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noncontraband news were collected and disseminated by the Associated Press. If that company were complainant and "clean-handed," its right to an injunction, the case being proper in other respects, would not be doubted. But if complainant were a gambler or a thief, what then? We think our answer has been sufficiently stated in Fuller v. Berger, 65 L. R. A. 381, 56 C. C. A. 588, 120 Fed. 274: "Equity is not concerned with the general morals of a complainant; the taint that is regarded must affect the particular rights asserted in his suit.

.. If the defendant can do no more than show that the complainant has committed some legal or moral offense which affects the defendant only as it does the public at large, the court must grant the equitable remedy and leave the punishment of the offender to other forums."

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ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT.

SCOTT,
COMPANY,

(........Ark.........)

&

The checking of baggage to destination upon a through ticket to transport the passenger over roads of initial and connecting carriers will render the initial carrier liable for its loss on a connecting line.

(January 21, 1905.)

A PPEAL by defendant from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Crittenden County in favor of plaintiff in an action brought to recover for the loss of baggage delivered to defendant for transportation. Affirmed.

The facts are stated in the opinion.

lant's violations of the common law or of the penal laws of Illinois than the general public.

In reaching our conclusion, we have given respectful consideration to the cases of Board of Trade v. O'Dell Commission Co. 115 Fed. 574; Board of Trade v. Donovan Commission Co. 121 Fed. 1012; Board of Trade v. Ellis, 122 Fed. 319; Christie Grain & Stock Co. v. Board of Trade, 61 C. C. A. 11, 125 Fed. 161,—and regret that we are unable to concur therein. We have been aided by the opinion of Judge Hook at circuit (116 Fed. 944) in support of his decree in the Christie Case, which was reversed in 61 C. C. A. 11, 125 Fed. 161.

NOTE. AS to liability of initial carrier generally for goods carried beyond its own line, see cases in notes to Fox v. Boston & M. R. Co. 1 L. R. A. 703; Crossan v. New York & N. E. R. Co. 3 L. R. A. 766, and Richmond & D. R. Co. v. Payne, 6 L. R. A. 849; also the later cases in this series of McCarn v. International & G. N. R. Co. 16 L. R. A. 39; McCann v. Eddy, 35 L. R. A. 110; Illinois C. R. Co. v. Carter, 36 L. R. A. 527; Colfax Mountain Fruit Co. v. Southern P. Co. 40 L. R. A. 78; Richmond & A.

The decree herein is reversed, with the direction to enter a decree in appellant's favor in conformity to the prayer of the bill.

Petition for rehearing denied May 27, 1904.

Affirmed by Supreme Court of United States May 8, 1905.

Mr. C. H. Trimble, for appellant: The initial carrier is only liable for loss on its own line.

Mauritz v. New York, L. E. & W. R. Co. 23 Fed. 765; Green v. New York C. R. Co. 4 Daly, 553; Milnor v. New York & N. H. R. Co. 53 N. Y. 363; Michigan C. R. Co. v. Mineral Springs Mfg. Co. 16 Wall. 318, 21 L. ed. 297; Myrick v. Michigan C. R. Co. 107 U. S. 106, 27 L. ed. 326, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 425; Ray, Negligence of Imposed Duties, p. 583.

A through ticket on three distinct lines of transportation on one piece of paper is to be regarded as a distinct ticket for each line.

Ray, Negligence of Imposed Duties, p. 525; Nashville & C. R. Co. v. Sprayberry, 9 Heisk. 852; Taylor v. Little Rock, M. R. & T. R. Co. 32 Ark. 393, 29 Am. Rep. 1; Packard v. Taylor, 35 Ark. 410, 37 Am. Rep. 37;

R. Co. v. R. A. Patterson Tobacco Co. 41 L. R. A. 511; Illinois C. R. Co. v. Southern Seating & Cabinet Co. 50 L. R. A. 729; Courteen v. Kanawha Despatch, 55 L. R. A. 182; and Taffe v. Oregon R. & Nav. Co. 58 L. R. A. 187.

As to rights of passengers generally on connecting roads, and liability of initial carrier. see Harris v. Howe, 5 L. R. A. 777; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Looney, 16 L. R. A. 471; Atty. Gen. v. Old Colony R. Co. 22 L. R. A. 112; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Mulford, 35 L. R. A. 599.

