insurance of supplies shipped for the use of the estate; but stands in precisely the same situation as a mortgagee in possession of an estate in England.

The principles on which the expense of the home-management of such estates is to be calculated. (Chambers v. Goldwin, 5 Ves. 834.) Leilh v. Irvine, M. & K. 277.

PARTITION.

The jurisdiction and practice of the Court with respect to proceedings under commissions of partition.—Manners v. Charletworlh, M. & K. 330.

POWER.

A power of sale, to be exercised during the continuance of successive estates tail, is good, the power being co-extensive only with the estates tail, and like them liable to destruction. (Powisw.Capron, Rolls, May 5th, 1830, 4 Sim. 138; Biddle v. Perkins, 4 Sim. 135.) Waring v. Coventry, M. & K. 349.

PRACTICE.

1. (Impertinence.) In a suit for specific performance of an agreement for a lease, the defendant may, by his answer, put in issue any fact tending to shew the insolvency of the plaintiff, however it may impeach the plaintiff's respectability; but mere imputations on the moral character of the plaintiff are impertinent.—Pearson v. Knapp, M. & K. 312.

2. (Exceptions.) Where a number of exceptions to an answer, allowed by the master, are enumerated seriatim, and the defendant takes one general exception to the master's report, alleging that all the before-mentioned exceptions ought to have been disallowed; if the Court is of opinion that the master was right in allowing any one of the exceptions, the general exception of the master's report covers too much, and will be overruled.— (Green v. Weaver, 1 Sim. 404.)^Pearson v. Knapp, M. & K. 312.

3. (Master's report.) The master's report speaks from its date; and if a creditor of a deficient estate proves a debt in respect of bills of exchange indorsed to him by the testator, and before the master has made his report, receives certain sums from the estates of other persons liable on the bills, such sums will be properly deducted in the report from the amount of the debt proved.—Jennings v Elsler, M. & K. 440.

4. (Showing cause.) The eight days given in the order nisi for showing cause against confirming a report, include the day on which the order is served; and the circumstance that the last of the eight days happens not to be an office day, does not entitle the party to show cause on the next day on which the office is open. (Mootham v. Waskett, 1 Mer. 243.)— Manners v. Bryan, M. & K. 453.

5. (Muster's report.) Where the claim of a creditor in the suit is by consent referred to a master, if the Court is satisfied with the master's conclusion, it will, upon further directions on the master's report, bind the rights of the parties. If otherwise, the Court will direct such further proceedings as may appear to be necessary.—Earl of Winchelseu v. Garretty, M. & K. 253.

PRIORITY OF INCUMBRANCER.

A second incumbrancer, without notice, who takes a protection against subsequent incumbrancers which the prior incumbrancer has neglected to do, has a better equity than the first incumbrancer. A prior incumbrancer, therefore, who had not given notice of his security to trustees, was postponed to a subsequent incumbrancer who . had. But a difference in the form of the instruments under which a prior and subsequent incumbrancer claim, that of the prior giving only an equitable, and that of the subse* quent a legal right to come upon the estates charged, does not affect the equities of the parties so as to postpone the prior.—Foster v. Blackstone, M. & K. 297.

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SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.

1. (Insolvency.) It is no defence to a bill, filed against a landlord for specific performance of an agreement for a farming lease, by a person to whom the benefit of the agreement has been assigned, that the party with whom the landlord contracted has become insolvent, provided the assignee is solvent and in a condition to enter into the usual covenants, and there is no evidence that the contract was entered in upon consideration personal to the assignor. (Powell v. Lloyd, 1 G. & J. 427.)— Crosbk v. Tooke, M. & K. 413.

2. (Same.) Where a landlord agrees to grant a lease to A., his executors, administrators, and assigns, upon certain conditions, and A. assigns his interest in the contract to B., and then becomes bankrupt, B., on performing the conditions, "has a right to enforce the agreement specifically, notwithstanding his assignor's bankruptcy; and this right is not affected by a proviso, that in case of the bankruptcy of A. the landlord shall have

T power to re-enter and sell the benefit of the contract and the premises, and hold the proceeds, subject to his own claims, for the use of A.'s estate.— Morgan v. Rhodes, M. & K. 413.

