The disallowance of his claim was held to be res judicata. Stults v. Forst, 135 Ind. 297, 34 N. E. 1125. And the defendants in ejectment were held entitled to an equitable counterclaim to the extent of the purchase money and taxes. Schafer v. Causey, 76 Mo. 365. This was an action of ejectment by heirs against the purchaser at an administrator's sale, void because the notice was published in a German newspaper, and because the sale was approved at the term of court at which it was made. It was pleaded that a small part, only, of the purchase money had been used to pay the debts of the estate, and that the greater part had been paid over to the plaintiffs' guardian for their benefit. But some cases hold that the purchaser is not entitled to relief where the sale was unnecessary, and where the purchaser had notice of the want of authority to make the sale, and where the sale was not confirmed. So where it was not shown that the proceeds of the sale were used to pay debts of the estate, and the administrator was the purchaser. In Illinois, Michigan, and Ohio it is held that if the debts paid are not a charge upon the land the purchaser is not entitled to reimbursement or subrogation on setting aside the sale. In the last state a statute has since provided relief in probate sales. In Aronstein v. Irvine, 48 La. Ann. 301, 19 So. 131, where the natural tutor as administrator, unnecessarily caused the property in the succession to be sold to pay debts, and became the purchaser, it was held that the minors could maintain a suit against the purchaser under a mortgage made by the tutor, without tendering the purchase price. The court said: "But in a case like the instant one there is no requirement of antecedent legal tender, as 'there is no principle of equity requiring plaintiffs to tender to defendants before asserting their absolute title to property belonging to them and held by defendant as a mere possessor without title. All that equity could possibly require would be to permit him to set up his claim in reconvention, which would not be denied.'" So, where an administrator's sale was void, and there were assets in the hands of the administrator sufficient to pay the claim of the purchaser, it was held that the purchaser was not entitled to a lien on the property for his purchase money in setting the sale aside. Bennett v. Coldwell, 8 Baxt. 483. The court said: "The law does not make the heirs securities for the administrator, nor make their rights dependent upon the integrity or negligence of the administrator. Hence, we are of the opinion that the decree of the chancellor declaring a lien, and ordering a sale of house and lot, was erroneous." And a purchaser of personalty at an administrator's sale, having notice of the want of authority of the administrator to make the sale, where the sale was held void, was held not entitled to recover the price from an administrator de bonis non, and the payment was held to be voluntary. Beene v. Collenberger, 38 Ala. 647. In Pool v. Ellis, 64 Miss. 555, 1 So. 725, where an administrator's sale was never confirmed, it was held the purchaser was under no obligation to pay to the administrator any portion of his bid before confirmation, and such payment was not binding upon the estate or the heirs at law. The court said: "The administrator held the money as a mere depository of the purchaser, and if it was wasted or misappro priated by him the loss must be borne by the purchaser. The chancellor, by subrogating the appellant to the rights of the creditor, to the payment of whose debt against the estate a part of the purchase money was applied, extended to him the full measure of relief to which he was entitled." A purchaser of land at an administrator's sale, where the purchaser was one of the administrators and the sale was void for that reason, was held to have no equity against the land, where it was not shown that the purchase money had been applied to the debts of the estate. Jayne v. Boisgerard, 39 Miss. 796. In Illinois, Michigan, and Ohio the purchaser at a void administrator's sale was denied relief where the money was not used to pay debts which were a charge on the land. In Bishop v. O'Conner, 69 Ill. 431, which was an action by the assignee of the purchaser for subrogation, it was held that a purchaser at an administrator's sale to pay debts, which was void for lack of service, would not be subrogated to the extent that money was paid for support of heirs or payment of debts. It was also held that, if it was an action against heirs, it was barred by limitation. But it is said that a volunteer is not entitled to subrogation, and that there is no implied agreement on the part of the heirs to refund. After land was given to the devisee with the executor's consent, and she had conveyed it, the executor