same object, against the defendant's executor. The proceedings in the latter suit were stayed until the costs of the former were paid. (Pickett v. Loggon, 5 Ves. 706.)-Spires v. Sewell, Sim. 193.

9. (Evidence.) The plaintiff in a suit examined a witness as to a conversation between the witness and the defendant, but declined to read the deposition: Held, that the defendant could not read it, as it was not evidence for him.-Wilson v. Calvert, Sim. 194.

10. (Reading answer.) If a plaintiff reads a passage in an answer as evidence, he must read all other passages explanatory of that read, whether connected with it in point of grammatical construction, or separated by passages relating to distinct subjects.-Nurse v. Bunn, Sim. 225. 11. (Conditional order.) In a suit by children, entitled to portions, against the executor of their father's will, whose estate was charged with the portions, the executor being guardian of the children, and also a creditor upon the father's estate, which suit was continued against his representative, certain sums were, by the master's report, found due to the estate of the executor; the report of the master proceeding on an account stated and settled between the executor and some of the children entitled to portions, and signed by them, but not signed by the plaintiffs in the suit. The report was confirmed; and, after various proceedings in the suit, upon application of the plaintiffs, leave was given to take proceedings for reviewing the matter of the report, on the condition that the plaintiffs should pay the costs of the proceeding, or otherwise that the matter of the report should stand confirmed: Held, on appeal, that the plaintiffs, not having complied with the conditions, were not entitled to relief.-Bouchier v. Dillon, Bl. 688.

12. (Dismissing bill.) In computing the time in which a bill may be dismissed, on the ground of no proceedings having been taken since the answer was filed, the intervals mentioned in the nineteenth amended order are not to be reckoned.—Attorney-General v. Jones, Sim. 246. 13. (Trustee.) A new trustee was appointed under 11 Geo. 4, and 1 Wm. 4, c. 60, without a reference to the master, the petitioner being the only person interested in the trust property.—Er parte Shick, Sim, 281. 14. (Same.) A deeree declared a defendant, against whom the bill had been taken pro confesso, to be a trustee of stock for the plaintiffs; but the Court declined to refer it to the master to appoint a person to transfer the stock in the place of the defendant, except upon a petition presented under 11 Geo. 4, and 1 Wm. 4, c. 60.-Fellowes v. Till, Sim.

319.

15. (Same.) A mortgagee in fee died intestate as to the mortgaged premises, but having bequeathed her personal estate to B., B. presented a petition under 11 G. 4, and 1 W. 4, c, 60, praying that some person might be appointed in the place of the mortgagee's heir, who could not be found, to convey the premises to him. The Court held, that the act was not intended to apply to cases like this, and refused to make any order. In re Stanley, Sim. 320.

16. (Same.) The Vice-Chancellor has no jurisdiction under 11 G. 4, and 1 W. 4, c. 60, in cases of lunatic trustees or mortgagees, beyond directing the reference to the master in the first instance.-Anonymous, Sim. 322. And see PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS-InterPleader-Issue.

PROBATE DUTY.

A testator having a general power of appointment over a fund by deed or will, exercises it by the latter: Held, that the testator by this appointment made the fund part of his general personal estate, and that the duty was payable.---Palmer v. Whitmore, Sim. 178.

PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS.

On a bill of discovery in aid of an action at law to try the question, whether the plaintiff was a resident householder within a certain parish, and liable as such to parochial rates; the Court ordered a defendant, the vestry clerk of the parish, to produce certain documents relating to the matter in question, and admitted by his answer to be in his possession.-Burrell v. Nicholson, M, & K, 680,

RECOVERY.

Estates were conveyed to J. and T. and the heirs of T. T. died, leaving J. him surviving, having devised the estates to his son in tail. The son conveyed the estates to D. to make him tenant to the præcipe, and a recovery was suffered to the use of the son in fee. D. afterwards died : Held, that though the recovery did not bar the estate tail, it had the effect of drawing out the legal estate from D., and that his heir was not a trustee within the stat. 11 G. 4, and 1 W. 4, c. 60. Re Debary, Sim. 283. SOLICITOR AND CLIENT.

