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than is the case with ordinary banks. By the pass book, and to prescribe that when a agreement between the bank and its deposi- depositor wishes to assign his funds on detors, possession of the pass book is made posit he must do it in a certain manner. It prima facie evidence of the right to draw is also urged that the rule reciting that upon the fund which it represents. The "every effort will be made to protect decheck itself is unlike checks drawn upon or positors against fraud" required that the dinary banks, not being negotiable, and be cashier or teller to whom the check was preing in reality nothing but a receipt for the sented should at least compare the signamoney drawn.

Of course, a savings bank ture to the check with that of the plaintiff would be liable if its officers or employees on file with the bank; and that the ensuing should negligently or recklessly pay out mon- clause, “but payment made to a person preey to one not entitled to receive it; and this senting pass book shall be good and valid on seems to be the basis of the cases relied up-account of the owner." etc., when taken in on as authority by counsel for the plaintiff connection with the first part of the rule, in error. But in this case there seems to conveys the meaning that the bank will only have been no negligence chargeable to the be excused from liability when it pays the bank. The money was paid in good faith to money after having exerted "every effort” one in possession of the plaintiff's pass book, and used extreme caution to prevent fraud. and apparently clothed with the right to We cannot agree with this construction of that possession. Under the rules of the bank the rule. Giving it what seems to us a reaassented to by the plaintiff, possession of the sonable intendment, the rule means this: pass book was prima facie evidence of the “We will do what we can to keep you from right to draw the money which it repre- being defrauded, but, as the pass book is sented; and there seems to have been abso- prima facie evidence of the right to draw lutely nothing to put the teller on inquiry as money, you must look well after your pass to the genuineness of the check. Under these book, and see that it does not fall into the circumstances we cannot hold that it was his hands of a thief or forger. Our means of duty to go further, and compare the signa- identification are imperfect, and if your pass ture with that of the plaintiff on file in the book is presented by someone other than bank, and that, failing in this, the bank is yourself, with apparent right to draw your liable for the money so paid out.

money, we will, unless our suspicions are Much stress is laid in the brief of counsel aroused, honor his check without further for the plaintiff in error upon the rule that, question. We will deal honestly and fairly unless the depositor is personally present with you, but you must take every precauwith his pass book when drawing money, tion to protect yourself by the preservation "an order properly signed and witnessed of your pass book.” Such a rule is reasonmust accompany the presentation of the book able, and, as the plaintiff in the present case in case of withdrawal," and it is urged that assented to it in writing, he is bound by its because the plaintiff did not appear in per

terms. son, and the person who did present the pass The foregoing disposes of the case on its book had no order as required by the rule, substantial merits, and it follows that, rethe bank is liable for the payment of the gardless of inaccuracies in the charge of the money. Thoughtful consideration must court as disclosed by the motion for a new show that this argument is entirely specious. , trial, the verdict was demanded, and the Plainly, this rule has no application to a case judgment overruling the motion will not be like this, where the check drawn was in fraud | disturbed. of both the plaintiff and the bank. Its Judgment affirmed. purport is merely to show that a savingsbank account is not negotiable by delivery of

All the Justices concur.

MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT.

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan

V.

John P. SCHNEIDER, Plff. in Certiorari.

(.... Mich.

thority to control, prescribe, and regulate the manner in which the streets shall be used

and enjoyed. 2. The court will take judicial notice

of the fact that many automobiles may be driven at a speed of at least 40 miles per

..)

hour. 3. Authority given to a municipal cor

poration to regulate includes authorit

1. Power to require the registering

and numbering of automobiles is conferred upon the city council by charter au

NOTE.—As to limitation of speed of automobiles in streets under control of park com

missioners, see, in this series, Com. v. Crowninsbield, 68 L. R. A. 245, with footnote as to

nance.

to license as a means of regulation when it | L. R. A. 498, 28 Am. St. Rep. 276, 50 N. W. cannot be otherwise accomplished.

