court decreed that the marriage between the defendant in error and the plaintiff in error be dissolved, and that the defendant in error recover of the plaintiff in error the sum of $5 a week as alimony, and the sum of $50 solicitors' fees, together with an undivided one-third interest in a house and lot belonging to the plaintiff in error, situated in the the city of Piqua, county of Miami, and state of Ohio. From the above decree the plaintiff in error sued out a writ of error from this court to reverse the decree in so far as it relates to the recovery of $5 per week as alimony, $50 as solicitors' fees, and an undivided one-third interest in a house and lot belonging to plaintiff in error, situated in the city of Piqua, county of Miami, and state of Ohio. The record shows plaintiff in error had no property within the state.

what it could not itself and without its intervention accomplish. This principle lies at the foundation of all of the cases subsequently cit ed in this note which uphold the jurisdiction of a court of equity of one state or country over a suit the avowed purpose of which is to affect real property in another. For a general statement of the principle, see especially the cases cited in infra, II., a.

The Lord Chancellor (Nottingham), in Arglasse v. Muschamp, 1 Vern. 75, thus quaintly replied to an objection that a court of equity of England had no jurisdiction of a suit for relief from a fraudulent conveyance of land in Ireland: "This is surely only a jest put upon the jurisdiction of this court by the common lawyers; for when you go about to bind the lands, and grant a sequestration to execute a decree, then they readily tell you that the au thority of this court is only to regulate a man's conscience, and ought not to affect the estate, but that this court must agere in personam only; and when, as in this case, you prosecute the person for a fraud, they tell you, you must not intermeddle here, because the fraud, though committed here, concerns lands that lie in Ireland, which makes the jurisdiction local, and so would wholly elude the jurisdiction of this court."

The following case states sharply and concisely the nature and general scope of the peculiar jurisdiction discussed in this note.

The jurisdiction acquired by the courts in one state over parties to an action incidentally affecting lands in another state is a jurisdiction purely in personam. The decree or judgment cannot have any extraterritorial force in rem. Bullock v. Bullock, 52 N. J. Eq. 561, 27 L. R. A. 213, 46 Am. St. Rep. 528, 30 Atl. 676.

It will be observed, in addition to the other objections to giving effect to the Ohio decree involved in PROCTOR V. PROCTOR, So far as real property in Illinois was concerned, that it was not a decree in personam, but a decree in rem, purporting to affect directly the property in question.

II. Conditions of jurisdiction.

a. Necessity of proper case for equitable intervention.

As will be shown in II. b, the ability to

The grounds relied on are that the court did not acquire such jurisdiction of the person of plaintiff in error as authorized it to enter the money decree against him, and did not have jurisdiction to enter any decree affecting real estate in the state of Ohio.

That the court had no such jurisdiction of the person of plaintiff in error as authorized a money decree or decree in personam seems to be settled by the case of Cloyd v. Trotter, 118 Ill. 391, 9 N. E. 507. In that case a bill was filed to remove a cloud from real estate situated in this state. James C. Cloyd, the defendant to the bill, resided in the city of New York, and service was had upon him in that city by a copy of the bill, and notice, as in the case at bar. The defendant defaulted, and the relief prayed was granted, and a judgment for grant effective relief by a decree operating solely against the person in a necessary condition of the jurisdiction of a court of equity over a suit, the purpose of which is to affect real property in another state or country. That, however, is not the only condition of such jurisdiction. To warrant the court in entertaining such a suit, it must also appear that the case, independently of the location of the land beyond the territorial jurisdiction, is a proper one for equitable intervention. Chief Justice Marshall defined this indirect jurisdiction as follows: "In a case of fraud, of trust, or of contract, the jurisdiction of a court of chancery is sustainable wherever the person be found, although lands not within the jurisdiction of that court may be affected by the decree." This statement of the jurisdiction has been very frequently quoted and approved in subsequent cases. See, for example, Carpenter v. Strange, 141 U. S. 87, 35 L. ed. 640, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 960; Binney's Case, 2 Bland, Ch. 99; DeKlyn v. Watkins, 3 Sandf. Ch. 185: Davis v. Morriss, 76 Va. 21. It follows that a court of equity of one state or country will not assume jurisdiction of a suit that in its essence involves merely the title or possession of land in another, and presents no ground of equitable intervention. In other words, if the action is one which, if it related to real property within the territorial jurisdiction, would be at law, and not in equity, a court of equity will not assume jurisdiction merely because, the property being beyond the territorial jurisdiction, a court of law cannot entertain an action in respect of it.