Little Rock & Ft. S. R. Co. v. Odom, 63 Ark. | constitute a contract by a common carrier 326. 38 S. W. 339.

to transport property delivered to it to its destination, when that place is beyond its route. Some courts hold that, "when a carrier receives goods directed to a place beyond his line, he, in the absence of a stipulation to the contrary, by the very act of acceptance, engages to deliver them at their destination, wherever that may be. Other courts hold that the acceptance of the goods for shipment, so directed, implies nothing more than an agreement on the part of the carrier to transport them to the end of their route, and there deliver them to a connecting carrier to complete the carriage. The first of these views is sustained by the English courts and a few of the American states, and

known as the "English doctrine." The other is adopted by the decided weight of American authorities. As this court has not adopted either view, we are at liberty to adopt that which in our opinion is more reasonable.

Mr. J. T. Coston, for appellee:

If the receiving carrier collects full fare from the passenger, issues a through ticket to him, and checks his baggage to his destination, it thereby contracts to deliver the passenger and his baggage to the place of his destination, and is liable for loss or damage to baggage occurring on its own, or connecting, lines.

4 Elliott, Railroads, § 1658; Schouler, Bailments & Carriers, 2d ed. § 696; Hawley v. Screven, 62 Ga. 347, 35 Am. Rep. 127; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Campbell, 36 Ohio St. 647, 38 Am. Rep. 617; Carter v. Peck, 4 Sneed, 203, 67 Am. Dec. 604; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Weaver, 9 Lea, 38, 42 Am. Rep. 657; Coward v. East Tennessee, V. & G. R. Co. 16 Lea, 225, 57 Am. Rep. 227; Candee v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 21 Wis. 582, 94 Am. Dec. 567; Nashua Lock Co. v. Worcester & N. R. Co. 48 N. H. 339, 2 Am. Rep. 242; Illinois C. R. Co. v. Copeland, 24 Ill. 332, 76 Am. Dec. 749: Illinois C. R. Co. v. Johnson, 34 Ill. 389; Foy v. Troy & B. R. Co. 24 Barb. 382; East Tennessee & V. R. Co. v. Rogers, 6 Heisk. 143, 19 Am. Rep. 589; Western & A. R. Co. v. McElwee, 6 Heisk. 208; Mobile & G. R. Co. v. Copeland, 63 Ala. 219, 35 Am. Rep. 13; St. John v. Southern Exp. Co. 1 Woods, 612, Fed. Cas. No. 12,228;

Condict v. Grand Trunk R. Co. 54 N. Y.

500; Peet v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 19 Wis. 119; Ogdensburg & L. C. R. Co. v. Pratt, 22 Wall. 132, 22 L. ed. 830.

Mr. Lawson, in his treaties on the Contracts of Common Carriers, gives the reason for the two views as follows: "In support of the first doctrine, it is argued that a different rule would work a great inconvenience. A person delivering his goods to a carrier, to be sent to a certain place, will generally rely on him alone to perform the service. He cannot be supposed to know the particular portion of the transit which the first carrier controls, much less, the other owners or proprietors of the continuous line. He intends to make one contract, but not two or three or half a dozen. When he places his property in the hands of the carrier, he at once loses all control over it. If it is not delivered, how is he to discover at what particular portion of the route it was lost? He would be forced to rely on the statements of the carriers themselves, who would be little likely to aid him in his search. If he did succeed in fixing the responsibility, he might find himself obliged to assert his claim against a party hundreds of miles away, and under circumstances which might well discourage a prudent man, and induce him to bear his loss rather than incur the expense and trouble of pursuing his remedy against so distant a defendant. The first carrier, on the contrary, has facilities for tracing the loss not possessed by the public. He is in constant communication with his associates in the business. He has their receipts for the property delivered to them, and with no inconvenience at all could charge the loss to his negligent agent. In support of the second doctrine, it is simply answered that the extraordinary Courts differ as to what is sufficient to liabilities of common carriers cannot in

Battle, J., delivered the opinion of the

court:

Josie Washington, in her own right and as next friend of her daughter, Nora Brown, brought this action against the Kansas City, Ft. Scott & Memphis Railroad Company to recover the value of a trunk and its contents. The defendant sold to Nora Brown a ticket over its railroad from Deckerville, Arkansas, by way of Memphis, and thence by a connecting railroad to Argenta, in this state, and checked her trunk over the same route to the same destination. She took passage on its train, and was transported as indicated by her ticket to Argenta, but her trunk was lost on the connecting railroad between Memphis and the place to which it was checked.

The question in the case is, Is the receiv ing carrier, in the absence of an express contract, liable for the loss of baggage by a connecting carrier; the receiving carrier having sold the passenger a through ticket, and checked her baggage through to her destination? The trial court held the former liable.

justice be extended beyond their own routes, where alone they have an opportunity of choosing for themselves their servants, and of guarding the property intrusted to their Lawson, Contracts of Carr.

care."

