1. The life estates created by statute,
giving a surviving husband or wife one-
third interest for life in the real estate of
the other, are subject to the incidents of
common-law life estates, although they are
not the same as the common-law estates;
and the life tenant is therefore impeach-
able for waste. Swayne v. Lone Acre Oil
Co. (Tex.)
986

2. One entitled to an undivided life es-
tate under a statute giving a surviving hus-
band or wife a one-third interest in the
real estate of the other cannot demand
102 absolutely any part of the production of

oil wells subsequently opened upon the
property by the remainder-men, but is en-
titled only to the income upon one third
of the oil produced.
Id.
Right to dividends.

3. The rule that cash dividends on cor-
porate stock go to life tenants, and stock
dividends to the remainder-men, will not
yield whenever an investigation might ap-
pear to indicate its failure in a given case
to accomplish what might be conceived to
be exact justice, upon the basis of some
theoretical view of the ultimate rights of
persons asserting conflicting successive
stock interests. Smith v. Dana (Conn.) 76
4. Withdrawal from certain incidental
branches of business which a corporation
has been carrying on does not make the
distribution of the money invested in them
as dividends a partial liquidation which
will carry the dividends to the remainder-
as against life tenants, where the
capital stock is not impaired, and its value
remains above par, and practically the
same after the dividends as before. Id.

men

Interest of life tenant in mines under
land; where life tenant is widow whose
estate is created by statute; right to oil
produced from wells drilled by remainder
men; to what life estates doctrine of waste
applies; what constitutes waste.

LIGHT.

2. It is not culpable laches for one who
has an equitable defense or reduction to a
promissory note which has been and is the
subject of pending litigation in another
court, and which, if available at law, would
survive as long as the cause of action upon
the note existed, to wait until an affirma-
tive action at law upon the subject of the
defense is barred, and until the equitable
defense is rejected in an action at law upon
the note, before invoking the aid of a court
of equity to enjoin the prosecution of the
latter action until his equitable defense is

5. Under a stipulation in a mortgage
securing a series of notes due at intervals
of one year, that nonpayment of any one of
them, together with nonpayment of taxes
due on the mortgaged premises, shall ma-
986 ture the entire debt, failure to pay the first
note at its maturity and taxes due at that
time, which default continues until all the
notes are due, starts the running of the
statute of limitations in favor of the
whole debt. Snyder v. Miller (Kan.) 250
Removal of bar.

Municipal Liability for Falling over
Horse Block from Lack of, see
HIGHWAYS, 8.

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS.
Estoppel to Plead, see ESTOPPEL, 7.
Invalidity of Short Limitation for
Suit on Policy, see INSURANCE, S.
Time for Filing Bill of Review, see
REVIEW, 2.

1. Under ordinary circumstances a suit
in equity will not be stayed for laches be-

6. Giving a note for interest upon a
larger note already barred by the statute
of limitations, which does not mention or
in any way refer to the earlier note, does
not revive it under a statute providing that
causes of action founded on contract are
revived by an admission in writing, signed
by the party to be charged, that the debt

is unpaid, or by a like new promise to pay | MAIL.
the same. Kleis v. McGrath (Iowa) 260

7. Payment of the taxes due on mort-
gaged premises by one who purchased the
property subject to the mortgage, but did
not assume its payment, does not suspend
the running of limitations against the
right to foreclose the mortgage, which had
been started by failure of the mortgagor
to pay at maturity the first of a series of
notes secured by the mortgage and taxes
due at that time, the mortgage providing
that nonpayment of any one of the notes,
together with nonpayment of taxes due on
the premises, should mature the entire
debt. Snyder v. Miller (Kan.)

NOTES AND BRIEFS.

250

The fact that each member is entitled
to trade out of the amount he has paid in
whenever he chooses to withdraw from the
club does not prevent a suit club, which is a
scheme by which a certain number of per-
sons pay a small sum per week, and choose
by lot each week one of the number who
shall receive a suit of clothes worth much
more than such weekly payment, upon re-
ceipt of which he ceases to be a member of
the club, from being a lottery. People v.
McPhee (Mich.)
505

Contract by, see CONFLICT OF Laws, 2.
MANDAMUS.

NOTES AND BRIEFS.

