the Bar upon the subject, that a deputation of its members, headed by the most distinguished counsel, waited upon his Honour, and formally remonstrated with him upon his deportment towards the profession. Of late years the submission of the Bar precluded a repetition of the scenes which had occurred during the earlier part of his judicial career; but the asperities of the Judge were far from being mitigated in proportion to the absence of a spirit of resistance. There was upon the whole, however, an equitable equality in the dispensation of those asperities; one or two individuals might, perhaps, experience the Judge's want of courtesy in a more marked manner than others, but in general, the discipline to which the whole Bar was subjected was impartially administered, and it might have been said of his Honour, as of another distinguished personage, that he had "no predilections."

In a late appeal before the Chancellor, one of the counsel, by way of illustrating the treatment which he had received in the Court below, alluded to the manner in which justice was said to be administered in another court below, and cited the passage in Virgil—

66

hæc Rhadamanthus habet durissima regna, Castigatque auditque."

The illustration was made in no unfriendly spirit; on the contrary, it came from a quarter where it could only have been made with the most perfect urbanity and good humour; but truth may well be uttered in jest, and may, moreover, be well enforced by a little pleasantry; and so far was the illustration from being over-charged, that we believe, in the case in question, the chastisement had been administered without being coupled with the proceeding (the auditque) which accompanied or followed it in the court described by the poet. Respect to judges is a tribute so generally and cheerfully paid by the Bar, and any anomalous case of petulance or indecorum is so certainly followed by instant rebuke and repression, that the danger is always on the side of obsequiousness and undue submission. The duty of asserting the independence of the Bar rests in a great degree with its leading members; and if the judge degenerates into the' schoolmaster, it may well be

come the "sixth-form" scholars in silk to consider, whether they are not too big to undergo the discipline,

Such as Lycurgus taught, when, at the shrine
Of the Orthyan goddess, he bade flog
The little Spartans,-such as erst chastis'd
Our Milton when at college.

The members of the bar are " men, high-minded men;" they emphatically "know their rights," and "knowing" them, they should be as true to themselves as to their clients, and "dare maintain" them.

In conclusion, we must observe that the remarks we have just felt it our duty to make apply solely to the judicial character of the late Master of the Rolls; for in private life his amenity and gentleness of manner were as remarkable as were the acerbity and want of temper which he too frequently exhibited on the Bench.

Several biographical notices of the late Master of the Rolls have been published in the daily and weekly papers.' The following are the best authenticated particulars of his career:

He was the son of a shopkeeper at Bedford, and was educated at the grammar-school of that place. On leaving school he was placed in a merchant's counting-house, and afterwards in the office of Sir Robert Taylor (the father of the late Michael Angelo Taylor) to learn the profession of architecture. He subsequently betook himself to the study of the law, by the advice, it is said, of the late Mr. Cockerell, and became the pupil of Sir William Alexander (lately Chief Baron of the Exchequer) then practising as an equity draftsman. He was called to the bar by the Middle Temple in 1790, and for some time attended the Home circuit and Surrey sessions. In 1800, however, he gave up all the common law practice, and devoted himself exclusively to the equity courts and the Cockpit, where he was much employed in West Indian appeals. His subsequent success is well known; in 1807 he received a patent of precedence, and the same year he was returned for the borough of Seaford, where he had purchased property and established an interest. His principal parliamentary exploits were a defence of the Duke of York against Colonel The fullest and most accurate appeared in The Legal Observer. VOL. XII. G G

Wardell, and an attack upon the bill creating the office of Vice-Chancellor, an office which he was, notwithstanding, the second to fill. He succeeded Sir Thomas Plumer as Vice-Chancellor in 1817, and received the honour of knighthood upon the occasion. He succeeded Lord Lyndhurst as Master of the Rolls in May, 1827. He died at Edinburgh, September 16th, 1834, at the age of 74.

DIGEST OF CASES.

COMMON LAW.

[Comprising 1 Adolphus & Ellis, (in continuation of Barnewall & Adolphus,) Part 1; 3 Nevile & Manning, Part 3; 1 Bingham's New Cases, Part 1; 4 Moore & Scott, Parts 1 and 2; 2 Crompton & Meeson, Part 2; 4 Tyrwhitt, Parts 1 and 3;-all Cases included in former Digests being omitted.]