sold the land under an order of the probate court to pay debts. The sale was held void, the executor having no power to sell the land. On a bill to declare the purchase money a lien because the money paid the executor was used for the estate, it was held that the purchaser had no lien. Frost v. Atwood, 73 Mich. 67, 16 Am. St. Rep. 560, 41 N. W. 96. The court said: "It is difficult to see how the case can be affected by the use which the executor made of the money. In all probate sales, valid or invalid, the officer making the sale receives the money, and usually appropriates it. But it never has been supposed, and it is not legally true, that such use creates any lien on the premises uniawfully sold. What he receives without lawful authority does not concern the estate, and he can no more create a lien by spending that money than by spending any other. If the estate owes him, he must pursue his remedy as the law gives it, and his claim must first be established before he can get any remedy. The use, if made, is not made for the benefit of the particular piece of land that he attempted to sell, but for the whole estate; and, if it becomes a claim, it is a claim against the whole estate, and not against a part of it." In the above case the executor had no power to dispose of the land under the will, and the action of the probate court in assessing and enlarging the amounts to be contributed by the devisee was without jurisdiction as there was no personal service. How. Stat. (Mich.) §§ 5818-5820, providing for issuing executions against the devisees in settling the amount of their liabilities, were held to be the only remedy, and they did not declare a lien, and would not bind any specific property. In this case there was no claim against the estate open to subrogation, and no money lent to the executor or to the estate. The court said: "In the present case, the record does not show that, if the executor had done his duty, the debts would not have been fully paid within the proper statutory period, without any deficiency arising. And when he sees fit to allow all parties to resttribution, and such sales are void, the heirs or on the idea that they can do what they will distributees recovering the same in ejectment with their legacies and devises, the statute shall hold such real estate subject to the paygives him no power to recall them." ment of said purchase money to said purchaser or any party holding under him. So, in Nowler v. Coit, 1 Ohio, 519, 13 Am. Dec. 640, it was held that purchase money paid to an administrator upon a sale of intestate's land was not a charge upon the land where the sale was void and the heirs recovered the land. The court said: "The lands of the deceased were never legally charged with the payment. The administrator, from whom the defendant purchased, had no power over them. He paid his money upon a mistake as to the consideration. The present complainants are not the parties to whom he paid it, or with whom he made the contract; and his right to recover back his money cannot be litigated with them, neither at law nor in equity. We can therefore make no decree with respect to the purchase money." So it was held that a purchaser could not set up an equity in the estate of the decedent by reason of the payment of the decedent's debts from his purchase, where a court in Virginia directed a sale of Ohio land to pay the debts of the estate in Virginia, and the sale was void as the court had no jurisdiction. Beall v. Price, 13 Ohio, 368, 42 Am. Dec. 204. The court said: "But no privity exists between the creditors of Duval and the estate of Price, which will justify them in reaching his assets, except as general creditors of Duval, pursuing his credits. Neither does the advance of money by a stranger, upon a defective sale of a decedent's lands, create an equity against his estate, although the money goes to pay his debts. It has been held by this court that the rule of caveat emptor operates on the purchaser at judicial sales, and cuts off all right to indemnity, except such as may arise from express warranty." So in a suit in equity by the purchaser against heirs it was held that no lien was acquired by the purchaser, and that, if he had a right to recover, the administrator must be made a party. This was in Lieby v. Ludlow, 4 Ohio, 469, where a probate sale to pay debts was void because it was proved that the land sold was in a city, and the order to sell to pay debts related to land outside the city, and a recovery from the purchaser was had in ejectment. A subsequent statute now provides relief. See subdiv. III. e, Statutory relief. e. Statutory relief. In some states statutory relief for the purchaser is provided. The decisions under the Indiana statutes have all affirmed the purchaser's right under a void