than is the case with ordinary banks. By agreement between the bank and its depositors, possession of the pass book is made prima facie evidence of the right to draw upon the fund which it represents. The check itself is unlike checks drawn upon ordinary banks, not being negotiable, and being in reality nothing but a receipt for the money drawn. Of course, a savings bank would be liable if its officers or employees should negligently or recklessly pay out money to one not entitled to receive it; and this seems to be the basis of the cases relied upon as authority by counsel for the plaintiff in error. But in this case there seems to have been no negligence chargeable to the bank. The money was paid in good faith to one in possession of the plaintiff's pass book, and apparently clothed with the right to that possession. Under the rules of the bank assented to by the plaintiff, possession of the pass book was prima facie evidence of the right to draw the money which it represented; and there seems to have been absolutely nothing to put the teller on inquiry as to the genuineness of the check. Under these circumstances we cannot hold that it was his duty to go further, and compare the signature with that of the plaintiff on file in the bank, and that, failing in this, the bank is liable for the money so paid out. Much stress is laid in the brief of counsel for the plaintiff in error upon the rule that, unless the depositor is personally present with his pass book when drawing money, "an order properly signed and witnessed must accompany the presentation of the book in case of withdrawal," and it is urged that because the plaintiff did not appear in person, and the person who did present the pass book had no order as required by the rule, the bank is liable for the payment of the money. Thoughtful consideration must show that this argument is entirely specious. Plainly, this rule has no application to a case like this, where the check drawn was in fraud of both the plaintiff and the bank. Its purport is merely to show that a savingsbank account is not negotiable by delivery of the pass book, and to prescribe that when a depositor wishes to assign his funds on deposit he must do it in a certain manner. It is also urged that the rule reciting that "every effort will be made to protect depositors against fraud” required that the cashier or teller to whom the check was presented should at least compare the signature to the check with that of the plaintiff on file with the bank; and that the ensuing clause, "but payment made to a person presenting pass book shall be good and valid on account of the owner," etc., when taken in connection with the first part of the rule, conveys the meaning that the bank will only be excused from liability when it pays the money after having exerted "every effort" and used extreme caution to prevent fraud. We cannot agree with this construction of the rule. Giving it what seems to us a reasonable intendment, the rule means this: "We will do what we can to keep you from being defrauded, but, as the pass book is prima facie evidence of the right to draw money, you must look well after your pass book, and see that it does not fall into the hands of a thief or forger. Our means of identification are imperfect, and if your pass book is presented by someone other than yourself, with apparent right to draw your money, we will, unless our suspicions are aroused, honor his check without further question. We will deal honestly and fairly with you, but you must take every precaution to protect yourself by the preservation of your pass book." Such a rule is reasonable, and, as the plaintiff in the present case assented to it in writing, he is bound by its terms. The foregoing disposes of the case on its substantial merits, and it follows that, regardless of inaccuracies in the charge of the court as disclosed by the motion for a new trial, the verdict was demanded, and the judgment overruling the motion will not be disturbed. Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur. missioners, see, in this series, Com. v. Crowninshield, 68 L. R. A. 245, with footnote as to to license as a means of regulation when it | L. R. A. 498, 28 Am. St. Rep. 276, 50 N. W. cannot be otherwise accomplished. 