§§

CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT.

W. H. HOLMES, Appt.,

V.

N. A. MARSHALL et al.
and
Annie J. JENKINS, Respt.
(145 Cal. 777.)

moneys, benefits, privileges, or immunities accruing, or in any manner growing out of, life insurance, are exempt from execution; and the same rule applies where the policy is payable to the estate of the assured, and, being exempt from his debts, the proceeds are distributed to his widow under the statute as his next of kin.

of

1. The exemption from execution
the proceeds of insurance policies is
not limited to claims against the in-
sured, but extends to those against the

Had the statute applied to the heirs or beneficiaries it would have so declared, and, in the absence of such designation, it would be giving the statute a broader scope than was intended by the legislature, by constru

beneficiary, under a statute providing that all ing it to read in favor of persons not therein

named.

2. The deposit by the beneficiary of the proceeds of a life-insurance policy, which are exempt from execution for her debts, in a bank, does not destroy the exemption.

238-242, and cases cited. Hutchinson, Carr. 2d ed. §§ 145a, 149b, and cases cited.

We think the English doctrine more reasonable, and adopt it. Judgment affirmed.

As the statute of this state has prescribed a mode of procedure, and pointed out the circumstances under which an attachment may be dissolved, the statutory remedy is the length and breadth of the respondent's rights in the premises.

Bolt v. Keyhoe, 30 Hun, 619; Crosby v.
Stephan, 32 Hun, 478; Millington v. Fox, 13
N. Y. Supp. 334; Commercial Travelers'
Asso. v. Newkirk, 16 N. Y. Supp. 177; Re
Brown, 123 Cal. 399, 69 Am. St. Rep. 74, 55
Pac. 1055.

Waples, Attachm. p. 427.

The statutes of exemption are in derogation of the common-law principle that a man's property should be taken in payment and satisfaction of his indebtedness, and the exemption laws should not be expanded or enlarged to include persons not therein specifically mentioned.

2 Freeman, Executions, 3d ed. § 234b;

3. The court may set aside the levy of quires in lieu thereof property not exempt, an attachment upon exempt property.

he waives his right to the benefit of the exemption law.

NOTE. As to exemption of proceeds of lifeinsurance policy, see also, in this series, Brown v. Balfour, 12 L. R. A. 373.

Only money, and not a debt, is exempt from execution.

(January 17, 1905.)

A
PPEAL by plaintiff from an order of the
Superior Court for Los Angeles County
setting aside an attachment of the proceeds
of a life-insurance policy. Affirmed.

2 Freeman, Executions, 3d ed. § 235; Harrier v. Fassett, 56 Iowa, 264, 9 N. W. 217; Connell v. Fisk, 54 Vt. 381; Dortch v. Benton, 98 N. C. 190, 2 Am. St. Rep. 331, 3 S. E. 638; Knabb v. Drake, 23 Pa. 489, 62 Am. Dec. 352; Drake, Attachm. § 244a; Cranz v. White, 27 Kan. 319, 41 Am. Rep. 408; State, Jardain, Prosecutor, v. Fairton Sav. Messrs. Powers & Holland, for appel- Fund & Bldg. Asso. 44 N. J. L. 376; Rozelle lant: v. Rhodes, 116 Pa. 129, 2 Am. St. Rep. 591, 9 Atl. 160; Martin v. Hurlburt, 60 Vt. 364, 14 Atl. 649; McIntosh v. Aubrey, 185 U. S. 122, 46 L. ed. 834, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 561.

The facts are stated in the Commissioner's opinion.

he statute says "money accruing" out of life insurance, etc., shall be exempt. The word "money" has a well-defined meaning.

15 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 701.

The word "accruing" does not apply to money already in hand.

L. ed. 374, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 322; Janin v.
Phoenix Bank v. Risley, 111 U. S. 125, 28
London & S. F. ank, 92
14, 14 L. R. A.
320, 27 Am. St. Rep. 82, 27 Pac. 1100;
Pullen v. Placer County Bank, 138 Cal. 169,
94 Am. St. Rep. 19, 66 Pac. 740, 71 Pac. 83.
Where the debtor voluntarily parts with
the ownership of exempt property, and ac-

Gross v. Partenheimer, 159 Pa. 556, 28 Atl. 370; Johnson v. Humboldt Ins. Co. 91 Ill. 95, 33 Am. Rep. 47; Kennedy v. Burrier, 36 Mo. 128; Cutcliff v. McAnally, 88 Ala. 509, 7 So. 331;. Jones v. Thompson, 27 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 234; Dresser v. Johns, 6 C. B. N. S. 434.