ABATEMENT, PLEA IN.-See PLEADING, 2.

AMENDMENT.

1. The declaration stated, that the defendants, in consideration that plaintiffs would supply A. with beer, undertook and promised the plaintiffs to pay them the amount of the beer so supplied. Another count stated an undertaking, upon the same consideration, to be accountable and to pay, &c. The proof was that defendants undertook, in writing, to guarantee to the plaintiffs the amount supplied: Held, that under the 3 & 4 W. 4, c. 42, s. 23, the judge at Nisi Prius might amend the record by substituting the word "guarantee" for "pay " in the first count.-Hanbury v. Ella, 1 Ad. & E. 61; 3 N. & M. 438.

2. Where the plaintiff had been misled by the defendant as to the nature of a charterparty, the Court permitted the plaintiff to amend by striking out a count in covenant on a charterparty, and declaring for freight, not upon the charterparty and that, although many years had elapsed since the commencement of the action, the defendant having been the cause of the delay.-Aylwin v. Todd, 1 Bing. N. C. 170.

And see PRACTICE, 8.

ARBITRATION.

(Sufficiency of arbitrator's adjudication.) On a reference of a cause and all matters in difference between the parties, the award is bad if it omit to assess damages on a judgment of nil dicit on a new assignment of excess in trespass. The arbitrator must make a substantial adjudication as to

all the issues. He need not, however, find for either party in the very words of the issue; it is sufficient if he decide substantially the questions in dispute. Wykes v. Shipton, 3 N. & M. 240.

And see LANDLORD AND TENANT, 3.

ARREST.

1. (What is a carrying to gaol.) Carrying a party arrested to public-houses within twenty-four hours from the arrest, without lodging him in gaol within that time, is not a beginning to carry to gaol within 32 G. 2, c. 28, s. 1.-Summers v. Moseley, 4 Tyr. 158.

2. (Protection of suitor from.) A party returning from attendance in a court of justice left the court at five o'clock, arrived at his office of business at twenty minutes after five, left it at seven, and in going along the street towards his house, went into a shop, where he was immediately arrested: Held, that he was privileged from arrest. (2 W. Bl. 1113.)—Pitt v. Coombs, 3 N. & M. 212.

3. (Arrest by private person on suspicion of felony.) A private person cannot apprehend another on suspicion of felony, for the purpose of taking him to the place where the theft was committed, there to ascertain whether he was the thief.— Hall v. Booth, 3 N. & M. 316.

ASSUMPSIT.

(Consideration.) The payment by the defendant of an agreed sum in discharge of an unliquidated demand for which an action has been commenced, is a good consideration for a promise by the plaintiff to stay proceedings and pay his own costs.-Wilkinson v. Byers, 1 Ad. & E. 106. ATTORNEY.

1. (Privilege of, from disclosing client's title—to whom available.) An attorney for a person not a party to an action, having refused at the trial to produce a deed belonging to his client, was directed by the judge to give parol evidence of its contents, and that evidence went to the jury: Held, that even supposing the judge was in error in so directing, the parties to the action had no right to object to the evidence going to the jury, since it was no privilege of theirs by which the deed was withheld.-Marston v. Downes, 1 Ad. & E. 31.

2. (Taxation of bill.) A Court has no power to order an attorney's bill to be taxed, where it does not appear that any part of the business was done in the Court to which the application is made.-Exp. King, 3 N. & M. 437. 3. (Right to proceed for costs.) A defendant, on being sued, paid the debt, but refused to the pay costs; the plaintiff's attorney proceeded to trial and issued execution for them. The Court stayed proceedings on an affidavit that he was uncertificated, and had omitted to enrol himself as an attorney of the Court. (3 Bing. 9; 3 Moo. & Sc. 195.)-Meekin v. Whalley, 1 Bing. N. C. 59.

4. (Enrolment of, in C. P.) The book of the clerk of the warrants is the proper place for the enrolment of the name of an attorney of the C. P. It is the attorney's duty to cause his name to be enrolled, and if he omits to