4. Requiring an automobile to carry a number does not violate the constitutional provision against unreasonable searches, or compel the owner to testify against himself, or deprive him of property without due process of law. CER (April 21, 1905.) ERTIORARI to the Recorder's Court of Detroit to review a judgment convicting defendant of violating a municipal ordinance. Affirmed. The facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. Henry F. Chipman and Henry Look, for plaintiff in certiorari: Municipal corporations derive all their power from legislative acts, and can pass no ordinance which conflicts with the terms of the charter. People v. Armstrong, 73 Mich. 288, 2 L. R. A. 721, 16 Am. St. Rep. 578, 41 N. W. 275; Taylor v. Bay City Street R. Co. 80 Mich. 77, 45 N. W. 335; Grand Rapids v. Newton, 111 Mich. 48, 35 L. R. A. 226, 66 Am. St. Rep. 387, 69 N. W. 84. Whenever a by-law is clearly unconstitutional, or its provisions are inconsistent with any of the requisites to its validity, it becomes the duty of the courts, as a matter of law, to declare it void. Cooley, Const. Lim. 6th ed. p. 240. Police power may regulate and preserve, and extend to the protection of, the public health, good order, and decency, the lives, health, and property of citizens; may maintain good order and public morals, and prevent imposition and fraud. People v. Wagner, 86 Mich. 594, 13 L. R. A. 286, 24 Am. St. Rep. 141, 49 N. W. 609; Davock v. Moore, 105 Mich. 120, 28 L. R. A. 783, 63 N. W. 424; People v. Phippin, 70 Mich. 6, 37 N. W. 888; Sherlock v. Stuart, 96 Mich. 197, 21 L. R. A. 580, 55 N. W. 845; People v. Walling, 53 Mich. 264, 18 N. W. 807; Robison v. Haug, 71 Mich. 38, 38 N. W. 668; People v. Hen 661; Chaddock v. Day, 75 Mich. 527, 4 L. R. A. 809, 13 Am. St. Rep. 468, 42 N. W. 977. Any person is at liberty to pursue any lawful calling, and to do so in his own way, not encroaching on the rights of others. Sherlock v. Stuart, 96 Mich. 197, 21 L. R. A. 580, 55 N. W. 845; Cooley, Const. Lim. 6th ed. 742. Property does not consist merely in the title and possession; it includes the right to make any use of it. Kuhn v. Detroit, 70 Mich. 534, 38 N. W. 470. The ordinance is inquisitorial, and compels the owner either to submit to a search or to give testimony against himself. Robison v. Haug, 71 Mich. 38, 38 N. W. 668; Chaddock v. Day, 75 Mich. 527, 4 L. R. A. 809, 13 Am. St. Rep. 468, 42 N. W. 977; Weimer v. Bunbury, 30 Mich. 201; Rosenthal v. Dickerman (Rosenthal v. Muskegon Circuit Judge), 98 Mich. 208, 22 L. R. A. 693, 39 Am. St. Rep. 535, 57 N. W. 112; Rouse, H. & Co. v. Donovan, 104 Mich. 234, 27 L. R. A. 577, 53 Am. St. Rep. 457, 62 N. W. 359; Parsons v. Russell, 11 Mich. 113, 83 Am. Dec. 728. The common council of the city of Detroit possesses no authority to make criminal by ordinance that which is not so in fact. Grand Rapids v. Powers, 89 Mich. 94, 14 L. R. A. 498, 28 Am. St. Rep. 276, 50 N. W. 661; Re Frazee, 63 Mich. 407, 6 Am. St. Rep. 310, 30 N. W. 72. The ordinance, in compelling owners of automobiles to take out a license, imposes a burden upon one class of citizens in the use of the streets not imposed upon others, and is a restriction which is not applied alike to all. Chicago v. Collins, 175 Ill. 445, 49 L. R. A. 408, 67 Am. St. Rep. 224, 51 N. E. 907; Wilkie v. Chicago, 188 Ill. 444, 80 Am. St. Rep. 182, 58 N. E. 1004; wood, 123 Mich. 317, 82 N. W. 70; People 176 Ill. 137, 52 N. E. 29; Bessette v. People, Cairo v. Bross, 101 Ill. 475; Kiel v. Chicago, v. Reetz, 127 Mich. 87, 86 N. W. 396. But property is sacred. People v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. 52 Mich. 277, 17 N. W. 841; Re Frazee, 63 Mich. 396, 6 Am. St. Rep. 310, 30 N. W. 72. In Michigan police power is not omnipotent; it cannot, under the guise of regulation, destroy property rights arbitrarily and without reason. Grand Rapids v. Powers, 89 Mich. 94, 14 limitation of speed of vehicles in streets generally. As to validity of regulation of use of bicycles on streets, see note to Taylor v. Union Traction Co. 47 L. R. A. 289. 