Petition for rehearing in banc.
The legislature has no power to increase

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12 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 2d ed. p. 167. The burden of proof of showing that money claimed to be exempt under a lifeinsurance policy is so rests upon the party making such claim.

The power of the court over its process is essential to the administration of justice, and is coeval with the common-law courts, and does not by any means depend upon statutory enactments.

Sandburg v. Papineau, 81 Ill. 446; 8 Enc. Pl. & Pr. p. 579; Blair v. Compton, 33 Mich. 414; Palmer v. Gardiner, 77 Ill. 143; Jones v. Williams, 2 Swan, 105; Bryan v. Bridge, 6 Tex. 137.

Briggs v. McCullough, 36 Cal. 542.

Messrs. Morton, Houser, & Jones, for of attachment was issued and levied upon respondent: $1,020.57 on deposit in the Citizens' National Bank of Los Angeles to the credit of respondent, Annie J. Jenkins. The court made an order, after notice, and on motion of respondents, setting aside the levy of said writ, and dissolving it as to the money so on deposit with said bank. This appeal is from the order so made.

If an execution is levied upon exempt property the levy may be quashed or vacated on motion in the court from which the execution issued.

12 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 2d ed. pp. 75, 76, and notes; Re McManus, 87 Cal. 294, 10 L. R. A. 567, 22 Am. St. Rep. 250, 25 Pac. 413.

12 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 2d ed. p. 255; Totten v. Sale, 72 Ala. 488; Catron v. Lafayette County, 125 Mo. 67, 28 S. W. 331; Jacks v. Bigham, 36 Ark. 481; Farrell v. McKee, 36 Ill. 225; Finke v. Craig, 57 Mo. App. 393; Wilson v. Stripe, 4 G. Greene, 551, 61 Am. Dec. 138.

The money was exempt from the debts of the beneficiary.

When a statute does not exempt specific articles, but exempts money within certain limits, property purchased with the exempt money is exempt.

The principal question is as to whether or not the said money was subject to the debts of respondent, Annie J. Jenkins, or exempt from execution against her. At the time of his death, J. F. Jenkins was the owner and holder of three full paid-up life-insurance policies upon his own life, two of which (one for $99 and one for $1,385) were payable to respondent, Annie J. Jenkins, and one of which (for $982.50) was payable to the estate of deceased, his administrators. or executors. The estate of said deceased was duly probated, and the $982.50 insurance collected, which constituted the entire estate, and of which there remained $539.45 after paying costs and expenses of administration. This was set apart to the surviving widow, Annie J. Jenkins, as exempt from execution, under § 1465, Code Civ. Proc. The proceeds of all said policies were deposited by respondent, Annie J. Jenkins, in one account, to her credit in said Citizens' National Bank of Los Angeles. She drew against this account from time to

The estate of the deceased is held in trust only, by the executor or administrator for a limited period for purposes of admin-time until the date of the levy of the attach

ment, when there remained the sum of $1,020.27 to her credit in said bank.

istration; and the court in such cases will not regard the estate, or administrator, or executor, as the actual owner, but will look through and beyond this limited and temporary right of possession of the administrator or executor to ascertain the real and intended beneficiary of the deceased. Pace v. Pace, 19 Fla. 438.

"All moneys, benefits, privileges, or immunities accruing, or in any manner growing, out of any life insurance, if the annual premiums paid do not exceed $500," are exempt from execution. Code Civ. Proc. subdiv. 18, § 690. The main contention of

Exemption statutes should be liberally appellant is that the exemption extends only construed. against the debts of the person whose life

Schillinger v. Boes, 85 Ky. 357, 3 S. W. 427; Brown v. Balfour, 46 Minn. 68, 12 L. R. A. 373, 48 N. W. 604; Re How, 61 Minn. 217, 63 N. W. 627; First Nat. Bank v. How, 65 Minn. 187, 67 N. W. 994; Minn. Gen. Stat. 1894, § 3312.

Yates County Nat. Bank v. Carpenter, 119 N. Y. 550, 7 L. R. A. 557, 16 Am. St. Rep. 855, 23 N. E. 1108; Pool v. Reid, 15 Ala. 826: 2 Freeman, Executions, 3d ed. § 235, p. 1270.

