REMAINDER-MEN.
See LIFE TENANTS.
7. That the title to property for which
replevin is brought is shown to be in one
of the plaintiffs is sufficient to sustain the
Liability of Trustee in Bankruptcy for, action; and defendant cannot take advan-
3. Replevin lies for growing strawberry
plants, although they are attached to the
soil, since they are fruits of industry, and
must be treated as chattels. Cannon v.
Mathews (Ark.)
827
4. The rule that one in adverse possession
under color of title of a tract of land is en-
titled to maintain replevin for logs cut
thereon by one claiming to be the true own-
er, regardless of the true location of the ul-
timate title to the land, applies where the
spot from which the logs were cut is an-
nexed to the actual possession of a portion
of the tract because within the boundaries
of the paper title. Wheeler V. Clark
(Tenn.)
5. That logs for which replevin is brought
were not all cut from plaintiff's land is im-
material, where the one from whose land
they were cut transferred all his right to
plaintiff before the bringing of the action.
Id.
6. That one suing to recover logs cut
from real estate is shown to have deeded
away a portion of the land, and that the
grant is not shown not to have included the
logs, are immaterial, where the grantee is
joined as plaintiff in the action.
tage of the fact that other plaintiffs are
not shown to have a right to the possession
of any interest therein.
2. Although there is no express statutory
limitation as to the filing of bills of re-
view, the analogous limitation of the right
of appeal should govern; and a bill, of re-
view cannot be filed after the lapse of three
years from the final decree, except in case
of new or newly discovered matter. Id.
3. Condonation of the adultery on which
a decree for divorce was based will not
justify the granting of leave to file a bill of
review. If intended to be interposed, it
should have been pleaded and proved in the
original suit.
Id.
Obtaining leave of court for.
4. When it is sought to reverse a decree
upon the discovery of some new matter,
leave of the court must first be obtained by
Id. petition, supported by affidavit that the ev-
Parol Evidence as to, see EVIDENCE, 14.
1. An implied warranty that an article
will be fit for a particular purpose may be
inferred from a contract to make or fur-
nish it to accomplish that specific purpose,
because the accomplishment of the purpose
is the essence of the contract. Davis Calyx
Drill Co. v. Mallory (C. C. App. 8th C.) 973
2. No implied warranty of the fitness of
an article for a particular purpose arises
out of a contract to make or supply a de-
scribed and definite article, although the
seller knows that the purchaser is purchas-
ing it to accomplish the specific purpose,
because the essence of the contract is the
delivery of the specific article, and not the
accomplishment of the purpose.
3. An implied warranty of the fitness of
a machine to do a particular work does not
include a warranty that it will do the
work as rapidly or economically as some
other specified machine; such a covenant
can be introduced by express contract only.
Id.
4. There is no implied warranty that a
drill and its machinery are suitable to bore
holes through a particular strata of land,
where a contract in writing, containing no
reference to a warranty, is made with a
manufacturer to buy one class F3 drill
made by the latter and described in his
catalogue, and certain other specific ma-
chinery and tools, for an agreed price, al-
though before the contract is made the pur-
chaser informs the seller that he wants
the drill and machinery to bore holes
through certain described strata of land,
and the manufacturer assures him that its
class F3 drill will do this work as rapidly
and economically as a diamond drill. Id.
Sale; written contract of sale; right to
ble damage is suffered, and no fraud is in-
flicted upon him, and where he is in statu
quo at the time of the commencement of
his action. Howes v. Barmon (Id.) 568
2. Specific performance of an oral agree-
ment to make a lease may be decreed where
a signed memorandum in writing of the
terms, made at the time of the agreement.
and a signed but undelivered lease, taken
together, show a completed agreement upon
the terms of the lease. Charlton v. Colum-
bia Real Estate Co. (N. J. Err. & App.)
1. A court of equity will not grant the
aid of specific performance where the party 4. A provision in a statute authorizing
invoking its aid has not parted with any the condemnation of land for boulevards to
consideration or property, and no irrepara-connect parks is covered by a title stating
the object of the statute to be to authorize | STREET FAIR.
the acquisition, improvement, and mainte-
nance of parks.
Permitting Use of Streets for,
HIGHWAYS, 3, 4.
5. A prohibition of contracts releasing STREET RAILWAYS.
corporations from their liability to injured
employees is within the main subject ex-
pressed in the title, which is the regula-
tion of liability in such cases. Pittsburgh,
C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Montgomery (Ind.)
.875
Arrest of Motorman to Abate. Nui-
sance, see FALSE IMPRISONMENT.
