a law which made personal property generally taxable at one's place of residence and the personal property of partnerships and corporations taxable at their places of business was constitutional. It may be said in this case, as was said in the case of Crawford v. Linn County, that the court could not judicially know that this method of taxation discriminated in favor of or against either of these classes of taxpayers. In saying in its opinion that the constitutional provision requiring uniformity left the legislature "free, as always heretofore, to prescribe regulations as to the situs of personal property," the court went far beyond the requirements of the case, and, like the Oregon case, has merely stated a dictum.

We are bound to say from this examina

ually having situs outside of the state, because personal property follows the owner's domicil, held that the change of veribiage meant a change of meaning, and was intended to change the rule established by the Hoyt decision.

At the time of writing, this case has not been reported as having been decided by the court of appeals if it was taken there for review.

In the early case of People ex rel. Hoyt v. Tax & A. Comrs. 23 N. Y. 224, it was held that the statute of New York (1 Rev. Stat. 387, § 1) making all !ands and all personal estate within the state, whether owned by individuals or by corporations, liable to taxation subject to specified exemptions, did not authorize the assessment and taxation of either personal or real property actually located and taxed outside of the state belonging to one of its resident citizens. This holding was supported as follows: We have a system, apparently symmetrical and complete, said the court, according to which all personal estate having an actual situs in this state is brought within the sphere of taxation without regard to the domicil of the owner, with only special exceptions dictated by policy and justice. And if this be the rule of taxation where the situs of the thing to be taxed and the domicil of the owner are different, it is conceded that the opposite rule cannot and does not prevail. Proceeding on this rule, Louisiana and New Jersey very justly imposed a share of their public burdens on the property of the relator situated in those states. The state of New York will do the same thing in respect of citizens of those states having property here, but it is not so unjust to its own citizens as to load them with double burdens by proceeding also upon the opposite principle.

This case is said to have been uniformly followed in that state. People ex rel. Orinoka Mills v. Barker, 84 App. Div. 469, 83 N. Y. Supp. 33.

The doctrine of the cases of Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 198 U. S. 341, 49 L. ed. 1077, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 669, and People ex rel. Hoyt v. Tax & A. Comrs. 23 N. Y. 224, has just been reaffirmed, and these cases followed. in Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194, 50 L. ed.- 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 36. IX. Particular classes of property.

a. Railroad rolling stock.

For taxing purposes, railroad rolling stock is personal property, and taxable only at the

tion of authorities that there is nothing but dicta to sustain relators' contention. We are therefore free to determine on principle whether the constitutional requirement of uniformity affects the legislative authority to determine the situs for the taxation of personal property. This is not a difficult inquiry, especially if the proposition be stated in different, but in equivalent, language, viz., Can the legislature, in determining the situs for the taxation of personal property, disregard the constitutional provision requiring uniformity? The legislature derives its authority to determine the situs for the taxation of personal property, and it certainly has that authority (see Detroit v. Board of Assessors [Detroit v. Rentz] 91 Mich. 78, 16 L. R. A. 59, 51 N. head office of the company when there is no statute fixing its situs elsewhere. Sangamon & M. R. Co. v. Morgan County, 14 Ill. 163, 56 Am. Dec. 497.

The rolling stock of a domestic railroad corporation, no statute prescribing otherwise, has its situs for taxation at the home office of the company. Appeal Tax Court v. Northern C. R. Co. 50 Md. 417.

The rolling stock of a domestic railroad corporation whose line is wholly within the state, whether considered to be personal property or movable fixtures partaking of the nature of real estate, is properly assessed for taxation at the principal office of the company, when the legislature has failed to prescribe some positive rule of distribution and apportionment. Appeal Tax Court v. Western Maryland R. Co. 50 Md. 274.

When the workshops and storage depots of a consolidated railroad corporation are without one of the states which its rolling stock regularly enters and leaves in the operation of its road, and the statutes of that state subject to taxation only property permanently located at the places where taxes are imposed, and there is no law for the apportionment and distribution for the purposes of taxation of railroad rolling stock, no valid tax can be laid thereon in such state, because its situs is at the head office of the corporation. Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. v. Appeal Tax Court, 50 Md. 397.

By the terms of the Maryland assessment act of 1876, railroad rolling stock is assessable for taxes only at the home office or principal place of business of the corporation which owns it, whether that be a domestic or a foreign one, and irrespective of the consideration whether, independent of such statute, railroad rolling stock is real or personal property. Appeal Tax Court v. Pullman Palace Car Co. 50 Md. 452.