sale to reimbursement, and the same was held in many cases before the statute recognizing this right was passed, and some decisions since the statute affirm the rule without noticing the statute. In New York the Code providing for redemption, and that the title shall pass to the grantee unless the money is paid to him in twenty days from the time the sale is adjudged void, is held unconstitutional. In Stevens v. Durrett, 49 Miss. 411, where a sale was void because made by an administrator without any order of court, it was said that Miss. act February 11, 1873, provides that where real estate has been sold under probate or chancery decrees for debts or distribution, and the money has been paid in good faith, and has been applied in good faith for debts or dis So a purchaser at a guardian's sale that was void was held entitled to an injunction against a judgment in ejectment obtained by the heirs, where the money was paid to the guardian, and the heirs who had become of age had received their shares. This was held to be on principles of equity and estoppel, as well as under Miss. act February 11, 1873, Pamph. 41, supra. Gaines v. Kennedy, 53 Miss. 103. In an action of ejectment by heirs of the intestate to recover land sold at a void probate sale, it was heid, under this statute, that the purchaser was entitled to an injunction to stay the ejectment suit until the purchase money was refunded, where it was shown to have been applied to the payment of the debts of the estate. Cole v. Johnson, 53 Miss. 94. The court said: "Certainly, the most appropriate, if not the only adequate, method of securing it would be by a chancery proceeding. Independently of this statute, however, a court of equity has the right to charge the purchase money on the land where it is shown to have been applied in exoneration of the liabilities of the estate, as was decided, before the enactment of the statute, in Short v. Porter, 44 Miss. 533; and it is well settled that the bestowal of jurisdiction on a common-law court does not devest the jurisdiction of a court of equity, unless it is expressly so enacted." In Montour v. Purdy, 11 Minn. 384, 88 Am. Dec. 88, Gil. 278, where a guardian's sale was attacked by the ward by an action of ejectment, it was held that a tender of the purchase money was not a condition precedent, as possession might be surrendered, and the lien allowed, under Minn. act March 3, 1864, protecting purchasers at executors', administrators', and guardians' sales, and providing that, if the sale shall be void or irregular, the purchaser shall have a lien on the real estate sold for the purchase money, taxes, and interest. In Reily v. Burton, 71 Ind. 118, which was an action to recover possession of land where the sale was held not void because of defect in nunc pro tunc entry directing the sale without relief from appraisement laws, it was said that the judgment debtor could not recover possession until the purchase money had been refunded with interest, deducting the rents, under the Indiana Code (2 Rev. Stat. 1876, p. 257, § 625), providing that, when land sold by an executor, guardian, sheriff, or commissioner, is recovered by any person liable to pay the judgment, the plaintiff shall not be entitled to a writ of possession without having paid the amount justly due. And under this statute a purchaser at an execution sale, where the property was misdescribed and the sale was void, was held entitled to be subrogated to the rights of a judgment creditor. Ray v. Detchon, 79 Ind. 56. In this case the foreclosure suit was commenced by publication, and the notice was void for want of sufficient affidavit, and the land was misdescribed in the decree, and the court had no jurisdiction over the person of one of the defendants. And the same was held in Short v. Sears, 93 Ind. 505. In this case it was said that there was no warranty in judicial sales. "But this rule has no application to cases where the pur chaser is asserting his rights against the execution debtor or his property. It was framed for and applies to a very different class of cases." And in Walton v. Cox, 67 Ind. 164, which was an action on a covenant of warranty, it was said that the grantee holding under a void administrator's sale in a suit for eviction should have set up his claim under this statute. A purchaser of school land defaulted, and the mortgage was foreclosed, and the land sold in 1876 to Sterne, against whom there was a judg ment in 1875, on which an execution sale was had in September, 1877. Sterne had made a mortgage of this land in the interim. The grantee of the original purchaser redeemed from the sale under the school-fund mortgage. It was then held that the lien of the purchaser under the judgment related back to the time of the judgment, and was prior to the lien of the