661; Chaddock v. Day, 75 Mich. 527, 4 4. Requiring an automobile to carry L. R. A. 809, 13 Am. St. Rep. 468, 42 N. W. a number loes not violate the constitution

977. al provision against unreasonable searches, or compel the owner to testify against him Any person is at liberty to pursue any self, or deprive him of property without due lawful calling, and to do so in his own process of law.

way, not encroaching on the rights of

others. (April 21, 1905.)

Sherlock v. Stuart, 96 Mich. 197, 21 L.

R. A. 580, 55 N. W. 845; Cooley, Const. YERTIORARI to the Recorder's Court of Lim. 6th ed. 742.

Detroit to review a judgment convict Property does not consist merely in the ing defendant of violating a municipal ordi- title and possession; it includes the right Affirmed.

to make any use of it. The facts are stated in the opinion.

Kuhn v. Detroit, 70 Mich. 534, 38 N. W. Messrs. Henry F. Chipman and Henry 470. Look, for plaintiff in certiorari:

The ordinance is inquisitorial, and comMunicipal corporations derive all their pels the owner either to submit to a search power from legislative acts, and can pass no or to give testimony against himself. ordinance which conflicts with the terms of

Robison v. Haug, 71 Mich. 38, 38 N. W. the charter.

668; Chaddock v. Day, 75 Mich. 527, People v. Armstrong, 73 Mich. 288, 2 L. 4 L. R. A. 809, 13 Am. St. Rep. 468, 42 R. A. 721, 16 Am. St. Rep. 578, 41 N. W. N. W. 977; Weimer v. Bunbury, 30 Mich. 275; Taylor v. Bay City Street R. Co. 80 201; Rosenthal v. Dickerman (Rosenthal Vich. 77, 45 N. W. 335; Grand Rapids v. v. Muskegon Circuit Judge), 98 Mich. 208, Newton, 111 Mich. 48, 35 L. R. A. 226, 22 L. R. A. 693, 39 Am. St. Rep. 535, 57 66 Am. St. Rep. 387, 69 N. W. 84.

N. W. 112; Rouse, H. & Co. v. Donovan, Whenever a by-law is clearly unconsti- 104 Mich. 234, 27 L. R. A. 577, 53 Am. St. tutional, or its provisions are inconsistent Rep. 457, 62 N. W. 359; Parsons v. Ruswith any of the requisites to its validity, it sell, 11 Mich. 113, 83 Am. Dec. 728. becomes the duty of the courts, as a matter The common council of the city of Detroit of law, to declare it void.

possesses no authority to make criminal by Cooley, Const. Lim. 6th ed. p. 240. ordinance that which is not so in fact.

Police power may regulate and preserve, Grand Rapids v. Powers, 89 Mich. 94, 14 and extend to the protection of, the public L. R. A. 498, 28 Am. St. Rep. 276, 50 health, good order, and decency, the lives, N. W. 661; Re Frazee, 63 Mich. 407, 6 Am. health, and property of citizens; may main. St. Rep. 310, 30 N. W. 72. tain good order and public morals, and The ordinance, in compelling owners of prevent imposition and fraud.

automobiles to take out a license, imposes People v. Wagner, 86 Mich. 594, 13 L. R. a burden upon one class of citizens in the A. 286, 24 Am. St. Rep. 141, 49 N. W. 609;

use of the streets not imposed upon others, Davock v. Moore, 105 Mich. 120, 28 L. R. and is a restriction which is not applied A. 783, 63 N. W. 424; People v. Phippin, alike to all. 70 Mich. 6, 37 N. W. 888; Sherlock v. Stuart, 96 Mich. 197, 21 L. R. A. 580, 55 A. 408, 67 Am. St. Rep. 224, 51 N. E.