The rolling stock of a railroad company, although continuously employed by it in operating leased lines in a state other than that which created it, is not taxable in the state where it is used, in the absence of any statute thereof fixing the situs of personal property for taxation elsewhere than at its owner's domicil, for such rolling stock has its situs at the principal office in the home state of the corporation to which it belongs. Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Allen, 22 Fed. 376.

The rolling stock, tools, etc., of a street railroad are no part of the track, but are personal property to be assessed for taxation at the place

The general rule is that seagoing vessels and boats navigating interstate waters are only taxable at the domicil of their owners when registered under the Federal navigation laws at the port in the district where that domicil is located, and when they visit other jurisdictions only in the course of trade or for temporary purposes.

A state has no jurisdiction over seagoing vessels for the purposes of taxation, where they are not abiding in the limits so as to become incorporated with other personal property in the state, but are there but temporarily in the course of trade, and where they have no situs at any of its ports by registration and the domicil of their owner. Hays v. Pacific Mail S. S. Co. 17 How. 596, 15 L. ed. 254.

It has no jurisdiction to tax as personal property a vessel which regularly visits its port while carrying on an interstate coasting trade, where it is registered in and owned by a resident of another state, since its situs for the purpose of taxation is in the latter state. Morgan v. Parham, 16 Wall. 471, 21 L. ed. 303.

When ferryboats passing between different states belong to a corporation chartered by one of them, and are registered at a port in that state, the other state cannot tax them. Their situs for taxation is at the domicil of their corporate owner, and the port where they are enrolled in the home state. Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196, 29 L. ed. 158, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 382, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 826.

For the purposes of taxation, vessels navigating the high seas have their situs at their home ports, where their owners are domiciled, and where they are registered under the laws of the United States, and never at the ports, or within the states, where incidentally and temporarily they touch to land or take aboard passengers and cargoes. Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18, 35 L. ed. 613, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 595, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 876.

Such vessels are not taxable by' states at whose ports they incidentally call to discharge and receive passengers and freight, because they are not in any proper sense abiding within

1901, as existing prior to the revenue act of 1903 (Cobbey's Anno. Stat. 1903, chap. 49), it is made the duty of the tax commissioner or assessor of such city to accept the values of the fractional part of such railroad property situated in the municipality as the same is valued and assessed by the State Board of Equalization, and apportioned to such city in accordance with the provisions of said act. 2. The proportional share of railway property as valued and assessed by the State Board of Equalization belonging to and situated in such city and subject to taxation for municipal purposes may be equalized by the proper authorities of such city by lowering or raising the value of the same, as thus ascertained, so as to bring the limits of such states, and have no continuous presence or actual situs within their jurisdiction; and not at all because they are engaged in foreign or interstate commerce. Ibid.

The decisions of the United States Supreme Court distinctly recognize the right of a state to tax a ship owned by one of its citizens, and having a situs within such state. Wiggins Ferry Co. v. East St. Louis, 107 U. S. 365, 27 L. ed. 419, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 257.

Seagoing vessels are not subject to taxation in a state whose ports they regularly visit in the course of trade, when they are not permanently and continuously, but only temporarily and incidentally, employed in the waters of such state, if they are owned by persons domiciled elsewhere, and are registered at the ports where their owners are domiciled. Registration in a foreign port and nonresident ownership, together, render seagoing vessels primarily and presumptively taxable only at their home port. Johnson v. De Bary-Baya Merchants' Line, 37 Fla. 499, 37 L. R. A. 518, 19 So. 640.

Water craft owned by a Michigan corporation whose principal office has been located in that state pursuant to its incorporation laws, and thus made its domicil, which are registered conformably to the United States navigation laws at the port of Michigan where such domicil is situated, and are engaged in interstate commerce, and not permanently employed anywhere else, are not taxable as personal property in another state whose ports they visit in the course of trade. Yost v. Lake Erie Transp. Co. 50 C. C. A. 511, 112 Fed. 746.

A tugboat enrolled and licensed under the Federal navigation laws, belonging to a nonresident, and upon which he has been taxed at his domicil, is not liable to taxation in a state where it comes for the purposes of trade. Roberts v. Charlevoix, Twp. 60 Mich. 197, 26 N. W. 878. It does not appear from the report of this case where the port was at which the boat was registered,-it could hardly have been in Dakota, the state of the owner's residence; nor does it appear what was the nature and duration of the boat's business in Michigan waters.

A domestic corporation owning ocean-going ships registered at the port in the state of its origin, where it has its principal place of business, and consequently its legal domicil, is,

about uniformity of valuation in respect of all property subject to taxation within the municipality.