Cooper, C., filed the following opinion: This action is upon a promissory note for $1,000, dated October 5, 1899, signed by J. F. Jenkins and his wife, Annie J. Jenkins. J. F. Jenkins died intestate, and respondent, Annie J. Jenkins, is his surviving widow. After the action had been commenced, a writ

was insured, and who paid the premiums | seized, taken, or appropriated, by any legal requisite to procure the insurance and keep it in force; and that such exemption does not continue after his death, in favor of the beneficiary. In construing this statute, as in the construction of all statutes, it is the duty of the court to arrive at the intent of the legislature, it can be done, from the language used in the statute. Statutes exempting property from execution are enacted on the ground of public policy, for the benevolent purpose of saving debtors and their families from want by reason of misfortune or improvidence. The general rule now is to construe such statutes liberally, so as to carry out the intention of the legislature and the humane purpose designed by the lawmakers. 12 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 2d ed. pp. 75, 76, and cases cited; Re Mc-sured. In New York the language of the

or equitable process, to pay any debt or liability of a member." In both these states the fund or relief is held to be exempt from execution, whether against the original member, or against any beneficiary who has been paid, or is entitled to be paid, any benefit falling within the class described in the statute. Schillinger v. Boes, 85 Ky. 357, 3 S. W. 427; Brown v. Balfour, 46 Minn. 68, 12 L. R. A. 373, 48 N. W. 604; First Nat. Bank v. How, 65 Minn. 187, 67 N. W. 994. It seems at least doubtful as to whether or not these decisions properly construe the statutes of these states. The decisions in other states-particularly in New York-hold similar language to create an exemption only as to the member or in

Manus, 87 Cal. 294, 10 L. R. A. 567, 22 Am.
St. Rep. 250, 25 Pac. 413; Spence v. Smith,
121 Cal. 536, 66 Am. St. Rep. 62, 53 Pac.
653. Bearing this rule in mind, let us see
what the legislature has said as to this mat-
ter. It has said that, where the annual
premiums do not exceed $500, the insurance
moneys shall be exempt from execution.
Here the annual premium did not exceed
$500. It has said that all moneys accruing,
or in any manner growing, out of any life
insurance shall be exempt from execution.
The money here accrued and grew out of life
insurance upon the life of deceased. After
his death no execution could issue against
him. The words "exempt from execution"
were clearly intended to apply to the moneys
coming from the life insurance to the hands
of the beneficiary. It is exempt from
execution as to all strangers or parties who
have no claim to it, without any provision
of statute. It was intended to exempt it
from the debts of the party to whom it was
payable, and who procured title to it by the
death of the insured. It was not the inten-
tion that the insured might die, leaving a
small insurance and a dependent family,
and that the insurance money should be sub-ry of the judgment debtor are exempt, and,
ject to execution for the debts of the wife,
even if she is the beneficiary named in the
policy. The words "exempt from execution"
mean exempt from any execution. The
legislature mentioned no class of executions,
and we are not at liberty to judicially in-
sert a class. "Exempt from execution" in-
cludes the defendant, Annie J. Jenkins, and
applies to plaintiff. We have no decision of
this court upon the question, and the de-
cisions of other courts do not furnish much
assistance, because the statute under which
each decision was made is different from
ours. In Kentucky and Minnesota the stat-
utes declare, in effect, that certain insurance
benefits, reliefs, etc., "shall be exempt from
execution, and shall not be liable to be

statute is that such funds shall be exempt
"from execution, and shall not be liable to
be seized, taken, or appropriated by any
legal or equitable process to pay any debt
or liability of such deceased member." Bolt
v. Keyhoe, 30 Hun, 619. The Kentucky and
Minnesota cases are criticised by Freeman
in his work on Executions, 3d ed. vol. 2, §
2346. But the author says, in speaking of
the language of the statutes in those states:
"If these statutes stopped with the words
‘exempt from execution,' there would be no
doubt of the exemption in favor of the
beneficiary; but the additional words in the
statute indicate that the legislature had in
mind merely the debts or other liabilities of
members of the association in question, and
hence that, after the benefit was received
by a person other than a member, it would
be subject to the usual laws relating to ex-
ecutions." In our Code the statute stops
with the words "exempt from execution."
Under our statute, necessary household and
kitchen furniture is exempt from execution;
and, if the wife succeeds to such furniture,
it is equally exempt as to her debts. The
farming utensils or implements of husband-

if the son should take them under the will
of his father, following his father's occu-
pation, they would still be exempt as to the
son's debts. Equally true as to the insur-
ance money in controversy herein. If it had
come to J. F. Jenkins in his lifetime, it is
conceded that it would have been exempt as
to his debts. It came to his wife as his
beneficiary, and is equally exempt as to her
debts.

As to the policy payable to and collected by the estate, the estate was the beneficiary, and the money was, for the reasons before stated, exempt from execution. It was therefore assets of the deceased exempt from execution, and was properly set apart to the widow as being so exempt. Code Civ. Proc.

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