Chicago v. Collins, 175 Ill. 445, 49 L. R. N. W. 845; People v. Walling, 53 Mich. 264, 18 N. W. 807; Robison v. Haug, 71

907; Wilkie Chicago, 188 Ill. 444, Mich. 38, 38 N. W. 668; People v. Hen- Cairo v. Bross, 101 111. 475; Kiel v. Chicago,

80 Am. St. Rep. 182, 58 N. E. 1004; wood, 123 Mich. 317, 82 N. W. 70; People 176 111. 137, 52 N. E. 29; Bessette v. People, v. Rectz, 127 Mich. 87, 86 N. W. 396.

193 Ill. 334, 56 L. R. A. 558, 62 N. E. 215. But property is sacred.

An automobile is a vehicle entitled to all People v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. 52 Mich. 277, 17 N. W. 841; Re Frazee, 63 and equal rights in the public streets with

other vehicles. Mich. 396, 6 Am. St. Rep. 310, 30 N. W. 72. In Michigan police power is not omnip

A bicycle is a vehicle. otent; it cannot, under the guise of regu

Myers v. Hinds, 110 Mich. 300, 33 L. R. lation, destroy property rights arbitrarily A. 356, 64 Am. St. Rep. 345, 68 N. W. 156; and without reason.

Wurfin v. Detroit & E. Pl. Road Co. 113 Grand Rapids v. Powers, 89 Mich. 94, 14 Mich. 675, 38 L. R. A. 198, 67 Am. St. Rep. limitation of speed of vehicles in streets gen As to license fee for use of streets by vehi. erally.

cles, see Tomlinson v. Indianapolis, 36 L. R. As to validity of regulation of use of bicy. A. 413, and note; also Chicago v. Collins, 49 cles on streets, see note to Taylor v. Union L. R. A. 408. Traction Co. 47 L. R. A. 289.

V.

V.

489, 71 N. W. 1108; Leslie v. Grand Rapids, | 125 N. Y. 641, 13 L. R. A. 454, 21 Am. 120 Mich, 28, 78 N. W. 885.

St. Rep. 764, 26 N. E. 919; Thorpe v. Messrs. Timothy E. Tarsney and Rutland & B. R. Co. 27 Vt. 140, 62 Am. J. Walter Dohany, for defendant in Dec. 625; Braun v. Chicago, 110 Ill. 187; certiorari:

Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 28 L. ed. The ordinance is not void for discrimi- 923, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 357; People ex rel. nation.

Mixer v. Manistee County, 26 Mich. 422; Des Moines v. Keller, 116 Iowa, 648, 57 | Com. v. Stodder, 2 Cush. 562, 48 Am. Dec. L. R. A. 243, 93 Am. St. Rep. 268, 88 N. W. 679; Frankfort & P. Pass. R. Co. v. Phila827; People v. Hanrahan, 75 Mich. 611, 4 delphia, 58 Pa. 119, 98 Am. Dec. 242. L. R. A. 751, 42 N. W. 1124.

The common council has power to provide The council has the power to provide for for the general health of the inhabitants the preservation of the general health of of the city, and to abate and remove all the inhabitants, and to make regulations nuisances in said city. to secure the same.

Rex v. Egerly, Cited in 3 Salk. 183; Rex Chicago Packing & Provision Co. v. Cross, 3 Campb. 226; King v. Russell, Chicago, 88 Il. 221, 30 Am. Rep. 545 ; | 6 East, 427; Dill. Mun. Corp. § 660, note. Kinsley v. Chicago, 124 Ill. 359, 16 N. E. The ordinance is reasonable. 260.

People v. Lewis, 86 Mich. 273, 49 N. W. The legislature has power to delegate to 140; People v. Hotchkiss, 118 Mich. 59, 76 municipalities the regulation of general N. W. 142; Jackson v. People, 9 Mich. 111, street traffic.