1. (Taxation.) The decision of the master is final on taxation, and is reviewed by the Court only where the master proceeds on some mistaken principle. (See Fenton v. Crickett, 3 Mad. 496.)—Alsop v. Lord Oxford, M. & K. 564.

2. (Charges.) It is the duty of the master to protect the client against unusual or unnecessary charges of the solicitor; and he was held to have properly disallowed a charge by a solicitor in the country for his personal attendance in town for the purpose of comparing an abstract with the title deeds, that business being usually entrusted to the agent's clerks. The case would not be varied by the circumstance that the client requested the attendance of the solicitor, unless he was informed by the latter that it was not considered necessary by the usage of the profession.-S. C.

3. (Will.) The conduct of an attorney drawing a will under which he takes a considerable benefit, will be viewed with jealousy; and a jury trying the validity of the will should be satisfied that the testator knew its contents, but this they may be on circumstantial evidence only,— Raworth v. Marriott, M. & K. 643.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.

H. K. W, and F. were entitled respectively to shares in a theatre, and by

agreement between them in 1822, the theatre was let to K. W. and F. for a term of ten years, at a rent of £12,000. C., who had also a share in the theatre, was not a party to this agreement. In 1823 C. filed a bill against H., K., W., and F., stating a deed made in 1812 between the then shareholders of the theatre, by which they contracted with each other that the funds of the theatre should be applied in payment of debts, of which some remained unsatisfied, and that the funds were then applied contrary to the provisions of this deed: upon this bill a receiver was appointed by order in 1824. This deed appeared to have been acted upon for a year or two, but not afterwards. As soon as the receiver had been appointed, K., W., and F. gave notice to determine the agreement of 1822, upon the ground of the appointment of the receiver, and that they had no notice of the deed of 1812, although they claimed under parties to that deed.

Upon this notice H. filed a bill against K., W., and F., and also against C., upon the ground of acquiescence, to compel performance of the agreement: Held, on appeal, that a Court of Equity would not compel specific performance of the agreement, false and erroneous statements as to the profits of the theatre having been made, although the defendants had access to the books by which the real state of the profits might have been ascertained.- Harris v. Kemble, Bl. 730. And see VENDOR AND PURCHASER.

TENANT FOR LIFE.

A tenant for life, subject to impeachment for waste, is entitled to the interest of money produced by the sale of timber cut by order of the Court. (Wickham v. Wickham, 19 Ves. 419.)-Tooker v. Annesly, Sim. 236. TITHES.

1. (Mill.) A new mill erected on the site of an ancient mill is exempt from tithes; but if it is built partly on the site of an ancient mill, and partly on a new site, it is not exempt.-Newcome v. Matthew, Sim. 243.

2. (Evidence.) In a suit for tithes between a vicar and the owner of a mill, an old map of the parish, belonging to the lord of the manor, is not admissible in evidence for the defendant.-S. C.

TRUST.

1. (Statute 1 W. 4, c. 60.) This statute, intituled "An Act for amending the Laws respecting Conveyances and Transfers of Estates vested in Trustees and Mortgagees," applies only to a cestui que trust, who is named in the instrument upon which his title depends, or to a person who claims directly under a cestui que trust so named, as real or personal representative, or as assignee.—In the matter of Merry, M. & K.

677.

2. (Parent and child.) A father transferred a sum of stock into the name of his son and of a third person, the banker of both father and son, and he directed the latter to carry the dividends when received to the son's account. This was done, and the son enjoyed the dividends during the

father's life: Held, on the death of the father, that the transfer was an advancement to the son (Taylor v. Taylor, 1 Atk. 386; Lamplugh v. Lamplugh, 1 P. W. 111): that neither a codicil executed two years after the transfer, nor any other matter er post facto could be allowed to alter what had been done that the language of the codicil was too vague to raise a case of election between the stock transferred and the benefits given by the will.-Crabb v. Crabb, M. & K. 511.

3. A father transferred a sum of consols into the names of his illegitimate daughter and her husband and their two children, declaring the investment to be for the benefit of all his daughter's children who should attain 21. He afterwards transferred a sum of long annuities into his own name jointly with the names of his daughter and her two eldest children, declaring that he did not intend to part with the control over this, and he in part afterwards disposed of it by his will: Held, on the death of the daughter and her husband, and of the two eldest children under 21, that two surviving children, who had attained 21, were entitled to the consols, and that the long annuities passed by the will.-Kilpin v. Kilpin, M. & K. 520.