mortgage made in 1876 as against the redemption fund. Paxton v. Sterne, 127 Ind. 289, 26 N. E. 557. The court said: "That a purchaser at a sheriff's sale acquires by subrogation the rights of the judgment plaintiff, in the event that the sale is ineffective to convey title, is affirmed by our statute and asserted by our decisions." And a purchaser at a sheriff's sale on foreclosure was held entitled to be subrogated to the right of the mortgagee, where the sheriff did not make sufficient written memorandum of sale, and the purchaser failed in a mandamus suit to acquire a deed. Bodkin v. Merit, 102 Ind. 298, 1 N. E. 625. The court said: "It is a familiar principle of equity, and is one fully recognized by our statute and decisions, that payment of a debt by a purchaser at an invalid sheriff's sale subrogates the purchaser to the rights of the creditor." in Short v. Sears, 93 Ind. 505, it was said: "A purchaser at a sheriff's sale, who buys in good faith, and pays money which goes to the discharge of a judgment lien on the execution defendant's land, is entitled to be subrogated to the lien of the judgment creditor. This is a general principle of equity, and is not dependent alone upon statutory law. Our cases very early held that a purchaser might recover in equity from the execution defendant the amount paid on his bid, and a long line of decisions has maintained this doctrine. The rule has not been confined to a right to a personal judgment against the debtor, but has been extended, as in justice and equity it should be, to a right to the lien of the judgment paid by the bid. The statute declares in very broad terms this general rule. Rev. Stat. 1881, $ 1084. As the statute is a remedial one, and in furtherance of a salutary and longrecognized rule, it ought to receive a liberal construction." Under Bates's Ohio Stat. §§ 5410, 5411, providing that the purchaser at execution, executors', guardians,' and assignees' sales, which are set aside, should be subrogated to the rights of the creditor, and shall have a lien, it was held that a purchaser at an executor's sale under an order of the probate court, which was void, was entitled to be subrogated to the creditor's rights when the purchase money was used to pay debts, and the property should be sold to reimburse him. Wehrle v. Wehrle, 39 Ohio St. 365. But in Gilman v. Tucker, 128 N. Y. 190, 13 L. R. A. 304, 26 Am. St. Rep. 464, 28 N. E. 1040, N. Y. Code Civ. Proc. § 1440 (Amended Laws 1881, chap. 681), providing for redemp tion, and that, if the title of the sheriff's grantee in sales under execution is adjudged void in an action brought by the judgment debtor, such judgment shall have no force unless within twenty days the plaintiff pay to such grantee the money paid on the sale with interest and costs; and that, if not paid, the title shall vest in the grantee,-was held to be unconstitutional. The court said: "The obvious intention of the act is to take away from the owner all remedy for the recovery of his property, except upon the payment by him to his adversary of a sum of money which must frequently be greater than the value of the property itself. If he remains in possession of the property, he is deprived of any remedy to protect his possession, and if his adversary has succeeded in obtaining possession, he is deprived of any remedy to recover it, except upon the condition that he pays as much, or more, than it is probably worth. An owner may, therefore, under this law, be stripped of his property under a void proceeding; be turned out of possession, and denied any affirmative relief in the courts, unless upon the condition that he pays for the property its value, as determined by a judicial sale, and, in addition thereto, a sum for costs and expenses, the amount of which he has no means of ascertaining, and which may also exceed the value of the property in litigation." This was an action by the judgment debtor to have the sale declared void because of void execution. After judgment in favor of the debtor the purchaser moved to set this aside because he had not been tendered the purchase money under the statute. See Meyer v. Farmer, 36 La. Ann. 785; McIntyre v. Sanford, 89 N. Y. 634; Lefevre v. Laraway, 22 Barb. 167,--subdiv. III. g; Elling to Harrington, 17 Mont. 322, 42 Pac. 851, subdiv. V.; Holt v. Bason, 72 N. C. 308, and Wood v. Genet, 8 Paige, 137, subdiv. V. f. Proceedings against nonresidents. The purchaser was held not entitled to relief where there was no lien, and the court had no jurisdiction, and the proceedings were by publication against nonresidents. A judgment was rendered against a nonresident without service, appearance, or attachment, and no lien was asserted. A sale thereunder was void, and it was held that the purchaser under such sale did not acquire a lien