77 Am. Dec. 491; Hyde v. Nelson, 11 Mich. Cicero Lumber Co. v. Cicero, 176 Ill. 9, 353; Linn v. Roberts, 15 Mich. 443; Lynch 42 L. R. A. 696, 68 Am. St. Rep. 155, 51 v. People, 16 Mich. 472; Brown v. BlanN. E. 758; Dane v. Mobile, 36 Ala. 304 ; chard, 39 Mich. 790; Sheldon v. Stewart, People ex rel. Nechamcus v. City Prison, 43 Mich. 574, 5 N. W. 1067; Fellows v. 144 N. Y. 529, 27 L. R. A. 718, 39 N. E. Canney, 75 Mich. 445, 42 N. W. 958; 686; Dill. Mun. Corp. p. 810, § 682. Crawford v. Byrnes, 112 Mich. 599, 71

The delegation of power by the legisla- N. W. 152. ture to the common council in 88 169 and 170 of the charter is not such a delegation Carpenter, J., delivered the opinion of power as will be held unconstitutional. of the court:

Brodbine v. Revere, 182 Mass. 598, 66 Certiorari to the recorder's court of the N. E. 607; Nagle v. Augusta, 5 Ga. 546. city of Detroit. Respondent was convicted

No one can say that the license charge in the lower court, and fined $25, for operof $1, which includes the price of the tag ating an automobile in the streets of the or number, is unreasonable or a tax, when city of Detroit without having first registhe paying of the sum but once entitles tered said automobile, and without placing the person to use said number and operate thereon a number, as required by an ordihis automobile for all time to come.

nance of said city. We are asked to set Terre Haute v. Kersey, 159 Ind. 300, 95 aside said conviction upon the ground that Am. St. Rep. 296, 64 N. E. 469; Brown v. said ordinance is invalid. Galveston, 97 Tex. 1, 75 S. W. 488; Nor. The provisions of said ordinance material folk v. Flynn, 101 Va. 473, 62 L. R. A. 771, to this decision are as follows: 99 Am. St. Rep. 918, 44 S. E. 717.

“Sec. 1. No person or persons shall drive Police power in its broadest acceptation or propel any automobile or other motor means the general power of a government vehicle within what is known as 34 mile to preserve and promote the public welfare circle at a rate of speed to exceed eight by prohibiting all things hurtful to the com- (8) miles per hour; nor shall any perfort, safety, and welfare of society, and es son or persons drive or propel any autotablishing such rules and regulations for the mobile or other motor vehicle outside of conduct of all persons and the use and said 34 mile circle within the city limits management of all property as may be con- at a rate of speed to exceed twelve (12) ducive to the public interests.

miles per hour; and at no time shall any 22 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 916; Stone person or persons drive or propel any autov. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 814, 25 L. ed. 1079; mobile on any street, highway, or public Wettengel v. Denver, 20 Colo. 552, 39 Pac. place in a careless, reckless, or negligent 343; Love v. Recorder's Ct. Judge (Love v. Phalan) 128 Mich. 545, 55 L. R. A. 618, “Sec. 2. The owner or driver of any auto87 N. W. 785; Com. v. Bearse, 132 Mass. mobile or other motor vehicle shall, before 542, 42 Am. Rep. 450; State, Cape May, D. operating the same, register with the license B. & 8. P. R. Co., Prosecutor, v. Cape May, collector his name and residence, together 59 N. J. L. 404, 36 L. R. A. 657, 36 Atl. with a description of the vehicle so owned 678; American Rapid Teleg. Co. v. Hess, 'or operated, and the license collector shall

manner.

or

as

enter such name and residence and descrip. , manner in which the highways, streets, avtion in a record kept for that purpose, and enues, lanes, alleys, and public grounds and shall furnish the person so registered with spaces within said city shall be used and one or more aluminum figures sufficient to enjoyed.” It is scarcely necessary to say compose a number corresponding with the that this gives the common council ample number appearing upon the record so made. authority to enact ordinances which will The figures shall be four (4) inches high, tend to make streets safe for the traveling and three (3) inches in width, for which public. We may take judicial notice that the person to whom delivered shall pay to many of these automobiles may be driven said license collector the sum of one dollar at a speed of at least 40 miles an hour. ($1). The owner of such vehicle shall Driven by indifferent, careless, or incomplace, or cause to be placed, such figures on petent operators, these vehicles may be a the rear of his vehicle in the center of the menace to the safety of the traveling pubbed thereof, arranging the same in a hori. lic. Under its authority to regulate the zontal line with a space of one and one- use of the streets, the city may enact ordihalf (13) inches, between the nearest ad- nances which will diminish this danger. It jacent points thereof, and on a dark back- is clear, and it is conceded, that it may reg. ground; but said figures may be rigidly at-ulate the speed of automobiles and repress tached to the axle or hung under the body their careless management, but it is conof the vehicle; said figures shall at no time tended that it has no power to provide for be concealed or covered, but shall be kept their registration and numbering. It is in plain sight.