Thus, Chief Justice Marshall said, in Massie v. Watts, 6 Cranch, 148, 3 L. ed. 181, that, if the cause of action in that case were to be considered as involving a naked question of title to land in Virginia, the court of Kentucky would not have had jurisdiction.

An action of ejectment cannot be maintained in the circuit court of the district of Michigan for land in any other district. Northern Indiana R. Co. v. Michigan C. R. Co. 15 How. 233, 14 L. ed. 674.

A decree recovered in the courts of Kentucky in a real action to try the title of lands in New Jersey, or in ejectment for the possession, would be a perfect nullity. No action could be brought upon it in New Jersey to obtain execution of it. It would be simply void. A decree to deliver possession of lands in New Jersey

costs against the defendant, Cloyd, was awarded. On error this court held that, in so far as the proceeding was in rem, the decree was valid, but that the court was without jurisdiction to enter a decree for costs against Cloyd, as that was in perso nam. In so far as the proceeding at bar related to the marital relation and its dissolution, the proceeding is regarded as one in rem, and the court was warranted in entering its decree dissolving the same. But the court could go no farther. It could not enter any binding decree in personam against plaintiff in error. 2 Black, Judgm. § 933; 9 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 2d ed. p. 745; Rigney v. Rigney, 127 N. Y. 413, 24 Am. St. Rep. 462, 28 N. E. 405; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 727, 24 L. ed. 570.

So much of the decree as sought to vest

might be enforced by the courts of Kentucky; if in possession of the person of the defendant, he could be imprisoned, or even subjected to peine forte ct dure until he actually delivered it. Davis v. Headley, 22 N. J. Eq. 115.

A court of one state has no jurisdiction of a suit which, in its essence, involves the possession of real property in another state, such possession not being incidental to the enforcement of a contract, or trust, or relief from fraud, but being in itself the foundation of the controversy. Lindsley v. Union Silver Star Min. Co. 26 Wash. 301, 66 Pac. 382.

Thomas v. Hukill, 131 Pa. 298, 18 Atl. 875, affirmed a decree dismissing a bill filed by a second lessee, out of possession, of oil lands situated in another state, alleging a forfeiture incurred by a prior lessee, in possession for failure to perform his covenants, and praying for an injunction to restrain further operations and for a decree declaring the prior lease void, and for an account. The supreme court said that, while the proceeding was in form a bill in equity, it was in substance a possessory action involving the title to real estate; that the decree of the court could only affect the person of the litigants, and could not control the title and possession of the land; and therefore the exercise of such jurisdiction would be of at least doubtful propriety, even though the parties were residents of Pennsylvania.

A court will not entertain jurisdiction where the naked question of title is involved, or a mere trespass or nuisance on extraterritorial real property is sought to be restrained. Chase v. Knickerbocker Phosphate Co. 32 App. Div. 400, 53 N. Y. Supp. 220.

Equity acts in personam when the parties are within the jurisdiction of the court, though the lands affected be within another state, but not to the extent of awarding relief more appropriately obtainable in a common-law action of ejectment triable by a jury of the vicinage. Genet v. Delaware & H. Canal Co. 13 Misc. 409, 35 N. Y. Supp. 147. In this case the court said that a determination that a contract relating to land in another state should be rescinded on account of breaches, with a decree requiring the defendants to remove from the lands all their apparatus, etc., and to surrender the premises to the plaintiff, would, in effect, be to enforce an action of ejectment from the

in defendant in error an interest in real estate in Ohio was extraterritorial and beyond the jurisdiction of the court. That part of the decree was purely a proceeding in rem, and the res, having its situs in another state, must be controlled by the laws of the state of its situs. Lynn v. Sentel, 183 Ill. 382, 75 Am. St. Rep. 110, 55 N. E. 838; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 727, 24 L. ed. 570; Story, Confl. L. § 539.

In decreeing alimony, solicitors' fees, and an interest in the land in Ohio, the court was in error, and in those respects the decree is reversed. As to the divorce no reversal is asked, and the decree remains in force and is affirmed. Plaintiff will have judgment for costs.

Decree reversed in part.

ands, a jurisdiction which the court could not assume; the rule being that actions for the possession of real property must be brought in the forum rei sita.

b. Ability to grant effective relief by a decree in personam the criterion of jurisdiction.