3. It is competent for the legislature to provide for the valuation and assessment of the property of railway companies such as is required to be listed and scheduled with the auditor of public accounts by §§ 39, 40, chap. 77, art. 1. Comp. Stat. 1901, as heretofore existing, by one assessing body, and for ascertaining the value of the whole of such property of any one railway corporation subject to taxation in this state as a unit or as an entirety, and to distribute the value as thus found over the main line or track of such railway company and to the different taxing districts, municipalities, etc., on a mileage basis.

4. Such a scheme or plan of assessment and taxation of the property of railway companies as therein provided when taxed in its home state upon its capital stock at its actual value, subject to assessment upon the value of such ships, notwithstanding they are physically absent and constantly employed in foreign seas. In such a case the subject of taxation is at all times where the corporation is in law and in fact domiciled, and the legal situs for taxation of such ships is in the home port. People ex rel. Pacific Mail S. S. Co. v. Tax Comrs. 1 Hun, 143, Affirmed in 58 N. Y. 243.

The corporation is entitled to no deduction from its assessment of the value of such ships. People ex rel. Pacific Mail S. S. Co. v. Tax Comrs. 5 Hun, 200, Affirmed in 64 N. Y. 541.

A corporation organized to build, own, charter, and navigate ships, whose paid-in capital has been invested, one half in a steamboat, and the other half in transporting it to its permanent location in South America, is properly taxable in the city where it has its principal office, upon the value of its capital stock, without allowance for the permanently absent steamboat beyond the United States. People ex rel. Zulia Steam Nav. Co. v. Tax. & A. Comrs. 51 Hun, 312, 3 N. Y. Supp. 885.

The situs of steamboats navigating waters within and bordering upon different states is that of the home port, which is ascertained by the residence of the owners, and is the port of enrolment and registration. Pelton v. Northern Transp. Co. 37 Ohio St. 450.

Water craft not registered or enrolled, and only temporarily employed at places other than the domicil of their owner, have their situs for taxation as personal property at such domicil, even though never there, when they are not actually shown to be subjected to taxation at places where they are used. Com. v. American Dredging Co. 122 Pa. 386, 1 L. R. A. 237, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 221, 9 Am. St. Rep. 116, 15 Atl. 443.

The statute of the United States (Rev. Stat. 4141, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 2808) requiring every vessel to be registered by the collector of the port to which she belongs at the time of her registry, and the one nearest the residence of her owner or husband, creates the home port of the enrolled vessel, and gives it an artificial situs which controls the place of taxation, but only when she has no actual situs elsewhere. Old Dominion S. S. Co. v. Virginia, 198 U. S. 299, 49 L. ed. 1059, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 686.

for state, county, and municipal purposes does not violate the provisions of the fundamental law commanding uniformity in the valuation and assessment of property for the purpose of raising needful revenues by the levying of a tax upon all property subject thereto according to its value.

of

5. The valuation and assessment the property of a railway company, as therein provided, as an entirety, and the distribution of the value thus ascertained upon a mileage basis over the entire line of such railway, do not operate as a changing of the situs of the property assessed. Its effect is only to distribute the value of an organic whole to the fractional parts situated in the different subordinate taxing districts through which the line extends and in which the property is actually situated, which is a legitimate exercise of legislative power.

The most potent factor in determining the situs of ships and vessels is the owner's domicil rather than the port of registration, when the two are in different taxing districts.

Ferryboats plying between two states, owned by a corporation of one of them, moored in the home state when not in use, have no situs for taxation in the other state, even when registered at one of its ports because that happens to be the same collection district as the corporate owner's domicil and the nearest port thereto. St. Louis v. Wiggins Ferry Co. 11 Wall. 425, 20 L. ed. 192.

A ferry plying daily between a city and another place where its owner is domiciled, and whence it starts every morning and where it is moored every night, has no situs in such city so as to entitle the city to tax it, and this notwithstanding it is registered at such city as its home port because the owner's domicil is in the same collection district. Mobile v. Baldwin, 57 Ala. 61, 29 Am. Rep. 712.

When the local statute makes personal property having its situs in the county where its owner resides taxable only in the township or town of the owner's domicil, steamboats which ordinarily would be taxable at their home port are, when that port is in another tax district from their owner's domicil, but in the same county, taxable in the district where the domicil is, not that in which the home port is. Pelton v. Northern Transp. Co. 37 Ohio St. 450.

If, however, personal property by the local laws is made subject to taxation in the district of its actual situs, steamboats will be taxable in the districts containing their home ports. Ivid.