not difficult to see that the registration and “Sec. 5. No person shall operate, or cause numbering of automobiles is intimately to be operated, an automobile or other mo- connected with their safe operation in the tor vehicle upon any of the streets, alleys, streets. In a city like Detroit many autoboulevards, park driveways, public mobiles are precisely alike in external apgrounds, of the city of Detroit without com- pearance. They are sometimes operated by plying with the provisions hereof.

persons whose faces are partially concealed “Provided that the provisions of the or- and whose identity is uncertain. Those opdinance relating to the registration and erators who are most reckless and indiffernumbering of such vehicles and notification ent—and those are the ones who endanger

to transfers thereof shall not apply the safety of others may violate this ordito automobiles or other motor vehicles nance with impunity unless some method is owned by nonresident visitors when said adopted by which they or their automobiles vehicle is kept in the city for not more than may be identified. The provision in the ortwo (2) days.

dinance for registration and numbering is “Sec. 6. Any person violating any of the such a method. It is reasonable to believe provisions of this ordinance shall be pun- that, when he knows that the number disished by a fine not exceeding one hundred played at the rear identifies his automobile, dollars ($100) for each offense; and, in the fear of discovery and punishment will lead imposition of such fine, the court may make the automobile's driver to observe the rea further sentence that, in default of the quirements of the ordinance. Indeed, we payment of such fine, the offender may be cannot say that the common council did not imprisoned in the Detroit House of Correc- decide—and did not justly decide—that the tion for such offense for any period of time provision for identification by registering not exceeding three (3) months.”

and numbering was necessary to prevent inRespondent concedes that part of the or- jury to pedestrians and other travelers dinance regulating the speed of automo- from the careless management of automobiles is valid. He contends, however, that biles. If authority be needed for the propthe provisions respecting registration and osition that the city may enact this provinumbering are invalid. His objections to sion for the purpose of identifying automothe validity of those provisions may be biles which endanger the safety of travelclassified thus: (1) The legislature has ers, Frankford & P. Pass. R. Co. v. Philanever granted to the common council of De- delphia, 58 Pa. 119, 98 Am. Dec. 212, is troit authority to enact them. (2) They such an authority. The ordinance there in interfere with respondent's constitutional question provided that each car run shall rights. We will consider each of these ob- be numbered and have its number painted jections separately.

in a conspicuous place.” The court sus1. Has the legislature authorized the tained this ordinance, saying: “It is obvi. common council to enact the provision in ous

that its effect is that of a poquestion? This depends upon the proper lice regulation. It clearly furnishes construction of g 170 of the city charter, means of identifying every car which may which gives the common council authority be run in violation of those rights and pub“to control, prescribe, and regulate the I lic interests which the city is authorized by its charter to maintain and secure." | regulation cannot otherwise be effectual, See also Laundry License Case, 22 Fed. 703. the grant of power to regulate does not