for the amount of the debt paid by the sale. Grigsby v. Barr, 14 Bush, 330. In an action of attachment against a nonresident no notice was given to defendant, and the papers contained a misnomer by transposing the initial letters of the Christian name. The conveyance was in the proper name. It was held that the proceedings were void, that the court had no jurisdiction, and the sale was void, of which the purchaser should have taken notice from the record. It was also held that the purchaser was not entitled, in equity, to retain possession of the land until he had been reimbursed. Buchanan v. Edmisten, 1 Herdman (Neb.) 429, 95 N. W. 620. The court said: "But it is insisted, that is to say, conceding, for the sake of discussion, that the attachment proceedings are void from their beginning to their conclusion, that the threshingmachine company never had any lien, and that no title passed pursuant to the pretended judicial sale, still, by reason of this void proceeding, vold sale, and void deed, the purchaser has acquired the right to take and retain possession of the premises until he shall be repaid the amount of his bid. In other words, that the unliquidated debt of the appellant has, by the means mentioned, been converted into an equitable mortgage upon his lands, and the purchaser has attained a position superior to that of a mortgagee in possession. Appellee cites no authority in support of this contention, which is indefensible in reason." So it was held that, a judgment being void, the sheriff's sale did not devest the defendant of his title, and he was not bound to refund the purchase money paid to the sheriff. Stegall v. Huff, 54 Tex. 193. This was an action by the defendant in execution against the purchaser to recover land the purchaser held under an execution sale based on a judgment by publication, where the court had no jurisdiction. The court said: "Otherwise he might indirectly be forced to pay an indebtedness which he did not owe." This case followed Edrington v. Allsbrooks, 21 Tex. 186, which was an action for an injunction against a garnishment judgment, and it was held that a debtor who seeks an injunction against a void judgment is not obliged to bring the money into court before he can claim its interposition. In Northcraft v. Oliver, 74 Tex. 162, 11 S. W. 1121, where the purchaser bought at an execution sale on a judgment void because rendered on publication against a nonresident, the heirs brought ejectment. The defendant pleaded that he should be reimbursed before losing the land, and also pleaded that the heirs could not maintain this action, as the right of action was in the administrator. This latter defense was sustained. As to his lien, the court said: The right of the creditor of the estate is good to defend against the heirs taking and appropriating the property, but this right is no better to appropriate it exclusively to his own use than is that of the heirs to do the same thing. The creditor protects himself, and at the same time all other creditors and claimants of the estate, by surrendering the estate's property only to an administrator of the estate in whose hands our laws are so framed as to provide for its proper distribution." See Boggs v. Fowler, 16 Cal. 559, 76 Am. Dec. 561, subdiv. V. g. Fraudulent sales. A large number of cases hold that a purchaser who was a participant in a fraudulent sale by procuring the property at a sacrifice, where competition was prevented, or who was a party to a fraudulent judgment, was not entitled to relief on the ground that "he that hath committed iniquity shall have no equity." Relief has been denied where an administrator purchased at his own sale. There are cases where relief was granted without discussing the question whether or not preventing bidding, or fraudulently co-operating in the sale, is sufficient to defeat his right. In some of these relief was granted because the sale was attacked in equity, and the complainant was required to do equity. A bidder procured a purchase by fraudulently preventing other bids. It was held that he acquired no title, and the court refused to reimburse him, on the maxim that "he that hath committed iniquity shall have no equity." Goble v. O'Connor, 43 Neb. 49, 61 N. W. 131. The court said: "The sale to appellant was void because of his wrongful and fraudulent acts at the time of the sale, and he acquired no title as against appellees, and is not entitled to have the money paid out by him refunded; and this last, not by way of punishment, and not that the court would help or desire to aid appellees beyond the demands of justice and equity, but because, by his own wrong, the appellant has placed himself in such a position that the court is unable to grant him relief." An administrator purchased land of an intestate at sheriff's