193 Ill. 334, 56 L. R. A. 558, 62 N. E. 215. An automobile is a vehicle entitled to all and equal rights in the public streets with other vehicles. A bicycle is a vehicle. Myers v. Hinds, 110 Mich. 300, 33 L. R. A. 356, 64 Am. St. Rep. 345, 68 N. W. 156; Murfin v. Detroit & E. Pl. Road Co. 113 Mich. 675, 38 L. R. A. 198, 67 Am. St. Rep. As to license fee for use of streets by vehi cles, see Tomlinson v. Indianapolis, 36 L. R. A. 413, and note; also Chicago v. Collins, 49 L. R. A. 408. 489, 71 N. W. 1108; Leslie v. Grand Rapids, | 125 N. Y. 641, 13 L. R. A. 454, 21 Am. 120 Mich. 28, 78 N. W. 885. Messrs. Timothy E. Tarsney and J. Walter Dohany, for defendant in certiorari: St. Rep. 764, 26 N. E. 919; Thorpe v. Rutland & B. R. Co. 27 Vt. 140, 62 Am. Dec. 625; Braun v. Chicago, 110 Ill. 187; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 28 L. ed. The ordinance is not void for discrimi- 923, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 357; People ex rel. nation. Des Moines v. Keller, 116 Iowa, 648, 57 L. R. A. 243, 93 Am. St. Rep. 268, 88 N. W. 827; People v. Hanrahan, 75 Mich. 611, 4 L. R. A. 751, 42 N. W. 1124. The council has the power to provide for the preservation of the general health of the inhabitants, and to make regulations to secure the same. Chicago Packing & Provision Co. V. Chicago, 88 Ill. 221, 30 Am. Rep. 545; Kinsley v. Chicago, 124 Ill. 359, 16 N. E. 260. The legislature has power to delegate to municipalities the regulation of general street traffic. Cicero Lumber Co. v. Cicero, 176 Ill. 9, 42 L. R. A. 696, 68 Am. St. Rep. 155, 51 N. E. 758; Dane v. Mobile, 36 Ala. 304; People ex rel. Nechamcus v. City Prison, 144 N. Y. 529, 27 L. R. A. 718, 39 N. E. 686; Dill. Mun. Corp. p. 810, § 682. The delegation of power by the legislature to the common council in §§ 169 and 170 of the charter is not such a delegation of power as will be held unconstitutional. Brodbine v. Revere, 182 Mass. 598, 66 N. E. 607; Nagle v. Augusta, 5 Ga. 546. No one can say that the license charge of $1, which includes the price of the tag or number, is unreasonable or a tax, when the paying of the sum but once entitles the person to use said number and operate his automobile for all time to come. Terre Haute v. Kersey, 159 Ind. 300, 95 Am. St. Rep. 296, 64 N. E. 469; Brown v. Galveston, 97 Tex. 1, 75 S. W. 488; Norfolk v. Flynn, 101 Va. 473, 62 L. R. A. 771, 99 Am. St. Rep. 918, 44 S. E. 717. Police power in its broadest acceptation means the general power of a government to preserve and promote the public welfare by prohibiting all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society, and establishing such rules and regulations for the conduct of all persons and the use and management of all property as may be conducive to the public interests. 22 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 916; Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 814, 25 L. ed. 1079; Wettengel v. Denver, 20 Colo. 552, 39 Pac. 343; Love v. Recorder's Ct. Judge (Love v. Phalan) 128 Mich. 545, 55 L. R. A. 618, 87 N. W. 785; Com. v. Bearse, 132 Mass. 542, 42 Am. Rep. 450; State, Cape May, D. B. & S. P. R. Co., Prosecutor, v. Cape May, 59 N. J. L. 404, 36 L. R. A. 657, 36 Atl. 678; American Rapid Teleg. Co. v. Hess, Mixer v. Manistee County, 26 Mich. 422; Com. v. Stodder, 2 Cush. 562, 48 Am. Dec. 679; Frankfort & P. Pass. R. Co. v. Philadelphia, 58 Pa. 119, 98 Am. Dec. 242. The common council has power to provide for the general health of the inhabitants of the city, and to abate and remove all nuisances in said city. Rex v. Egerly, Cited in 3 Salk. 183; Rex v. Cross, 3 Campb. 