But it is said that the provision for reg. carry with it power to license. We do not istration and numbering is a license, and think that any of the cases cited by responthat the grant of authority to regulate gave dent are opposed to this conclusion. The the city no power to license. If the provi- cases most nearly in point are Chicago v. sion for registration and numbering—which Collins, 175 Ill. 445, 49 L. R. A. 408, 67 involves no discrimination, and requires Am. St. Rep. 224, 51 N. E. 907, and Chicago the payment of nothing more than is nec- v. Banker, 112 Ill. App. 94. In Chicago v. essary to pay for the number which the mu- Collins the supreme court of Illinois held nicipality furnishes--can be regarded as a invalid an ordinance of Chicago which imlicense (for conflicting definitions of "li- posed a license fee of $10 on each vehicle cense,” see Cooley on Taxation, 3d ed. p. using the streets of the city. The grounds 1137; Adler v. Whitbeck 44 Ohio St. 539, 9 of that decision were these: (a) The city N. E. 672), it is not a license for the pur- had no authority to prohibit, and therefore pose of raising revenue. If it were, it no authority to license, "an ordinary methmight well be contended that it did not od of locomotion, or even an extraordinary pass as an incident to the power to regulate. method, if it is not of itself calculated to See Cooley, Taxn. 3d ed. p. 1141; Laundry prevent a reasonably safe use of the street License Case, 22 Fed. 703. It is a license by others.” (b) The city had no authority (if a license at all) as a mere means of to raise a revenue by taxing the use of vehiregulation: indeed, we might say, as already cles which were already subject to taxation shown, as a necessary means of regulation. under the general laws of the state. That This proposition is self-evident, viz., that decision has no application to the case at the grant of authority to accomplish a cer- bar. It does not hold nor indicate that tain purpose carries with it authority to municipal authorities may not (if in their use any proper and lawful means without judgment such a requirement is essential to which that purpose cannot be accomplished. safe travel) exclude from their streets auIf, therefore, the speed of automobiles can- tomobiles not registered and numbered. not be effectually regulated without licens. Chicago v. Banker, 112 Ill. App. 94, is more ing them, the grant of the power to regulate nearly in point. In that case it was deconfers upon the city power to license, unless cided that an ordinance of the city of Chisome other provision of law forbids the ex-cago compelling one "who uses his automoercise of that power. I think this conclu- bile for his private business and pleasure sion is supported by the following author- only to submit to an examination and to ities: Russellville v. White, 41 Ark. 485; | take out a license (if the examining board Ft. Smith v. Ayers, 43 Ark. 82; St. Johns- see fit to grant it) . is beyond the bury v. Thompson, 59 Vt. 300, 59 Am. Rep. power of the city council, and is therefore 731, 9 Atl. 571; Laundry License Case, 22 void.” Without approving that decision, it Fed. 703. In the Laundry License Case, is sufficient to point out that the ordinance which involved the licensing of laundries in question in that case goes further than in the city of Portland, Oregon, it was said: the ordinance in the case at bar. "The words to control and to regulate,' We conclude, therefore, that the common er vi termini, imply to restrain, to check, council of the city of Detroit had authority to rule and direct. And in my judgment, to provide for the registration and numberthe power to do either of these implies the ing of automobiles under the grant of powright to license, as a convenient and proper to regulate the use of the streets, unless

means to that end. ... By this the exercise of that power is forbidden on means the persons or occupations to be reg. some constitutional ground. ulated

located and identified and 2. Is the ordinance constitutional? Rebrought within the observation of the mu- spondent contends that the ordinance vionicipal authorities, so that whatever regulates $ 26, art. 6, of our Constitution, which lations are made concerning them may be forbids "unreasonable searches,” and § 32 the more easily and certainly enforced.” of article 6, which reads: “No person shall There are cases holding that the grant of be compelled in any criminal case to be a power to regulate does not confer upon the witness against himself, nor to be deprived city power to license. See Burlington v. of life, liberty, or property without due proBaumgardner, 42 Iowa, 673. In that ca se cess of law.” We deem it sufficient to say (that was a grant of authority to regulate that the provision requiring one operating taverns and houses for public entertain an automobile on the street to display therement) it might be said that the power of on a number furnished by the municipality regulation might be effectually exercised is not an unreasonable search. The state. without licensing. That is by no means an ment in the opinion of this court in Robiauthority for the proposition that, when son v. Haug, 71 Mich. 38, 38 N. W. 668, re

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