The nonresidence of the defendant, and the inability to subject him personally to the jurisdiction of the court, do not necessarily defeat the jurisdiction of a court of equity over a suit affecting lands within the territorial jurisdiction, since, as stated in supra, I., such courts are now commonly empowered by statute to grant decrees in rem in respect of land within the territorial jurisdiction. It is otherwise in respect of real property beyond the territorial jurisdiction. Assuming that a proper case for equitable intervention is presented, the criterion of the jurisdiction of a court of equity over a suit, the purpose of which is to affect real property beyond the territorial jurisdiction, is its ability to grant effective relief by a decree in personam; and, therefore, in order to uphold the jurisdiction, the defendant must be personally subject to the jurisdiction of the court; and to subject him personally to the jurisdiction, he must, if a nonresident, either have appeared, or have been served personally within the jurisdiction; constructive service, or service outside of the jurisdiction, is not sufficient (see note to Pinney v. Providence Loan & Invest. Co. 50 L. R. A. 577); though, according to the weight of authority, such serv ice is sufficient if the defendant is a resident, though temporarily absent from the jurisdiction (see same note).

An exception to the rule that the defendant must be personally subject to the jurisdiction of the court was, however, made in the case of Ward v. Arredondo, Hopk. Ch. 213, 14 Am. Dec. 543, which held that a court of equity might enforce specific performance of a contract for the sale of land outside the state, notwithstanding that the vendor was out of the jurisdiction, by laying hold of a deed which he had sent to an agent within the state to be delivered upon the payment of a certain sum, which was in excess of that found to be due

him upon an accounting. This seems to be the only case in which the jurisdiction of a suit in personam, the purpose of which is to

In Cookney v. Anderson, 32 L. J. Ch. N. S. 427, 9 Jur. N. S. 736, 8 L. T. N. S. 295, 11 Week. Rep. 629, it was held that the court of chancery of England had no power, in a suit to carry out trusts under a deed made in Scotland, to order a copy of the bill to be served on the defendants out of the jurisdiction, it appearing that they were nonresidents. It was further held in this case that, the defendants having appeared and demurred to the bill, the demurrer must be allowed, although the defendants did not move to discharge the order of service.

A decree requiring the conveyance of property in another state by nonresidents who are not personally, but only constructively, before the court, would be nugatory. McGaw V. Gortner, 96 Md. 489, 54 Atl. 133.

Existence or nonexistence of the power to make a decree which the court can enforce is a good test by which to try the jurisdiction of the court. Ibid.

Ordinarily a court of equity having personal jurisdiction of the defendant will, in case of fraud, of trust, or of contract, grant relief, although lands not within the jurisdiction of the court will be affected by the decree, upon the principle that, in equity, the primary decree is in personam, and not in rem; still, in such cases relief will not be granted unless that sought is of such a nature as the court is capable of administering in the particular case. Harris v. Pullman, 84 Ill. 20, 25 Am. Rep. 416. The power of a court of equity to require one personally subject to its jurisdiction to execute a conveyance is the most prolific source of its jurisdiction of suits the purpose of which is to affect real property beyond the territorial jurisdiction. And a court of equity having personal jurisdiction of the parties may entertain a suit, otherwise cognizable in equity, or at least any such suit arising out of fraud, of trust, or of contract,-in which effective relief may be granted by a decree requiring a conveyance of land in another state or country. Massie v. Watts, 6 Cranch, 148, 3 L. ed. 181; Lewis v. Darling, 16 How. 1, 14 L. ed. 819; Corbett v. Nutt, 10 Wall. 464, 19 L. ed. 976; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. ed. 565; Tardy v. Morgan, 3 McLean, 358, Fed. Cas. No. 13,752; Lyman v. Lyman, 2 Paine, 11, Fed. Cas. No. 8,628; McGee v. Sweeney, 84 Cal. 100, 23 Pac. 1117; Enos v. Hunter, 9 Ill. 211 (obiter); Gilliland v. Inabnit, 92 Iowa, 46, 60 N. W. 211; Seixas v. King, 39 La. Ann. 510, 2 So. 416; Vreeland v. Vreeland, 49 N. J. Eq. 322, 24 Atl. 551; Bullock v. Bullock, 52 N. J. Eq. 561, 27 L. R. A. 213, 46 Am. St. Rep. 528, 30 Atl. 676; Mead v. Merritt, 2 Paige, 402; Mitchell v. Bunch, 2 Paige, 606, 22 Am. Dec. 669; Chase v. Knickerbocker Phosphate Co. 32 App. Div. 400, 53 N. Y. Supp. 220; Orr v. Irwin, 4 N. C. (2 Car. Law Repos.) 465; Kirklin v. Atlas Sav. & L. Asso. (Tenn. Ch. App.) 60 S. W. 149; Moseby v. Burrow, 52 Tex. 396; Morris v. Hand, 70 Tex. 481, 8 S. W. 210; Farley v. Shippen, Wythe (Va.) 135.