In holding boats and vessels belonging to a domestic corporation taxable at the place of the principal office or domicil of the company, in Pelton v. Northern Transp. Co. 37 Ohio St. 450, the Ohio supreme court felt the influence of the actual situs of such boats in Cleveland, but that city was in the same county, although in a different taxing district. The court leans to the opinion that the actual situs of tangible personal property is the controlling factor, as against the domicil of the owner, in determining the place of taxation, unless a statute directs otherwise. It said: In deciding this case we have been guided solely by the statute, without calling to our aid the familiar doctrine of the common law that the situs of personal property follows the domicil of the owner; for we

6. In the assessment of railway property for taxation as therein provided, it is competent for the legislature to classify such property, and provide for the assessment of the same as personalty, and to fix the situs of the property assessed by providing for the valuation of the property as an entirety and the distribution of the total value to each taxing district, according to the number of miles of main track located therein.

7. Said §§ 39 and 40, as existing prior to their repeal by the revenue act of 1903 (Cobbey's Anno. Stat. 1903, chap. 49), not invalid as taking property by taxation without due process of law.

A

(October 5, 1904.)

are

PPLICATION for a writ of mandamus to compel the equalization of the asadmit that, if the owner had not resided in Cuyahoga county, the result would have been different. And, on the other hand, if the situs of the property had been in another county, subject to be listed and taxed there under the statute, the residence of the owner in Cuyahoga county would not have given the latter county any right whatever to tax it.

sessment of taxes upon certain property within the city of Omaha. Denied. The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. T. J. Mahoney, for relators: The constitutional limitations do not relate merely to state taxation, or to the rate of levy within taxing districts, but they require uniformity of both levy and assessment in each taxing district.

High School Dist. No. 137 v. Lancaster County, 60 Neb. 147, 49 L. R. A. 343, 83 Am. St. Rep. 525, 82 N. W. 380; State ex rel. Cornell v. Poynter, 59 Neb. 417, 81 N. W. 431; State ex rel. Shriver v. Karr, 64 Neb. 514, 90 N. W. 298; State ex rel. Young v. Osborn, 60 Neb. 415, 83 N. W. 357.

When the legislature assumes to make the apportionment according to the numresidence. Morgan v. Parham, 16 Wall. 471, 21 L. ed. 303.

But boats which have a physical situs at a given port, especially when that port is where they are registered under the Federal statutes, are taxable there irrespective of their owner's domicil. St. Louis v. Consolidated Coal Co. 113 Mo. 83, 20 S. W. 699.

But since the amendments of 1884 to the statutes of the United States, respecting the registration of vessels, shipowners have the option of selecting any one of three places as the home port of their boats, to wit, the port of registry, the port in the same district where the vessel was built, or the port where one or more of the owners reside; and when the home port has been selected and the statutes otherwise complied with, the vessel acquires a situs for the purpose of taxation at that port regardless of the owners' domicil. Com. v. Ayer & L. Tie Co. 25 Ky. L. Rep. 1068, 77 S. W. 686.

Water craft, however, like other tangible personal property, is capable, under some circumstances, of acquiring a situs for taxation in jurisdictions where neither their ports of registration nor their owners' domicils are located. If ships and vessels are so permanently and constantly used within the limits of a single state as to be fairly regarded as incorporated with the general property in that state, they may lawfully be taxed like other tangible property having a physical presence there. regardless of a foreign ownership and registration.

The physical presence within a state of a vessel engaged in coasting trade does not of itself entitle such state to tax it as personal property; neither does its character as a vehicle of commerce exempt it from taxation; but its taxability depends upon its situs, and this is decided by its port of registry and its owner's

Ct. Rep. 686.

In Johnson v. De Bary-Baya Merchants' Line, 37 Fla. 499. 37 L. R. A. 518, 19 So. 640, Liddon, J., dissented, taking the ground that the actual situs of seagoing vessels was the controlling factor in determining their taxability, and would prevail over the port registry and domicil of the owner, and that the facts in the case at bar established an actual situs in Florida waters.

In the examination of the question as to whether movable property has acquired a situs at a place not the domicil of the owner, a very obvious distinction must be recognized between vessels engaged in navigating interstate waters and other tangible property having a permanent situs. Apart from the rule that personal property foliows its owner, Congress has given vessel property a situs or home port by statutory provisions respecting registration and enrolment, painting the name of the port legibly on the stern, and requiring such port to be at or nearest the owner's domicil. And it is now settled in the Federal courts, and by the weight of opinion in the state courts, that such home port is the only place where registered water craft actually engaged in interstate or foreign commerce is taxable. Yost v. Lake Erie Transp. Co. 50 C. C. A. 511, 112 Fed. 746.

There is said to be an obvious and striking distinction between ships belonging to citizens of one state or to foreigners domiciled at home and which are registered at ports where their owners reside, and which, navigating the high seas or other common waters, only come at the ends of their voyages to the ports of another