TRUST.

The case of Wilson r. Moore, (L. M. May, 1834,) was affirmed by the Lord Chancellor on appeal.—M. & K. 337.

VENDOR AND PURCHASER.

Where a party had contracted to purchase, and had been eight years in the possession of premises, to which the vendor was unable to make a good title, and refused either to abandon the agreement or accept such title as the vendor could give, having paid no part of the purchase-money and no rent; the Court, on a bill filed by the vendor for relief, directed the agreement to be delivered up to be cancelled, and the rents and profits to be received by the purchaser to be accounted for, and ordered the purchaser to pay the costs of the suit.—King v. King, M. & K. 442.

WILL.

1. (Lapsed legacy.) A testator gave a legacy of £2000 to S. B., and in case S. B. should die in his lifetime, he directed that the legacy should go and be paid to her executors or administrators. S. B. died in the lifetime of the testator, having made a will by which she appointed R. P. her residuary legatee; Held, that on the death of S. B., her next of kin, and not her residuary legatee, became entitled to the legacy. (Bridge v. Abbott, 3 Bro. C. C. 224.)— Putin v. Hills, M. & K. 470.

2. (Annuities.) A testator gave several life annuities charged upon a particular fund, the income of which he considered to be equal to them in value; and he gave the fund itself over to another person for life, upon the respective deaths of the annuitants; the fund having proved deficient, and the annuitants having suffered a proportional abatement, it was held, on the death of one of them, that the income from the fund released by the falling in of her annuity went over to the tenant for life, and was not applicable to make good the deficiency of the continuing annuities.—Scott v. Salmond, M. & K. 363,

3. (Construction.) A testatrix gave real and personal estate to trustees, in trust for M. K. for life, with remainder as she should appoint; and in default of appointment, in trust to convey the real estate to such person or persons as would be the heir-at-law of M. K., and to transfer and assign the. personal estate to or amongst such person or persons as would be the personal representative of M. K. M. K. appointed only a part of the personal estate: Held, that the personal representatives meant next of kin.— Baines v. Otlcy, M. & K. 465.

BANKRUPTCY.

[Containing 3 Deacon & Chitty, Part 1; and Montagu & Ayrton, Part l.J

ACT OF BANKRUPTCY.

An attorney conveyed the principal part of his estates to trustees to sell and dispose of the proceeds as he should direct; a commission issued against him, but more than two months afterwards: Held, by the Master of the Rolls, that the deed evinced on the face of it no intention to defeat or delay creditors, the bankrupt still remaining in the beneficial ownership of the property; that the conveyance having been made, as appeared from the evidence in the cause, in Consequence of the bankrupt's depressed and disordered state of mind, though arising out of his pecuniary embarrassments, could not be said to have been intended to defeat or delay creditors. (Berney v. Davidson, 1 Bro. & Bing. 409.) Robinson v. Carringion M. & A. 1.

APPEAL.

(Special case.) When a special case arrives before the Lord Chancellor for hearing, it is final and conclusive as settled by the judge. Where, therefore, it was suggested that the case was erroneous, the Lord Chancellor refused permission to present a petition for the appeal to be heard on petition, and not by special case.—Exp. Low, M. & A. 189.

ASSIGNEES.

1. (Removal of.) Assignees are not removable, merely because the commissioners improperly reject the proofs of creditors, who would have been entitled to vote in the choice of assignees, if they had been permitted to prove their debts; unless their proofs are fraudulently procured to be rejected, with a view to influence the choice of assignees. (Exp. Durent, Exp. Thompson, Buck, 201.)—Exp. Milner, D. & C. 236.

2. (Allowance to official.) The Court has jurisdiction to revise the allowance made by a commissioner to an official assignee; but, it seems, will only, exercise it in extreme cases, as where the commissioner proceeds on principles evidently erroneous—or the allowance is manifestly extravagant. —Exp. Tiplady, M. & A. 184.

3. (Reserved bidding.) On the sale of property pledged, the assignees cannot have a mere reserved bidding, they may have permission to bid as any other persons.—In the matter of Skinner, M. & A. 81.

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