Where the necessary parties are before a court of equity, it is immaterial that the res of the controversy, whether it be real or per

risdiction. It has power to compel the defendant to do all things necessary, according to the lex loci rei site, which he could do voluntarily, to give full effect to the decree against him. Without regard to the situation of the subject-matter, such courts consider the equities between the parties, and decree in personam according to those equities, and enforce obedience to their decrees by process in personam. Phelps v. McDonald, 99 U. S. 298, 25 L. ed. 473.

Excluding cases where a suit is brought in one state or country to restrain legal proceedings in another in respect of lands situated in the latter, it may be said for practical purposes that a court of equity will not, by virtue of its jurisdiction over the person whose title or interest is to be affected, compel him to take any action in respect of real property beyond the territorial jurisdiction, unless a case is presented of which equity might take cognizance if the land were within its territorial jurisdiction. The converse of this proposition is not necessarily true, since the location of land within the territorial jurisdiction of a court of equity may enable it to grant relief by a decree in rem, which could not be effectually granted by a decree in personam. See infra, III., j, with reference to a suit for partition. c. Nonresidence of defendant as affecting jurisdiction.

In some of the cases the rule with respect to the jurisdiction of equity over suits in personam, the purpose of which is to affect real property in another state or country, is stated with the condition or qualification that the suit must be against a resident of the state or country where the suit is brought.

Thus, in Todd v. Lancaster, 104 Ky. 427, 47 S. W. 336, the court said: "It is well settled that suits for rescission, or for specific performance of agreements respecting land, are transitory, and not local. Kendrick v. Wheatley, 3 Dana, 34; Bullitt v. Eastern Kentucky Land Co. 99 Ky. 324, 36 S. W. 16. But this rule is not applicable to suits against nonresidents. In such cases the courts where the land is situated have jurisdiction to rescind the contract for fraud or other reason, or enforce its specific execution. This is a rule of necessity."

So, in Wicks v. Caruthers, 13 Lea, 353, it was said that courts of equity act in personam in most cases where they have jurisdiction of the person, and compel parties to perform contracts for conveyance of lands in foreign countries; but the essential qualification of the rule is, "if the parties are resident within the territorial jurisdiction of the court."

In Solenberger v. Herr (Va.) 27 S. E. 839, the court said that, if a bill to compel one to acknowledge the trust character of his holding of real property had otherwise set forth a proper case for the intervention of equity, it could not be sustained in view of the fact that the defendant was a resident of Pennsylvania, and that the subject of the alleged trust was real estate in West Virginia; since the court had jurisdiction neither of the trustee nor of the subject of the trust, and it could acquire no jurisdiction of either unless he came forward and voluntarily submitted himself to its jurisdiction, which it could not be expected that he would do.

A court of equity will not entertain a suit by a person residing within its jurisdiction against parties residing in Scotland in respect of real property situated there, and upon a contract entered into there which contains no special provision affecting, in any way, the ju risdiction of the locus contractus. Cookney v. Anderson, 32 L. J. Ch. N. S. 305, Affirmed in 32 L. J. Ch. N. S. 427.

Matthaei v. Galitzin, L. R. 18 Eq. 340, sustained a demurrer to a bill filed by a foreigner against another foreigner, and against an English company formed for working a Russian mine, to restrain the English company from paying to the codefendant a part of the profits of the mine, which were claimed by the plaintiff, and for an account of profits against the company, upon the ground that the matter related to foreign property, and that the substantial controversy was between parties who were both foreigners. See also Norris v. Chambres, 29 Beav. 246, Affirmed in 3 De G. F. & J. 583, infra, II., d, and Blake v. Blake, 18 Week. Rep. 944, infra, III., g, 1.

though within the jurisdiction at the time of the commencement of the suit, since he may depart from the jurisdiction before the decree, and thus render the court powerless, for the time, at least, to enforce the decree. The difference in this respect, however, between a nonresident and a resident is merely one of degree, since even a defendant who is a resident at the time of the commencement of the suit may depart from the state pending the suit. At most the non residence of the defendant, assuming that he is at any time after the commencement of the suit personally subject to the jurisdiction, would seem to be a matter that merely affects the discretion of the court in exercising the jurisdiction or the practical possibility of enforcing the decree, rather than the existence of the jurisdiction.

d. Discretion as to exercising jurisdiction.