Negligence of motorman.
Question for Jury as to, see TRIAL, 5.
1. The speed of an electric car running
along a sparsely settled country road in the
6. An amendatory act, whose caption space between intersecting crossroads in the
merely recites the title of the original act, dark is to be governed, not by the ability of
without enlarging its scope, is constitution- the motorman to stop his car after discov
al and valid, providing its purview is ger-ering an object on the track by the aid of
mane to the title of the original act. Mem-
phis v. Hastings (Tenn.)
Special legislation.
7. The employer's liability act changing
the law as to the defense in case of negli-
gence of fellow servants of corporations is:
not within a constitutional provision as to
local or special laws "regulating the prac-
tice in courts." Pittsburgh, C. C. & St.
L. R. Co. v. Montgomery (Ind.)
his headlight, but by the ability of persons
on the track conveniently to leave it after
seeing the light and hearing or understand-
ing the signals given by the approaching
car. Vizacchero v. Rhode Island Co. (R. I.)
3. A motorman in charge of a street car,
upon seeing a wagon approaching the track,
has the right to presume that the driver
will use his senses to avoid driving onto the
track in front of the car.
389
Metropolitan Street R. Co. (Mo.)
4. One in charge of an electric street car
approaching a public crossing must antic-
ipate that any person approaching the junc-
tion from either side may turn his team
into the cross street, and must exercise all
due care to have his car under such con-
trol as to be able to stop it at the crossing,
if necessary, to avoid an accident. Marden
v. Portsmouth, K. & Y. Street R. Co. (Me.)
300
Contributory negligence.
Question for Jury as to, see TRIAL, 9.
Imputing Owner's Negligence to Driv-
er of Wagon, see NEGLIGENCE, 9.
5. It is negligence to attempt to drive
across a street car track in dangerous prox-
imity to an approaching car which is in
plain sight, whether the car is actually seen
or not. Markowitz v. Metropolitan Street
R. Co. (Mo.)
careful and prudent man, having in mind | puting time; transaction of judicial busi-
his own safety, under like circumstances, to ness on; signing of bill of exceptions on
conclude that no car is in such proximity Sunday.
as if properly managed, to endanger his
safety in crossing.
Id. SUPERINTENDING CONTROL.
See COURTS, 6, 7.
SUPPORT.
Liability where both parties are neg-
ligent.
8. To hold a street car company liable
for the results of a collision with a team
attempting to cross the track in front of a
car notwithstanding the negligence of the
driver, those in charge of the car must
have been guilty of gross negligence, or
reckless and wanton conduct. Markowitz
v. Metropolitan Street R. Co. (Mo.) 389
9. The negligence of a man in crawling
on his hands and knees towards an ap-
proaching electric car in the dark after the
appearance of the headlight, which can be
seen 800 feet away, is continuing, so as not
to entitle his personal representative to
hold the company liable for his death on
the theory of last clear chance, because the
speed of the car is so great that it cannot
be stopped after his presence on the track
is discovered. Vizacchero v. Rhode Island
Co. (R. I.)
188
Street railways; limiting speed of street
cars; unreasonableness of limitation; speed
on country roads; injury to intoxicated per-
son crawling along track.
189
Care required in crossing track; negli
gence in running car at improper speed;
measure of care required of motorman;
relative rights of street car and pedestrians
in street.
300
Duty of motorman to avoid injuring per-
sons on track; effect of contributory negli-
gence where motorman saw peril in time to
prevent accident; not necessary that motor-
man be guilty of gross negligence to render
company liable.
Duty to look and listen before crossing
track; duty of motorman to person on or
near track; negligence in walking on track.
606
SUBPARTNERSHIP.
See PARTNERSHIP.
Excluding in Computing Time to Sign
Bill of Exceptions, see APPEAL AND
ERROR, 3.
Sunday; including or excluding, in com-
Of Wife; Husband's Liability for, see
HUSBAND AND WIFE, 14.
Of Insane Person, see INCOMPETENT
PERSONS.
3. The holding of annual stockholders'
and directors' meetings at the place named
in the articles of incorporation as the home
of the corporation is not its principal busi-
ness, so as to make it taxable there, where
substantially all the business for which it
is organized is transacted and its funds
kept at another place, under a statute pro-
viding that a corporation shall be taxable
where its office is located by its charter, pro-
vided its business is actually transacted
there, but that, if it shall establish its
principal office in another place, then the
place where it transacts its principal busi-
ness shall be deemed its residence for pur-
poses of taxation.
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