sale on a judgment recovered for an alleged debt of the intestate. In ejectment brought by heirs of the intestate alleging the judgment to be fraudulent, it was held that, if the debt was not shown to be bona fide, and if the administrator had assets to pay it, the heirs could recover the land against the administrator on the ground of fraud, without tendering the money paid or the value of the improvements. Riddle v. Murphy, 7 Serg. & R. 230. So, in an action of ejectment by devisees against the purchaser at sheriff's sale, where the purchaser had fraudulently misrepresented the land at the sale so as to acquire it at a low price, it was held that the plaintiff did not have to tender to the purchaser the money paid in order to recover. Gilbert v. Hoffman, 2 Watts, 66, 26 Am. Dec. 103. In this case the court said: "In the case at bar, Daniel Gilbert has a title to the land, as the devisee of his father Leonard, which is not in the slightest degree impaired by the deed of the sheriff, which is ab initio void, by reason of the fraud practised at the sale. This opinion, it must be observed, is grounded on the assumption that the purchaser was guilty of such fraud as avoids the sheriff's sale. Whether there was actual fraud will be for the jury to decide on another trial." So it was held that the purchaser could not hold the title as security for the purchase money advanced, or anything else, where he prevented bidding by fraudulently representing that he was buying the property for the family of the defendant in execution, and that the purchaser would take it charged with liens which he knew the sale would devest. McCaskey v. Graff, 23 Pa. 321, 62 Am. Dec. 336. It was also held that the plaintiff in ejectment was not bound to tender the purchase money before trial, nor to take a conditional verdict by which he would be compelled to pay it afterwards. Two lots amounting to 446 acres were struck off for $13. The sale was set aside as fraudulent on the part of the sheriff. The purchaser had assigned his bid, and the sheriff had conveyed to the assignee. It was held that he was not entitled to any protection in his purchase. Tiernan v. Wilson, 6 Johns. Ch. 411. The court made no disposition as regards the purchase money. The sheriff was decreed to pay the costs. A sale was set aside for fraud. It was held that the purchaser was not entitled to equitable relief for the purchase money paid. Teas v. McDonald, 13 Tex. 349, 65 Am. Dec. 65, The court said: "But in this case, if Teas, the purchaser of the property, was chargeable with notice of the facts, as we think he was, he is to be deemed to have purchased with a knowledge of the fact that the judgment debtor, whose property he purchased, though legally liable to the plaintiff in execution, yet, as be tween him and his codefendant Cotton, was not equitably liable; for that he had paid his proportion of the debt, and really owed nothing; and that his codefendant Cotton, who pointed out the property, was the sole debtor, out of whose property the debt should have been collected; and that he was held so liable by the plaintiff in execution, who did not desire the property of the plaintiff in this suit to be sold in satisfaction or his judgment." An administrator in a mortgage foreclosure was the purchaser. The purchaser had previously contracted to sell the land, and his vendee was to abstain from bidding, and his vendee subsequently paid him for the land. It was held that the combination not to bid rendered the sale void, and that the vendee could not claim a return of the price on setting aside the sale under La. Rev. Civ. Code, § 2505, providing that the seller, in case of eviction, was entitled to restitution of the price, except that this shall not be the case where the buyer, at the time of sale, was aware of the danger of eviction, and purchased at his peril. Meyer v. Farmer, 36 La. Ann. 785. In Forniquet v. Forstall, 34 Miss. 87, where an administrator at his own sale had made a fraudulent combination with the purchaser to buy for the benefit of the administrator, and had sacrificed the property, and had colluded with subvendees to dispose of the same, it was held, in an action by the administrator de bonis non to recover the property, that he did not have to tender the purchase money, as such purchasers could not require that before the party entitled shall recover his just rights he should be compelled to pay them what they have knowingly seen fit to pay in order to deprive him of his property. In Hampton v. Hampton, 9 Tex. Civ. App. 497, 29 S. W. 423, where a guardian's sale to his wife was set aside, under Tex. Rev. Stat. § 2582, providing that, if a guardian is the purchaser, directly or indirectly, the sale shall be void, and shall be set aside, as to whether or not the purchaser was