Mandamus; to compel court to proceed
with trial; where party is in contempt. 312

To compel courts and judges to approve
and accept bonds; to compel performance
of act by officer who pleads authority of un-
constitutional act for nonperformance. 428

To restore to membership one expelled
from state legislature; mandamus from one
branch to co-ordinate branch; not issued
when not effectual or beneficial; to control
discretion of lawmaking branch of govern-
ment.
557

2. Failure of an engineer to observe a
custom of the road, when cars are being
coupled together, to stop his engine imme-
diately when the cars come together and hold
it stationary until signaled by the brake-
men making the coupling to move it again,
is negligence rendering the company liable
for injury to a brakeman in consequence
thereof. Schus V. Powers-Simpson
(Minn.)

Co.
887

3. An employer without the necessary

technical knowledge to enable him to deter- | mand relative to the handling of the cars.
mine whether or not a boiler furnished by Dill v. Marmon (Ind.)
him is safe may rely upon the statement of
the official city boiler inspector, so far as his
duty towards his employees is concerned.
Service v. Shoneman (Pa.)
792

freight train, so as to render the railroad | same dangers and risks as are employees of
railroad corporations engaged in the busi-
ness of a common carrier. Schus v. Pow-
ers-Simpson Co. (Minn.)

company liable for injury to the latter by
his negligence. Louisville & N. R. Co. v.
Dillard (Tenn.)
746
17. A servant employed to assist in shift-
ing cars to be loaded at a mill cannot hold
the master liable for an injury caused by
the negligence of the foreman in charge of
the two or three men engaged in such work,
but who is not at the head of a department
of the work, in directing him to push a car
after it has been set in motion by the mo-
mentum of another car, or in failing to
stop the latter after the servant, in attempt
ing to obey the order, has slipped and fallen
in such a way that he will be injured in case
it is not stopped. Dill v. Marmon (Ind.)
163

18. The doctrine of fellow service will not
defeat the liability of a steamship company
for death of a member of the crew through
the sinking of the vessel, although the cause
of the accident was the negligence of the
master and pilot, where the loss of life was
due to inability to launch the boats because
of insufficiency of the crew in that they
could not understand the language of the
officers, and had not been drilled in lowering
the boats. Re Pacific Mail S. S. Co. (C. C.
App. 9th C.)

71

19. An employee injured by the negli-
gence of another while both are acting in
the line of duty as employees of a corpora-
tion has a right of action against the com-
pany, under the Indiana employer's liabil-
ity act of 1893. Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L.
875
R. Co. v. Montgomery (Ind.)

20. Negligence of a superior servant of a
railroad company, causing injury to an em-
ployee under his control, renders the em-
ployer liable under Ohio act April 2, 1890.
although the negligence was in respect of
the performance of work of the kind done by
the injured person, and not in the perform-
ance of any duty imposed by law on the
master personally. Peirce v. Van Dusen
(C. C. App. 6th C.)

705

887

23. A statute making void a contract by
a corporation for the release or relief from
liability to an employee for negligence of a
servant is not unconstitutional.
fellow
Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Montgom-
ery (Ind.)

875

24. An agreement by a railroad employee
that the acceptance of benefits from a relief
fund shall operate as a release of all claims
against the railroad company is void, un-
der the employer's liability act of 1893, al-
Id.
though the release is only conditional.
Liability to third persons for serv-
ant's acts.

To guest at Hotel, see INNKEEPERS,

Duty to furnish safe appliances; measure
of care; furnishing appliance in ordinary
use; where there are safer appliances; lia-
bility for error in judgment in selecting ap-
pliances; right to rely on inspection of ap-

21. An action against a receiver of a
railroad corporation is within the provisions
of Ohio act April 2, 1890, making railroad
companies liable in certain cases for the neg-pliances by public officials.
ligence of fellow servants or employees who
have power or authority to direct or control
the one injured.

Id.

797

Defective appliances; when servant may
recover for injury caused by; duty of in-
spection; negligent construction of scaffold;
22. A corporation operating a "logging where scaffold erected by independent con-
tractor; liability of master for safety of
railroad," not as a common carrier, but ex-
clusively for its own private business, is machinery and appliances furnished and
subject to the provisions of a statute mak-built by other contractor; duty to furnish
ing railroad corporations liable for injuries safe place to work; delegation of duty of
to servants caused by the negligence of fel- inspection; choice of methods of doing work
low servants, since its employees engaged in by employee; employee's knowledge of dan-
the operation of the road are exposed to the | ger.

697