The existence of the jurisdiction is one thing. and the discretion of the court with respect to its exercise is another. As will appear from the cases cited in the subdivisions of infra, III., the courts have frequently refused, as a matter of discretion, to entertain suits, the pur

For

It is doubtful, however, whether these courts intended to make the residence of the defendant within the jurisdiction where the suit is brought an absolute condition of the jurisdiction considered from the broad point of view of private international and interstate law. tically, of course, the nonresidence of the defendant will frequently defeat the jurisdiction because of the inability to subject him personally to the jurisdiction of the court, which, as shown in supra, II., a, is a condition of the jurisdiction of a suit the purpose of which is to affect land beyond the territorial jurisdiction. If, however, the defendant, though a nonresident, is personally served within the state or country where the suit is brought, or voluntarily appears, it would seem, upon principle, that his nonresidence would not necessarily defeat the jurisdiction; and in many of the cases cited in infra, III., the jurisdiction was upheld, notwithstanding that the defendant was a nonresident, he having been personally served within the jurisdiction, or having appeared. Most of these cases seem to assume, without questioning the point, that if the defendant is personally subject to the jurisdiction, his residence or nonresidence is immaterial. But in Mussina v. Belden, 6 Abb. Pr. 165, which held that the supreme court of New York had jurisdiction of a suit for fraudulent conspiracy by defendants in another state to devest the plaintiff of his title to land in that state, the relief sought being damages for the wrong and an accounting and payment of rents and profits, the court said that it was not necessary that the defendants should be residents of New York; it was sufficient if they were served with process within the state, however brief their sojourn there.

In Wicks v. Caruthers, 13 Lea, 353, supra, the court held that a decree requiring a nonresident to convey should not be granted, although he had been personally served within the state, it appearing that he was no longer within the state. The court said that a decree ordering him to convey would only give authority in Tennessee, and be waste paper as soon as he crossed the line of Mississippi; and that the court would not make a mere declaration of right which it could not enforce. suggests a practical difficulty in enforcing the decree when the defendant is a nonresident,

This

In a number of cases the courts have, in the exercise of their discretion, refused to entertain the suit, because under all the circumstances the interests of justice required that the liti gation be determined by the courts of the place where the property was situated.

III. Particular subjects of jurisdiction.

a. Creation and enforcement of trusts; substitution of trustees.

It will be observed by refering to supra, II., a, that the case of "trusts" was specifically mentioned by Chief Justice Marshall as a proper one for the jurisdiction of a court of chancery, when the person can be found within the jurisdiction, although lands not within the jurisdiction may be affected; and it is settled by the great weight of authority that a court of equity of one state or country, having personal jurisdiction of the necessary parties, and the consequent power to compel a conveyance, may declare and enforce a trust relating to real property in another state or country.

Thus, Massie v. Watts, 6 Cranch, 148, 3 L. ed. 181, upon the ground that the action arose out of a contract or an implied trust, held that a court of Kentucky had jurisdiction to compel defendant to convey to the plaintiff land in Ohio, for which he had procured a patent in his own name in violation of his duty under a contract by which he was employed to locate the land for the plaintiff's assignor.

A court of equity having jurisdiction of the parties may entertain a suit for the establishment of a resulting trust in lands in another state. Moore v. Jaeger, 2 McArth, 465. This was a case of fraud and resulting trust arising from the purchase of an outstanding title to

real property by one who had previously conveyed it by a deed of trust to secure a debt due the complainant.

Questions of trust are personal, and not local; and are, therefore, subject to the juris diction of a court of the District of Columbia, although the land in respect of which the trust has arisen is situated elsewhere. Whitney v. Frisbie, 6 D. C. 262. This also was a case of a constructive trust.

A court having jurisdiction of the person of defendants may entertain a suit in equity to have the defendants declared trustees ex maleficio of an undivided interest in real property • in Mexico. Butterfield v. Nogales Copper Co. (Ariz.) 80 Pac. 345.

A court of equity of another state having personal jurisdiction of the parties has jurisdiction of a suit to declare that a legal title to lands in Iowa is subject to a trust; and a decree of such court dismissing the bill is therefore conclusive upon the parties in Iowa. MacGregor v. MacGregor, 9 Iowa, 65.

A court of equity of one state has jurisdiction of a bill to set aside a conveyance of land in another state, which an agent, appointed to sell the land, caused to be conveyed to himself. Sturdevant v. Pike, 1 Ind. 277.