entitled to a return of the purchase money was not decided. The court said: "Whether, under the terms of this statute, that character of decree could be entered, we need not decide. But it is not believed that such conditions should be imposed where the sale is one forbidden by law, and those who have become interested were informed of the fact when they purchased; and it does not appear that, assuming the guardian had received the purchase money, the minors derived any benefit from the sale. Conceding that plaintiffs may have had recourse on the guardian and his sureties, we conclude that this fact would not interfere with their prosecution of this remedy, if they so elected." In other cases where bidding was prevented the purchaser was allowed a lien for his purchase money, without discussing the effect of fraud on the right of subrogation. The Stuart v. Brown, 135 Ind. 232, 34 N. E. 976. The court held that he was bound by his contract to purchase for the benefit of the heir. made with the heir's agent at the sale. This was a suit by the heirs to set aside the sale. and the purchaser contended that plaintiffs were not entitled to equity by reason of their fraudulent agreement to prevent competition, and he claimed, in the event of the sale being set aside, the right of subrogation. The court characterizes his purchase as fraudulent, but does not discuss the effect of that fraud upon his right of subrogation. So, where a bidder prevented competition by his agent representing that the purchase was for a home for an aged and dependent mother of the purchaser, and the property was sacrificed, the sale was held void, and was set aside as fraudulent, because such a purchase was contrary to public policy. It was held that the purchaser was entitled to have the purchase money refunded which had been applied to pay on complainant's debt, and that a lien should be allowed on the land for the same. Bunts v. Cole, 7 Blackf. 265, 41 Am. Dec. 226. The court does not discuss the effect of such conduct on the right of the purchaser to subrogation. So where an administrator bought real estate at his own sale, and a suit to set aside the sale was brought at the instance of the heirs. it was said that, where the administrator had been allowed to make lasting improvements without objection, "it may be good ground in equity for reimbursing him therefor out of the first moneys arising from resale of the property as was ordered by the court, but when this is done he cannot equitably claim anything more." Potter v. Smith. 36 Ind. 231. A bill was filed by minors to set aside a guardian's sale where the purchaser had prevented bidding. The sale was set aside. It was held that the purchaser should be reimbursed the payment made, which had been applied to an existing mortgage and 6 per cent interest, but he was denied the right of subrogation to the mortgage bearing 10 per cent interest. Devine v. Harkness, 117 Ill. 145, 7 N. E. 52. The court said: "Paying the mortgage debt to the mortgagee was no more than paying the amount of it to the guardian, and was but paying appeilant's bid for the land. The payment was one made in wrong, in the carrying out of a wrongful purchase, and presents no case for the application of the equitable doctrine of subrogation." The court does not discuss further than is stated above the effect on subrogation of the fraud of the purchaser: but the case seems to turn only on the proposition as to whether he was to get 6 per cent, or whether he was entitled to the 10 per cent called for in the mortgage. A sale under attachment of four lots in a body, which were divisible and worth eight times the amount of the debt, was held to be fraudulent and a breach of trust on the part of the auditors, who were authorized to sell only so much of the land as was necessary to satisfy the debts of the plaintiff. It was held that the sale should be set aside with liberty to the owners to apply for an injunction in case the plaintiff in attachment, who was the purchaser, upon being tendered the amount, refused to acknowledge satisfaction. Johnson v. Garrett, 16 N. J. Eq. 31. An assignee of a rent note went to a taxforeclosure sale to procure the title for one of the heirs. A lessee was present, and made arrangements to buy the property and protect the assignee, and he procured the title, but failed to carry out his contract for the heirs. lessee purchased a 140-acre lease for a period of seven years, fairly worth $1,500, for which he paid but $455. The sale was set aside, and the lessee who had paid the purchase price of A purchase by an executor at an orphans' the rental was held entitled to the equitable lien court sale for the payment of debts was held of a vendee to the extent of the sum he had paid. | voidable by the heir, and the purchaser was held |