4. (Implied.) A testator lending a sum of money on mortgage, had the security made in the name of his brother, for whose benefit he declared that the principal should be. He however had no communication with his brother on the subject, and always received the interest himself. In a suit against the brother, held, that a resulting trust may be rebutted as to part of the land comprised in a deed, and prevail as to the remainder. (Lloyd v. Spillett, 2 Atk. 148; Lane v. Dighton, Amb. 409): that in this case the trust being of personal estate, was not within the statute of frauds, or the doctrine of resulting trusts under that statute; but that the property belonged to the brother by force of the testator's declaration. Benbow v. Townsend, M. & K. 506.

And see RECOVERY; WILL, 2.

VENDOR AND PURCHASER.

1. (Deposit.) Where a vendor filed a bill for a specific performance, and was not able to make a good title, his bill was dismissed, and he was ordered to return the deposit with interest.-Lord Anson v. Hodges, Sim.

227.

WILL.

1. (Remoteness.) A testator bequeathed his residuary estate to trustees, in trust for the support, by sale or otherwise, of his wife for life, and after her decease, to preserve the then remaining part of his estate, or the produce thereof, for the grandchildren of his brother, to be by them received in equal proportions when they should severally attain 26, and when the youngest should have attained that age, and have received his final dividend or share of the estate, the trust should cease. The testator left his widow surviving, who died shortly afterwards. At her death several grandchildren of the brother were in existence, and several were born subsequently: Held, that the will was not void for remote

ness; and that those only of the grandchildren were entitled to take who were in esse at the death of the widow.-Kevern v. Williams, Sim. 171. 2. (Construction.) A testator gave all his property to trustees, in trust to invest it in securities at interest for the use of his nephew, to be paid at such time and in such manner as the trustees should think fit; and when the nephew should attain 21, that the trustees should pay him the amount of the interest or proceeds of the money come to their hands, as they might think most for his advantage, in weekly or quarterly payments, for his life: Held, that there being in the first part of the will an absolute bequest, the Court could not cut that down on account of subsequent doubtful expressions.-Billing v. Billing, Sim. 232.

3. (Same.) Testator gave one-third of his residue to his niece, which he desired might be settled by his executors on her, for her separate use for her life, but to devolve to her issue at her death, and failing issue, then to revert to his nephew. The Court directed the third to be settled in trust for the niece, for her separate use for life, and after her death in trust for her issue then living, and if there should be no such issue, then in trust for the nephew.-Stonor v. Curwin, Sim. 264.

4. (Same.) A., on his marriage, grants a rent-charge to his wife out of his estates for her jointure, which he secures by a term limited to trustees. By his will he gives his mansion-house and park, being part of the settled estates, to his wife for life, and the rest of his estates to B.; and directs that the repairs, painting, &c. of his mansion-house shall be paid for by sale of timber on the premises devised to B., and then he confirms the settlement: Held, that the jointure was wholly raisable out of these estates. (Knight v. Calthorpe, 1 Vern. 347.)- Grigby v. Powell,

Sim. 590.

5. (Same.) A bequest of a year's wages to each of the testator's servants, over and above what might be due to them at the time of his decease, was held to apply only to family servants usually hired by the year.— (Chilcott v. Bromley, 12 Ves. 114; Exp. Craufoot, 1 Mont. 270.)— Booth v. Dean, M. & K. 560.

6. (Trust.) A testator gave his residuary personal estate to two trustees, their executors, administrators, and assigns, upon trust to apply the same as he should appoint; and in default of appointment, he left it to his said trustees to settle such part thereof, either to charitable purposes at their discretion or otherwise, for the separate benefit of his sister and her children. The surviving trustee having died, leaving a portion of the fund unapplied: Held, that there having been no disposition in favour of charity as to the unappointed part, the Court would not interfere; and that the trustees having had a personal discretion as to the application of the fund, which they had died without exercising, that part was undisposed of by the testator, and belonged to the next of kin, Down v. Worrall, M. & K. 561.

7. (Construction.) A testator having freehold and leasehold property in the same place, by a devise of his lands, tenements, and hereditaments. in that