226; King v. Russell, 6 East, 427; Dill. Mun. Corp. § 660, note. The ordinance is reasonable. People v. Lewis, 86 Mich. 273, 49 N. W. 140; People v. Hotchkiss, 118 Mich. 59, 76 N. W. 142; Jackson v. People, 9 Mich. 111, 77 Am. Dec. 491; Hyde v. Nelson, 11 Mich. 353; Linn v. Roberts, 15 Mich. 443; Lynch v. People, 16 Mich. 472; Brown v. Blanchard, 39 Mich. 790; Sheldon v. Stewart, 43 Mich. 574, 5 N. W. 1067; Fellows v. Canney, 75 Mich. 445, 42 N. W. 958; Crawford v. Byrnes, 112 Mich. 599, 71 N. W. 152. Carpenter, J., delivered the opinion of the court: Certiorari to the recorder's court of the city of Detroit. Respondent was convicted in the lower court, and fined $25, for operating an automobile in the streets of the city of Detroit without having first registered said automobile, and without placing thereon a number, as required by an ordinance of said city. We are asked to set aside said conviction upon the ground that said ordinance is invalid. The provisions of said ordinance material to this decision are as follows: "Sec. 1. No person or persons shall drive or propel any automobile or other motor vehicle within what is known as 4 mile circle at a rate of speed to exceed eight (8) miles per hour; nor shall any person or persons drive or propel any automobile or other motor vehicle outside of said 4 mile circle within the city limits at a rate of speed to exceed twelve (12) miles per hour; and at no time shall any person or persons drive or propel any automobile on any street, highway, or public place in a careless, reckless, or negligent manner. "Sec. 2. The owner or driver of any automobile or other motor vehicle shall, before operating the same, register with the license collector his name and residence, together with a description of the vehicle so owned or operated, and the license collector shall enues, lanes, alleys, and public grounds and spaces within said city shall be used and enjoyed." It is scarcely necessary to say that this gives the common council ample authority to enact ordinances which will tend to make streets safe for the traveling public. We may take judicial notice that many of these automobiles may be driven at a speed of at least 40 miles an hour. Driven by indifferent, careless, or incompetent operators, these vehicles may be a menace to the safety of the traveling public. Under its authority to regulate the use of the streets, the city may enact ordinances which will diminish this danger. It is clear, and it is conceded, that it may reg enter such name and residence and descrip- | manner in which the highways, streets, avtion in a record kept for that purpose, and shall furnish the person so registered with one or more aluminum figures sufficient to compose a number corresponding with the number appearing upon the record so made. The figures shall be four (4) inches high, and three (3) inches in width, for which the person to whom delivered shall pay to said license collector the sum of one dollar ($1). The owner of such vehicle shall place, or cause to be placed, such figures on the rear of his vehicle in the center of the bed thereof, arranging the same in a horizontal line with a space of one and onehalf (1) inches, between the nearest adjacent points thereof, and on a dark background; but said figures may be rigidly at-ulate the speed of automobiles and repress tached to the axle or hung under the body of the vehicle; said figures shall at no time be concealed or covered, but shall be kept in plain sight. "Sec. 5. No person shall operate, or cause to be operated, an automobile or other motor vehicle upon any of the streets, alleys, boulevards, park driveways, or public grounds, of the city of Detroit without complying with the provisions hereof. "Provided that the provisions of the ordinance relating to the registration and numbering of such vehicles and notification as to transfers thereof shall not apply to automobiles or other motor vehicles owned by nonresident visitors when said vehicle is kept in the city for not more than two (2) days. "Sec. 6. Any person violating any of the provisions of this ordinance shall be punished by a fine not exceeding one hundred dollars ($100) for each offense; and, in the imposition of such fine, the court may make a further sentence that, in default of the payment of such fine, the offender may be imprisoned in the Detroit House of Correction for such offense for any period of time not exceeding three (3) months." Respondent concedes that part of the ordinance regulating the speed of automobiles is valid. He contends, however, that the provisions respecting registration and numbering are invalid. His objections to the validity of those provisions may be classified thus: (1) The legislature has never granted to the common council of Detroit authority to enact them. (2) They interfere