The general principle that a court having jurisdiction of the parties has jurisdiction to enforce trusts, although in doing so the title to lands lying beyond its territorial limits is incidentally affected, is asserted in Manley v. Carter, 7 Kan. App. 86, 52 Pac. 915, although in that case it is merely applied as between courts of different districts of the same state.

A court of one state, having personal jurisdiction over the trustee of a resulting or con structive trust of land in another state, may compel him to make a conveyance to the beneficiaries of the trust. McQuerry v. Gilliland, 89 Ky. 434, 7 L. R. A. 454, 12 S. W. 1037. The court said that, in such a case, the subject-matter is not the recovery of the land, and the action is not a proceeding in rem; that it is true that the title to the land is to be affected by the decree in so far as it compels the party to convey, but, by reason of his trust or contract duty, he is personally obliged to convey, and that duty may be discharged in one state as well as another, although the land may not be situated in such state.

In Hawley v. James, 7 l'aige, 213, 32 Am. Dec. 623, the chancellor directed a decree de claring that, in consequence of the invalidity of the express trust declared in a will with reference to land in Illinois, there was a resulting trust in favor of the heirs at law, and requiring the trustees to convey the property to such heirs by a conveyance duly executed to pass the legal title according to the laws of Illinois, and to be recorded according to the laws of that state. The chancellor said that the court had no jurisdiction to make a decree which would directly affect either the legal or equitable title to lands situated in another state; and that, if the legal title to the lands in question had been in any of the infant parties according to the laws of Illinois, or if those who had the legal title had been out of the jurisdiction of the court, so that it would have been impossible to operate upon them personally to compel them to execute the trust, or to convey the legal title according to the decree, he would have dismissed the application and referred the parties to the courts of the

state where the trust property was situated; but that the court would not decline the jurisdiction of the case so long as it had power to execute its decision through the medium of the holders of the legal title.

The New York supreme court has jurisdiction to compel the conveyance by defendant, who has appeared in the suit, of land in a foreign state. Gardner v. Ogden, 22 N. Y. 327, 78 Am. Dec. 192. It was alleged in this case that the plaintiff had been fraudulently induced to convey the land to defendant; but the ground of the suit was that the defendant stood in such relation to the plaintiff that he became a trustee of the former with respect to the land in question.

A court of equity of North Carolina, having jurisdiction of the person of the trustee, may compel the execution of the trust with reference to real property in another state by compelling him to pay over the sum for which the land was sold. Henderson v. McBee, 79 N. C. 219.

A court of one state has jurisdiction of a bill to compel the conveyance, by a trustee residing within the state, of the outstanding legal estate in lauds situated in other states. Vaughan v. Barclay, 6 Whart. 392.

Where the legal title to a tract of land, partly in Tennessee and partly in Mississippi, is held subject to a constructive trust in favor of a decedent's estate, a decree may be rendered, in a suit for that purpose, requiring the holder of the legal title to convey the entire tract of land, including that in Mississippi, as well as that in Tennessee, to the administrator for the purposes of the estate; and a sale of the land may then be decreed to be made by the administrator in such manner and on such terms as will be most beneficial to the trust. Miller v. Birdsong. 7 Baxt. 536. The court said it was obvious that no decree could be made in the first instance for a sale of the Mississippi portion of the land, but, after determining that complainant was entitled to the land as assets of the estate, it had power to make such decree in personam as would coerce him to convey the land to complainant for the benefit of the estate.

A court of equity in Virginia may compel persons residing within that state to account for lands in Kentucky descended to them as heirs, as a trust subject to the payment of the ancestor's debts, in accordance with the law of Kentucky. Dickinson v. Hoomes, 8 Gratt. 353, 410.

An executrix as such cannot be held to an account and settlement by a court of a state other than that in which her letters were granted; but the court of another state may, for the purpose of determining whether real property in the latter state is held by her subject to a constructive trust in favor of the heirs of the testator, compel her to disclose whether the property was purchased with the funds of the estate. Clopton v. Booker, 27 Ark. 482.

In Cranstown v. Johnston, 3 Ves. Jr. 182, the court decreed a reconveyance of an estate in the West Indies, which the defendant had purchased under his own execution under circumstances making his purchase a security for the debt. The decision was upon the ground that such a decree acts in personam, and not in rem.

In Kildare v. Eustace, 1 Vern. 405, Lord Chancellor Jefferies doubted his jurisdiction to entertain a bill to be relieved touching trusts