with respondent's constitutional rights. We will consider each of these objections separately. their careless management, but it is con- ous 1. Has the legislature authorized the common council to enact the provision in question? This depends upon the proper lice regulation. It clearly furnishes a construction of § 170 of the city charter, means of identifying every car which may which gives the common council authority be run in violation of those rights and pub"to control, prescribe, and regulate the lic interests which the city is authorized the grant of power to regulate does not by its charter to maintain and secure." | regulation cannot otherwise be effectual, See also Laundry License Case, 22 Fed. 703. But it is said that the provision for registration and numbering is a license, and that the grant of authority to regulate gave the city no power to license. If the provision for registration and numbering which involves no discrimination, and requires the payment of nothing more than is necessary to pay for the number which the municipality furnishes can be regarded as a license (for conflicting definitions of "license," see Cooley on Taxation, 3d ed. p. 1137; Adler v. Whitbeck 44 Ohio St. 539, 9 N. E. 672), it is not a license for the purpose of raising revenue. If it were, it might well be contended that it did not pass as an incident to the power to regulate. See Cooley, Taxn. 3d ed. p. 1141; Laundry License Case, 22 Fed. 703. It is a license (if a license at all) as a mere means of regulation: indeed, we might say, as already shown, as a necessary means of regulation. This proposition is self-evident, viz., that the grant of authority to accomplish a certain purpose carries with it authority to use any proper and lawful means without which that purpose cannot be accomplished. If, therefore, the speed of automobiles cannot be effectually regulated without licensing them, the grant of the power to regulate confers upon the city power to license, unless some other provision of law forbids the exercise of that power. I think this conclusion is supported by the following authorities: Russellville v. White, 41 Ark. 485; Ft. Smith v. Ayers, 43 Ark. 82; St. Johnsbury v. Thompson, 59 Vt. 300, 59 Am. Rep. 731, 9 Atl. 571; Laundry License Case, 22 Fed. 703. In the Laundry License Case, which involved the licensing of laundries in the city of Portland, Oregon, it was said: "The words 'to control' and 'to regulate,' ex vi termini, imply to restrain, to check, to rule and direct. And in my judgment, the power to do either of these implies the right to license, as a convenient and proper means to that end. . . By this means the persons or occupations to be regulated are located and identified and brought within the observation of the municipal authorities, so that whatever regulates § 26, art. 6, of our Constitution, which lations are made concerning them may be the more easily and certainly enforced." There are cases holding that the grant of power to regulate does not confer upon the city power to license. See Burlington v. Baumgardner, 42 Iowa, 673. In that case (that was a grant of authority to regulate taverns and houses for public entertainment) it might be said that the power of regulation might be effectually exercised without licensing. That is by no means an authority for the proposition that, when is beyond the We conclude, therefore, that the common council of the city of Detroit had authority to provide for the registration and numbering of automobiles under the grant of power to regulate the use of the streets, unless the exercise of that power is forbidden on some constitutional ground. 2. Is the ordinance constitutional? Respondent contends that the ordinance vio forbids "unreasonable searches," and § 32 of article 6, which reads: "No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor to be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." We deem it sufficient to say that the provision requiring one operating an automobile on the street to display thereon a number furnished by the municipality is not an unreasonable search. The statement in the opinion of this court in Robison v. Haug, 71 Mich. 38, 38 N. W. 668, re |